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1. Worldviews in the Roman and Han empires  
 
Some chronicler, speaking of Asia, asserted that one man ruled as much land as the 
sun passed, and his statement was not true because he placed all Africa and Europe 
outside the limits where the sun rises in the East and sets in the West. It has now 
however turned out to be true. Your possession is equal to what the sun can pass, and 
the sun passes over your land. Neither the Chelidonean nor the Cyanean promontories 
limit your empire, nor does the distance from which a horseman can reach the sea in 
one day, nor do you reign within fixed boundaries, nor does another dictate to what 
point your control reaches; but the sea is drawn as a belt without distinction through 




In AD 144 Aelius Aristides (117-181) delivered a panegyric in the city of  Rome. 
In his speech he extolled the grandeur which Rome had achieved under 
imperial rule. He claimed that the Mediterranean Sea occupied the center of  the 
inhabited and civilized world, and that the Roman emperor ruled an empire 
without limits. Many centuries later Edward Gibbon referred to the first and 
second centuries AD as a period of  peace, prosperity and order, when Rome 
achieved universal domination. 2  The optimistic message broadcasted by 
Aristides echoes the Virgilian notion of  the imperium sine fine, which stresses the 
universal character the imperium Romanum. 
          On the other end of  the Eurasian landmass, Ban Gu (AD 21-92), a 
senior official who lived during the early decades of  Eastern Han dynasty, 
formulated a worldview which looks similar to that of  Virgil and Aristides. In a 
fictional dispute between a spokesman from the western capital Chang’an and a 
speaker originating from the eastern capital Luoyang, the latter supports his 
claim that Luoyang is the better city by offering the following arguments:  
 
Moreover, to dwell in a remote area bordering the Western Rong,  
Block by steep barriers in all directions, 
And maintain “defense and resistance,” 
How can this compare with dwelling in the center of  the country, 
                                                          
1 The translation is based on Oliver (1953) 896. 
2 Woolf  (1993) 185. 
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Which is level and flat, open and accessible,  
Where a myriad places converge like the spokes of  a wheel? 
… 
You know only the Qin Epang Palace that reaches to the heavens, 
And are unaware that the Capital Luo conforms to set regulations. 
You recognize that Han valley may serve as a protective pass, 
But you do not realize that the true King sets no external boundaries.3 
 
Eastern Capital Rhapsody 311-16; 334-37 
 
Can Ban Gu’s representation of  the world ruled by the Han emperors really be 
compared to that of  Aristides, or are the similarities between the two passages 
superficial? In other words, did most, or some intellectuals of  the Han empire 
subscribe to a truly universalistic worldview or was the Roman ideology of  
unbounded empire based on cultural assumptions which have no counterparts 
in Chinese political ideology? 
       
2. Structure and content 
 
The principal aim of  this dissertation is to bring Roman and early Han 
worldviews and imperial ideologies into sharper focus by carrying out a series 
comparative studies focusing on the complex connections between worldviews, 
military policies and cultural ideas regarding the responsibilities and duties of  
imperial rulers. Chapters 1 and 2 deal with the formation and development of  
worldviews in the pre-imperial societies of  Roman Italy and China. Two main 
questions are raised. How did Romans of  the republican period and various 
intellectuals in pre-Qin China perceive the world, and what is the relationship 
between pre-imperial perceptions and representations of  the world and those 
worldviews which we find in early-imperial Rome and in Qin and Han China? 
In the sections of  these chapters I will focus on the representations of  imperial 
rules which we find in Augustus’ Res Gestae and in the stele inscriptions erected 
by Qin Shi Huang, the first emperor of  the unified Qin empire. 
          In chapters 3 and 4 I move on to the frontier policies which were 
pursued by the Roman emperors of  the first to early third centuries AD and by 
the Qin and Han emperors of  the late third to late first centuries BC. One of  
my questions will be whether any differences between the military policies of  
Roman and Chinese emperors can be perceived. In studying this topic I will pay 
                                                          
3 The translation is based on Knechtges (1982) 171. 
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attention to various factors and considerations which are likely to have shaped 
imperial policies and to the objectives which individual emperors, or emperors 
of  various sub-periods, were trying to achieve. Finally, I will try to shed some 
light on the complex interplay between worldviews and actual frontier policies, 
paying special attention to the question if, or to what extent, long-term changes 
in frontier policies stimulated the formulation of  alternative worldviews or vice 
versa. 
          Chapter 5 and chapter 6 will focus on the roles which the Roman 
emperors of  the Principate and the Chinese emperors of  the Qin and Western 
Han dynasties were expected to play. What were the relationships between 
Roman emperors and the army, and to what extent did the search for military 
glory and prestige continued to stimulate territorial expansion in the period 
between Augustus’ death and that of  Septimius Severus? Did Chinese emperors 
and intellectuals of  the Qin and Han periods cultivate close relationships with 
the army, did Chinese emperors pursue military successes with the aim of  
bolstering their prestige, or were Chinese ideas about the way in which 
emperors were supposed to rule, and the images of  imperial rule which the Qin 
and Han emperors were trying to broadcast, differ from what we find in the 
Roman world of  the first two centuries AD?   
          The ultimate aim of  these comparative enquiries is to offer some new 
insights into the natures of  the two empires which were home to almost fifty 
per cent of  the world’s population at the beginning of  the first millennium 
AD.4  
 
3. Methodologies and problems 
 
The six chapters of  this book deal alternately with Rome and China. In this 
respect I followed the model used by Mutschler and Mittag’s Conceiving Empire, 
China and Rome Compared rather than the integrated approach of  Scheidel’s Rome 
and China, Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires. 5  An important 
advantage of  organizing a comparative study of  Rome and China in parallel 
chapters is that it allows a focused, detailed and sustained discussion of  clearly 
                                                          
4 For the challenges of  comparative studies of  various aspects of  the Greco-Roman 
world and China, see Scheidel (2013) 1-12; (2015) 5-6. 
5 Mutschler and Mittag (2008); Scheidel (2009). Vasunia in a review article about the 
two books also notices the differences in approach, see Vasunia (2011) 224, also 
Scheidel (2015) 6.  
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defined topics. A potential drawback of  this method is that it might result in a 
book in which similarities and differences are highlighted through iuxtaposition 
rather than analyzed. In order to avoid this outcome chapters 2, 4 and 6 end 
with a section in which similarities and differences in worldviews, imperial 
ideologies, frontier policies and the various roles played by Roman and Chinese 
emperors are directly compared. 
          One of  the prices which comparative historians have to pay, particularly 
if  they are trying to answer big questions, is that at least some topics can be 
dealt with only superficially. To give just one example, while Chapter 3 of  this 
dissertation aims to give a general impression of  the Roman frontier policies 
and of  some important changes which took place during the first to early third 
centuries AD, it is not based on a detailed inspection of  the situation which 
existed in each frontier zone at different moments in time, for the obvious 
reason that such an approach would have been too time-consuming and would 
therefore have been incompatible with my aim to compare Roman and Chinese 
frontier policies in a large number of  frontier zones and during a period of  
almost 250 years. Although there can be no doubt that a more detailed 
examination of  the literary, epigraphic and archaeological evidence for each 
frontier would have resulted in a deeper understanding of  regional 
particularities, I derive some consolation from Scheidel’s reminder that “a 
crucial benefit of  comparative study lies in its capacity to recognize broad 
patterns obscured by a preoccupation with “local” details and to identify 
significant differences between particular cases.” 6  Only by taking a wide 
perspective can crucial differences which existed within and between empires 
be brought to light.  
          In my comparative investigations differences will receive more attention 
than similarities. In recent article Peter Bang has urged comparative historians 
not to ignore similarities. While this reminder is both timely and useful, 
however, I have deliberately chose to highlight differences in Roman and 
Chinese worldviews, military policies and ideas regarding the roles and duties 
of  rulers, for the simple reason that I started my investigations with the aims of  
highlighting some of  the distinctive features of  the Roman and Qin-Han 
empires.7 Of  course, similarities are also important, if only because there would 
                                                          
6 Scheidel (2015) 7. For a long-term comparative assessment on social development in 
eastern and western Eurasia, see Morris (2009); Scheidel (2015) 5, no. 17. 
7 See Bang (2015) 37-38: “In putting the emphasis on similarities, we have been going 
against the inclination of  much humanist research, which has tended to stress the 
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no point in carrying out a comparative study of two societies which were totally 
different. However, as Scheidel has pointed out in a recent book, the emphasis 
on critical differences between two cultures helps us to “identify variables that 
were critical to particular historical process and outcomes, and allows us to 
assess the nature of  any given ancient state or society within the wider context 
of  pre-modern world history”.8 
          In this book I will sometimes use various “big terms”, such as “Roman”, 
“Chinese” and “Confucianism”. I am keenly aware that these terms as well as 
many other generalizing concepts have rich but ambiguous meanings. Since 
completely avoiding them was not a feasible option, I can only hope that the 
intended meanings, which are often not very specific, will be clarified by the 




For the purposes of  this study the literary sources are more important than any 
other kind of  evidence. The main reason for this is because these sources offer 
the best information on most of  the topics which are examined in this 
dissertation. This is particularly true of  worldviews and ideas regarding the 
various roles which Roman and Chinese emperors were expected to play. 
Needless to say, the reliability and utility of  the surviving literary sources are 
often in doubt, but that is a problem with which almost all historians have to 
deal in some way or another.9 Because this dissertation covers huge spaces and 
long periods, special attention will be given to the problem of  distortions 
created by anachronistic perceptions. As a general rule I have tried to rely on 
contemporary literary works rather than on sources which were composed long 
after the events which they describe.  
          In addition to the literary sources, some inscriptions also play an 
important part in this thesis. As has already been explained, a comparative study 
of   the Res Gestae Divi Augusti and the Stele Inscriptions of  Qin Shi Huang will 
                                                                                                                                        
unique features of  societies and therefore privilege the culturally specific or what 
Clifford Geertz dubbed local knowledge… In short, there is a real risk that nominalism 
will crowd out analysis here in the desire to emphasize, even celebrate difference and 
complexity. The scholar may simply end up stating the obvious, in this particular case 
that Latin was not Chinese and vice versa”. 
8 Scheidel (2009) 5. 
9 For a general discussion of  literary sources and historical writings in early China, see 
Lewis (1999). For Rome, see Bispham (2006) 29-50; Damon (2006) 23-35. 
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be undertaken in the final parts of  the first and second chapters. In chapters 3 
and 5 other inscriptions will be used as supplementary sources of  information. 
In my discussions of  the roles and duties of  Roman and Chinese emperors and 
of  the images which they tried to broadcast I will occasionally draw on various 
types of  material evidence, such as coins, sculptures, reliefs and paintings, but 
these types of  evidence have been used mainly to supplement or to correct the 
picture which emerges from the literary sources. A systematic study of  all the 
evidence relating to all of  the topics which will be examined in this dissertation 






Roman worldviews during the Republic  
       
1. Introduction 
 
In 220 BC Rome had just recovered from the horror of  the invasion by the 
Gauls and was being dragged into a war against various Illyrian tribes living on 
the east coast of  the Adriatic Sea. Only one year later, the siege and fall of  the 
city of  Saguntum triggered a new war between Rome and Carthage.1 At the 
outbreak of  the Hannibalic War, neither the Romans nor the Carthaginians 
could foresee that it would last for nearly twenty years or that it would 
profoundly change the course of  world history. The defeat of  Carthage itself  
marked the beginning of  a new era of  Roman expansion. In the late 160s BC, 
Polybius revealed an acute sense of  the far-reaching changes which had taken 
place and was shocked by the rise of  Roman power throughout the 
Mediterranean world. In the first book of  his Histories, he sees the four years 
between 220 and 216 BC (the 140th Olympiad) as the beginning of  “world 
history”.2 Polybius says that prior to the Second Punic War history had been 
fragmented; the histories of  various regions were unrelated to one another. In 
other words, before the outbreak of  the Second Punic War the histories of  
Libya, Italy and Asia had unfolded separately. After 218 BC, events in the West 
and the East had become interlinked and “the affairs of  Italy and Libya have 
been interwoven with those of  Asia and Greece, leading to one end.”3 In a 
short period of  a mere fifty-six years, Rome had extended its power from Italy 
across almost the entire inhabited known world. How could this have happened? 
The question is raised in the opening of  Polybius’ Histories and prompted him 
to look for explanations in the rest of  his books.4 
          In reality, at the time of  Polybius’ death (c. 118 BC) Rome had not yet 
                                                          
1 For the origins of  the Second Punic War, see Astin (1967) 577–596. 
2 Polyb. 1,3,1. 
3 Polyb. 1,3,3-4.  
4 Polyb. 1,5. On the interactions between the Romans and the Hellenistic world in the 
work of  Polybius, see Walbank (1963) 1-13; Derow (1979) 1-15. For the notion of  
universal history and the concept of  space in the eyes of  Polybius, see Clarke (1999) 
77-127; For reflections on Polybius’ Roman mastery of  the world in book 6, see 
Erskine (2013) 231-247.  
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completed the conquest of  the entire world. 5  The final stage of  Roman 
expansion in Asia Minor and the Near East did not take place until the time of  
Pompey in the 60s BC. Only in the 50s BC were central and northern Gaul 
conquered by Caesar’s legions. Egypt became a province in 30 BC, and south-
west Germany, Britain, Judaea and Dacia passed into Roman hands after the 
establishment of  the Principate. Although the Romans continued to covet the 
empire of  Parthia for centuries, the annexation of  the Iranian plateau never 
happened, let alone the acquisition of  the exotic Indian lands conquered by 
Alexander the Great.6 
          As this chapter will show, the fact that a large part of  the known world 
had not been conquered did not stop Augustus from claiming Roman 
supremacy throughout the orbis terrarum. During Augustus’ reign Polla, a sister 
of  Marcus Agrippa, began the construction of  the Porticus Vipsania. This 
building was unfinished at the time of  Agrippa’s death in 12 BC but was 
completed by Augustus. According to Pliny, in this building Agrippa planned 
“to set the world before the city for inspection”.7 This statement has been 
interpreted as referring to a map of  the world but, as Brodersen has pointed 
out, Pliny might be referring to an inscription listing or describing the various 
parts of  the inhabited world.8 However Pliny’s words are interpreted, there can 
be no doubt that the Porticus Vipsania with its map or inscription was intended 
to be an emblem of  Augustan world rule. 
 
The final decades of  the third century BC not only marked the beginning of  a 
new phase in “universal history” in the Mediterranean world. In 220 BC, at the 
other end of  the Eurasian continent, the state of  Qin 秦 had just ended its wars 
against the other six states and ultimately unified China, an area completely 
unknown to all but a handful of  Greeks and Romans. Chronologically, the 
                                                          
5  It is extremely doubtful whether anyone in Rome was toying with the idea of  
conquering of  the world in the time of  Polybius. As both Derow and Gruen have 
pointed out, we must distinguish between the accomplishment of  “worldwide 
supremacy” and world domination as a military and political goal. See Derow (1979); 
Gruen (1984) 286; Clarke (1999) 116. 
6 About the growth of  Roman imperialism from the early second century BC in the 
aftermath of  the Hannibalic War to the age of  Julius Caesar, see the brief  overviews of  
Badian (1968) 1-16 and Lintott (1993) 6-15. For the Roman view of  India, see 
Whittaker (2004) 144-62.    
7 Pliny HN 3,17. 
8 Nicolet (1991) 95-121 follows the traditional view that Pliny is referring to a world 
map. But see the criticisms of  Brodersen (1995) 268-285. 
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establishment of  the Chinese empire, which has been designated the “Great 
Unity” (Da yitong 大一統), took place slightly earlier than the rise of  Rome to 
super-power status in the Mediterranean. 9  In the same year in which the 
Romans began to build the Via Flaminia between Rome and the Latin colony 
of  Ariminum (220 BC), the new government of  Qin was equally ambitiously 
implementing the imperial highway system. 10  Sima Qian 司馬遷  says that 
during the reign of  Qin Shi Huang (r. 221 – 216 BC), the first emperor of  Qin, 
two large-scale palace-construction projects were carried out in Xianyang 咸陽, 
the capital of  the new empire. In 220 BC the First Emperor built the Xin 
Palace 信宮 near the south bank of  the River Wei 渭河. Shortly afterwards, it 
was renamed the Ji Temple 極廟 to symbolize the ultimate power of  heaven. In 
212 BC, Qin Shi Huang began to construct a garden called Shanglin 上林苑  
and the famous palace of  Epang 阿房宮  on the same site. Besides these 
building activities, between the palace of  Epang and the South Mountain 南山, 
a huge bridge was erected spanning the River Wei, to connect the new buildings 
with the capital, Xianyang. On a symbolic level, this bridge referred to the fact 
that the constellation of  the Big Dipper and Polaris had crossed the Galaxy and 
met the star Encampment (part of  the constellation of  Pegasus). As such, it 
reflected the way in which the First Emperor imagined the universe. 
          There are good reasons to think that the First Emperor’s mausoleum, 
located at the foot of  Li Mountain 驪山, about ten miles northwest of  the city 
of  Xianyang, also reflected ideas about the celestial and temporal worlds.11 
Since excavations of  the mausoleum complex have not been carried out so far, 
scholars have very limited knowledge about the structure of  the inner chambers 
and the objects they contain. 12  However, thanks to the vivid and detailed 
description of  Sima Qian, it is possible to shed some light on this giant 
                                                          
9 For discussion on the paradigm of  “Great Unity” of  Chinese history, see Pines (2000) 
280-324.  
10 The large-scale constructions of  the Qin included the making of  the “Straight Road” 
(Zhidao 直道) and the imperial highways (Chidao 馳道), see Shelach  (2011) 122; 131-
32. On the construction of  the Straight Road, see Shiji 6, 256; ibid. 110, 2885-86; Shi 
Nianhai 史念海 (1991) 435-453. 
11. On the construction of  the palaces in imperial Qin, see Shiji 6: Bodde (1986) 54; 
Lewis (2006) 156-158; 171-175. 
12 For discussions about the latest findings to do with the Mausoleum of  Qin Shi 
Huang, see Thote and Von Falkenhausen (2008). For the latest review concerning the 
untouched mausoleum see Shelach (2013). 
10 
 
monument. Sima Qian’s account records that the ceiling of  the burial chamber 
was decorated with jewels depicting the sun, the moon and the stars. The 
chamber also contained other spectacular features such as miniature palaces, 
pavilions with flowing rivers and surging oceans made of  mercury. If  the 
narrative of  Sima Qian is authentic, there is no reason to doubt that the First 
Emperor attempted to connect the earthly and celestial worlds, thereby 
constructing a complex universal network to fit the cognitive map of  the 
universe in his mind.13  
          After ending periods of  intense military conflict and restoring peace and 
order, the founders of  the Roman and Qin empires each made an attempt to 
proclaim their successes to the world. In doing so, they disseminated visible 
images of  the world through the media of  coinage, architecture, sculpture and 
other works of  art. Both emperors also left behind important documents 
eulogizing their virtues and their accomplishments in establishing their 
“universal” empires. The documents in question are the Res Gestae Divi Augusti 
and the Stele Inscriptions of  the First Emperor of  Qin. Each of  these texts 
contains important information about the world views which the first Roman 
and first Chinese emperor sought to disseminate, thereby allowing us to study 
similarities and differences between Roman and Chinese conceptions of  “world 
domination”.14 In these texts Qin Shi Huang and Augustus used the terms 
tianxia and orbis terrarum to refer to the geographical dimensions of  imperial 
power. At first sight, the meanings of  these terms are very similar, but closer 
scrutiny reveals they had very different connotations in their respective cultural 
and political contexts. 
          The first two chapters of  this book are devoted to the emergence of  the 
                                                          
13 Lewis (2006) 172-3.   
14 There is no need to reiterate the importance of  the Res Gestae Divi Augusti in studies 
of  the political history of  Roman Principate. Named “the queen of  inscriptions” by 
Mommsen, it provides an invaluable insight for our understanding of  Roman political 
ideology of  Augustan and later periods. The text of  Res Gestae has been translated into 
many languages (e.g. for the Chinese version, see Zhang Nan and Zhang Qiang, 2007). 
For the latest English translation and commentary, see Cooley (2009). The stele 
inscriptions commemorating the achievements of  Qin Shi Huang, originally eight in 
number, were all inscribed in stone and set up on mountains. Six of  them were 
preserved in Sima Qian’s Shiji. The text of  one of  the two inscriptions missing from 
Sima Qian’s work is known from a copy made during the Tang dynasty, but the other 
one has been lost. Systematic modern research on the inscriptions started with Rong 




Roman and Chinese ideologies of  “world domination” and more specifically to 
a study of  the semantics of  various terms used in texts broadcasting these 
ideologies. In each case, I shall begin by examining how the ancient Chinese 
and the Romans imagined the world prior to the establishment of  the Qin and 
Augustan empires. Focusing on the seemingly parallel terms orbis terrarum and 
tianxia, I shall first analyse the text of  the Res Gestae Divi Augusti and then that 
of  the Stele Inscriptions of  Qin Shi Huang in an attempt to capture the 
worldviews of  the emperors responsible for their creation. Building on the 
findings which will emerge from these textual enquiries, I shall offer an 
explanation of  the strikingly different imperial world views which emerge from 
the Roman and Chinese material. 
 
2. Roman worldviews during the Middle and Late Republic 
 
In Roman Italy historical writing began with Fabius Pictor, who was active 
during the final years of  the third century BC.15 However, Fabius wrote his 
history in Greek. The first historical book written in Latin was Cato’s Origines, 
which appeared a couple of  decades after Fabius Pictor’s account. For the study 
of  early Roman history, ancient historians have to rely on archaeological 
evidence and, to a lesser extent, on various works written by Greek authors 
during the second and first centuries BC. Unquestionably, the Romans had 
developed their own concepts of  space and geography as early as the Regal 
period, but the evidence relating to Roman worldviews during the Monarchy 
and during the first three centuries of  the Republic is too meagre to offer a 
basis for systematic research.16 
          In 509 BC Rome concluded a treaty with Carthage which contained 
provisions concerning Roman traders doing business in Sardinia, Sicily and 
North Africa. Nevertheless, politically the geographical horizon of  the Romans 
remained confined to the area between Veii and Tarracina.17 During the fourth 
and early third centuries BC, Roman power was extended northwards to the 
Pisa-Rimini line and southwards to the Ionian Sea. In 268 BC a map of  Italia 
                                                          
15 On the primary literary sources of  the early Roman Republic, see Cornell (1995) 1-26; 
Bispham (2007) 29-51. 
16 On the views of  cosmology and space in the Roman tradition, Whittaker gives a 
brief  introduction in his first chapter. See Whittaker (2004) 10-30. Others, see 
Brodersen (2010).  
17 Pol. 3,23. 
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was set up in the temple of  Tellus (Earth) by the Roman consul P. Sempronius 
Sophus. This map probably showed peninsular Italy.18 About a century later, 
Cato famously referred to the Alps as a wall protecting Italy, but in another 
passage he refers to Gallia Cisalpina as lying outside Italy, suggesting that, as 
late as the first half  of  the second century BC, at least two different concepts 
of  “Italy” coexisted and also that, depending on the context, the ideological 
boundaries of  Italia might be constructed differently.19 
          In his account of  the year 197 BC, Livy reports that various Greek states 
sent ambassadors to Rome in order to persuade the Senate to continue the war 
against Philip V of  Macedon. Livy writes, “What especially impressed the 
Senate was their elucidation of  the geography of  the area in question, of  the 
sea and the land. This made it clear to everyone that, if  the king held Demetrias 
in Thessaly, Chalcis in Euboea and Corinth in Achaea, Greece could not be 
free ....”20  This episode shows that as late as the early second century BC 
members of  the Roman elite were still inadequately acquainted with the 
geography of  mainland Greece. 
          The concept of  orbis terrarum does not appear to have developed until the 
late Republic. The obvious explanation for this is that Roman worldviews 
developed as a result of  military conquest and territorial expansion beyond the 
Italian Peninsula after the First Punic War.21 Nevertheless, it is clear that during 
the Middle and Late Republic Roman geographical and cosmological 
conceptions were in some ways influenced by ancient Greek and Hellenistic 
thought.22 During the past century, Greek theories about the universe and the 
inhabited oikoumene from Homer to the death of  Alexander the Great have 
received considerable scholarly attention. 23  The inevitable starting point is 
                                                          
18  Varro RR 1,2,1; Florus, 1,19,2. For modern discussions see Williams (2001) 37; 
Bispham (2007) 56.  
19 Cato F85P (= iv. 10C) and F39P (= ii. 9c). Cf. Bispham (2007) 59. For the evolving 
notion of  Italia during the Republic, see Dench (2005) 152-221; Bispham (2007) 53-73. 
20 Livy 32,37. 
21 Only in the early first century BC was imperium related to the orbis terrarum in literature. 
For some examples: Cic. De imp. Cn. Pomp. 53; Cat. 4,11; Rosc. Am. 131; Off. 2,27; Inv. 
rhet. 4,13. For the meaning of  the phrase orbis terrarum, see Nicolet (1991) 31; Gruen 
(1984) 274.   
22 For the relations between Greeks and Romans and the influences of  ancient Greek 
culture on the Roman aristocratic society in the Republic, see Rawson (1985) 3-38. 
Especially for the impacts of  Greek geographical thought on the later Romans, see 
Rawson (1985) 250-67; Momigliano (1971).  
23 Nicolet (1991) 57-85. On the idea of  the oikoumene, see Gisinger (1937) = Gisinger, 
Oikoumenē, RE 2123-74. 
13 
 
Homer’s depiction of  the inhabited oikoumene as a huge island encircled by the 
boundless Ocean, an idea which remained popular in the Archaic and Classical 
periods.24  
          Pytheas of  Massalia, a Greek adventurer and geographer who lived in the 
fourth century, for example, wrote two books, a Description of  the Earth, and a 
treatise On the Ocean. Of  these works, only a few fragments survive.25 It appears 
that Pytheas expanded existing geographical knowledge on the basis of  his 
voyages and expeditions to the northern and western parts of  the 
Mediterranean world. 26  As a result of  further research carried out by 
Dicaearchus of  Messana (c. 350 – 285 BC), Aristarchus of  Samos (310 – 230 
BC) and, especially, by Eratosthenes of  Cyrene (c. 276 – 195 BC), who is widely 
regarded as the most erudite scholar of  the third century, cartographical 
theories were raised to a higher level as the standard of  geographical and 
astronomical knowledge grew. Nevertheless, with regard to the general 
understanding of  the oikoumene, Eratosthenes still maintained the Homeric 
model, seeing the world as an indivisible entity surrounded by vast oceans.27 
          There is no agreement in the sources on what else remained beyond the 
ocean, although a number of  Hellenistic scholars seem to have believed that 
there was more than one oikoumene in existence.28 Crates of  Mallos, a Greek 
Stoic philosopher and grammarian living in the second century BC, proposed 
that the globe was divided by the ocean into four zones which were 
symmetrically positioned in four directions.  
          When Latin authors use the expression orbis terrarium to refer to the 
inhabited world in its entirety, their conception of  what this world looked like is 
indistinguishable from that of  their Classical and Hellenistic predecessors.29 
Cicero, for instance, believed that the inhabited world was encircled by an 
                                                          
24 On the world visions of  the ancient Greeks from the time of  Hesiod to Alexander 
the Great, see Romm (1994). Herodotus, for instance, did not believe in the existence 
of  a river of  Ocean flowing around the whole earth. See Her. 4,36.  
25 See Mette (1952). 
26 He wrote two books, at least as far as we know: On the Ocean and Description of  the 
Earth, of  both of  which only fragments remain. See Nicolet (1991) 60. For the itinerary 
of  Pytheas, see Dion (1977) 189-99. 
27 About the development of  geographical knowledge in the Hellenistic period, see 
Nicolet (1991) 60-2. 
28 Homer seems to have believed that the world had boundaries. In Book Nine of  the 
Odyssey, he depicts the coastline of  Polyphemus’ island as the boundary of  the Earth. 
See Hom. Od. 9,284; Romm (1994) 12. 
29 See Nicolet (1991) 15-31; Gruen (1984) 273-5.  
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immense ocean.30 He also relates the dream of  Scipio Africanus in which the 
Earth is said to consist of  two zones, the north and the south, with the Greeks 
and Romans both living in the north, and conjectures that, had Alexander the 
Great lived longer, he might have crossed the vast ocean.31 His contemporary, 
Sallust, records that Sertorius was forced to flee to the edge of  the known 
inhabited world, the ocean, to escape from his enemies.32 A couple of  decades 
later, Virgil and Horace appealed to Augustus to pursue his world conquest, 
carrying Roman arms beyond the encircling Ocean, and conquering every piece 
of  land on Earth.33 Strabo says that, although the eastern and southern limits 
of  the oikoumene were still unknown, they presumably bordered on the ocean.34 
The same idea is to be found in the works of  Pomponius Mela and Pliny the 
Elder in the Early Imperial period.35 
          These examples clearly show that Roman ideas about the oikoumene were 
heavily influenced by Classical and Hellenistic geographical thought, a 
consequence of  the increasing interaction with the Hellenistic world after the 
third century BC.36 As the extant literary sources are too scarce to permit a 
thorough examination of  the matter, to what degree such a worldview was in 
accord with that of  the early Romans has to remain unknown. However, it has 
to be remembered that, before the mid-third century BC, Rome was a 
traditional agrarian society in which most people were peasants who knew little 
about seafaring.37 The first Roman navy was created at the time of  the First 
Punic War, and it was only then that the Senate began to conceive the 
possibility of  establishing Roman military power in the western Mediterranean. 
 
                                                          
30 Cic. Rep. 4,31.  
31 Cic. Rep. 6,20; 4,31. The tale that Alexander the Great had ambitiously planned to 
cross over the Ocean and conquer the whole world is described only by Cicero, but 
hints of  it are also seen in the writings of  other Roman authors. See Quint. Inst. 3,8,16; 
Sen. Ep. 119.7; Luc. 10,36,41.  
32 Sall. Hist. 1,102.  
33 Verg. G. 1,25-31; Aen  6,785-88; 8,226-27; Hor. Carm. 1,12,57; Ov. Fast. 4,857-62. 
34 Strab. 1,1,8. 
35 Pomponius Mela, a geographer living in Rome during the reign of  Claudius, wrote 3 
books entitled De chorographia (Description of  Regions). He thought that the Earth 
consisted of  two hemispheres and was divided into five climatic zones, wholly 
surrounded by the Ocean. See Pompon. 1,5; 3,45. His work became the main source for 
Pliny the Elder’s description of  the world. Plin. HN 2,2405f.  
36 For general upper-class Roman attitudes to the Hellenistic culture, see Gruen (1984) 
204-72.  
37 Rosenstein (2004) 3.  
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3. The emergence of  the idea of  world domination during the late 
Republic 
 
As the result of  the First Punic War, Sicily became Rome’s first overseas 
province in 241 BC. Only three years later, Sardinia and Corsica were annexed. 
After the battle of  Zama (202 BC), Rome became the mistress of  the western 
Mediterranean, enabling it to shift some of  its focus of  attention to the East. 
Although threats from northern Italy during the first decades of  the second 
century retarded the pace of  conquest in the East, Rome managed to intervene 
in the affairs of  the Hellenistic world and triumphed over Philip V of  Macedon 
and the Seleucid king Antiochus III.38 It is noteworthy that these successes did 
not immediately result in the creation of  new provinces in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Although Macedon and Asia became Roman provinces in 146 
BC and 129 BC, large-scale annexations of  eastern territory did not happen 
until the time of  Sulla and Pompey in the next century. 39  Syria was not 
transformed into a province until after the Battle of  Dastria in 66 BC. The 
eastward expansion came to a temporary halt in 53 BC when M. Licinius 
Crassus lost his legions at Carrhae.40 Julius Caesar planned to campaign against 
the Parthian Empire but was assassinated before he could carry out this 
project.41 In an attempt to surpass Octavian in terms of  military achievements, 
Mark Antony mounted his Persian campaign in 37 BC but achieved few lasting 
results.42  Not until the time of  Augustus, in 20 BC, did Rome manage to 
reclaim the Roman standards which had been in Parthian possession and then 
did so by diplomatic means.43 
                                                          
38 For the contacts between Rome and the Hellenistic world in the early stages, see 
Arthur Eckstein’s recent book: Eckstein (2008). For the policies of  the Roman state in 
the East in the second century BC, see Sherwin-White (1984) 18-121. 
39 By 103 BC, the number of  overseas provinces of  Rome had risen to eleven. Most 
were located in the western half  of  the Mediterranean world. They were: Sicily (241), 
Sardinia (238), Corsica (238), Hispania Ulterior (197), Hispania Citerior (197), Cisalpine 
Gaul (191), Macedon (146), Africa (146), Asia (129), Transalpine Gaul (121) and Cilicia 
(103). Illyricum was a Roman protectorate from 167 BC but does not seem to have 
become a separate province having its own provincial administration until the late 30s 
BC. 
40 Cass. Dio 40,21-4; Plut. Crass. 23-7. 
41 On Caesar’s plan, see Suet. Jul. 44,3. 
42 On M. Antony’s disastrous Parthian campaign, see Cass. Dio 49,23-28; Plut. Ant. 37-
50. 
43 For the retrieval of  the standards from the hands of  Parthian king Phraates, see Cass. 
Dio 54,8. The Roman wars in the East and Roman foreign policies from the mid-
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          Ever since the late nineteenth century, there has been a lengthy and fierce 
debate about the driving forces behind Roman imperialism during the 
Republic. 44  Commencing with Mommsen, some have argued that Rome’s 
territorial expansion was driven mainly by the wish to obtain security by 
eliminating external threats (T. Mommsen, Maurice Holleaux, de Sanctis, T. 
Frank, and H. H. Scullard). Against this hypothesis, many other scholars have 
maintained that Roman expansion was stimulated by the prospect of  tangible 
profits and martial gloria (W. Harris, P. Brunt and K. Hopkins, E. Gruen and N. 
Rosenstein). Yet another group of  researchers emphasizes the importance of  
such psychological drives as greed, fear and shame, or a mixture of  such 
sentiments (J. Rich, S. Mattern, J. Peristiany). Whatever the view adopted, 
Roman society was characterized by a high-level of  militarism. Constant wars 
and campaigns were part and parcel of  the state of  Rome for centuries, 
fostering a competitive and highly militaristic culture. As Eckstein has recently 
pointed out, such a warlike and aggressive culture was not a uniquely Roman 
feature but a common characteristic of  states in the Mediterranean world, and 
hence should not be seen as the key to Rome’s success. In his view, the success 
of  Rome was largely built on its remarkable capacity to absorb the resources of  
newly conquered territories and people for the next round of  military 
expansion.45 
          Whatever view is taken on the driving forces behind Roman expansion 
during the Republic, it cannot be denied that Rome was a thoroughly militaristic 
society. During the Republic, Roman aristocrats had to serve in the army for ten 
years, and military service was a requirement for access to political office. The 
military participation rate of  the citizen population was very high. During the 
second century BC, approximately ten per cent of  the adult male citizen 
population served in the army in each year. During the wars of  the first century 
BC, this ratio rose to one-third.46 Another statistic shows that more than half  
of  all Roman citizens regularly served in the army for seven years in the early 
second century BC.47 It is also generally accepted that military success brought 
                                                                                                                                        
second century BC to the Augustan period are surveyed by Sherwin-White (1984).  
44 Erskine offers a lucid overview of  approaches to the nature of  Roman imperialism 
over the one hundred years since Mommsen, see Erskine (2010) 33-49. 
45 See Eckstein (2006) and (2008) 16-19 and 187-88.  
46 Brunt (1971) iv. 
47  Hopkins (1978) 32-5; Finley (1985) 68. For Roman manpower and recruitment 
during the Middle Republic, see De Ligt (2007); For publications and scholarly debates 
on the problems of  Roman demography in the last decades, see Scheidel (2008); De 
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enormous material, social and political rewards. All of  these factors helped to 
drive Roman expansion forwards, but for a long time no clear concept of  the 
ultimate territorial objectives of  this process emerged. 
          So, exactly when did Roman politicians, generals or intellectuals conceive 
of  the idea that Rome might be on the way to achieving mastery of  the entire 
world? 
          In Arrian’s Anabasis, Alexander the Great is credited with having had the 
plan to conquer the entire inhabited world. When his army refused to advance 
farther into India, for instance, Alexander is said to have given a speech in 
which he tried to persuade his men to follow him to the Eastern Ocean. In 
Book Seven, Arrian reports that some writers believed that Alexander intended 
to sail round Arabia, Ethiopia and Libya, so as to press forward beyond Mount 
Atlas and conquer Libya and Carthage. Other writers have credited Alexander 
with the intention of  attacking the Scythians living near the Sea of  Azov or 
with the plan of  invading Italy.48 
          It has been plausibly suggested that the theme of  world domination 
which surfaces in the sources recounting Alexander’s conquests was borrowed 
from the cultures of  the Ancient Near East, where Assyrian and Persian kings 
had claimed control of  the four corners of  the earth. 49  During the three 
centuries following Alexander’s death, various Hellenistic monarchs tried to 
emulate Alexander’s example and repeated his ideological claims. The ideal of  
establishing universal rule after the conquest of  vast territories and multitudes 
of  peoples can be found in texts relating to the achievements of  various 
monarchs of  the Seleucid and Ptolemaic empires. The most famous example is 
the Res Gestae of  Ptolemy III Euergetes (r. 246 – 222 BC), which contains the 
following account of  his achievements during the Third Syrian War: 
 
Ptolemy, the Great King..., paternal descendant of  Heracles, son of  Zeus, and 
mother's side of  Dionysus, son of  Zeus, after he had inherited his father's dominion 
over Egypt, Libya, Syria, Phoenicia, Cyprus, Lycia, Caria and the islands of  the 
Cyclades, he marched out into Asia with infantry and horsemen and elephants from 
the land of  the Troglodytes and from Ethiopia, which his father and he was the first 
to hunt from these lands and, after bringing them to Egypt, equipped them for 
military use. Having gained possession (kyrieusas) of  all the land on this side of  the 
Euphrates, of  Kilikia, Pamphylia, Ionia, the Hellespont, Thrace, and of  all the 
                                                                                                                                        
Ligt (2012), in particular Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, 79-192.  
48 Arr. Anab. 5,26; 7,2. 
49 Strootman (2014) 120-37. 
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forces in these countries and of  the Indian elephants, and having made all the rulers 
of  these areas his subjects, he crossed the river Euphrates, and having subdued 
Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Sousiana, Persis, Media and the rest of  the land as far as 
Bactria, and having sought out all the sacred objects that had been carried out of  
Egypt by the Persians, and having brought them back to Egypt together with the rest 
of  the treasures from these areas, he sent his forces across the rivers (canals) that were 
dug out . . .50 
 
Similar ideological statements are to be found in Appian’s account of  the far-
flung conquest of  Seleucus Nicator (r. 306-281 BC): 
 
He acquired Mesopotamia, Armenia, 'Seleucid' Cappadocia, Persis, Parthia, Bactria, 
Arabia, Tapouria, Sogdia, Arachosia, Hyrcania, and other adjacent peoples that had 
been subdued by Alexander, as far as the river Indus, so that the boundaries of  his 
empire were the most extensive in Asia after that of  Alexander. The whole region 
from Phrygia to the Indus was subject to Seleucus.51 
 
In his attempt to emulate Alexander, one of  the most dynamic and successful 
Seleucid kings, Antiochus III (r. 222-187 BC), claimed the title of  Megas Basileus, 
a term borrowed from the Persian tradition.52 Likewise, Hannibal’s spectacular 
march into Italy was said to have been encouraged by the example of  
Alexander the Great’s military expedition to the Persian Empire.53 
          Various pieces of  evidence suggest that the example set by Alexander 
and the claims to universal rule which were formulated by some of  his 
successors had a major impact not only on Roman ideas about generalship but 
also on formulations of  the ultimate goals of  imperial conquest. Scipio 
Africanus was probably the first Roman general to model himself  on 
Alexander.54 Nevertheless, it took at least another century for the Hellenistic 
concept of  world domination to find its way into Roman ideology.  
A key figure in this process was Pompey the Great, another general 
whose aspirations for glory were inspired by the accomplishments of  Alexander 
the Great.55 Diodorus describes the results of  Pompey’s campaigns in the East 
                                                          
50 OGIS 54; cf. Austin (2006) 466, no. 268; Sage (1996): no. 275; Chaniotis (2005) 58. 
51 App. Syr. 55.  
52 On the name, see Ma (1999) 273-76. About Antiochus III’s emulation of  Alexander 
the Great, see ibid. 273. 
53 Hoyos (2003) 105. 
54 Weippert is critical of  the Alexander imitatio by Scipio Africanus. See Weippert (1970) 
55. 
55  According to Sallust, “Pompey from his early manhood, influenced by what his 
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in language which is strongly reminiscent of  the ideological claims of  various 
Hellenistic kings: 
 
Pompeius Magnus, son of  Gnaeus, imperator, freed the coasts of  the world and all 
the islands within the Ocean from the attacks of  pirates. He rescued from siege the 
kingdom of  Ariobarzanes, Galatia and the territories and provinces beyond there, 
Asia and Bithynia. He protected Paphlagonia, Pontus, Armenia and Achaia, also 
Iberia, Colchis, Mesopotamia, Sophene and Gordyene. He subjugated Dareius king 
of  the Medes, Artocles king of  the Iberians, Aristobulus king of  the Jews, and 
Aretas king of  the Nabataean Arabs, also Syria next to Cilicia, Judaea, Arabia, 
the province of  Cyrenaica, the Achaeans, Iazygi, Suani and Heniochi, and the other 
tribes that inhabit the coast between Colchis and Lake Maeotis, together with the 
kings of  these tribes, nine in number, and all the nations that dwell between the 
Pontic Sea and the Red Sea. He extended the borders of  the empire up to the borders 
of  the world. He maintained the revenues of  the Romans, and in some cases he 
increased them.56 
     
Plutarch’s biography of  Pompey describes the latter’s achievements in very 
similar terms: 
 
Inscriptions borne in advance of  the procession indicated the nations over which 
Pompey triumphed. these were: Pontus, Armenia, Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Media, 
Colchis, Iberia, Albania, Syria, Cilicia, Mesopotamia, Phoenicia and Palestine, 
Judaea, Arabia … and cities not much under nine hundred in number, besides eight 
hundred pirate ships, while thirty-nine cities had been founded … But that which 
most enhanced his glory and had never been the achievement of  any Roman before, 
was that he celebrated his third triumph over the third continent. For others before him 
had celebrated three triumphs; but he celebrated his first over Libya (Africa), his 
second over Europe, and his last over Asia, so that he seemed in a way to have 
included the whole world in his three triumphs.57  
 
According to Velleius Paterculus, Pompey set up three monuments, each 
representing a continent that he had conquered.58 
Pompey’s claim that he had established Roman power throughout the 
inhabited world was clearly influenced by Hellenistic imperial ideology, with 
                                                                                                                                        
supporters said, thinking that he would be the equal of  King Alexander, sought to rival 
his deeds and plans”. See Sall. Hist. 3,88. For Pompey’s emulation of  Alexander the 
Great, see Weippert (1970) 56-104. 
56 Diod. Sic. 40,4.  
57 Plut. Pomp. 45; Cass. Dio 49,40,2 -41,3. 
58 Vell. Pat. 2,40,4. 
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which the Romans had become familiar during the second and first centuries 
BC. Considering the example set by Pompey, it is not surprising to find Crassus 
attempting to invade and conquer Parthia, and Caesar’s conquest of  Gaul as 
well as his expedition to Britain could be presented in the same light. In 34 BC 
Mark Antony declared Cleopatra VII Queen of  Egypt, Cyprus, Libya and Coele 
Syria. To Cleopatra’s son by Julius Caesar, Caesarion, he granted the title King 
of  Kings, giving him sovereignty over the vassal kings and cities of  the Middle 
East. Of  course, Octavian presented this act as proof  that Antony had been 
manipulated to the point at which he was prepared to betray the interests of  the 
Roman people. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Antony’s seemingly 
“insane” behaviour made perfect sense from the point of  view of  Hellenistic 
practice and ideology.59  
After defeating his opponents in 31 BC, Octavian boasted that he had 
brought peace to the Roman empire. Nevertheless, new wars against external 
enemies were launched, marking a new phase of  bold expansionism which 
lasted until the later years of  Augustus’ reign. Augustus’ presentation of  these 
military successes and the ideology of  conquest which emerges from his 
account will be examined in the final part of  this chapter.  
  
4. Imperium sine fine and the idea of  Roman world domination 
 
Once Augustus had secured his position, the Roman legions were moved to the 
periphery of  the empire. During the next two centuries most wars were fought 
far away from Italy.60 Ever since Edward Gibbon, Roman historians have used 
the expression Pax Romana to refer to the relatively peaceful period which now 
commenced for most inhabitants of  Italy and the Mediterranean provinces of  
the empire.61 Of  course, the quasi-disappearance of  warfare from these core 
regions by no means implies that Roman emperors began to adopt anti-
militaristic policies, or that the incentives which had driven Roman imperialism 
during the Republic no longer existed. In fact, a positive attitude to warfare and 
imperial expansion remained important elements in mainstream ideology. Soon 
after the Battle of  Actium in 31 BC, Virgil vigorously celebrated Roman 
                                                          
59 This view is elucidated in Strootman (2014).  
60 For the transformation, see Cornell (1993) 139-70. 
61 Weinstock points out that pax, in the Augustan context, connotes security and order, 
rather than tranquility. See Weinstock (1960) 33-58; Galinsky (2005) 115. Discussion on 
the concept of  pax Romana, see Woolf  (1993) 179.  
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dominion over the Mediterranean world and fictitiously represents various 
peoples living beyond the boundaries of  the Roman empire, among them 
Britons, Parthians and Indians, as having been subjected to Rome’s supremacy.62 
Horace also expresses the wish that Augustus will conquer the Parthians and 
Scythians living in the peripheral parts of  the oikoumene. 63 As agent and 
representative of  Jupiter, Augustus has spread the power of  the Romans all 
over the inhabited world. Ovid expresses similarly optimistic ideas about 
Rome’s expansion throughout the entire world. He claims that, under Augustus, 
the expanse controlled by the city of  Rome had become conterminous with the 
entire world (Romanae spatium est urbis et orbis idem). 64  He urges Augustus to 
undertake the long-awaited march to the East and finally subdue the Parthians 
by force. In a similar vein, Livy, at the beginning of  his Ab urbe condita, predicts 
that it was Rome’s destiny to be “the head of  the world”.65   
           The theme of  Rome’s world conquest was propagated not only in 
literature but also in a wide range of  visual media. For example, a coin minted 
between 32 and 29 BC depicts an image of  the Roman goddess Victoria 
standing on a globe, with a wreath and a palm frond in her hands, signifying 
Rome’s domination of  the world. 66  Other visual materials used to present 
Rome’s world ascendancy include Agrippa’s map. From Pliny the Elder’s 
account, we know that it was displayed on the wall of  Porticus Vipsania. 67 
Despite this information, whether or not it was a real, graphic map remains a 
matter of  dispute. According to Servius, Augustus constructed a porticus ad 
nationes, in which he displayed statues from almost all known peoples of  the 
world. A giant statue of  Hercules stood at the entrance, symbolizing that 
Rome’s domination had spread over the entire oikoumene.68 As we will see, such 
                                                          
62 Verg. G. 3,16-33; 2,169-70. 
63 Hor. Serm. 2,1,10-15. 
64  Ov. Fast. 2,684. On the one hand, Ovid sings of  peace, on the other hand he 
expresses the hope that people of  all the corners of  the world will fear the offspring of  
Aeneas. See Ov. Fast. 4,857-863. 
65 Livy 1,16,7: caput orbis terrarum.  
66  Globes on coinage as symbol of  Roman domination of  the known world were 
popular throughout the last decades of  the Republic and in the early Principate. For 
some instances, see RRC, nos. 393; 397; 409,2; 449,4; 464,3; 465,8, 480,6; 594,5 etc. 
BMC, 1 no. 217. Discussions of  the numismatic evidence include Gruen (1984) 274, n.5; 
Brunt (1990) 477; and Nicolet (1991) 41; 51, n. 29. 
67 Plin. HN 3,17. Scholarly discussion on Agrippa’s map in Pliny’s account, see Levi 
(1987) 17; Zanker (1988) 143; Whittaker (2004) 66; 78-79; Nicolet (1991) 100-12. 
Brodersen strongly opposes the existence of  the map; see Brodersen (1995) 268. 
68 Mattern (1999) 183. 
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an open, all-encompassing mental world map contrasts sharply with the closed, 
exclusive worldview held by the First Emperor of  China. 
Another important representation of  the known world (orbis terrarum) 
linked to Augustus’ ambitious worldwide military conquests is to be found in 
the Res Gestae Divi Augusti. A large part of  the text (Chapters 25-33) is devoted 
to Rome’s military expansion throughout the inhabited world after 27 BC.69 
One of  the focal points of  the Res Gestae is a long enumeration of  remote 
towns, rivers and peoples (gentes). As Nicolet has pointed out, of  these names, 
many are referred to in Latin for the first time in this document. 70  By 
highlighting so many unfamiliar names and displaying them to the public in 
Rome, the centre of  Roman power, these chapters promulgate the martial 
greatness of  the Roman people and of  Augustus in particular. 
         The expression orbis terrarum appears twice in the text of  Res Gestae:71 
 
i. rerum gestarum divi Augusti, quibus orbem terrarum imperio populi Romani 
subiecit...72  
[Account] of  the achievements of  the deified Augustus, by which he 
made the orbis terrarum subject to the rule of  the Roman people… 
 
ii. bella terra et mari civilia externaque toto in orbe terrarum saepe gessi…73  
I have often conducted wars on land and at sea, civil wars as well as 
foreign ones, across the entire world… 
 
In the second of  these passages Augustus refers to the military successes 
achieved by him “by land and sea” (terra marique). This expression is also found 
in two other passages: 
 
iii. Ianum Quirinum, quem claussum esse maiores nostri voluerunt, cum per totum 
imperium populi Romani terra marique esset parta victoriis pax...  
Our ancestors wanted [the temple of] Janus Quirinus to be closed when 
peace had been achieved by victories on terra marique throughout the 
Roman Empire…74 
 
                                                          
69 Cooley (2009) 36. 
70 For Augustus’ primary concern with Roman society, see Nicolet (1991) 21.  
71 My translations of  passages from the Res Gestae are based on Cooley (2009).  
72 Heading of  the Res Gestae. 
73 RG 3,1. 
74 RG 13. 
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iv. ob res a me aut per legatos meos auspicis meis terra marique prospere gestas 
quinquagiens et quinquiens decrevit senatus supplicandum esse dis immortalibus.75   
On account of  affairs successfully accomplished terra marique by me or 
by my legates under my auspices the Senate fifty-five times decreed that 
thanksgiving should be offered to the immortal gods.   
 
In the first two texts, Augustus announces that his achievement was based on 
successful conquests of  the whole inhabited world (orbis terrarum). In making 
such an ambitious pronouncement, Augustus suggests that his military 
accomplishments exceeded those of  Alexander the Great, Pompey and Julius 
Caesar.76 
In the third text, Augustus claims to have achieved peace by winning 
victories “by land and sea” (terra marique) throughout the Roman Empire rather 
than “throughout the entire world”. The former expression is more ambiguous 
than the latter. As Momigliano has pointed out many years ago, the Latin 
expression terra marique might be regarded as corresponding to the Greek 
formula kata gên kai kata thalassan, which was widely used in Greek literary 
sources of  the Hellenistic period. Momigliano suggests that the popularity of  
this phrase reflects the impact of  the ideology of  Persian kingship according to 
which “the king of  kings” claimed universal rule “over land and sea”.77 Viewed 
in this light, Augustus’ use of  the expression terra marique could be read as 
another way of  expressing the Roman claim to unlimited world dominance. 
The central point of  Chapters 26 to 33 of  the Res Gestae is that, under 
Augustus’ auspices, the Roman legions had been taken to the remotest corners 
of  the known inhabited world. 78  Chapter 26 records that Augustus had 
                                                          
75 RG 4,2. 
76 RG 26,2; 31. Cf. Cooley (2009) 36-37. 
77 Momigliano has offered a series of  examples to argue that, by the fifth and fourth 
centuries BC, the formula of  “land and sea” was used to refer to political hegemonic 
rule over land and sea. See Momigliano (1943) 62, n. 36. It later impacted on Rome’s 
formation of  the model of  territorial conquest. In Cicero’s Speech Pro Balbo, for 
example, he voices his appreciation of  Cnaeus Pompeius, cuius res gestae omnis gentis cum 
clarissima victoria terra marique peragrassent, cuius tres triumphi testes essent totum orbem terrarum 
nostro imperio teneri (“whose exploits had traversed all nations with splendid victory on 
land and at sea, whose three triumphs bore witness to the fact that the entire world is 
controlled by our authority”). See Cic. Balb. 6,16. Cf. De imper Cn. Pompei 56. Nicolet 
(1991) 36. 
78 Cooley (2009) 36-38. General discussion on Augustan imperial policy, see more in 
Luttwak (1976) 7-13; Mann (1979) 178-79; Gruen (1990) 395- 416; Austin and Rankov 
(1995) 111-13; Nicolet (1993) 85-95; Eck (1998) 93-104, etc. I shall deal with this 
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“extended the territory of  all those provinces of  the Roman people which had 
neighbouring peoples who were not subject to our authority.” No limits to 
Roman expansion are specified here.79 Referring to the North, he states that the 
Roman fleet had sailed eastward from the mouth of  the Rhine as far as the 
place where the sun rises. Turning to the West, Augustus says that the Roman 
conquests reached Cadiz, the end of  the world signified by the Pillars of  
Hercules.80 Besides these geographical allusions, the names of  foreign peoples 
are listed. The aim of  this selective enumeration is to show that the military 
achievements of  Augustus exceeded those of  his Roman predecessors, and 
even those of  Alexander the Great who had not managed to lead his troops to 
the very edge of  the world.81  
          In the Res Gestae, the theme of  Roman world domination is not restricted 
to passages dealing with military successes, but also occurs in references to 
diplomatic missions sent by various distant peoples who wanted to obtain 
Augustus’ friendship and that of  the Roman people (amicitiam meam et populi 
Romani, RG 26,4). Most of  those peoples who are said to have sent embassies 
are the inhabitants of  remote regions which were barely known in Italy, like the 
Charydes and Semnones of  Germany, and the Medes and the Indians living on 
the eastern edges of  the inhabited world, but some of  them were less exotic 
peoples who had not been subjugated by Rome, like the Armenians, the 
Parthians and the Sarmatians. Similarly, Suetonius mentions that various 
peoples who had previously been mere names to the Romans, like the Indians 
and the Scythians, were induced by Augustus’ virtues and moderation (virtutis 
moderationisque) to request the friendship of  Augustus and the Roman people. 
Rome’s principal opponent in the East, the Parthians, symbolically submitted to 
Roman authority by returning the military standards which had been captured 
from Crassus.82 The underlying message is clearly that Augustus’ claim of  world 
conquest did not necessarily have to be fulfilled by force, but could also be 
obtained in peaceful ways.  
In short, the central message broadcast in Chapters 26-33 of  the Res 
Gestae is that the boundaries of  Rome have been extended on an unprecedented 
scale. Although in a later passage Augustus claims that his personal power 
                                                                                                                                        
subject at length in Chapter 3.  
79 RG 26,1: omnium provinciarum populi Romani, quibus finitimae fuerunt gentes quae non parerent 
imperio nostro, fines auxi. 
80 RG 26,2-5. 
81 Levi (1947) 206; Cooley (2009) 37. 
82 Suet. Aug. 21,3. 
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(potestas) was “not greater than that of  others”, these chapters raise him to a 
position above all Romans and non-Romans of  all time. 83  The message 
conveyed by the Res Gestae is consistent with Virgil’s claim that the Roman 
empire was an imperium sine fine. 84  As mentioned, the Roman claim to 
domination of  the entire orbis terrarum has clear antecedents in the Late 
Republic. In the Res Gestae, however, this theme appears to have been 
intertwined with a celebration of  the virtues and exploits of  the first emperor.85 
In other words, the theme of  uncontested domination over the world is 
inextricably intertwined with Augustus’ self-presentation.  
           
          In conclusion, the development of  the worldview of  the Romans in the 
Republic was tied to the rise of  Roman imperialism in Mediterranean from the 
Early Republican period. Over a span of  several centuries, the mode of  the 
Roman imperialism follows a centrifugal pattern, which alike fostered the 
Roman worldview of  the last hundred years of  the Republic to even greater 
heights. By then, as a highly militarized society, the desire to conquer lands 
worldwide was stimulated to its zenith, fuelled by increasingly toxic competition 
between the leading political protagonists. However, on the other hand, it 
should be noted that, in the early fifth century BC, Rome was only one of  the 
clustering of  city-states of  Latium in central Italy. For the greater part of  the 
Republican period, world conquest was apparently not part of  the plans of  the 
Roman aristocratic rulers. Little is known about how the Roman elite viewed 
the world until the last half  of  the third century BC, when Roman power 
increasingly gained control over the whole of  the Italian Peninsula. Still, it 
seems clear that it was only with the increase in the interactions between Rome 
and the Hellenistic world from the early second century BC onwards that the 
horizons of  Romans to the outside world were dramatically broadened. In the 
last century of  the Republic, overseas territorial expansion was paid greater 
attention as the competition in the search for glory and power among those 
men of  power in the Roman Senate began to accelerate. Geography, military 
conquest and historiography were therefore bound up with each other more 
closely than before, and consequently Rome’s aspiration for world conquest was 
displayed more brutally. As Augustus gradually took over the state in the last 
                                                          
83 RG 34,3. For a reconsideration of  Augustus’ auctoritas, see Rowe (2013) 1-15. 
84 Verg. Aen 1,278. 
85 See Brunt (1984) 423-44. On the acceptance of  Augustus’ image as monarch, see 
Syme’s classic account, Syme (1939) esp. 277 ff. On its reflections in coins and artworks, 
see Wallace-Hadrill (1986) 66-87; Zanker (1988) 297-33.  
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decades of  the first century BC, the concept of  a relative open, inclusive and 
outward-oriented worldview emerged more clearly. 
          The worldview broadcast in the Res Gestae can be described as open, 
universal and encompassing. During the last decade of  Augustus’ lifetime, 
however, the empire had to face some serious military challenges and setbacks. 
The rebellions which erupted in Pannonia and Dalmatia between AD 6 and AD 
9 were regarded as the most serious military crisis since the Hannibalic War. In 
AD 9, three Roman legions were cut to pieces in the Teutoburger Forest. 
Following this disaster, Rome withdrew its troops from the valley of  the Elbe 
to the western bank of  the Rhine. Suetonius records that Augustus was severely 
affected by this stroke of  bad luck.86 Before he died, Augustus left behind a 
consilium for Tiberius, suggesting that the empire should not be expanded any 
farther.87 Cassius Dio reports that Augustus left four posthumous documents 
for the Senate.88 In one of  these documents, the Emperor advised his fellow 
Romans to be satisfied with what they possessed and not to seek any farther 
territorial expansion. Some ancient historians see the late reign of  the Augustus 
as a turning-point in the long history of  Roman territorial expansion.89 In their 
view, Roman expansion slowed down markedly after Augustus.  
Before examining the course taken by Roman imperial expansion after 
AD 14, I shall shift the focus of  my attention to China where, about two 
hundred years before the initiation of  the Principate, the Emperor Qin Shi 
Huang also claimed that the entire inhabited world had been unified under his 
sovereignty. How did Chinese rulers and writers envisage the world before and 
after the establishment of  imperial rule? How do the worldviews which are 
encountered in China compare to the Roman worldviews which we encounter 
in Late-Republican and Early-Imperial Rome? These are the main questions 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
  
                                                          
86 On the reign of  Augustus in the last decade from AD 4 to 14, see Cass. Dio 55,13-
56,46; Crook (1996) 94-112.  
87 Tac. Ann. 1,9,3-5. 
88 Cass. Dio 56,33.  




Chinese worldviews from the late Shang  




Between 500 BC and AD 14 Rome developed from a small city-state into a 
large territorial empire. The process of  state formation in China was very 
different. When Qin Shi Huang founded the first unified empire, various 
dynasties had already held sway before 221 BC. There has been a long-standing 
debate between western scholars and Chinese historians and archaeologists 
about whether or not the Xia 夏 should be seen as the first Chinese dynasty and 
the precursor to the emergence of  large states in China.1   
However, this is not the place to enter into the complex controversy 
about the origins of  Chinese state formation.2 After the creation of  the Qin 
Empire in China and the establishment of  the Roman Principate in 
Mediterranean and western Europe, the elite class of  the two societies applied 
the terms tianxia and orbis terrarum to describe the world as they knew it. In the 
previous chapter, the transformation of  the Roman worldview during the 
Republic and early Principate has been examined by focusing on the appearance 
of  the term orbis terrarum and its use in the Res Gestae. In this chapter I shall 
carry out a study of  the formation and transformation of  Chinese worldviews 
during the lengthy process leading to the emergence of  the Qin Empire. The 
concept of  tianxia, the Chinese counterpart of  the Latin orbis terrarum, will serve 
as a focal point for an investigation into the evolution of  Chinese worldviews 
                                                          
1 Huber (1988) 46-77; Thorp (1991) 1-33; Liu Li and Chen Xingchan (2003) 26-29. 
2 For this issue, see the monograph of  Liu Li and Chen Xingchan (2003); Liu Li (2004) 
223-238. Many debates focus on whether the Erlitou culture (c. 1900 – 1500 BC) in 
archaeology corresponds to the legendary Xia dynasty (c. 2100 – 1600 BC), the earliest 
large territorial state in Chinese history. For discussions of  this problem, see Allan 
(1984) 242-256 and id. (1991). In a recent article, Allan offers a new interpretation of  
the relationship between Erlitou culture and the formation of  Chinese civilization; see 
Allan (2007) 461-96. In an interesting article, Liu Li investigates the divergent views of  
Chinese and non-Chinese scholars on the question of  whether the Xia dynasty should 
be regarded as historical fact or as fiction. See Liu Li (2009) 831-843. The question of  
the existence of  the Xia dynasty has become the subject of  a prolonged debate since 
Gu Jigang 顧頡剛 cast doubt on its historicity in the early twentieth century. 
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during the long pre-Qin period.  
  
2. Worldviews between the late Shang and late Zhou periods 
 
2.1 Zhong and Sifang/Situ: concepts of  space in the mental map of  the 
Shang people 
 
The Taiwanese scholar Xing Yitian 邢義田 claims that the first attestation of  
the term tianxia is to be found in an essay entitled The Announcement of  Duke 
Shao (Shaogao召告) from the Book of  Zhou (Zhoushu周書), a section of  the Book 
of  Documents (Shangshu尚書). Since this treatise is commonly assumed to have 
been written in the early Western Zhou period (1046-771 BC), it can be used to 
shed some light on the worldview held by the ruling class of  early-Chinese 
society.3 The text runs as follows:  
  
Only if  the king is virtuous and the king himself  serves as a model followed by the 
people under the tianxia, can his name spread far and wide throughout (the lands). 
其惟王位在德元，小民乃惟刑用於天下，越王顯。4 
 
Sima Qian states that the Announcement contains moral advice which the Duke 
Zhou 周公, the younger brother of  King Wu 武王 (r. 1046-1043 BC), gave his 
nephew, King Cheng 成王 (r.1042/35-1006 BC), Wu’s successor, on how to 
become a good monarch by applying the power of  virtue.5 In a literal sense, 
tianxia 天下 is a geographical term meaning “all (areas) under Heaven”. 6 
                                                          
3 The Shaogao is commonly regarded as one of  the earliest chapters of  the Shang shu. For 
a good discussion of  the Shang shu itself  and of  the high reputation it enjoyed among 
later writers for a period of  over two thousand years, see Shaughnessy (1993) 376-89.  
4  Shang shu 15,14. 400; Xing Yitian (1991) 441. The Japanese scholar Shinichiro 
Watanabe 渡辺信一郎 has carried out a detailed investigation into the term tianxia and 
its usage in written sources of  the pre-Qin period. See Shinichiro Watanabe, trans. Xu 
Chong 徐衝 (2008) 3-17. Zhao Tingyang 趙汀陽 has published a series of  articles 
focusing on the concept of  tianxia in the Chinese classical sources, but his approach is 
principally philosophical. For a critical discussion of  Zhao’s theory, see Zhang Qixian
張其賢 (2001). 
5 Shiji 4, 133. 
6 In most publications dealing with Chinese ancient history in English scholarship, the 
term “tianxia” is simply translated as “all under Heaven” without any further 
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Nevertheless, in the passage from the Announcement just quoted, the emphasis is 
on the political space in which the king’s example should be followed by his 
subjects. In the Zhou dynasty, the sort of  a geopolitical entity implied by tianxia 
under the authority of  the Zhou king was conceptualized as consisting of  two 
parts: the wangji 王畿 , the core lands of  the Wei River Valley which were 
directly controlled by the Zhou royal domain, and the numerous hereditary fiefs 
surrounding this core area which were ruled de facto by the Zhou nobles.7  
Soon after the Zhou defeated the Shang, the Dukes of  Shao and Zhou 
fulfilled the plan of  the deceased King Wu to build a new capital at the 
confluence of  the Yellow River and River Luo, which was called Luoyi (present-
day Luoyang, Henan Province) 洛邑, or Chengzhou 成周, symbolizing the 
centre of  the tianxia.8 The city, together with its adjacent lands, formed the core 
area of  the Zhou domain, and the vast areas of  lands surrounding this core 
area were called the sifang 四方  (four quarters) or situ 四土  (four lands). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the term tianxia天下 was not used in 
the early Chinese written sources until the Spring and Autumn 春秋 period 
(770 – 476 BC) and the time of  the Warring States 戰國 (476 – 221 BC). 
The idea that the world consisted of  a centre and four quarters (sifang) is 
much older. Using the then newly discovered oracle-bone inscriptions to study 
Shang history, Dong Zuobin 董作賓 (1895 – 1963), one of  the first historians 
in modern Chinese scholarship, was able to show that the capital of  Yin Shang
殷商 referred to in the early Chinese literature appears as Dayi Shang (the big 
city of  Shang)大邑商 or Zhong Shang (Central Shang)中商 in the oracle-bone 
documents.9 The territory of  the late Shang state was thought to consist of  a 
                                                                                                                                        
interpretation. In my view, this is somewhat problematic.  
7 For the landscapes of  the Western Zhou homeland and its regional states, see Li Feng
李峰 (2006) 30-90. 
8 Shiji 4, 133. According to the account of  Sima Qian, nine tripod cauldrons, which 
were believed to have been cast by the legendary flood-tamer the Great Yu in remote 
antiquity and which symbolized the nine earliest provinces of  China, were moved the 
city of  Luoyi. From this moment, the new capital was regarded as the centre of  the 
Chinese political landscape. For the fable of  the casting of  the nine tripods, see Chang 
(1983) 95-100; Lewis (1999) 268-271; (2006b) 54. 
9 Chen Mengjia 陳夢家 (1956) 255. On the sources for early Chinese history, see the 
essays in Shaughnessy (1997). For the Chinese writing system of  the pre-Qin period, 
see Boltz (1999) 74-124. The most important publications on the Shang oracle 
inscriptions in Chinese are the monographs by Chen Mengjia and Hu Houxuan 胡厚宣. 
In Western scholarship, Keightley’s Sources of  Shang history: the Oracle-bone Inscriptions of  
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core area, the royal domain, and the vast neighbouring areas loosely called the 
situ 四土  or sifang 四方 , which literarily means “the lands of  the four 
directions”.10 But scholars who study late Shang history have observed that the 
character fang as it appears in many of  the oracle-bone inscriptions often refers 
to various political entities in or bordering on the Shang territory. In order to 
achieve a better understanding of  this point, it is necessary to pay attention to 
the spatial aspects of  political and administrative organization in the Shang 
period. Following the reign of  King Tang 湯 (c.1675 – 1646 BC), the first 
monarch of  the Shang, the Shang people frequently moved their capital from 
one place to the other, their aim being to control valuable resources like copper, 
tin and lead, as shown by the brilliant studies by Chang Kwang-chih 張光直.11 
This situation lasted until the reign of  King Pan Geng 盘庚 (c. 1290 – 1263 
BC), who moved the capital to Yin 殷 (present-day Anyang 安陽, northern 
Henan province). This became the permanent capital until the displacement of  
the Shang dynasty by Zhou. However, although the Shang kings constantly 
shifted their capitals during the first three centuries after the establishment of  
their dynasty, the region in which the members of  the Shang royal house 
performed sacrifices to the spirits of  their deceased ancestors, especially the di
帝, the highest god in the pantheon of  the Shang religion, never changed. This 
sacred place was thought to be the core area in the Shang cosmology.12 Around 
                                                                                                                                        
Bronze Age China (Berkeley 1978) is an indispensable monograph in the field of  oracle-
bone studies. For the studies of  oracle-bone inscriptions in the twentieth century, see 
Wang Yuxin 王宇信 and Yang Shengnan 楊升南 (1999). On the bronze inscriptions of  
the Shang and the Zhou dynasties, the most important publications are the eight 
volumes edited by the Institute for Archaeology of  the Chinese Academy of  Social 
Sciences. In the West, Shaughnessy’s monograph focusing on the inscribed bronze 
vessels in the Western Zhou dynasty has become a standard book in the field of  
inscribed bronze vessels. See Shaughnessy (1992). 
10 For examples of  the sequences sifang, situ or fang in the oracle-bones in the reign of  
Wuding 武丁, see Chen Mengjia (1956). Wheatley translates these expressions as “four 
quarters”, and this is the translation which I adopt in my discussion. See Wheatley 
(1971); Wang Aihe 王愛和 (2000) 23; Wang Aihe (2001) 114.  
11 For the frequent movement of  the Shang capital before King Pan Geng, see Chen 
Mengjia (1956) 249-252; For Chang Kuang Chi’s famous theory, see Chang (1990).  
12 Scholars believe that the cult of  di is closely related to the worship of  the Shang 
ancestral spirits. See Hsu and Linduff  (1988) 101. For the rite of  ancestor worship and 
Shang state religion, see Eno (2009) 54-102. For an archaeological account of  the core 
area of  Shang, see Chang (1980) 69-73. Whether the di was originally regarded as the 
highest god and later transformed into the representative of  Shang ancestral spirits, or 
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the core area lay multiple subordinate states scattered across the central plain 
surrounding the Shang royal domain. All of  these states, to a greater or lesser 
extent, stood in a dependent relationship to the Shang; some of  them were 
even only very loosely under the control of  the Shang state.13 The Shang king 
bolstered his power by means of  frequent travels, hunting trips and military 
campaigns. The territories of  these political entities which were connected to 
the Shang royal house were referred to in the inscriptions on the oracle bones 
as sifang四方 or situ四土. In later political contexts fang means “side”, “border” 
or “quarter”. 14  As will be revealed, such a conception of  a square world 
consisting of  a centre and four cardinal directions played a significant role in 
shaping the spatial conception of  the subsequent Chinese dynasties.   
 
2.2. Sifang and zhongguo: worldviews in the Western Zhou period         
 
After the battle of  Muye 牧野 in 1046 BC, the Zhou, a subordinate state 
located on the western periphery of  the Shang world in the Wei River Valley, 
annexed large parts of  the Shang land and established a new regime in c. 1045 
BC.15 Although the extent to which the geographical and cosmological views of  
the Western Zhou people were influenced by the former Shang dynasty is 
unknown, the character sifang四方, which appears on many inscribed bronze 
objects belonging to this period, clearly illustrates the link between the two 
dynasties in terms of  cosmological views.16 For example, the inscription on the 
bronze sacrificial vessel named the Da Yu Ding 大盂鼎, which can be dated to 
the reign of  King Kang 康王 (r. 1005/3-978 BC) of  the early Western Zhou 
period, contains the phrase “extending to the sifang” (puyou sifang匍有四方).17 
                                                                                                                                        
vice-versa, is a matter of  dispute in scholarship, see Shima Kunio 島邦男 (2006); Chen 
Mengjia (1958) 561-582; Hu Houxuan (1959) 23-50; 89-110; Wang Aihe (2001) 116; Itō 
Michiharu 伊藤道治 trans. Jiang Lansheng 江藍生 (2002) 3-38. 
13 Keightley (1983) 552. 
14 Keightley (2000) 66. In addition to the fact that the fang is related to directions in 
many oracle-bone inscriptions, the Shang people were in the habit of  linking the fang to 
a number of  names referring to specific places, see Chen Mengjia (1956) 270-291. 
15 The precise date of  the Zhou conquest of  Shang is far from certain. Shaughnessy 
suggests that the Zhou dynasty began in 1045 BC. See Shaughnessy (1991) 217-236; 
Wang Aihe (2000) 57. 
16 For continuities in cosmological conceptions during the Shang and Zhou periods, see 
Keightley (1983) 121-129. 
17 JC 2626. The Da Yu Ding records King Kang’s appointment of  a minister named Yu, 
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The term sifang also appears on the Lai Pan 逨盤, a inscribed bronze vessel 
dating from the late Western Zhou. 18  In the Book of  Songs (Shi jing 詩經), 
containing the oldest surviving Chinese poetry, some of  which was written 
during the early Western Zhou period, the expression sifang frequently appears 
in some early poems, generally carrying a meaning similar to that which can be 
observed in the inscription on the Da Yu Ding and some other contemporary 
bronze vessels.19 It is impossible to verify whether this geographical concept 
existed in Zhou culture before the Zhou state became affiliated to Shang, or 
whether it was borrowed from the Shang people.20 However, it is clear that, by 
the early Western Zhou period at the latest, the basic world view was based on 
the idea that there was a core area in which the royal domain was located and 
four quarters (sifang) occupying the peripheral zones. 
         Against this background, it does not come as a surprise that the emphasis 
on the sifang in early Chinese sources was closely related to various groups of  
characters, such as zhong 中(centre) or zhongguo 中國 (Central State(s)). For 
instance, a poem entitled Minlao 民劳 in the Shi jing contains the following 
passage: 
       
Let us cherish the centre of  the state (zhongguo) in order to secure the pacification 
of  the four quarters (sifang)…Let us cherish the capital (jingshi) of  the state in 
order to secure the pacification of  the four quarters (sifang).惠此中国，以绥四
方……惠此京师，以绥四方。21 
 
In this passage sifang refers to the vast territories beyond the core area of  the 
                                                                                                                                        
and the latter cast a bronze vessel inside which King Kang’s appointment and 
instructions were inscribed. As one of  the most famous excavated bronze vessels of  
the Western Zhou, it has been thoroughly discussed since the late 19th century. For a 
recent study, see Li Xueqin 李學勤 (1985) 51-55. 
18 The texts containing the characters 四方 can be seen on some other bronze vessels 
such as the Ke Ding 克鼎, the Shihu Gui 師虎簋 and the Jinbang Gui 晉邦簋 cast 
during different periods of  the Western Zhou dynasty. See Yu Shengwu 于省吾 (1935) 
38-43. 
19 For some of  the character sifang四方 appearing in Shijing, see Shijing 270; 280; 315; 
367; 373; 381; 387; 395; 397; 422; 418; 422; 433; 450; 454; 562; 465; 478; 480; 483; 506; 
527; 533, see Gao Heng 髙亨 (1980). 
20 For the relationship between the Zhou and the Shang, see Hsu and Linduff  (1988) 
41-59. 
21 Shijing 422. Mao Heng 毛亨, an exegete living in Han period, comments: “Zhongguo, 
the capital”.    
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Zhou. The term zhongguo corresponds to jingshi, most likely signifying the new 
capital of  Zhou, the city of  Luoyi, mentioned above. 
         The term zhongguo also appears in the chapter Zicai梓材 of  the Shangshu: 
 
Heaven gave our ancestors a mission to open up new fields [and] to govern the people 
at the centre of  the state (zhongguo). 皇天既付中國民，越闕疆土于先王。
22 
 
At the opening of  the chapter, it has been said that some essays from the 
Shangshu can be dated back as far as to the time of  Duke Shao in early Western 
Zhou times when the project for the construction of  the city of  Luoyi was just 
commencing. In the chapter Zicai, the term zhongguo is again used to refer to the 
city of  Luoyi, the new capital located in the Luo River Valley.23 An inscription 
on the bronze vessel He Zun 何尊 excavated near present-day Baoji 寳雞 
(Shanxi province) in the early 1960s corroborates the argument. The value of  
the inscribed text lies not only in the fact that it confirms that the new capital 
of  Luoyi was constructed in the fifth year of  the reign of  Duke Zhou, as stated 
in the Shangshu (cf. below); it is also the earliest record containing the characters 
zhongguo 中國 (central state), which is nowadays used to refer to the People’s 
Republic of  China. Consequently, the inscription in the He Zun has attracted 
special attention from scholars studying the origins of  Chinese ethnicity and 
nationality.24 
          In a nutshell, it can be concluded that the Western Zhou people 
subscribed to a worldview in which the world consisted of  a central area 
(sometimes referred to as the zhongguo) which was surrounded by territories 
vaguely designated the sifang. However, the paucity of  early Chinese texts makes 
it difficult to achieve a clear understanding of  the relationships between the two 
                                                          
22 Shang shu 14,13. 387.  Shang shu Zhengyi Vol. 2, 458.  
23 Wang Aihe (2000) 65. A whole chapter is addressed to cosmological views in Shang 
and Zhou China in Wang’s monograph. See Chapter 2, 23-74.  
24 For instance, Ge Zhaoguang’s recent book on Chinese identity in Chinese intellectual 
history, Zhai Zi Zhongguo宅兹中國, quotes the famous phrase from the inscription of  
the He Zun, which is translated as I built my home in the zhongguo 余其宅兹中國. For an 
interpretation of  the full inscription, see Tang Lan 唐蘭 (1976) 60-61. The text of  the 
He Zun has been translated into English by Shaughnessy, see Shaughnessy (1997) 77. 
Ge notes that the term zhongguo carries different meanings in different periods of  
Chinese history. In the inscription of  the He Zun, zhongguo denotes the city of  Luoyi. 




          Pertinently, such a perception of  the world was not merely a symbolic 
exercise in the ideological realm. It was also connected to the territorial 
expansion which had taken place in the early Western Zhou period. In the first 
two hundred years following its conquest of  Shang, the Western Zhou went 
through a process of  large-scale territorial absorption. In particular during the 
reigns of  King Cheng 成王 (d. 1021 BC) and King Kang 康王 (d. 996 BC), the 
power of  the Zhou reached its zenith.25 By their time the lands under the 
control of  Zhou had been substantially increased since the time of  King Wu. 
Its eastern boundary was now formed by the East Sea; its southern regions 
extended as far as the Han River Basin 漢江盆地 and the Nanyang Plain 南陽
平原; its northern frontier followed the course of  the Ordos 鄂爾多斯 in 
modern Inner Mongolia; and its western boundary lay beyond the eastern 
Liupan Mountains 六盤山. Therefore the Zhou territories consisted of  the 
Luo River Valley (modern Henan and southern Shanxi province), which was 
the core area, and of  the vast tracts of  lands stretching outwards in the four 
directions. 
          It is well known that the most distinctive feature of  the political 
institution of  the Western Zhou was its feudal system.26 From roughly the time 
of  Duke Zhou and thereafter, the Zhou kings established multiple vassal states 
among them Yan 燕, Qi 齊 and Lu 魯 throughout the alluvial plain in the 
Yellow River Valley. The nobles of  Zhou and old Shang, who initially had been 
granted the newly conquered land by the Zhou kings, were endowed with the 
power to rule the indigenous peoples, although they were all to some extent 
supervised by the royal house of  Zhou.27 Many of  the vassal states located on 
the fringes of  the Western Zhou realm were surrounded by “barbarian 
peoples”, the Man 蛮, the Yi 夷, the Rong 戎 and the Di 狄 referred to in later 
texts. Why were so many vassal states located in remote places far from the 
core area of  Zhou? One possible answer is that these vassal states were 
                                                          
25 On territorial expansion in the period of  the early Zhou, see Li Feng (2006) 1-27.  
26 For a discussion of  Zhou feudalism, see Hsu and Linduff  (1988) 177-85. Li Feng, 
however, opposes the use of  the term “feudalism” in the context of  Western Zhou 
political history. Instead, he suggests that the political system of  the Western Zhou state 
was a kind of  “delegatory kin-ordered settlement State”. For details, see Li Feng (2010) 
269-302. For the relationship between the local sub-states and the central government 
of  Zhou, see ibid, 254-267. 
27  For the bureaucratic apparatus of  the Western Zhou, see Li Feng’s English 
monograph, Li Feng (2008).   
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supposed to act as watchdogs, protecting the Zhou people from the threat of  
rebellion by local populations and from barbarian invasions.28 If  this view is 
accepted, the outlying territories occupied an important place in the Zhou 
worldview. It also follows that, at least during the early and mid-Western Zhou 
dynasty, the Zhou people did not have well-defined boundaries. 
         A passage contained both in Chapter Kanggao康誥 and Chapter Zicai梓
材 of  the Shang shu sheds some light on the place occupied by the barbarians 
dwelling on the borders of  the Zhou realm in Zhou world views: 
 
Duke Zhou commenced the construction of  the new great city at Luo in the eastern 
land. People from the four quarters flocked to the assembly, including those who dwell 
in hou, dian, nanbang, cai, wei, as well as hundreds of  craftsmen and peoples 




Most scholars agree that this passage was written in the early Western Zhou 
period. In it hou and dian are the two zones closest to the centre, similar to the 
picture to be found in the Yugong. The term bomin almost certainly refers to such 
barbarian peoples as the Man, the Yi, the Rong and the Di living on the 
periphery of  the Zhou world. These peoples were invited by Duke Zhou to 
attend the inauguration ceremony which took place in Luoyi. The author of  the 
Zuozhuan 左传 (Commentary of  Zuo),30 a historical work completed between 
the late fifth and fourth centuries BC, mentions that during the reign of  King 
Mu 穆王 (r. 956-918 BC) a significant military campaign was waged against the 
Quanrong犬戎, a barbarian tribe living in the northeastern regions of  the Wei 
River Valley. Thereafter, the Quanrong never seem to have made an appearance 
the Western Zhou royal court again. These indications suggest that, even before 
the mid-Western Zhou period, the barbarian peoples living on the fringes of  
the Zhou borders occupied a place in Zhou worldviews. 
          The kings of  the early Zhou period authorized various Zhou nobles to 
establish vassal states in the far-off  lands. As far as the Zhou state was 
                                                          
28 Li Feng (2008) 113. 
29 Shang shu 14,11. 358.  
30 The Zuozhuan is now regarded as a compilation of  several authors rather than a work 
completed by a single writer. Sima Qian credits Zuo Qiuming 左丘明 as the compiler 
of  the works. See Shiji 130, 3300.  
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concerned, this was actually a convenient method of  achieving territorial 
expansion and establishing regular communication with the east. In some 
literary sources of  the Zhou period, those dwelling in the remote lands are 
referred to as the yuanmin遠民, “the distant people”. Some were descendants 
of  the Shang, but the rest belonged to various ethnic groups. In the inscribed 
bronzes of  the Zhou period they are designated by such names as Xianyun 獫
狁, Rong 戎 or Huaiyi 淮夷.31 However, it should be emphasized that the 
relationships between the Zhou king and royal court and various groups living 
on the periphery of  the Zhou realm frequently alternated from friendly to 
hostile or vice-versa. Therefore it is impossible to draw a clear line between the 
lands inhabited by the Zhou people and the non-Zhou barbarians.  
 
2.3. Changes in world views during the Spring and Autumn and Warring 
States periods 
 
After the collapse of  Western Zhou power during the eighth century BC, King 
Ping 平王 (r. 770-720 BC) moved the old capital from Hao 鎬 to Luoyi in the 
Luo River Valley, an event marking the beginning of  a new era, the Eastern 
Zhou (771-255 BC). During the next five hundred years Chinese worldviews 
changed significantly.32 
          In various written sources compiled during the Eastern Zhou, the 
expression “the central state” (zhongguo) no longer referred specifically to the 
city of  Luoyi, but more frequently connoted the Central Plain (zhongyuan中原) 
of  the Yellow River Valley, a huge landmass encompassing modern Henan, 
northern Jiangsu and Anhui, western Shandong and a small part of  Hubei. As 
time went by the power and authority of  the Zhou king and Zhou royal house 
declined. Luoyi lost much of  its earlier prominence, and a number of  feudal 
states in the Eastern Zhou royal domain was rising to power. 
                                                          
31 Scholars suggest that the Xianyun 獫狁 recorded in the Western Zhou inscriptions 
are to be identified with the Quanrong 犬戎 , mentioned in the literary sources 
compiled in the Eastern Zhou period. For the names and origins of  these barbarian 
peoples in the Western Zhou, see Wang Guowei 王國維 (1959) 583-605. 
32 The homeland of  the Zhou people in the Wei River Valley had been occupied by the 
barbarian tribe of  the Western Rong (Xi Rong西戎) by the mid-eighth century BC. This 
was the most immediate cause of  King Ping’s decision to move eastwards. However, 
recent research has revealed that many royal activities had been taking place in the 
capital city of  Chengzhou 成周 (Luoyi) since the early Western Zhou period. See Hsu 
and Linduff  (1988) 264-265. 
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          A number of  dukedoms originally founded by relatives or associates of  
the Zhou king, such as Zheng 鄭, Qi 齊, Jin晋, Lu 魯 and Qin 秦 had grown 
into powerful states from the late seventh and early sixth century BC. 
Subsequently, the non-Zhou states in the south, like Chu 楚 in the Han River 
Valley and Wu 吳 and Yue 越 in the Yangzi Delta also gained prominence 
during the early Eastern Zhou period, more commonly known as the Chunqiu 
(Spring and Autumn) period. 33  From approximately this period onwards, a 
number of  states in the Central Plain began to trace their cultures back to a 
common ethnic and cultural identity, the culture of  huaxia華夏. This increase 
in cultural and ethnic homogeneity ran parallel to a process in which barbarian 
tribes were either absorbed into the newly created world order or excluded 
from it.34 In part as a result of  this growth in cultural self-consciousness, the 
concept of  tianxia was increasingly used to denote a more or less “closed” 
entity whose boundaries were determined by culture, ethnicity and geography.35 
          Scholars have long observed the fundamental impact of  changes in 
ecology and landscape of  northern China on the formation of  the two cultural 
zones in the first half  of  the last millennium BC.36 As historical meteorologists 
and anthropologists have noted, the late Neolithic period (c. 2000-1000 BC) 
witnessed the emergence of  drier and colder climatic conditions along the line 
of  the northern Yellow River – Qin Mountains 黄河–秦嶺, especially in the 
area of  the present-day Ordos 鄂爾多斯 and Baotou包頭 in Inner Mongolia. 
This trend peaked around 1000 BC. As a result, in the vast areas ranging from 
                                                          
33 For the eclipse of  the Western Zhou royal house and the rise of  the neighbouring 
vassal states, see Hsu (1999) 547-51; Li Feng (2006) 91-140. 
34 For the locations of  the Zhou people and the non-Zhou in the Western Zhou and 
Spring and Autumn period, see Shi Nianhai 史念海 (1990) Vol. 2, 57-84. 
35  The rise of  the identity of  huaxia can be attributed to the long-term historical 
evolution of  the amalgamation between the Zhou people and their neighbours. See 
Paulleyblank (1983) 411-66; Hsu (1999) 550. Nowadays huaxia is often used as an 
equivalent of  “Chinese”, but strictly speaking this is a misuse of  the term. 
36 See Chu Coching 竺可楨 (1972) 17. From the perspective of  anthropology and 
archaeology, Wang Mingke 王明珂 believes that the pastoral boundary in northern 
China was formed between 2000 BC and 1000 BC as a result of  climate change. See 
Wang Mingke (2008) 97-99. In an influential publication Wang examined the formation 
of  the ecosystems in the areas of  modern Qinghai, Ordos and the West Liao River 
from c. 2000 BC to 600 BC; see Wang Mingke (1997), 95-151. In his classic book, Di 
Cosmo has also examined the transition to pastoral nomadism in the northern zone of  




Hetao 河套 located to the south of  the Yin Mountains 陰山 to the state of  
Yan and even to the north of  the Liaodong Peninsula 遼東半島, at the end of  
the seventh and sixth century BC the mixed economic model combining 
agriculture and animal husbandry was gradually replaced by a type of  nomadic 
economy.37 
          Correspondingly, the barbarians who lived to the north of  the Yellow 
River gradually developed their distinctive culture and customs. One outcome 
of  this natural change was the formation of  new ethnic peoples in the Eastern 
Zhou period. The Hu (later known as the Xiongnu 匈奴), for instance, were a 
confederation of  nomadic tribes which arose in the last decades of  the third 
century BC, when they began to pose a threat to the Qin and Han Empires. I 
shall discuss their development in a later chapter. Another phenomenon of  this 
period was the gradual migration of  a number of  peoples who had lived on the 
periphery of  the Zhou areas into the central regions. These peoples were 
progressively integrated into the mainstream huaxia culture. In the meantime, 
those tribes which remained in and beyond the Hexi Corridor 河西走廊 and 
on the Inner Mongolian Plateau were becoming nomadized. 
          Consequently, by the sixth century BC at the very latest two features can 
be observed. First, more frequently than before, those rulers who had 
established their states in the early Western Zhou period and were connected 
with the Zhou clans, like the leaders of  the states of  Qi, Lu and Jin, began to 
trace their origins to the Western Zhou culture. Both culturally and 
psychologically, they self-consciously distanced themselves from the non-Zhou 
states, including the barbarian tribes on the northern and western frontiers and 
those in and beyond the Yangzi River Valley. Abundant evidence in the 
documents created in the pre-Qin period reveals the cultural and ethnic 
discrimination towards such non-Zhou peoples as the Man 蠻 and the Yi 夷.38 
In the next three centuries, in order to seize hegemonic power (ba) 霸 over the 
Central Plain, the principal states of  Qi 齊 in the east, Jin 晉 in the north and 
Chu 楚 in the south as well as Wu 吳 and Yue 越 in the Yangzi River Delta 
struggled fiercely for power using the slogan “venerate the Zhou king, expel the 
barbarians” (Zun wang rang yi尊王攘夷).39 Interestingly, although in the Spring 
and Autumn period some states were situated in the remote areas of  the Zhou 
                                                          
37 Wang Mingke (2008) 65. 
38 For some instances in Chinese classical texts, see Luo Zhitian 羅志田 (1996) 215. 
39 On the formation of  the Ba system, see Hsu (1999) 551-562. 
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realm, intersecting with various ethnic tribes, they consciously reinforced their 
“Chinese-ness”, considering Zhou rituals and institutions as models which had 
to be followed.  
          The case of  the vassal state of  Qi bears witness to the vast distances 
across which these Zhou models were thought relevant. Although the first ruler 
of  Qi, Jiang Shang 姜尚, was not a member of  the Ji 姬 clan, the Jiang 姜 clan 
had established a marriage alliance with the Zhou rulers when Zhou was still a 
humble state in the Wei River Valley. As a general and the right-hand man of  
King Wu, Jiang Shang had made important contributions to the Zhou 
campaigns against Shang. Accordingly, Qi occupied a prominent position 
among the vassals of  the Western Zhou. In the Spring and Autumn period, 
Duke Huan of  Qi 齊桓公 (r. 685-643 BC) appointed Guan Zhong 管仲  prime 
minister. The latter embarked on a series of  reforms and finally made Qi the 
most powerful state of  the early Eastern Zhou period.40 Pertinently, it should 
be noted that, geographically, Qi was not at the centre of  the Zhou world but 
part of  the eastern lands bordering the sea. Like other states affiliated with 
Zhou, the Qi people were surrounded by various barbarian tribes, the most 
formidable of  which was the Dong Yi東夷. From roughly the early Western 
Zhou period onwards, Qi frequently suffered disturbances from incursions by 
neighbouring barbarian tribes like the Yi, Rong and Di. Furthermore, during 
the reign of  King Yi 夷王 (r. 899/7-873 BC), the king launched a military 
campaign against Duke Ai 齊哀公 (d. 863 BC) in retaliation for the latter’s 
noncompliance. Despite these difficulties, Qi was able to maintain a prominent 
place among the vassal states until the late Warring States period.  
          The influence exercised on the state of  Qi by Zhou culture is reflected 
by a famous saying of  Confucius (551-479 BC): 
 
Had it not been for Guan Zhong, we might well be wearing long hair and folding our 
robes to the left! 微管仲，吾其被髮左衽矣！41 
 
Confucius’ words imply that the differentiation between the xia 夏 or hua 華 
(Chinese-ness as selfness) and yi夷 (barbarianism as otherness) did not depend 
on the geographical distance between vassal states and the Zhou royal court, 
                                                          
40 On the hegemony of  the state of  Qin over the Central Plain in the reign of  Duke 
Huan, see Tong Shuye 童書業 (2003) 155-174. For Guan Zhong, see Rosen (1976). 
41 Lun yu (Xian wen) 14,17. 157. 
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but on the degree of  the affinity with the Zhou tradition in ritual and customs. 
After the collapse of  Zhou rule, the transmission of  the Zhou legacy was 
thought to be a key component in reconstructing the ethnical and cultural 
identities. 
          One of  the effects of  the emergence of  a relatively homogenous 
Chinese culture based on Zhou models was a transformation of  the idea of  
tianxia, which was now invested with new connotations. Two cases quoted from 
Zuo Zhuan, the most important document on the history of  the Lu state 
compiled in the Warring States period, illustrate this phenomenon: 
 
Even ruling the world mildly, (the Zhou) was still worried about invasions by the 
outsiders. 42 其懷柔天下也，猶懼有外侮。 
 
Humanizing the central states (zhongguo) by means of  virtue, while intimidating 
barbarians in the four quarters (siyi) by means of  punishment.43 德以柔中國，
刑以威四夷。 
 
In the first passage, Fu Chen 富辰 , a minister of  King Xiang (d. 619), is 
persuading the Zhou king to treat the vassal states, Hua 滑, Wei 衛 and Zheng
鄭 fairly. He does so by pointing out that, even in the period of  Western Zhou, 
when the Zhou house was powerful and capable of  ruling the world (tianxia) 
mildly, the Zhou was still anxious about external attacks (waifu). Fu’s words sit 
uneasily with the Zhou view that lands inhabited by “outsiders” were part of  
the “Zhou world”. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the dialogue 
between Fu Chen and King Xiang took place in the late seventh century, when 
Zhou power had been declining for a long time. In the meantime, the 
barbarians on the periphery of  the former Zhou realm and multiple vassal sates 
had risen to prominence. The worldview during this very period was 
undergoing a crucial transformation in which the original concept of  tianxia, 
which was based on the model of  a “centre and four quarters”, was finally 
displaced by a two-tier cosmic system based on the ideas of  “inside” (nei) and 
“outside” (wai). The geographical meaning of  zhongguo now increasingly became 
synonymous with tianxia, while the land of  barbarians was conceptualized in 
opposition to it. 
         In the second statement, siyi (barbarians living in the four quarters) is used 
                                                          
42 Zuo zhuan  (Xi 24) 425. 
43 Zuo zhuan  (Xi 25) 436.  
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in opposition to zhongguo (the people in the central states), indicating that a 
distinction between the two ethnic groups had been drawn.44 Literary texts 
show that Chinese identity was beginning to be consolidated as an articulation 
of  the concept of  zhongguo. The transformation of  the concept of  tianxia 
should be seen as a closely related development.45  
          Down to the Warring States period, various vassal states of  Zhou had 
been obliterated as a result of  perennial and intensive warfare. Finally, by the 
early and mid-fourth century BC seven major states, Yan 燕, Qi 齊, Zhao 趙, 
Wei 魏, Han 韓, Qin 秦 and Chu 楚, dominated the landscape of  Chinese 
politics. A detailed analysis of  the key factors and events leading to the 
formation of  the first unified Chinese Empire between the fourth and late third 
centuries BC is beyond the scope of  this chapter. Nevertheless, two 
developments which occurred during this period are directly relevant to the 
issues being discussed here. 
The first of  these is that, by the late third century BC, those non-Zhou 
barbarian tribes such as the Rong, Di and Yi which used to live on the northern 
periphery of  the old Zhou had either had been forced to move to areas far 
from the Chinese states in the Central Plain, or had migrated to the central 
areas and been incorporated into the newly shaped huaxia civilization. 
Secondly, by the late Warring States period, the geographical boundaries 
of  China, defined here as comprising all those areas in which huaxia civilization 
had taken root, had expanded far beyond the drainage basin of  the Yellow 
River. The state of  Chu provides a good illustration. Chu was initially 
established by the non-Zhou people of  the central Yangzi valley.46 Even in the 
early Western Zhou period, Chu had risen to prominence on account of  its far-
flung territory and large population, which allowed it to act as a counterweight 
to the power of  the Zhou and its vassals.47 After the conquest of  Yue in 334 
                                                          
44 Here zhongguo should be understood as an ethnic concept rather than geographical 
one.  
45 A great deal of  attention has been paid to the subject of  the mutual transitions 
between the xia夏 and the yi夷 in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. 
For some examples, see Luo Zhitian (1996) 213-224; Guo Wei 郭玮 (2004); Li Feng 
(2006) 285; Di Cosmo (2004) 93-94; Mittag and Mutschler (2010) 524. 
46 For discussions on the culture of  Chu and its acculturation with the states in the 
Central Plain during the Warring States period, see a series of  papers edited by Lawton 
(1991).   
47 For the geography of  Chu and its relationship with Western Zhou and its vassal 
states, see Blakeley (1999) 9-20. 
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BC, the Chu gained control over the entire middle and lower Yangzi River 
region. As a result of  frequent interactions with other major states in the 
Central Plain over the course of  several centuries, by the mid-fourth century at 
the latest in a cultural sense the Chu had come to resemble the old Zhou 
states.48  
          Another example is the state of  Qin. As it was situated in the Wei River 
Valley, Qin had been closely associated with various barbarian tribes and alien 
cultures since the Western Zhou dynasty. For a long while Qin had been a 
second-rank state among Zhou’s satellites. Nonetheless, archaeological evidence 
shows that the Qin nobles shared a common culture with their counterparts in 
other states of  the Central Plain.49 After the Shang Yang reforms 商鞅變法 in 
the mid-fourth century BC, Qin rose to become the leading state.50 For the 
purposes of  the present investigation, the most important point is that, while 
Qin undoubtedly distanced itself  from the other vassal states of  Zhou, it never 
considered itself  to be culturally more closely associated with the barbarians 
than with other Zhou vassal states in the Central Plain.51 Qin undoubtedly saw 
itself  as a part of  the tianxia order rather than as an outsider to that system.52  
                                                          
48 Major (1999) 168; This is, of  course, not to deny the distinctiveness of  the Chu 
culture from that of  the states in the northern part of  the Central Plain. For the 
distinctive culture of  Chu and its diversity and complexity, see several articles collected 
in Cook (1999). But, as Pines points out, “during the Warring States period, the 
centrifugal tendencies were counterbalanced by forces of  renewed cultural integration, 
promulgated by members of  the educated elite”; see Pines (2012) 187 n.12. 
49 Lewis (2007) 39.  
50 For the reforms in and territorial expansion of  Qin in the Warring States period, see 
Lewis (1999) 596. For the history of  Qin prior to unification, see the monograph of  
Wang Quchang 王蘧常(2000). For an excellent recent overview of  Qin history from its 
early origins to the eve of  unification, see Pines with Von Falkenhausen, Shelach and 
Yates (2013) 11-32. 
51  As Pines observes in a recent article, “For generations Western scholarship was 
plagued by the erroneous view, perpetuated among others by Bodde, which, following a 
series of  pejorative remarks about Qin in the Warring States and Han literature, in 
particular in the Historical Records Qin is identified as a “semi-barbarian” polity, a 
cultural outsider from the margins of  the Zhou civilization. Archaeologists — most 
notably Lothar von Falkenhausen — were among the first to question this 
misperception.” See Pines (2014) 446-447. Kern’s book on the stele inscriptions of  Qin 
Shi Huang is an impressive book reinforcing our understanding of  the close affinity of  
the Qin ruling elite with Zhou culture. 
52 I do not agree with Yuri Pines who boldly stated that, since the mid-fourth century 
BC after Shang Yang’s reforms, Qin was ‘definitely beyond tianxia boundaries’. See 
Pines (2002) 110. 
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On the basis of  the evidence, the conclusion is that, by the middle and 
late Warring States period, tianxia more frequently was used to refer to the huge 
landmass made up of  the combined territories of  the seven major states. Two 
passages quoted from the Zhanguo ce 戰國策  (Schemes/Strategies of  the 
Warring States) clearly show that such an idea was very common among the 
elite members in this period:  
 
In ancient times, there were tens of  thousands of  states within the four seas. 
Although the size of  some cities was big, none was bigger than 300 zhang. 
Although the population of  some cities was large, there was none larger than 3,000 
hu… The tens of  thousands of  states in ancient times have nowadays been reduced 




Although the term tianxia does not appear in this text, in which it is replaced by 
sihai, the message is clearly that the territory within the sihai (in other words, the 
tianxia) which had contained tens of  thousands of  states in remote antiquity, 
had now fallen under the control of  only seven major states.  
In another passage, Su Dai 蘇代, a statesman and rhetorician living in 
the middle of  the Warring States period, gives the following comment on the 
relative importance of  the state of  Yan among the states of  the Warring States 
period: 
 
In the tianxia which consists of  the seven states, Yan is one of  the weaker. 凡天下
之戰國七，而燕處弱焉。54 
         
On the basis of  the foregoing discussion, it is possible to conclude that the 
period between the late Shang era and the foundation of  the first unified 
empire witnessed some important transformations in worldviews.  
In the late Shang period, the early Chinese worldview conceptualized the 
world as consisting of  a “centre” and “four quarters”. In the Zhou period, a 
very similar cosmic ideology still prevailed according to which the world 
consisted of  a central capital (zhongguo) and four quarters (sifang), which had 
almost certainly been formulated under the influence of  Shang models. 
                                                          
53 Zhanguo ce 20 (Zhao 3,1) 678. 1 zhang = 10 chi = 2.32 metres. 
54 Zhanguo ce 29 (Yan 1,8) 1056. 
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Interestingly, the term tianxia rarely appears in early Chinese political discourse 
until the fall of  Zhou in the mid-seventh century. 
As a result of  the decline of  Zhou power in the eighth century BC, the 
Zhou capital of  Luoyi gradually lost its role as the centre of  the Zhou world. 
Probably as a result of  its diminution in power, the concept of  zhongguo 
acquired a broader connotation, developing as a term for the Chinese world 
and tending to become coterminous with tianxia.  
          When a recognizably Chinese identity began to develop from about the 
sixth century BC, it continued to bear the imprint of  Zhou tradition. From 
about this time, the Chinese worldview began to be heavily influenced by layers 
of  cultural and religious self-consciousness. The distinction between the hua 
(roughly translated as Chinese-ness) and yi (barbarianism), which appeared 
between the seventh and the fifth century BC, introduced an important element 
of  introversion and inclusiveness into Chinese worldviews.  
          From the middle of  the Warring States period, two factors encouraged 
this development. First, the increasingly clear-cut separation between the 
agricultural and nomadic worlds in the north; and second, the emergence of  an 
increasingly homogenous culture in which all of  the seven major states 
participated. 
          The establishment of  a unified Chinese Empire by the Qin king, Ying 
Zheng 嬴政 , who became the First Emperor, created a new world order 
encompassing all those areas which participated in the emerging Chinese 
culture and identity. This political fact is reflected by the further development 
of  the term tianxia, which now began to be used to refer to a “closed” 
geopolitical space consisting of  the former territories of  the seven states. 
 Although the literary evidence pointing to the emergence of  this new 
worldview is quite strong, it would be wrong to conclude that the more open 
conception of  the world which had existed in the Western Zhou period 
completely disappeared. In recent research into the development of  spatial 
conceptions in early Chinese classical literature, a chapter preserved in the Shang 
shu named Yugong禹貢 (Tribute of  Yu), an eulogy attributed to the legendary 
sage ruler Great Yu 大禹, the founder of  the Xia, has attracted particular 
attention. Unfortunately, this text cannot be securely dated. It is universally 
agreed that the Yugong cannot possibly have been written by its alleged author, 
but the dates of  composition which have been proposed in the scholarly 
literature range from the last centuries of  Zhou to the early imperial period. For 
the purposes of  my argument it does not really matter which of  these 
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proposals is more likely to be correct.55 
 According to traditional Chinese historiography, the Great Yu was 
known as a hero who successfully resolved the flooding problems which had 
plagued the Central Plain of  the Chinese landmass for a long time. Allegedly, he 
spent thirteen years giving leadership to people in trying to cope with the floods, 
and finally overcame them by draining the land and channelling the rivers to the 
sea.56 The Shangshu reports that the Great Yu divided the floodplain into nine 
parts, or nine provinces, named the jiuzhou 九州 . This is the earliest 
administrative division based on geographical knowledge recorded in Chinese 
historical documents.57 In the world system conceived by the Great Yu, the 
jiuzhou was closely linked to the wufu (five zones) 五服 , five geographical 
cultural zones which are named dian 甸, hou 候, sui 綏, yao 要 and huang 荒 
respectively.58 The innermost zone was seen not only as the geographical centre, 
but also symbolized the highest level of  civilization of  the five. Conversely, the 
zone of  huang, the outmost layer of  the world order, was seen as the least 
civilized region in the world. Everything lying outside of  the huangfu荒服, the 
outmost layer of  the system, was designated the siji四极 (four ends), referring 
to the four outermost ends of  the world. 
It is noteworthy that in some pieces of  classical Chinese literature the 
term siji is replaced by another term, sihai 四海 (four seas). In the book The 
Explanation of  Names (Shiming 釋名 ), a Chinese lexicographical compilation 
attributed to Liu Xi 劉熙 and believed to date from c. AD 200, the hai is 
explained as being interchangeable with the similarly shaped character, but with 
a different radical, hui晦, which means “too obscure to see clearly”.59 From this 
it might be inferred that the world order which is found in the Yugong, as argued 
                                                          
55 See Loewe (1993) 378. 
56 For the flood myths of  early China and the tale of  Great Yu, see Lewis (2006) 38-39.  
57 The names of  the nine provinces are not only recorded in the Yugong, they appear in 
later literary sources among them You shi lan 有始覽 in Lüshi Chunqiu 呂氏春秋, Zhi 
fang職方 in Zhouli周禮 (Zhou’s Ritual) and Shidi釋地 in Erya爾雅. Tang Xiaofeng 唐
曉峰 suggests that in the later sources jiuzhou is not always related to the tale of  the 
Great Yu. In the later period, it was generally used to refer to the vassal states of  the 
Western Zhou. See Tang Xiaofeng (2010) 221-222. 
58 According to Guangya廣雅, huang荒 means “remote” or “far”, see Shigu釋詁, Guang 
ya.  




earlier, had a relative well-defined centre but unclear boundaries. 
Whatever the exact date of  composition of  the Yugong might have been, 
its contents serve as a reminder that rather than ousting existing ideas about the 
world, the more closed worldview which emerged during the Spring and 
Warring States periods coexisted with older spatial conceptions.  
 




According to the Basic Annals of  the First Emperor of  Qin in the Shiji 史記 
(Records of  the Grand Historian), Qin Shi Huang paid four visits to his newly 
conquered eastern regions between 219 and 210 BC.60 During each of  his tours, 
he visited venerated mountains located on the eastern edge of  the empire and 
performed rituals, after each of  which a series of  inscribed stelae was set up to 
eulogize the virtues of  Qin (song Qin de 頌秦德).61 Although Sima Qian relates 
that eight stelae were set up during Qin Shi Huang’s eastern tours, the texts of  
only six inscriptions are recorded in his account. 62  The text of  a seventh 
inscription is known from a transcription made during the Tang dynasty. 
Linguistically, the seven surviving inscribed texts are characterized by certain 
uniform rhymes and formulae, but these aspects will not be discussed in this 
chapter.63  
                                                          
60 For the routes, see Wang Jingyang 王京陽 (1980) 70-76. 
61 For an introduction to Qin Shi Huang’s progresses and his stele inscriptions, see 
Kern (2000) 1-9. For the texts of  the stele inscriptions of  Qin Shi Huang, see Shiji 6, 
243-267; Kern (2000) 10-49. For a commentary on the inscriptions, see Rong Geng 
(1935) 125-171.   
62 The inscription of  Mt Yi 嶧山 was composed when Qin Shi Huang made his first 
tour in 219 BC but the text was not included in the Shiji. However, its contents have 
been preserved in a transcript which was made during the Tang 唐 dynasty (AD 618–
907). The copy of  the Mt Yi inscription is now in the Museum of  the Forest of  Stelae 
of  Shanxi Province. The only missing text is the inscription of  Zhifu 之罘, created 
after the First Emperor’s visit to Mount Zhifu in the same year. Most scholars do not 
doubt the authenticity of  these inscriptions; see Kern (2000) 3. 
63 Scholars believe the author of  the inscriptions to have been Li Si 李斯, Chancellor to 
the First Emperor. Liu Xie 劉勰 (467–522) and Li Daoyuan 酈道元 (c. 470 – 527), two 
writers who lived in the period of  Nanbei Dynasty 南北朝 , state that both the 
calligraphy and the content were derived from Li Si; see Liu Xie, Wenxin diaolong文心雕
龍 , 21,803; Li Daoyuan, Shuijing zhu 水經注 , 4,130; 25,810; 40,1256. Some have 
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          The texts of  Mt Langxie (琅邪) and Mt Kuaiji (会稽) contain 288 
characters each, making them twice as long as the other inscriptions.64 Despite 
these differences, all of  the seven inscriptions have the same basic structure.65 
For the purpose of  the present analysis, they can be divided into three parts. 
The first part provides background information which sets the scene for the 
following narrative. In part two, the inscription provides an eulogy of  the grand 
achievements of  Qin Shi Huang. In most cases the topics covered in this 
section include criticism of  the cruelty and violence of  the six former kings and 
praise for the pacification and unification achieved by the First Emperor. The 
last part can be regarded as a kind of  summary. It normally consists of  only 
two or three lines, closing the panegyric by emphasizing the lofty aim of  the 
erection of  the inscribed stelae, which are stated to have been set up in order to 
publicize the principles of  imperial rule and to glorify and transmit the 
accomplishments of  the First Emperor to later generations forever.66 
          Since Martin Kern has made a close and systematic analysis of the 
structure of the text, there is no need for a detailed re-examination of this 
topic.67 For this reason I shall immediately focus on those issues which are 
directly related to my own investigations. The two central questions which will 
occupy us are: What kind of worldview is found in Qin Shi Huang’s stele 
inscriptions, and in what way or ways does this worldview differ from those of 
the pre-imperial period? In the first half of this chapter, I discussed changes in 
Chinese worldviews over a long period of time, tracing their transformation 
between the late Shang and the Eastern Zhou periods. Building on earlier 
findings, I shall now proceed to examine the inscribed stelae set up by Qin Shi 
Huang with the aim of shedding some light on the next stage of development.  
 
3.2. Tianxia in the stelae 
 
                                                                                                                                        
expressed doubts about the authorship of  these inscriptions. Chen Zhiliang 陳志良, 
for example, thinks the texts were composed by Zhao Gao 趙高, a eunuch and later 
chancellor of  Qin. Since both Li Si and Zhao Gao were closely connected to Qin Shi 
Huang, the problem of  authorship has little relevance to my examination of  the 
worldviews of  the ruling class in the Early Imperial China. 
64 Some lines of  the Jieshi Gate inscription（碣石門）are thought to be missing.  
65 As pointed out by Kern (2008) 217-240. 
66 This formula is clearly presented in the inscriptions of  Mt Yi; Mt Tai; Mt Zhifu; Mt 
Jieshi Gate and Mt Kuaiji. 
67 Chapter 4 in Kern (2000), 119-147. 
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In the seven inscriptions, tianxia, one of the terms most frequently used in the 
text, occurs nine times altogether. The complete lists is as follows: 
 
i) Now the August Thearch/ Has unified the tianxia under one lineage/ Warfare 
will not occur again! 迺今皇帝，壹家天下，兵不復起！68 
 
ii) In his twenty-sixth year/ He first unified the tianxia/ There was none who was 
not respectful and submissive. 廿有六年，初並天下，罔不賓服。69 
 
iii) The August Thearch embodies sagacity/ And after having pacified the tianxia/ 
he has fulfilled his duties as a ruler. 皇帝躬聖，既平天下，不懈于治。70 
 
iv) Everywhere in the tianxia/ He unifies the minds and integrates the wills. 普天
之下，摶心輯志。71 
 
v) He universally promulgates sagacious laws/ Gives warp and woof to the tianxia/ 
Forever to serve as ritual norm and guideline. 普施明法，經緯天下，永為儀
則。72 
 
vi) He seized and extinguished the six kings/ Far and wide the tianxia was 
unified/ Disaster and harm were cut off and stopped/ Forever halted were clashes of 
arms. 禽滅六王，闡並天下，災害絕息，永偃戎兵。73 
 
vii) The numerous multitudes are free of corvée/ And the tianxia is pacified. 黎庶
无繇，天下咸抚。74 
 
viii) In his thirty-seventh year/ He tours the tianxia in person/ And all around 
surveys the distant regions. 卅有七年，親巡天下。75 
 
                                                          
68  Inscription of  Mt Yi, 28-29. The translations given here and below are slightly 
adapted versions of  those of  Kern.  
69 Inscription of  Mt Tai, 4-6.  
70 Inscription of  Mt Tai, 19-21.  
71 Inscription of  Mt Langxie, 17-18. 
72 Inscription of  Mt Zhifu, 28-30. 
73 Inscription of  Mt Zhifu Dong-guan, 16-18.  
74 Inscription of  the Jieshi Gate, 27-28. 
75 Inscription of  Mt Kuaiji, 4-6. 
49 
 
ix) He took great pains to cleanse/purify customs, and the entire tianxia receives the 
influence/is affected by this/ [All] is covered and clothed by the superb guidelines. 大
治濯俗，天下承風，蒙被休經。76  
 
In each of these nine passages, tianxia seems to refer to a relatively closed geo-
political entity. In the first text, tianxia refers to the unified land made up of the 
formerly fragmented territories of the multiple states which had existed before 
unification. The emphasis is on the fact that the First Emperor, for the first 
time, had unified the world under his own lineage. In the future warfare would 
be a thing of the past, disasters would no longer occur and people would 
henceforth live in peace and tranquility.77 The use of the phrase “has unified 
the tianxia under one lineage” (yi jia tianxia壹家天下) merits attention. In this 
instance, the character jia (家 house, lineage) symbolizes the House of Qin.78 It 
indicates that the territories of the former seven states constituting the tianxia 
have now been brought together in a cohesive imperium under Qin Shi Huang 
and his clan.79 
          The theme of unification, implying the earlier existence of a fragmented 
world, is also found in the inscriptions of Mt Tai (nos. ii and iii) and Mt Zhifu 
Dong-guan (no. vi). In the latter inscription the perspective shifts from 
territorial unification to the unification of minds and wills. 
          In the inscription of Mt Langxie (no. iv), the author eulogizes the 
accomplishments of the First Emperor by referring to his famous unification of 
the written script, weights and measures, coinage and so on. These measures 
can be seen as making a contribution to the unification of “minds and wills” 
                                                          
76 Inscription of  Mt Kuaiji, 58-9. 
77 In lines 19-27, the author briefly recalls history, stating that there had been conflicts 
and wars since remote antiquity. By calling attention to the chaos and turmoil of  the 
past, the author underlines the formidable achievement of  the First Emperor who had 
stopped warfare and unified the world.  
78 For the complicated relationship between guo國 (state) and jia家 (house) in ancient 
Chinese society, see the monograph by Ogata Isamu 尾形勇, trans. Zhang Hequan 張
鹤泉 (1993). The author examines the origin of  jia and its relationship to the royal 
houses and dynasties since the Zhou period. He acutely points out that the relationship 
between the state and house in kingship was based on the loyalty of  ministers to their 
political leaders. In our text, on the term yi-jia 壹家 , yi means “one”, jia refers to 
“house”. The phrase denotes that Qin Shi Huang annihilated the six feudal states and 
unified them as single state under the authority of  Qin, the new empire. For jia as a 
spatial unit in pre-Qin China, see Lewis’s recent study (2006) 77-130. 
79 For the historical narrative of  the annihilation of  the six states, see Shiji 5, 231-235.  
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referred to in Text iv. The basic message is that, on all levels, an indivisible 
imperial domain had been forged.80   
          The layout of the Zhifu inscription (no. v) is similar to that of the Mt Yi 
text. The author first eulogizes the military feats and prowess of Qin Shi Huang 
who had obliterated the atrocious kings of the six states through punitive wars, 
bringing an end to centuries of chaos and turmoil. In the subsequent section, 
the author focuses on the laws promulgated by the First Emperor. Here, the 
metaphor of the warp 經 and woof 緯 is used to denote the politico-ethical 
principles institutionalized by the emperor.81 The Emperor hopes these will be 
obeyed throughout the Empire and will be adopted as guidelines by later next 
generations.82  
          The stele inscription at the Gate of Jieshi, the present-day city of 
Qinhuangdao秦皇島, Hebei province (no. vii), was erected in 215 BC, when 
the First Emperor visited the territory of the former state of Yan during his 
third eastern excursion. Several lines are missing at the beginning of the text, 
but the structure and subject of the inscription generally coincides with those of 
the other six. The text states that, after eliminating the six kings, the First 
Emperor ordered all city-walls of the old states to be demolished, opened the 
river embankments and removed dangerous obstacles. These attempts were just 
as pertinently aimed at building a unified empire in a real sense. Following this, 
the author narrates that multitudes of commoners (lishu黎庶) are now free of 
corvée, and that the tianxia has been pacified and peace bestowed on it. 83 
Therefore, tianxia is connected to lishu, designating the people affected by the 
administrative re-organization of Qin.  
          In 210 BC, Qin Shi Huang made his fourth and final tour through the 
eastern commanderies of his empire (no. viii). This time he travelled all the way 
to the territory of the old Yue state (present-day Zhejiang province). This 
                                                          
80 Inscription of  Mt Langxie, 17-20. On these policies see Shiji 5, 239. In recent years, 
scholars have begun to doubt that the scale of  Qin Shi Huang’s reforms was as large as 
has been previously thought. For discussion, see Pines with Von Falkenhausen and 
Shelach and Yates (2013) 48. 
81 See Zuo Zhuan (Zhao 25) p.1197: The ritual is the discipline observed by both upper 
and lower classes in society, as warp and woof  connecting Heaven and Earth, see also 
Kern (2000) 37. 
82 Inscription of  Mt Zhifu, 30: “Forever to serve as ritual norm and guideline” (yong wei 
yi ze永爲儀則)  
83 Inscription of  Jieshi, 21-24.  
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region had been outside the old Zhou domain of earlier centuries, but had been 
incorporated within the First Emperor’s new tianxia system. 
          The ninth passage refers to Qin Shi Huang’s reforms in moral and social 
terms. In line 57, for example, the author claims that, under the sovereignty of 
the ruler, “all has been transformed to become honest and pure”.84 The entire 
population living within the boundaries of the political domain of Qin is said to 
have been affected by these reforms. Here as the other texts, the term tianxia 
cannot be interpreted as a reference to the entire world but only to those areas 
which had been conquered.85  
          The meanings of the term tianxia in the stelae inscriptions of Qin Shi 
Huang shed an interesting light on the relationship between the configuration 
of imperial power and imperial world views during the Qin period. Following 
the centuries of disunity and turmoil which had arisen after the decline of Zhou, 
for the first time the Chinese world was unified under a single monarchic 
sovereignty.  
          The First Emperor of Qin travelled continuously throughout the newly 
conquered territory for the purpose of consolidating imperial sovereignty and 
authority. During these journeys, sacrifices were performed on venerated 
mountains and on the banks of rivers to honour Heaven and various holy 
(ancestral) spirit beings in order to link the emperor to the divine world and 
immortality.86  The act of erecting inscribed stelae on top of mountains was 
meant to contribute to achieving this purpose.  
          Therefore, the meanings of the term tianxia which are encountered in the 
inscriptions strongly reinforce the idea that the Chinese “world” had begun to 
be perceived as a relatively closed geopolitical entity, different in character from 
                                                          
84 Inscriptions of  Mt Kuaiji, 57. 
85 Of  the seven inscriptions, only the last one mentions some concrete reforms of  
customs and rituals. I would suggest that this text refers to the territory occupied by the 
old Yue in the Spring and Autumn period. For a long time, this area had been regarded 
as a region in which civilization stood at a lower level than in the states of  the Central 
Plain. The First Emperor might have felt it more urgent to launch reforms in this 
region.  
86 It is believed that the spirits of  the legendary sage kings, like the Yellow Emperor and 
the Immortals could be reached by ascending to the top of  a number of  venerated 
mountains. This is the main reason the First Emperor and some emperors in the later 
Han dynasty had to travel to the eastern edge the world, ascending mountain tops to 




the unbounded and open worldview which was embraced by the Romans 
during the Late Republic and Early Principate.  
 
3.3. Tianxia in Sima Qian’s biography of Qin Shi Huang 
 
A study of the meanings of the term tianxia in the Basic Annals of the First 
Emperor strengthens this conclusion. In this treatise, the expression tianxia 
occurs ninety-one times, often in passages containing such terms as sihai四海, 
hainei海内 and junxian郡县, which belong to the same semantic field. These 
other terms help clarify the connotations of tianxia in the passages concerned. 
Some good examples are to be found in various passages from the Basic Annals 
of Qin Shi Huang: 
       
Chancellor Wang Wan, Imperial Secretary Feng Jie and Commandant of Justice Li 
Si all replied: “…Now Your Majesty has raised troops to punish the evil and the 
remiss, brought peace to the tianxia, made the hainei (area within the seas) into 
junxian (provinces and counties) and ensured that laws and rulings shall proceed from 
a single authority. From highest antiquity to the present, such a thing has never 




Thus the tianxia was divided into thirty-six jun (commanderies), and each 
commandery was provided with a governor, a military commandant and a censor. The 
common people were renamed the “black-headed ones”. 分天下為三十六郡，郡
置守、衛、監。更名民曰“黔首”。88 
 
Now the Emperor has unified the hainei (all within the sea), making it into juxian 
(commanderies and counties), and the bringing peace to the tianxia… 今皇帝並一
海內，以為郡縣，天下和平……89 
 
Captain of the Archers Zhou Qingchen stepped forward and spoke these words of 
praise: “In former times Qin’s territory did not exceed 1,000 li. But Your Majesty, 
through your spiritual power and enlightened sagacity, has pacified the hainei (all 
within the seas) and driven out the Man and Yi barbarians… 周青臣進頌曰：
                                                          
87 Shiji 6, 239. 
88 Ibid., 239.  






The Second Emperor plotted with Zhao Gao, saying: “I am still young and have just 
ascended the throne, and the black-headed people are not yet won over to me. The 
former emperor made tours through the commanderies and counties in order to display 
his might and cause the hainei (area within the seas) to be held in awe. Now, if I do 
not make a similar tour, they will regard me as weak and I shall have no way to 




The Second Emperor said: “…The former emperor rose up from among the feudal 
lords to unite the tianxia. After the tianxia had been pacified, he drove out the four 
barbarian tribes in order to bring peace to the border regions, and he built halls and 
palaces as a symbol of his success…” 二世曰：“……且先帝起諸侯，兼天
下，天下已定，外攘四夷以安邊境，作宮室以章得意……”92 
 
The first three passages refer to the tianxia or hainei being divided into 
administrative units after the establishment of a unified, pacified empire. The 
last three texts refer to the idea that imperial sovereignty was bounded by “the 
four seas” (sihai) or confined to the areas “within the seas” (hainei).93  This 
conceptualization of space and power was evidently influenced by the pre-Qin 
worldview in which the world consisted of a centre and four quarters (sifang). 
Ideologically, the primary Qin administrative organization, the system of 
commanderies and counties, was established throughout the newly conquered 
lands in which the people of huaxia, representing the mainstream of developing 
“Chineseness”, defined the backbone of the order of tianxia.94 In the process, 
the barbarian tribes, as clearly shown by the last three texts, were all driven out 
of the newly formed Chinese realm.  
In the biography of Qin Shi Huang, Sima Qian relates that walls and 
bulwarks were built to fend off the invasions by non-Chinese barbarians, of 
which the most important project was the construction of the Great Wall.95 Qin 
                                                          
90 Ibid., 254. 
91 Ibid., 267. 
92 Ibid., 271.  
93 For the symbolic meaning of  the “sea”, see the above discussion.  
94 For the names of  the thirty-six provinces, see Shiji 5, 239.  
95 Shiji 5, 239. 
54 
 
Shi Huang’s overall defensive imperial policy was bitterly criticized after the 
collapse of Qin. The most influential critic was the early-Han statesman Jia Yi
賈誼 (200-168 BC). In his famous essay, Faulting the Qin (Guo Qin lun過秦論), 
Jia identified the completely defensive policy of Qin as one of the main reasons 
for its rapid demise.96 The practical imperial policies of the Qin dynasty will be 
discussed in a later chapter. 
 
4. Alternative worldviews in Qin China 
 
Soon after the unification, according to Shiji, the high-ranking Qin officials led 
by Chancellor Wang Guan 王琯, Court Minister Li Si and Imperial Councillor 
Feng Jie馮劫, advised Ying Zheng to change his title in order to broadcast his 
successes.97 Having examined various old designations such as those of the 
Three Augusts 三皇 and the Five Emperors 五帝, which had been used to 
refer to the legendary sage rulers of remote antiquity, he coined a brand new 
title huangdi皇帝 (Thearch August) for himself. By assuming this title Qin Shi 
Huang wished to express the idea that he had opened a completely new chapter 
in human history, in line with his conviction that his personal achievements 
surpassed those of any previous ruler.98 The title of “king” (wang王) transmitted 
from the Zhou dynasty was no longer deemed appropriate. Interestingly, 
another traditional title, tianzi, meaning “Son of Heaven”, remained in use.99 As 
                                                          
96  Jia Yi’s essay is recorded in Sima Qian’s Shiji. As Jia notes, “Qin united and 
incorporated the lands of  the feudal lords East of  the Mount into more than thirty 
commanderies, repaired ferries and forts, and refined their armour and weapons to 
protect them”. See Shiji 5, 279. 
97 In their proposal these officials highlighted the achievements of  the First Emperor. 
As they pointed out, “if  the title is not changed now, there will be no way to celebrate 
the achievements and make them known to [future] generations. Let’s consult on the 
imperial title.” See Shiji 5, 236. 
98 According to Nishijima Sado 西嶋定生, as a title, huangdi 皇帝, originally meant 
“shining god”. Literally,  the character huang皇 has the same sound value as 煌, and as 
an adjective means “shining”. If  this opinion is right, it would follow that the First 
Emperor saw himself  as a god rather than as a deified human being. Therefore, Sado’s 
observation challenges the traditional view that the emperor was assumed to be an 
agent between God and humankind, a view which Sado thinks emerged only after the 
period of  the Western Han dynasty. See Nishijima Sado 西嶋定生 , trans. Huang 
Yaoneng 黄耀能 (1983) 23-24. 
99  The term tianzi 天子 , which can be traced back to the Western Zhou dynasty, 
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many scholars have pointed out, this title emphasizes the affinity existing 
between the ruler and Heaven, denoting that the ruler’s legitimate power 
derived from Heaven. This ideological claim might explain why the First 
Emperor chose to have his accomplishments displayed on mountain tops near 
the edge of the oikoumene, in complete contrast to the Senate’s decision to set up 
copies of Augustus’ Res Gestae in major cities.100 
          If imperial sovereignty was to be linked to Heaven, it should not be 
limited by any spatial limits, like mountains, rivers and seas, but extend to the 
everything under Heaven, in accordance with the literal meaning of tianxia. As a 
matter of fact, the stele inscriptions contain various references to such a 
worldview, which is at odds with the concept of a bounded tianxia:  
 
This is the land of the August Emperor: to the west it ranges to the flowing sands, to 
the south it completely takes in where the doors face north. To the east it enfolds the 
eastern sea, to the north, it goes beyond Daxia. Wherever human traces reach, there 
are none who are not his subjects. 皇帝之土，西涉流沙，南盡北戶，東有
東海，北過大夏，人跡所至，無不臣者。101 
 
It is also recorded that every bit of earth on which the sun and the moon shine 
is included in the emperor’s domain: 
 
Wherever the sun and moon shine, and wherever boats and carriages carry loads, all 
people live out their lives and of all/among them all there is none who does not achieve 
his ambitions！日月所照，舟輿所載，皆終其命，莫不得意！102  
 
These two passages refer to a worldview which is radically different from that 
which encountered in other passages of the same texts. Interestingly, however, 
the existence of this alternative worldview never tempted the First Emperor to 
adopt a sustained policy of further expansion after the territories of the seven 
major states had been unified into a single empire. 
          It is true that, after 221 BC, the First Emperor ordered his generals to 
campaign against the Yi tribes in the southeast of the empire, and took great 
                                                                                                                                        
appeared in Chinese sources at very early period. By the time of  Warring States period, 
it had become the general designation of  the political leader with highest power. See 
Gan Huaizhen 甘懷真 (2008) 348.  
100 For a more detailed discussion of  Qin Shi Huang’s visit to Mount Tai and of  the 
performance of  the rituals of  feng and shan, see Chapter 6. 
101 Inscription of  Mt Langxie, 62-68.  
102 Inscription of  Mt Langxie, 21-24.  
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pains to conquer the Southern Yue 南 越 , establishing a number of 
commanderies and counties on the imperial frontiers,103 but these military and 
administrative efforts should be seen as sequels to the defeat of the state of 
Chu in 223 BC. Unlike Augustus, the First Emperor of China does not seem to 
have been much attracted by the idea of extending imperial power into terra 
incognita. 
          A brief review of the military conquests of Qin after 221 BC casts into 
relief the differences existing between the imperial policies of the two empires. 
Shortly after the unification of China, Qin Shi Huang established a 
commandery in Longxi 隴西 (present-day southeastern Gansu Province) to 
define and stabilize the western frontier of the new Empire.104 Following this 
he ordered his general, Meng Tian 蒙恬, to expel the Qiang tribes 羌 from the 
Hehuang Basin 河湟谷地 (modern eastern Qinghai province).105 After this goal 
had been achieved, the First Emperor seems to have had no interest in any 
further westward expansion.  
If Sima Qian’s narrative can be relied upon, the campaign which was 
fought against the Xiongnu in 215 BC arose from more or less fortuitous 
causes. When Qin Shi Huang was on his way to inspect the northern frontier of 
the empire, Master Lu 卢生, a native of Yan, who had been sent out to the East 
[China] Sea to search for the Immortals, returned. He submitted a document to 
the emperor in which he predicted that the Qin Empire would be ended by the 
                                                          
103 Sima Qian reports that, after the defeat of  the Chu state, Qin established new 
provinces in the south of  Chu, namely Ba province 巴郡 and Qianzhong province 黔
中郡. In the Qin dynasty, a man named Chang An 常頞 was ordered to construct a 
road called Wuchi Dao 五尺道 to cross from Southern Shu 蜀南 (corresponding to 
southern Sichuan Province) to Dianchi 滇池 (modern Dali 大理, Yunnan Province). 
Some imperial officials were dispatched to administer these areas. See Shiji 116, 2993. 
Fan Ye says that King Zhao 昭 (325-251 BC) of  the Qin state annexed some lands of  
the Yi tribes and created the province of  Qianzhong when the Qin army was 
campaigning against Chu under General Bai Qi 白起. For details, see Fan Ye 范曄, Hou 
Hanshu 86.  
104 The three provinces, Longxi 隴西, Beidi 北地 and Shangjun 上郡, were established 
in the reign of  King Zhao, after the king of  Yiqu 義渠, a barbarian tribe active in the 
Liupan Mountains 六盤山 and Hetao area, had been killed by Empress Xuan in the 
Ganquan Palace 甘泉宮. Immediately after the establishment of  these provinces, the 
ruler of  Qin begun to build Great Wall in these areas to protect them from hostile raids 
undertaken by the Hu. See Shiji 109, 2874.  
105 Hou Hanshu 87,77.  
57 
 
Hu. For this reason the First Emperor ordered Meng Tian to attack the Hu 
barbarians in the north with a force of 300,000 troops. Meng Tian successfully 
seized the area to the south of the bend in the Yellow River. In the area 
between Yuzhong 榆中 and Mt Yin 陰山, forty-four counties were established 
in the frontier zone in order to establish security.106 A line of fortification works 
was constructed along the Yellow River to protect the northern frontier. Only 
three regions beyond the Yellow River, namely: Gaoque 高闕, Beijia 北假 and 
Yangshan 陽山, had been seized from the hands of barbarians, but outposts 
were also established to separate the Rong people 戎  from the Chinese 
settlements.107 In 213 BC, Sima Qian says, officials in charge of administering 
lawsuits who had been found guilty of corruption were transported either to 
construct the northern section of the Great Wall or the garrison of Nan Yue in 
the southernmost part of the Qin Empire.108  
To sum up, the stele inscriptions and other sources for Qin history 
indicate the simultaneous existence of two seemingly contradictory worldviews. 
On the one hand, there is the view that “all under Heaven” had been unified 
under the First Emperor’s omnipotent and omnipresent power. On the other 
hand, the idea that imperial sovereignty was geographically unbounded also 
existed. To judge from the surviving sources, the former view was not only 
ideologically dominant but also informed or reflected actual Qin policies. The 
First Emperor and his son were fully aware that beyond the boundaries of the 
Qin Empire lived other ethnic groups including the Qiang, the Rong, the Hu 
and Chaoxian 朝鮮. In most texts these huge territories are represented as lying 
outside the boundaries of the tianxia, and neither the Qin nor the early Han 
emperors showed any great interest in subjugating these areas. 
 
5. China and Rome compared  
 
As we have seen, the concepts orbis terrarum, “circle of the lands”, and tianxia, 
“all under Heaven”, played an important part in the imperial ideologies and 
worldviews of the early Principate and Qin China respectively. At first glance, 
the two concepts, each of which refers to “the world as a whole”, are very 
                                                          
106 For the anecdote and Meng Tian’s military success against Xiongnu, see Shiji 5, 252-
253. 
107 Ibid., 253.  
108 Three provinces were created in Lingnan 嶺南 which was located in the very south 
of  the territory, namely: Guilin 桂林, Xiangjun 象郡 and Nanhai 南海. See Shiji 5, 253.  
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similar. Nevertheless, on closer inspection, it transpires that they carry rather 
different meanings which point to important differences in the way the world, 
and the place of the Roman and Chinese Empires in that world, were perceived. 
          The first chapter has revealed that orbis terrarum, in the language of 
politics of the Late Roman Republic, and specifically in the inscription of Res 
Gestae Divi Augusti, refers to an open, externally orientated and all-inclusive 
worldview. In complete contrast to this, both the stele inscriptions set up by 
Qin Shi Huang and classical Chinese literature employ the term tianxia to refer 
to a far more closed, inwardly orientated and exclusive view of the world. The 
founding emperors of China and Rome, Qin Shi Huang and Augustus, both 
demonstrated their supreme authority by claiming that they had achieved 
“world dominance”, but in reality they were claiming two different things. How 
can this discrepancy be accounted for? 
          Part of the explanation might lie in the rather different historical 
trajectories followed by early Roman and early Chinese expansion and in the 
different social and political structures of republican Roman and pre-Qin 
society. As pointed out by Eckstein, the war-like city-state of Rome developed 
in a ferociously competitive inter-state environment which covered large parts 
of the Mediterranean world. Consequently, the emergence and persistence of a 
militaristic mentality in Rome cannot be regarded as exceptional or surprising. 
What remains striking is the extent to which the processes of military expansion 
were intertwined with social and political developments in republican Rome. 
Large sections of Roman society benefited from the conquests which 
commenced in the late fifth century BC and accelerated during the final 
centuries of the Republic. Lands and booty were distributed to Roman 
smallholders as reward for their service in the army. Aristocrats were expected 
to serve in the army for as long as ten years, and aristocratic generals and 
officers acquired land, slaves and social prestige. In conjunction with the 
emphasis on virtus and gloria as key cultural values, the fierce competition among 
the Roman noble families in their pursuit of military prestige and glory made 
the Roman state an aggressive “war machine”.109 The interplay between these 
                                                          
109 Joseph Schumpeter defined imperialism as the “objectiveless disposition of  a state to 
unlimited forcible expansion”. See Dolye (1986) 23-24. Schumpeter is probably one of  
the earliest scholars to use the phrase  “war machine” to describe the aggressiveness 
and intense militarism of  some empires in human history.  Here I use the term “war 
machine” to describe Rome’s aggressiveness in annexing alien territories, but I do not 
agree that Rome’s expansion was driven by an “objectiveless disposition”. For a good 
discussion of  the objectives of  Roman warfare and expansion during the Republic see 
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internal stimuli and external factors drove a process of quasi-continuous 
expansion which lasted for centuries.  
          As was discussed in Chapter One, Hellenistic imperial ideologies began 
to affect Roman worldviews in the second century but did not achieve any 
prominence until the second quarter of the last century BC. In this period, 
territorial expansion continued to be seen as a tool to satisfy the personal desire 
for glory. Nevertheless, the elite of republican Italy had now also found an 
ideology perfectly suited to presenting the seemingly never-ending process of 
expansion in a new light and to define “world domination” as the ultimate goal 
of this process. Following the establishment of the Principate, this ideology was 
adopted by Augustus and thence found its way into the imperial ideology of 
subsequent centuries. 
          Ancient China followed a completely different historical trajectory. 
Unlike the Roman Empire of the late first century BC, the first united Chinese 
Empire was preceded by the organized and highly prestigious political system 
of the Western Zhou which had encompassed large parts of China. In other 
words, by the time of the establishment of the Qin Empire in 221 BC, 
advanced political entities had already existed in the landmass of East Asia for 
centuries. The Western Zhou can be seen as a quasi-territorial empire which 
was characterized by the supremacy of the Zhou king over a number of feudal 
states which occupied most of the Zhou world. As said, the worldview of the 
Zhou people appears to have been based primarily on the view that the world 
consisted of a “centre” and “four quarters”. This corresponded to the political 
structure of the Zhou realm which consisted of a royal domain which was 
surrounded by multiple vassal states.  
          The high value which the Zhou kings placed on the concept of zhong 
(centre) can be traced back to the late Shang dynasty. The first ruler of the 
Western Zhou dynasty built a new capital, the city of Luoyi, which he named 
zhongguo, referring to the centre of the state. He also called himself Son of 
Heaven, reflecting the claim that his rule was based on a “Mandate of Heaven” 
(tianming天命).  
          If Heaven was seen as a supreme god rather than simply as a celestial 
object, this might have resulted in a worldview in which the areas subjected to 
this omnipotent Heaven did not have any geographical limits. However, as 
noted in the first half of this chapter, the term tianxia rarely appears in Western 
Zhou texts. So it is not entirely clear where the limits of the Zhou territory were 
                                                                                                                                        
Harris (1979).  
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supposed to lie. In reality, the Zhou king distributed the conquered lands to his 
supporters, and the multiple regional states thereby created, mainly in the 
eastern lands, surrounded Luoyi in the nature of satellites.  
          The eastern capital of Luoyi did not become the political centre of the 
Zhou world until 771 BC, when King Ping was forced to move there as a result 
of the threat posed by the western Rong. During the following centuries, the 
power of the central Zhou state declined, while that of a handful of Zhou 
feudal states increased. Pledging its allegiance to the principle “venerate the 
Zhou king, expel the barbarians”, the state of Qi followed Zhou rituals and 
norms while trying to carve out a dominant position in the newly emerging 
multi-state system. However, in the following two centuries Zhou rituals 
became increasingly less important, prompting Confucius to call for a 
restoration of the order in the world by returning to the rituals and norms of 
the Zhou ancestors.  
          Under these circumstances the concept of zhong (centre) became even 
more important than it had been. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, during 
this period, the idea of centre was transformed from a geographical into a 
cultural and ethnic concept. This shift was paralleled by the gradual emergence 
of the cultural concept of “Chinese-ness” (xia) from which all non-Chinese 
peoples (yi) were excluded.  
          As a result of these developments, the earlier worldview which had been 
based on the opposition between centre and sifang was replaced by a new 
perception of the world which distinguished between “inside” and “outside”. In 
this new context, the term tianxia, “all under heaven”, acquired a new meaning. 
From the late third century BC, this term was frequently used to refer to the 
“closed” geographical, political and cultural world ruled by Qin Shi Huang and 
his successors.  
          The historical trajectory followed by the fast expanding city-state of 
Rome was completely different. Although Roman culture was heavily 
influenced first by the Etruscans and later by the Hellenistic Greeks, the 
aristocratic elite of republican Rome did not have to deal with the cultural 
legacy of a highly prestigious political and cultural precursor comparable to the 
Zhou kingdom. During the seventh century BC, Rome had been just one of a 
vast number of tiny city-states and over the centuries which followed Roman 
worldviews took shape gradually in a long process of centrifugal expansion. 
During the first half of the third century, the concept of Italia became an 
important element in Roman territorial thinking, but as demonstrated in 
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Chapter One, even this concept was open to various interpretations, and soon 
after Roman hegemony had been established throughout peninsular Italy, 
Roman armies were sent to Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, North Africa and the Greek-
speaking East. 
When cultural contacts with the Hellenistic world intensified during the 
second and first centuries BC, Rome took over the Hellenistic ideology of 
world dominance, an idea which perfectly described the logical outcome of a 
never-ending process of centrifugal expansion. Elaborating on this idea, writers 
of the Augustan period developed not only the concept of the imperium sine fine 
but also the idea that Rome or Italy was the centre of the orbis terrarum.110 The 
centrifugal, inclusive and encompassing worldview of this period stands in 
sharp contrast to the cohesive, exclusive and self-contained perception of the 
world which is found in Qin and Han China. 
Although this contrast between Roman and Chinese worldviews can be 
convincingly related to differences in the military, political and cultural 
trajectories from which the Qin-Han and Roman Empires emerged, ecological 
factors might also have played a part. The city of Rome was situated in close 
proximity to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, leading to a much higher 
level of connectivity. After the Second Punic War, the existence of excellent 
connections by sea facilitated Roman expansion and, by the end of the first 
century BC, Roman “world dominance” continued to be largely synonymous 
with mastery of the Mediterranean world.111 
The core area of Shang China was the North Chinese Plain, far away 
from the sea. When this fact is taken into consideration, it is not entirely 
surprising that the Shang people saw themselves as occupying the centre of a 
square world. The homeland of the Zhou kings was located in the Wei River 
Valley, adjacent to the Yellow River but far from the Yellow Sea. In various 
early Chinese texts, such as the Book of Mountains and Seas (Shanhai jing山海經) 
and the Tales of King Mu, Song of Heaven (Mu tianzi zhuan穆天子傳), the sea is 
described as a marginal part of the world, teeming with exotic mysteries.112 
                                                          
110 For example, Strab. 2,5,26; 6, 4,1. Vitr. 6,1,10-11. For a good discussion of  this idea 
see Clark (1999) 220-223. 
111 For the ecology of  the Roman Empire, see Woolf  (2012) 56-61. For connectivity in 
the ancient Mediterranean world, see Horden and Purcell (2000) and Wilson (2003). 
For the Mediterranean as the Roman mare nostrum see Abulafia (2011) 191-211. See also 
the essays in Harris (2005) for a reconsideration of  the role of  the Mediterranean in 
Antiquity.  
112 Tang (2006) 128-33. In Chinese classical texts the Eastern Sea is often associated 
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          As the discussion in Chapter Four will show, the ecological changes 
which took place in the northern regions of China between the sixth and third 
centuries BC created a rather sharp dichotomy between the areas dominated by 
traditional farming and the regions in which pastoral nomadism was becoming 
the principal economic activity. Even before the unification of China in 221 BC, 
the states of the northern plain had begun to build walls as a prevention against 
invasions by the nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes of the north. Admittedly, 
some of these walls were built to secure newly conquered areas rather than to 
protect existing territories. The stone walls along the Yin Mountain Ridges built 
by Zhao in the late Warring States period, for example, are a mark of the 
successful expansion of the agrarian territories to the north.113 Similarly, Qin 
Shi Huang’s military operations against the Xiongnu, which resulted in the  
conquest of the Houtao area 後套 in 215 BC, are also thought to have served 
this purpose.114 However, the construction of the Great Wall following the 
completion of the First Emperor’s short campaign against the northern 
barbarians strongly suggests that he had no interest in further territorial 
expansion. 115  Similarly, after Qin’s conquest of Nanyue, the Qin and Han 
emperors showed little interest in conquering the hilly terrain of South China 
stretching beyond the Yangzi valley. 
          Turning to the Roman Empire, it has been suggested that the pace of 
territorial expansion slowed down after Augustus because various “natural” 
limits, among them the Rhine, the Danube and the Sahara, had been reached.116 
But closer inspection suggests that, although the Sahara and the Arabian Desert 
did form insuperable obstacles, many opportunities for further conquest 
continued to exist in other areas. What possible explanation can be offered for 
the fact that, in the two centuries which followed Augustus’ death, far fewer 
regions were added to the Empire than during the last two centuries BC? Does 
                                                                                                                                        
with monsters and the Immortals. 
113 Baiyin Chagan 白音查幹 (2000) 81-6. Cf. Di Cosmo (2004) 138-58. Lees and Bates 
argue that the increase in the number of  the people involved in agriculture during the 
Warring States period stimulated the devolvement of  irrigated farming, which in turn 
stimulated further population growth. The agriculturalists responded to this by 
expanding their farming areas to the north. See Lees and Bates (1974) 187-193. 
114 Wang Mingke 王明珂 (2008) 155;  Xin Deyong 辛德勇 (2009) 241-42; 55. For a 
detailed discussion of  the northern frontiers of  the Qin and Han Empires and of  the 
functions of  the Great Wall, see Chapter Four. 
115 For a more detailed discussion of  this issue see Chapter 4.  
116 Cornell (1993) 141 and 146. 
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this mean that the policies of most Roman emperors were less aggressive than 
those of the generals of the Middle and Late Republic? Is it possible to find any 
evidence of the gradual abandonment of the “open” worldview of the 
Augustan age and the emergence of a more “closed” perception of the Roman 
world which placed more emphasis on the opposition between the “civilized” 
world ruled by the Roman emperors and the areas beyond the frontiers 
inhabited by “uncivilized” barbarians? These are the main questions for which 





From Orbis terrarum to Orbis Romanus:  




Most handbooks in the field of ancient history give the year 27 BC as the 
commencement of the history of the Roman Empire, but the heyday of Roman 
territorial expansion was in the period of the Late Republic, roughly from the 
age of Sulla to that of Julius Caesar, rather than during the Early Empire.1  
          During much of the Augustan period, the momentum of Roman 
expansion remained robust. After the annexation of Egypt in 30 BC, North-
West Spain was subjugated by 19 BC. After these conquests, Augustus acquired 
new territories in Africa and Arabia. The hill tribes of the Alpine region 
succumbed to Roman rule after bitter fighting between 16 to 14 BC. Pannonia, 
Dalmatia, northern Macedonia and Achaea were also incorporated in this 
period. The brothers Drusus and Tiberius launched large-scale campaigns into 
the German lands beyond the Rhine between 12 and 9 BC, leading Roman 
arms as far as the Elbe River. At the time of the Teutoburg Forest disaster in 
AD 9, Germany was on the point of becoming a province. This audacious 
worldwide military expansion fits the literary picture which is found in the Res 
Gestae, as I have argued in the first chapter of this thesis.2  
          Despite such a promising beginning, during the last decade of Augustus’ 
reign the Romans suffered a severe blow from revolts in Dalmatia and 
Pannonia between AD 6 and AD 9. Immediately following the revolt of 
Illyricum, Varus’ defeat resulted in the loss of three Roman legions. The elderly 
Augustus responded by moving all Roman forces back to the left bank of the 
Rhine. In a posthumous consilium, he advised his successor not to expand the 
boundaries of the empire beyond the current frontiers.3 This consilium suggests a 
                                                          
1 For the rise of  Roman imperialism, see Chapter One.  
2 Many articles focus on the subject of  the world conquest under Augustus, for example, 
Brunt (1990) 169-176; Nicolet (1991) 40-47; Eck (1998), 93-104. 
3 Tac., Ann. 1,11,7: addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminus imperii (He had added the 
advice that the empire should be kept within its boundary stones); Dio, 56,33; 
Whittaker (1994) 25.  
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degree of frontier consciousness had awakened in the minds of the Roman 
ruling elite of the Early Principate.4  
          John Richardson has studied the change in the meanings of the two 
terms imperium and provincia in Latin literature. One of his findings was that it 
was only during the final years of Augustus’ reign that these terms began to be 
used to refer to territorial entities which were bounded by fines.5 In the Res 
Gestae, Augustus claims that he extended the fines of “all the provinces of the 
Roman people” (omnium provinciarum populi Romani). Here the provinces are seen 
as geographically circumscribed units whose size could be expanded by military 
conquest. In his consilium, Augustus advised his successors to refrain from 
further expansion and “not to wish to increase the empire to any greater 
dimensions”.6  
          In retrospect, Augustus’ recommendation did not determine Roman 
imperial policy making during the first and second centuries. Only three 
decades after the catastrophe in the Teutoburg Forest, the Romans began to 
contemplate the conquest of Britain. Gaius’ abortive plan to invade the island 
was followed up by Claudius who sent an invasion army in AD 43. Although 
his successor Nero might be seen as one of the least warlike emperors in 
Roman history, imperial conquest continued during his reign. In the East, 
Nero’s general, Corbulo, achieved notable successes against Parthia, and in the 
West the Romans continued to expand their territory in Britain. In AD 61, 
Nero dispatched a praetorian regiment up the Nile on an exploratory and 
cartographical mission. Around the time of his death, he was planning to send 
his armies to the region of the Caspian Gates.7 In the 80s AD, Domitian’s 
Chattian Wars extended Roman control over parts of Free Germany. Two 
decades later, Trajan turned Dacia into a Roman province and as late as the 
                                                          
4 Isaac (1990) 28; Whittaker (1994) 29; (2004) 40-42.  
5 Richardson (2011) 10. While Richardson’s theory is broadly acceptable, he goes rather 
far in playing down the degree of  frontier consciousness during the Republic. The lex 
publici portorii Asiae (AE 1989, 681; SEG XXXIX 1180), which was set up under Nero 
but contains much Republican material, refers to “the boundaries of  the province”, 
demonstrating that a distinction was made between the land within the province of  
Asia and that outside the provincial boundaries. For studies of  the inscription, see 
Engelmann and Knibbe (1989); Cottier and Crawford (2009). For discussions of  the 
boundaries of  the province of  Asia, see Mitchell (2009) 169 ff.; Kantor (2011) 155-58.  
6 Cass. Dio 56,33,5. 
7  Plin. HN 6,181; Sen. Q Nat. 6,8,3–4; and Cass. Dio 63,8,1; Nicolet (1991) 86; 
Pogorzelski (2011) 151. 
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early third century Septimius Severus invaded Mesopotamia. Cassius Dio claims 
that he did so “out of a desire for glory”.8  
          In short, although the pace of the Roman conquest slowed down during 
and after the final years of Augustus’ reign, territorial expansion continued for 
more than two centuries, demonstrating that, until the early third century, most 
Roman emperors did not direct their efforts to demarcating the frontiers of the 
empire. 
          In this chapter I shall argue that a more bounded worldview began to 
emerge during the second century AD, without obliterating the Augustan 
ideology of the imperium sine fine. One of the questions which will be considered 
is how these competing worldviews could coexist. Another is whether the 
emergence of an alternative worldview which assigned great importance to 
fixed and well-defended boundaries had any discernible impact on actual 
military policies.  
 
2. Fines imperii: limits of power or limits of territory?   
 
As seen in the first chapter, the Emperor Augustus proclaimed that he had 
made the entire world subject to the rule (imperium) of the Roman people.9 This 
claim fits perfectly with the concept of an imperium sine fine which is found in 
Virgil’s Aeneid.10 Indeed, the relationship between space and power is more 
explicitly expressed in the works of other Augustan writers such as Horace, 
Ovid and Vitruvius, and material objects also broadcast the idea that all the 
peoples of the world were now subject to Rome. On the Gemma Augustea, the 
emperor can be seen enthroned as Jupiter, sitting in the midst of various deities, 
including Roma, Tellus and Oceanus. He is crowned by another figure who has 
been identified as Oikoumene. The bottom half of the cameo shows Roman 
soldiers with barbarian captives. 11  The image explicitly advertises Rome’s 
supremacy over the entire world, while emphasizing Augustus’ divinely 
sanctioned power and authority. The Great Cameo of France, which dates to 
                                                          
8 Cass. Dio 67,4,1.  
9 RG heading: quibus orbem terrarum imperio populi Romani subiecit. Some scholars assume 
the preface was added by Tiberius. See Cooley (2009) 102. 
10 Verg. Aen 1,278-79. 
11 For the Gemma Augusta, see Bernoulli (1886) 262–274 and Plate XXIX; Picard 
(1957) 304–310; Richter (1971) Vol. 2, no. 501; Megow (1987) no. A10, 155–163; 
Hannestad 1988, 78–80; Ando (2000) 287. For a picture see Zanker (1988) 230–232, 
with Fig. 182 on p. 231; Pollini (1993) 50; Whittaker (1994) 33-34, with Fig. 6 on p. 34.  
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the early reign of Tiberius, also expresses the idea that the imperium Romani has 
no boundaries. 12  The image shows a seated Tiberius holding a spear and 
surrounded by a cluster of figures. Some of these have been identified as 
members of the imperial domus divina and others as deities. In the sky, can be 
seen a man carrying a globe. One of the messages conveyed by this scene is that 
domination over the orbis terrarum had been transmitted from Augustus to 
Tiberius.  
          The claim that Rome’s rule had no limits continued to be repeated by 
other writers of the first century. Pliny the Elder, for instance, states that a vast 
portion of the Earth bears the Romans’ glory and honour.13 Flavius Josephus 
credits King Agrippa of Judaea with a speech in which he points out to the 
rebellious Jewish people that Romans arms “have triumphed over the whole 
world”, warning them not to challenge the authority of Rome.14 These texts 
show that, throughout the first century AD, the ideology of Roman power 
without limits remained deeply ingrained in the minds of the upper classes of 
Roman society. 
          Such claims did not remain not undisputed. Some Latin writers of the 
early first century explicitly acknowledge that not all gentes and nationes of the 
orbis terrarum are subject to Rome’s domination. Ovid, for example, urges 
Augustus not to stop territorial expansion but to pursue universal domination. 
As he writes, 
 
Ecce, parat Caesar, domito quod defuit orbi 
Addere. Nunc, Oriens ultime, noster eris. 
Oh, Caesar was preparing to complete the conquest of the world!  
Now, the farthest East should be ours.15   
         
The contemporary poet Horace likewise expresses the wish that Caesar will 
push forward into the lands inhabited by various groups of barbarians, among 
them the Parthians, the Scythians, the Arabs and the Britons.16 He takes for 
granted that all the territories from the far West (Spain) to the far East (India), 
and from the Nile in the deep south to Britain in the north hold Augustus in 
                                                          
12 Gagé (1930), 18–21; Megow (1987) no. A85 on 202–206; Ando (2000) 289, n. 57. 
13 Plin. HN 2,68,6-8. 
14 Jos. BJ 2,358. 
15 Ov. Ar. Am. 1,177-8; Met. 15,832-831; see also Nicolet (1991) 44; Ov. Met. 15, 832-
831. 
16 Hor. Serm. 2.1.10-15. 
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awe. 17  Virgil predicts that the territory of Augustan Rome will reach the 
Garamantes and India, surpassing Hercules and Dionysus.18 Strabo, on the one 
hand, emphasizes that the Britons sent envoys to Augustus to ask for his 
friendship, but also admits that Britain was not under direct Roman control. 
His explanation is that Britain was simply not worth conquering.19 During the 
reign of Nero, the poet Lucan laments that the conquest of the world should 
have been completed by Pompey and Caesar, but that the attainment of this 
goal had been delayed by the civil war. Hence, he prompts Nero to complete 
this project.20 A number of unconquered peoples are explicitly identified in his 
work. For example, in the first book of his Bellum Civile, he expresses the view 
that, if the Romans genuinely love war, they must set out to campaign against 
the peoples dwelling on the edge of the world, such as the Scythians, the 
barbarous Arabs and even the people of Central or East Asia:  
 
sub iuga iam Seres, iam barbarus isset Araxes 
et gens si qua iacet nascenti conscia Nilo. 
tum, si tantus amor belli tibi, Roma, nefandi, 
totum sub Latias leges cum miseris orbem, 
in te verte manus: nondum tibi defuit hostis. 
Already the Seres might have passed beneath our yoke, already the       
barbarous Araxes,  
and any race, if there is one, that knows the source of the Nile.  
If Rome has such love of unspeakable warfare,  
let her first subdue the whole world under Latin laws,  
turn your hand against yourself—you have never yet lacked a foe.21 
  
At the same time, many Romans seem to have thought that Roman power had 
been brought to nearly every corner of the earth. For instance, in AD 15, after 
the mutiny of the Roman troops on the German frontier, Germanicus launched 
a punitive campaign against the Chatti and Cherusci. After defeating the 
German barbarians, a number of Roman legions reached the shores of the 
North Sea via the river routes. Tacitus describes this part of the ocean as the 
roughest in the world, with hostile coasts bordering a vast and deep sea beyond 
                                                          
17 Hor. Carm. 4.14.41-52 
18 Mattern (1999) 169. 
19 Strab. 2,5,8. 
20 Luc. BC 1,53-62.  
21 Luc. BC 1,13-23. 
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which no other lands exist.22 On the eve of the Claudian invasion of Britain, the 
troops commanded by the Roman general Aulus Paulinus were reluctant to 
board ship, because they thought Britain was outside the limits of the known 
world.23 In the fictitious the speech given by Boudicca, she points out that the 
ocean separates the island of Britain from the continent, claiming that the 
Britons were living under a different sky.24 After Claudius’ conquest of Britain 
in 43, the emperor had a naval crown fixed to the pediment of the imperial 
palace, symbolizing that he had overcome the Ocean. An inscription dating to c. 
AD 51-52 states that Claudius was the first to have subjected the barbarian 
tribes living beyond the Ocean to the rule of the Roman people.25 
          
          This discussion produces two conclusions. Firstly, during the first 
century AD the idea that Rome, as the caput orbis terrarum, had universal and 
limitless power continued to be reiterated. Secondly, the claim to universal 
dominance could be combined with the admission that in actual fact Rome had 
not yet conquered the entire world in a geographical sense.  
          The concept of world dominance might be regarded as part of the 
ideological legacy of the Late Republic, when Roman writers and politicians had 
embraced an open, encompassing and outwardly oriented worldview, as 
discussed in Chapter One. In the sections which follow, I shall examine to what 
extent this unbounded worldview manifested itself in greater territorial 
expansion and in Roman frontier policies. At the end of this chapter, I shall 
return to Roman worldviews, focusing specifically on the changes in the 
ideological representations of the empire which can be observed during the first 
two centuries of the Principate. 
 
3. Frontiers, foreign relations and imperial expansion during the first  
and second centuries AD 
 
3.1. Client kingdoms  
 
Undeniably a certain type of frontier consciousness existed during both the 
Republic and the Early Empire. When the Roman province of Africa was 
created after 146 BC, an earthwork, the fossa regia, was constructed to demarcate 
                                                          
22 Tac. Ann. 2,24.  
23 Cass. Dio 60,19,3. 
24 Cass. Dio 62,4,2. 
25 Wiedemann (1996) 236.  
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the boundary between the new province and the Numidian kingdom.26 This 
example shows that, even if the Romans might not have thought of each 
frontier province as having a clear linear boundary, they were fully aware that 
those lands which were either occupied by allied kingdoms or inhabited by 
various barbarian tribes were not directly controlled by Rome. Consequently, it 
is not entirely true that the idea that states are separated by clear boundary lines 
did not emerge until the Early Modern Period.27  
          If a certain degree of frontier consciousness had not existed, Augustus’ 
advice to “keep the empire within its boundaries” (coercendi intra terminos imperii) 
would have been nonsensical.28 In this passage, the phrase terminos imperii must 
refer to the boundaries of the geographical area within which Rome could exert 
her power absolutely and directly. During the period of the Julio-Claudian 
dynasty, many parts of the Roman empire were surrounded by various client 
kingdoms or client tribes. 29  Although it is by no means obvious that the 
decision not to incorporate these client kingdoms and tribes stemmed from any 
conscious strategic considerations, as presumed by some modern scholars, it 
remains the case that, in the Early Imperial period, most client kings and tribal 
leaders who were thought of as amici populi Romani were allowed to keep their 
positions, as long as they behaved as loyal allies.30 
          In his account of the foreign policies adopted by Augustus around 20 BC, 
Cassius Dio distinguishes between two types of territories controlled by the 
Romans. While those territories which had been incorporated as provinciae were 
governed according to Roman customs, Augustus allowed allied peoples to 
                                                          
26 For discussions of  the fossa regia, see Di Vita-Evrard (1986); Mattingly (2005) 137, 
181-182, 206, 330; Quinn (2004); Abid (2014) 401-418. 
27 Whittaker claims that, by their nature, empires are incompatible with territoriality. See 
Whittaker (2004) 2. He argues that there was no direct link between sovereignty and 
territoriality until 1648, when the Peace of  Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War. 
This moment is widely regarded as signalling the creation of  the concept of  the nation-
state. For the significance of  the Westphalian system, see Osiander (2001) 257-284. For 
criticism see Badie (1995) 12-17. Whittaker’s point remains valid to the extent that the 
client kingdoms of  the first century could be seen as being subject to (indirect) Roman 
rule. 
28 Tac. Ann. 1,11; Cass. Dio 56,33,5. 
29 General studies about the relationship between the Roman Empire and the client 
kingdoms in the Principate, see Braund’s monograph: Braund (1984); also Braund (1988) 
69-96. 
30 Braund (1984) 55-70. This is also the viewpoint of  Luttwak, who argues that the 
imperial rulers strategically employed the client system to defend the empire and sustain 
expansion. See Luttwak (1978) 50. 
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govern themselves in accordance with their indigenous traditions.31 Dio also 
says that Augustus was satisfied with the status quo and that he had no intention 
of bringing any new territories or allied nations under his rule. 32  Likewise, 
Suetonius discusses the fate of those kingdoms which had turned against Rome 
during the civil war. In the aftermath of this conflict, Augustus restored some 
of these kingdoms but incorporated others into various Roman provinces.33  
          In some cases Rome took the step of appointing new client kings. King 
Juba II of Mauritania provides a good example. Juba II was raised and educated 
in Rome. His father was Juba I, an ally of Pompey and an enemy of Caesar, 
who died after the battle of Thapsus in 46 BC. Juba II became a close friend of 
Octavian. In 27 BC Juba was made king of Mauritania and married Cleopatra 
Selene II.34 Juba’s kingdom was not annexed until AD 40, because, Cassius Dio 
asserts, Caligula coveted the wealth of Mauritania. Juba’s son and successor, 
Ptolemy, was recalled to Rome and forced to commit suicide. Thereafter the 
kingdom of Mauritania was annexed and divided into two provinces, 
Mauritania Tingitana and Caesariensis.35 
          The fate of the kingdom Cappadocia in the East was similar to that of 
Mauritania. After the death of King Archelaus in AD 17, it became part of the 
province of Syria. If Tacitus’ account is reliable, the main reason for taking this 
step was that Archelaus had been discourteous to Tiberius when he was living 
as an exile in Rhodes in AD 1.36 Another client kingdom, Commagene was also 
annexed in AD 17, after the death of King Antiochus III.37 Among the client 
kingdoms bordering the eastern provinces, the disappearance of the client 
kingdom of Thrace can be attributed to similar causes. After the death of King 
Rhoemetalces I in AD 12 Augustus separated Thrace into two kingdoms, 
appointing Cotys VIII and Rhescuporis II kings, but in AD 19 the latter 
reunited the kingdom by murdering Cotys. 38  When the reigning king 
Rhoemetalces III was murdered in 46, Claudius converted Thrace into a 
                                                          
31 Cass. Dio 54,9,1. 
32 Suetonius has a similar account; see Suet Aug. 21,2,-3.  
33 Suet. Aug. 48.  
34 Dio Cass. 53,26,2. Braund (1984) 16-17. 
35 Dio Cass. 59,23,1. For general discussions of  these two frontier provinces, see Millar 
(1967) 169-172; Raven (1969) 55; Breeze (2012) 142-143. 
36 Dio Cass. 57,17,3-6; Tac. Ann. 2,42. 
37 Tac. ibid. 
38 Tac. Ann. 2,64-67. 
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province.39 By the end of the reign of Vespasian in 79, many former client 
kingdoms had become Roman territories. 
          Those client kings who were allowed to keep their kingdoms or had had 
them conferred by friendly emperors, were expected to ensure the stability of 
the frontiers and to provide manpower for the auxiliary units. 40  Similar 
relationships had already been formed during the Middle and Late Republic, 
when some foreign rulers had sought the patronage of powerful Roman 
families.41 During the Early Empire, allied kings had to play the game exercising 
more care, as personal relationships with the incumbent emperor became a 
crucial factor in the fate of their kingdoms.42 Augustus awarded kingdoms to 
his friends Juba II of Mauritania and Herod the Great. Antiochus IV of 
Commagene and Herod Agrippa were close friends of Caligula. Immediately 
after the latter’s accession to the throne, Antiochus received the territory of his 
deceased father augmented by the coastlands of Cilicia. Simultaneously, Julius 
Agrippa (Herod Agrippa) was released from prison and offered a vast amount 
of land and royal titles. When he died in AD 44, his kingdom ceased to exist, 
but his son Julius Agrippa II received the kingdom formerly held by his uncle, 
Herod of Chalcis. In the 60s, Nero enlarged his territory by adding a number of 
cities in the Galilee and Peraea. The kingdom continued to exist until Julius 
Agrippa’s death in AD 93.43 
          Were the allied kingdoms bordering the provinces of the empire 
regarded as being inside or outside the empire? As argued by Braund, the best 
answer to this question is that they “were neither and both”.44 Administratively, 
the Romans were aware of the distinction between provinces and non-
provincial areas. In the Res Gestae, for instance, Augustus claims that he 
                                                          
39 Dio Cass. 60,28.  
40 Luttwak (1976) 49-50. Most scholars criticize Luttwak for overestimating the role of  
these allied kingdoms in securing the provinces of  the empire during the Julio-Claudian 
era, but there can be little doubt that they did have this effect to a greater or lesser 
degree, whatever the aims originally were. See Gruen (1978) 564. 
41 Astin (1967) 27-31; Badian (1958); Braund (1988) 82-86; Wallace-Hadrill (1989). 
42 Some examples, see Braund (1984) 55 ff.  
43 Joseph, Ant. Iud. 20,9-15; Tac. Hist. 2,81. In addition to these examples, it is known 
that the Parthian king, Vologaeses, did once, in AD 69, promise to offer Vespasian 
40,000 archers, although the latter refused to avail himself  of  it. For some other 
examples: the Cheruscan leader Italicus, Iulius Agrippa of  Judaea, Antiochus IV of  
Commagene and Tigranes V of  Armenia and Pharasmanes of  Iberia; see Suet. Vesp. 
6,3; Tac. Hist. 4,51.  
44 Braund (1984) 182.  
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advanced the “the boundary of Illyricum to the bank of the River Danube”.45 
The passage shows that the Emperor regarded the Danube as the border of 
Illyricum, at least at a particular moment in time. In AD 66, when the Armenian 
king, Tiridates, returned home after paying a visit to Nero, he was accompanied 
by many artists whom he brought with him from the city of Rome. Cassius Dio 
says that Corbulo forbade some of these artists to cross into the land of 
Armenia,46 proving that the existence of a clear territorial division did not mean 
that Armenia was free to pursue its own policies independently of Rome. 
Similarly, the fact that a stone column was set up to mark the boundary 
between the province of Osrhoene and the kingdom of Abgar of Edessa in AD 
195 does not imply that Abgar was free to disregard Roman interests.47 
          In those regions in which Roman provinces did not border on client 
kingdoms, indisputable traces of a dynamic conception of provincial fines exist. 
The passage from the Res Gestae in which Augustus claims to have extended the 
fines Illyrici all the way the Danube goes on to state that his army crossed the 
Danube and subdued the Dacians beyond it.48 Tacitus refers to Elephantine 
and Syene as being the frontier-posts of the Roman Empire at the time of 
Germanicus’ visit in AD 19, but then goes on to say that, in his time, the 
boundary had been extended to the Red Sea. In the Germania, Tacitus explains 
that, only after a military road had been built (limite acto) and the garrisons had 
been moved forward (promotisque praesidiis), was the area of the Agri Decumates 
regarded as an outlying region of the empire and as part of a province.49 
 
3.2. Parthia and the East  
During the first and second centuries, Rome probably considered Parthia the 
only neighbouring state capable of posing a serious threat to it.50 The Persians 
had been defeated by Alexander the Great, but Rome never came close to 
                                                          
45 RG 30,1.  
46 Cass. Dio, 62,6,3.  
47 The stone was set up when the new province of  Osrhoene was established. See Lo 
Cascio (2000) 85; Whittaker (2004) 7.   
48 RG 30,2. 
49  Tac. Ger. 29,4. In the Penguin translation of  1948, the phrase limite acto is 
mistranslated as “the frontier line of  defence was drawn”. For the meanings of  the 
terms limes and limites, see Isaac (1988) 125-147. 
50 However, the dearth of  evidence from the Parthian side makes it difficult for modern 
researchers to evaluate relationship between Rome and Parthia. For the problems posed 
by the biased sources, see the comments of  Wheeler (2000) 288. 
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repeating this achievement against the Parthians. After Crassus’ defeat at 
Carrhae in 53 BC and the unsuccessful campaigns of Mark Antony, the Roman 
government developed a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards Parthia.  
          Augustus recovered the lost Roman standards and prisoners from 
Parthia by diplomacy. Roman writers of the first century urged Augustus to 
march against Parthia, but no such expedition was undertaken during his 
reign.51 Under Nero, military conflicts took place between Parthia and Rome 
but these never escalated into massive warfare. During the second and early 
third centuries, Rome fought several large-scale wars against the Parthians. The 
armies of Trajan and Septimius Severus did manage to capture large parts of 
Mesopotamia, but the Rome troops never managed to penetrate into the 
Iranian hinterland and turn the whole area to a Roman province.52  
Between the death of Augustus and that of Septimius Severus, the 
Romans were able to maintain their dignitas in their relations with Parthia.53 
Whenever the confrontations between Rome and Parthia escalated into warfare, 
it was usually Rome which was capable of enough mobilizing military 
manpower and resources to launch long-distant campaigns into the Parthian 
territories, rather than the other way round.54  Although scholars claim that 
most Roman emperors of the first two centuries adopted the prudent strategy 
of avoiding direct confrontation with Parthia, preferring to deal with the 
Parthian question by manipulating the politics of Armenia, it is widely agreed 
                                                          
51 Hor. Odes, 4,15,23; Pogorzelski (2011) 163-168 e.g. For the general discussion about 
the relationship between Rome and Parthia from Augustus to Caracalla in the third 
century, see Karl-Heinz Ziegler (1964); Campbell (1993) 213-240; Wheeler (2000) 287-
292. 
52 Cass. Dio 68,17; 71,2; 76,9-13. For overall discussion about Roman-Persian wars 
from the Late Republic to the third century, see Isaac (1990) 28-33.  
53 Cass. Dio 68,29. The failure to extend Roman control into the Parthian hinterland 
can be attributed to complex reasons. Focusing on the Euphrates River, Dåbrowa, 
points out that, unlike other major rivers in the Roman frontier zones, such as the 
Rhine and the Danube, only a limited section of  the Euphrates was navigable. In 
addition, no navigation upstream was possible. These features made it difficult for 
Rome to gain control over the whole waterway. See Dåbrowa (2002) 275-279. 
54 In a letter sent by the Caesennius Paetus, legate of  Cappadocia, to the Parthian king 
Vologaeses V in AD 62, the former compares the strength of  the two states, claiming 
that the king of  Parthia had mobilized all the resources of  his kingdom against Rome’s 
two legions, but that Rome had the rest of  the world (orbem terrarum reliquum) behind it. 
It should, however, be noted that Paetus made this claim while his troops were being 
besieged by Parthian troops in a series of  hastily erected camps. He was ultimately 
forced to accept a treaty under which all Roman troops were to be withdrawn from 
Armenia. See Tac. Ann. 15,13. 
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that, before the rise of the Sassanid Empire in the mid-third century, Rome had 
the upper hand in Roman-Parthian relationships.55 In other words, while the 
Roman emperors of the Principate might have surrendered the ambition of 
rivalling the achievements of Alexander the Great by annexing all of Parthia, 
the Romans continued to have a large degree of political and military freedom 
in dealing with their eastern neighbour.  
 
3.3. North-West and Central Europe (the Rhine and Danube frontiers) 
On the western fringes of the empire, where no political entity capable of 
playing a role similar to that of Parthia existed, the levels of political 
organization were more primitive than they were in the East.56 After Augustus’ 
death, the majority of German tribes maintained alliances with the Romans. 
From the first century AD, numerous German barbarians served in the Roman 
auxiliary troops, but tribal loyalties to the Roman government were fragile. The 
events leading to the Teutoburg Forest disaster and the Batavian Revolt during 
the civil war between AD 68 and 69 are well-known cases in point. 57 
Unquestionably, because of the low level of cohesiveness within these tribal 
organizations and their limited military striking power, they did not pose any 
really serious threat to Roman domination and, under normal circumstances, 
the Romans experienced few difficulties in keeping the German tribes in check 
by a combination of military force, diplomacy and other techniques. Italicus, for 
example, the son of Flavus the brother of Arminius, was educated in Rome. He 
was then sent back to the Cherusci by the Roman emperor Claudius when the 
tribe asked the Romans for king. Maroboduus, the leader of the Marcomanni, 
incurred the anger of Tiberius because he did not provide the Romans with 
                                                          
55 Isaac (1990) 19-53.  
56 For example, multiple tribes along the Rhine and beyond it were all lumped together 
under the same name and were called Germani by Roman authors, despite the fact that 
these tribes were not a unified nation. For the research on the origins and development 
of  Germani in Roman period, abundant works have been published. However, it is 
impossible to mention all the studies in this footnote. Important works published in the 
last two decades include Todd (1992) and Wolfram (1997); see also Rüger (1996) 517-
534. 
57 The most important revolts of  the first century AD are recorded by Tacitus. They 
include the Gaulish revolt led by the Treviri in 22, the revolt of  the Frisii in Lower 
Germania in 28, and the uprisings of  the Iceni in 47 and 60.  
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support during the punitive German campaigns led by Tiberius and 
Germanicus after the Teutoburg Forest disaster.58 
          Between the end of Germanicus’ German military expeditions in about 
AD 16 and the outbreak of the Batavian Revolt, there were a few sporadic 
uprisings among the German tribes of the Lower Rhine area, but on the whole 
the region remained relatively peaceful.59 Tacitus states that Corbulo had the 
opportunity to launch a major campaign against the Chauci, but Claudius 
stopped him from further expansion.60 
          Turning to the frontier along the Upper Rhine and Upper-Middle 
Danube, from the early first century, at first sight, a good opportunity to annex 
the territory of Marcomanni presented itself when a split emerged in the tribal 
confederation AD 18 and Maroboduus fled to Italy. The reason Tiberius did 
not undertake any military action at this juncture remains obscure.61 Gaius does 
not appear to have been interested in the conquest of this area, although he 
visited the Roman legions stationed on the Rhine frontiers in AD 39/40. Nero 
had little interest in military matters and there was no territorial gain in 
Germany under his reign.62 Vespasian also showed hesitation about bringing 
the Roman troops across the Upper Rhine, but he did consolidate the frontier 
zone by building roads across the Agri Decumates.63  
          Taking all the evidence into account, it is fair to say that there was no 
attempt to expand Roman power into the territory of Germans until AD 83.64 
In that year the young emperor Domitian, who felt he lacked sufficient military 
prestige, launched a major war against the German Chatti. However, 
immediately following the conclusion of the First Chattian War, he turned his 
gaze to the frontier of the Middle Danube. Against the advice of his friends, 
who urged him to continue Vespasian’s policy of maintaining client 
relationships with the Suebi and the Dacians, Domitian moved large numbers 
of troops from the Rhine to the Danube in preparation for another war. 65 
During the last decade of the first century, the Germanic Suebi, Marcommani 
                                                          
58 Tac. Ann. 2,46,5.  
59 Tac. Germ. 37.2: tam diu Germania vincitur. For the policy of  the German frontiers 
under Augustus, see Wells (1972) 156-161. 
60 Tac. Ann. 11,16–20; Cass. Dio 60,8,7. 
61 Suet. Tib. 41.  
62 Griffin (2008) 124-125.   
63 Tac. Germ. 29,3. Schönberger (1969) 158. 
64 Tac. Germ. 37. For Domitian’s first Chattian War, see Cass. Dio 67,3-4; Jones (1992) 
128-131.  
65 For the war of  Chatti, see Jones (1973) 79-90; (1992) 126-131.  
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and Quadi, as well as the Sarmatians and Dacians, continued to attract plenty of 
Roman attention. 
          In the following century, Trajan’s aggressive policies resulted in the 
incorporation of Dacia as a new province. Although shortly after his accession 
to the throne Hadrian withdrew the army from parts of Dacia, restricting 
Roman Dacia to the area within the Carpathian Mountains, Rome continued to 
control the entire area of the lower Danube. As long as the Marcomanni and 
Quadi on the middle Danube remained subservient to Rome, the imperial 
government could control them by manipulating their internal affairs.  
          Following the Claudian invasion of Britain and the creation of the 
province of Britannia, Rome pursued a highly expansionist policy in this area. 
Between 70 and 85 all of Wales, northern England and southern Scotland were 
added to the province.66 After AD 85 Roman policies became less aggressive, in 
part because attention shifted to the eastern frontiers. Hadrian and Antoninus 
Pius built their walls in order to make it easier to monitor the movements of 
the British barbarians. In AD 208 Septimius Severus launched a new series of  
aggressive campaigns against the Britons. These campaigns seem to have begun 
as a punitive war but, as many other Roman wars, they quickly became more 
aggressive. The advance of the Roman troops ended with the emperor’s death 
in Eboracum (York) in 211.67  
On the whole, Rome enjoyed a position of superiority in dealing with the 
various barbarian peoples on the Rhine and Danubian frontiers during the two 
centuries after Augustus’ death. Although some aggressive campaigns were 
fought and some new provinces were created, skillful manipulation of the 
internal affairs of barbarian tribes generally sufficed to secure Roman 
interests.68 Compared to the situation which had existed during the Republic, 
war became intermittent but Rome did not hesitate to resort to force if the 
interests of the empire or the personal interests of the emperor required this. 
Millar has also pointed out that many conflicts seem to have been initiated by a 
particular emperor’s subjects.69 While there is an element of truth in this theory, 
it has to be said that, in almost all cases, the decision to continue a war or to 
make peace was made by Rome rather than by barbarian peoples. Examples 
                                                          
66 For British conquests in the reign of  Vespasian, see Levick (1999) 158 -159. 
67 For Septimius Severus’ military activities in Britain, see Birley (2002) 170-187. For the 
Roman conquest of  Britain from Claudius to Septimius Severus, see Mattingly (2006) 
94-127.  
68 Pitts (1989) 45-58. 
69 Millar (1966) 165-166; (2010), Part Three, Subject and Emperor, 275-537, passim. 
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include Germanicus’ punitive war against the Germans between AD 15 and 
AD 17, Gaius’ decision to abandon the plan to conquer Britain in 39, Corbulo’s 
withdrawal of the army from the east bank of the Rhine on the orders of 
Claudius in 47, Domitian’s Second Dacian War in 87, Hadrian’s withdrawal of 
the Roman forces from the lower Danube in 127, as well as Commodus’ 
decision to conclude a truce with the Marcommani, Quadi and Burii in 180. 
These examples illustrate that, by and large, Rome was able to maintain an 
elastic and confident stance in its dealings with its barbarian neighbors. While 
Roman policies were not invariably aggressive during the first two centuries AD, 
warfare always remained one of the options available to the emperors of this 
period.  
 
4. Frontier policy making and the Grand Strategy revisited 
In the field of Roman frontier studies, a fierce debate has raged about whether 
the central Roman government did develop a long-term, rational policy for the 
defence of the empire. A key moment in this debate has been the publication of 
Edward Luttwak’s The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (1976), which 
stimulated debates not only among ancient historians, but also among 
archaeologists and political and military specialists. 70  Luttwak sees the 
development of the Roman frontier from the time of Augustus as having been 
shaped by rational and well-calculated planning. He divides the development of 
Roman frontiers into three chronological phases. In the first phase, which 
lasted from the reign of Augustus to that of Nero, the client kingdoms on the 
periphery of the empire were allowed to survive because the Romans believed 
their existence helped to protect the inner zones of the empire from the 
intrusions of hostile barbarian enemies. Between the death of Nero and that of 
Septimius Severus, Rome developed a new policy of “preclusive security” by 
annexing client kingdoms or tribes until it reached natural defensive frontiers. A 
well thought-out system of fortifications was built up in this period. Luttwak 
sees the period from 235 to the end of the Principate in AD 285 as the third 
stage of the Grand Strategy. This period witnessed the emergence of the idea of 
defence-in-depth. 71  Since the last period is beyond the scope of my 
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investigations, the following discussion will focus on the first two phases of 
Luttwak’s Grand Strategy.  
Luttwak’s theory sits rather uneasily with the fact that imperial frontier 
policies during the Principate appear to have been highly erratic, not only 
between Augustus and Nero but also between the beginning of the Flavian 
period and the end of the Severan dynasty. Certainly, there are strong 
indications that the emperors of the first and second centuries AD did not see 
continuous territorial expansion as an inevitable military or political goal. Tiberius, 
for example, preferred to solve conflicts with barbarian tribes or kingdoms by 
virtue of either diplomacy or trickery rather than by military means. One reason 
for this seems to have been that he had acquired sufficient military prestige 
before his accession to the throne.72 Claudius advertised his close relationship 
with the army, but showed little interest in further expansion after his armies 
had conquered large parts of Britain. As stated, he ordered Corbulo to 
withdraw his army to the left bank of the Rhine in 47,73 and in AD 51 Helvidius 
Priscus was forced to return with his army after having crossed the Taurus 
Mountains into Armenia.74 
Despite the caution exercised by some, many emperors did initiate wars 
and some newly conquered areas were incorporated as provinces, following the 
pattern set during the Republic. In most cases, the motives of the emperors 
who took these decisions remains an unknown mystery, but it is certain that 
Luttwak’s emphasis on considerations of frontier security is far too one one-
sided. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, among the reasons behind the 
foreign policy making, the necessity for emperors to accumulate military 
prestige is likely to have played a very important part. The conquest of Britain 
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by Claudius provides the most striking example. Trajan’s expeditions into 
Armenia and Mesopotamia, culminating in the capture of Ctesiphon, were very 
probably motivated by the wish to follow in the footsteps of Alexander the 
Great.75 As far as can be ascertained, many other major military operations, 
among them Germanicus’ German campaign, Domitian’s Chattian War of AD 
83, Antoninus Pius’ military advance to the area beyond the Hadrian’s wall and 
Septimius Severus’ offensive in northern Britain, were not undertaken for the 
purpose of protecting or achieving imperial security. Unquestionably, an 
appetite for military prestige and glory seems to have played an important part 
in carrying out these campaigns.  
This is not to say that Roman emperors never took of the security of the 
empire into account. In this respect Luttwak’s critics have gone too far. After 
the Illyrian and Dalmatian revolts and the disaster of the Teutoburg Forest, 
Augustus seems to have reconsidered the wisdom of his earlier plan to conquer 
the world.76 Hadrian’s decision to give up part of the newly conquered Dacian 
territory might have been informed by the idea that the province of Dacia 
should be confined to those areas which could be defended against barbarian 
incursions. 77  The efforts which Hadrian made to build or reinforce linear 
systems of fortifications in Britain, between the upper Rhine and Danube and 
in the southern Aurès Mountains of Numidia likewise suggest that he had a 
long-term view about the safety of the imperial frontiers. Nevertheless it should 
be emphasized that, immediately after Hadrian’s death, Antoninus Pius 
launched a new aggressive policy in Britain. Hadrian’s Wall was abandoned and 
replaced by another wall which was located about 100 miles farther north. This 
example clearly shows that Hadrian’s policies cannot be regarded as reflecting 
the existence of a “Grand Strategy” which informed the actions and policies of 
successive emperors.   
 As some of Luttwak’s critics have pointed out, any attempt to develop a 
long-term military policy would have run up against insuperable practical 
                                                          
75 For Trajan’s military image and the theme of  “world conquest”, see Griffin (2000) 
109-113; 123-128; Bennett (1997) 88-99; 166-221. 
76 Dio reports that, in 23 BC, when Augustus suffered a severe illness which nearly led 
to his death, he gave Calpurnius Piso a document listing the forces and the public 
revenues. See Cass. Dio 53,30,2. According to Suetonius, in AD 14 after Augustus death, 
four books were brought to the Senate to be read out. One of  these contained an 
account of  how many soldiers were serving in each place and how much money there 
was in the Treasury. See Suet. Aug. 101,4. These references show that Augustus 
possessed general information about the present situation of  the empire.  
77 Zahariade (1997) 603.  
81 
 
difficulties. Both J. C. Mann and Millar, for example, have emphasized that 
emperors and government officials were unable to obtain accurate information 
about recent events or developments on the distant frontiers.78 Therefore, it 
would have been impossible for Roman policy makers to have made any quick 
response to revolts and other threats on the borders of the Roman world. Nor 
are there any indications that the Romans adopted a scientific or holistic 
approach to frontier policies. 79  A more acceptable alternative is that the 
emperor and his advisors devised policies on the basis of the latest news from 
the frontiers. If they took a more active role, they were normally motivated by 
considerations to do with their personal prestige or the interests of the Roman 
state, as I shall discuss in the following chapter.  
          An examination of the history of the client kingdoms, which loom large 
in Luttwak’s account of the first stage of the Grand Strategy, confirms that the 
short-term interests of emperors trumped any attempt to pursue long-term 
strategic goals. As has been shown, personal ties with the Roman emperor and 
his family played a significant part in the fate of the client kingdoms. This 
personal factor resulted in policies which were quite erratic. After Nero had 
ordered Corbulo to withdraw the legions to the right bank of the Euphrates, he 
allowed Armenia to retain its status as a kingdom as long as it preserved its 
loyalty to Rome. In AD 64 the king of Armenia, Tiridates, a brother of the 
Parthian king, Vologaeses, was publicly crowned by Corbulo on the Euphrates 
frontier, in front of Nero’s statue. Two years later he paid a visit to Rome and 
was generously treated by Nero.80 In the early 70s, however, Vespasian deposed 
Aristobulus of Lesser Armenia by merging his kingdom, along with the 
territories of Pontus and Cappadocia, into the enlarged province of Galatia.81  
          Another good example is Commagene, a small kingdom located in 
northern Syria, which had swung between Rome and Parthia for generations. It 
was first annexed by Tiberius in 17. Caligula returned the kingdom of 
Commagene to his friend, Gaius Iulius Antiochus, but the latter soon lost it 
again. The kingdom was restored once more by Claudius in 41. In AD 71 
Vespasian deprived King Antiochus IV of his title and permanently annexed 
Commagene, turning it into Roman territory.82 In contrast, Julius Agrippa II, 
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King of the Galilee and the Peraea, who maintained friendly relations with a 
succession of Roman emperors, was allowed to retain his territory until his 
death in the year 92/93.83 In many cases, no reasons are given for why an 
emperor decided to annex a client kingdom, or a part of its territory. But, 
whatever the motives in each individual case might have been, there can be no 
doubt that Roman emperors saw client kingdoms as convenient vehicles for 
controlling people and sustaining Rome’s hegemony at minimum cost.  
          The only possible conclusion is that Roman decisions in the field of 
foreign policy, such as that to annex a particular client kingdom, were 
prompted by a combination of case-specific factors, some of which might have 
been quite trivial. All that can be said is that Roman emperors and their 
advisors were guided primarily by considerations linked to the ruler’s interests 
and needs at a particular moment in time.      
          However, even if Luttwak’s theory about the existence of a “Grand 
Strategy” is rejected, his observation that, from about the second half of the 
first century AD, the client kingdoms increasingly passed under direct Roman 
control remains valid. After Domitian and particularly from the Hadrianic 
period, many of these kingdoms disappeared, thereby making the geographical 
contours of the empire gradually more visible. During the same period, many 
new military installations, such as legionary forts, towers, palisades, ditches and 
military roads appeared in the frontier zone. In the second half of this chapter, 
I shall focus on the development of the Roman limes system and on the 
emergence of a less open worldview which fitted the changing realities of the 
second century AD.  
 
5. Developments in the frontier zone 
 
5.1. Rivers as natural boundaries  
In the Res Gestae we not only find the concept of the imperium sine fine, it also 
includes the idea that all gentes inhabiting the orbis terrarum, including those 
dwelling in the remotest areas bordering the Oceanus, acknowledge Rome’s 
hegemony.84  A logical corollary of this ideological conception was that any 
further military conquests lost their urgency. This can be seen as contributing to 
the background to Augustus’ consilium. In actual fact, the Roman frontier 
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remained quite open throughout the first century AD. As has emerged, it was 
more or less impossible to draw a clear line separating Roman territory from 
the territories of indigenous tribes and Roman client kingdoms. 
          In marked contrast to the Han Empire, the north-western and eastern 
fringes of the Roman Empire were marked by three major rivers, the Rhine, 
Danube and Euphrates. It is well known that, from the reign of Augustus, large 
numbers of Roman legions supplemented by auxiliary forces were stationed 
along these rivers, for the purpose of securing the hinterland of the empire.85 
Furthermore, imperial fleets were stationed in several harbours in the frontier 
regions.86  
          During the reign of Tiberius, eight legions were stationed along the 
Rhine frontier. Four legions were stationed in the two Danubian provinces of 
Pannonia and Moesia. In the north-western frontier zones, legionary fortresses 
were usually constructed along the major rivers or along important tributaries. 
From Vindonissa (Windisch) in Upper Germania to Katwijk in the Rhine Delta, 
nearly all legionary forts, such as Moguntiacum (Mainz), Bonna (Bonn), Colonia 
Agrippinensis (Cologne), Novaesium (Neuss) and Vetera (Xanten), were 
situated along the c.1, 000 kilometer-long Rhine River.  
          Austin and Rankov have criticized the tendency of scholarship to play 
down the role of the riverine frontiers of the empire as defensive barriers.87 In 
some cases rivers do seem to have functioned as dividing lines separating ethnic 
groups. Julius Caesar stated that the River Rhine roughly separated the 
Germans from the Celts, although archaeological research contradicts the idea 
that its course coincided with any ethnic or cultural boundaries. 88  Among 
modern scholars, Braund has argued that rivers were perceived as deities, 
whose natural powers did play a part in separating different peoples.89 After the 
catastrophe of the Teutoburg Forest, Augustus withdraw the army from the 
Elbe Valley to the west bank of the Rhine and between the late Augustan 
period and the outbreak of the Chattian War in 83 most Roman military forces 
remained stationed on the left bank of the Rhine for most of the time.90 The 
fact that no permanent bridges were built over the Rhine until after the Flavian 
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advance across Odenwald could be taken to suggest that this river was regarded 
as a convenient barrier impeding the free movement of hostile barbarian 
tribes.91   
          Nevertheless, the archaeological evidence leaves no doubt that, during 
the Julio-Claudian period, some Roman military bases were built in areas either 
to the east or north of the Rhine. During the last phase of the German 
campaigns of this period, new camps were established along the Rhine in 
Germania Inferior. Examples include those in Oberaden and Haltern, both 
situated on the River Lippe.92 These two camps were established as permanent 
military bases in the period before the battle of the Teutoburg Forest. A few 
bases such as Waldgirmes and Haltern even developed into civilian 
settlements. 93  After the Varian disaster, all forts east of the Rhine were 
abandoned. However, a six-mile-wide strip of land on the right bank of the 
river was still considered to be Roman territory and available for the use of the 
military (see below).94 These examples show that, in this period, the Rhine was 
not regarded as marking the boundary between the Roman empire and the non-
Roman-oriented tribes.95 As many scholars have pointed out, rivers served as 
arteries of communication, which facilitated the transportation of military 
supplies from inland areas to the legionary garrisons and local communities as 
well as for the transmission of news and information from the frontier to the 
central area of the empire and vice-versa. 96 Cogently, the forts which were 
constructed along various rivers in the frontier zones served not only defensive 
purposes, but were also used as bases for further aggression.97  
A passage from Tacitus’ Annals shows that, during Nero’s reign, the 
Romans remained ideologically committed to the view that the rule of Rome 
was universal and that the empire had no boundaries. In the early first century, 
an area on the right bank of the Rhine opposite Cologne had been occupied by 
the Frisians, but after they had been expelled, probably under Tiberius, it was 
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left as an empty zone. In the late 50s AD, the Ampsivarii, who had been driven 
from their territories by the Chauci, arrived and occupied the lands. The 
Ampsivarii realized that this area was controlled by the Roman army. Therefore 
they chose Boiocalus, a veteran who had served in the Roman auxiliary forces 
for nearly fifty years, as their spokesman and sent him to Lucius Avitus, the 
governor of Roman Germany, to ask permission to settle in the territory. 
Boiocalus pointed out to Avitus that, as the territory was rarely used to pasture 
livestock belonging to the Roman soldiers, they should give it to a friendly tribe 
which had been made homeless. He continued to stress that the area in 
question had belonged to various tribes, implying that the Romans had no 
justification to hold it as an exclusive possession.98 This episode shows that the 
Romans had an unchallenged dominance in this region, despite the fact that 
they had not occupied it. It also demonstrates that the frontier along the Rhine 
remained quite open and flexible.  
          When attention shifts from the Rhine to the Danube, a similar pattern 
emerges. Here too Roman armies were stationed in camps along the river from 
the early first century. In the Res Gestae, Augustus claims to have brought 
Roman arms not only to the banks of the Danube but to the areas on the far 
side of the river as well. 99  At certain sites along the river, like Mursa and 
Sirmum, military posts were built in the time of Augustus and Tiberius. The 
first forts along the Danube appeared in the 30s AD at the terminal points of 
roads which were probably built under Tiberius. During the reign of Claudius, 
more forts and new routes appeared in the Pannonian frontier zone, and a 
legion was established at Carnuntum.100 From about this period a Roman fleet 
began to patrol the river.101 Between the accession of Gaius and the early 60s, 
the Danube frontier generally remained in a tranquil state.102 However, during 
the final years of Nero’s reign, the Roxolani, a Sarmatian tribe living to the 
north of the Danube, began to stir up trouble.103 In the civil war of 68/9, the 
Dacian barbarians campaigned across the Danube into Moesia and destroyed 
some forts and legionary bases by taking advantage of the absence of the two 
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legions previously stationed in the province.104 The Danubian tribes remained 
troublesome during the Flavian period. Vespasian’s decision to transfer one 
more legion to the Moesian area might be an indication that he was concerned 
about the security of the Danube frontier. Under the Flavians, more forts and 
military installations appeared along the Pannonian and Moesian frontiers.105 
          In about AD 85, the Dacian king, Decebalus, launched an attack crossed 
the Danube, killing the Moesian governor, Oppius Sabinus, and causing 
widespread panic.106 Probably in the next year, Moesia was divided into two 
parts, each with a consular commander to increase military effectiveness. 
Between 85 and 95, Domitian waged two wars against the Dacian tribes and 
also campaigned against the Pannonian tribes. After the suppression of 
Saturninus’ revolt on the Rhine in 89, the emperor transferred a substantial 
number of troops from the Rhine frontier to the East. This signalled a shift in 
the centre of military activity from the Rhine region to the Danubian area. The 
situation on the Danube frontier saw another dramatic change after Dacia was 
annexed by Trajan in 106. New forts, such as Quadrata and Ad Statuas, now 
appeared on the lower reaches of the Danube.107 Unquestionably, a continuous 
chain of military bases along the Danube had been established at the end of the 
Trajanic period. Nevertheless, this building programme did not signify that the 
Danube had become the military defensive line of these areas. The fact that, 
even before Trajan’s Dacian War, forts were established beyond the Danube in 
Wallachia points in the opposite direction. 108  As did the River Rhine, the 
Danube served as a supply route, both in times of peace and during military 
campaigns. 
          Unlike the Rhine and Danube, the Euphrates seems to have been 
generally regarded as marking a kind of boundary separating the zones of 
influence of Rome and Parthia.109 Plutarch records that, as early as in 55 BC, 
the Parthian king tried to specify the Euphrates as the boundary between Rome 
and Parthia but, according to the historical sources from the Roman side, 
Pompey rejected this proposal.110 However, the later historian Orosius reports 
that the Parthians saw Crassus’ expedition into Northern Mesopotamia as a 
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violation of existing arrangements, suggesting that the Parthians did see the 
Euphrates as demarcating the frontier between the Roman and Parthian 
Empires.111 This was confirmed by the fact that, in 2 BC or 1 BC, Gaius Caesar 
met Tigranes III on an island in the Euphrates and confirmed the latter as the 
king of Parthia.112 A similar diplomatic meeting took place on the Euphrates in 
AD 18, this time between Germanicus and Parthian envoys.113 When conflicts 
between Rome and Parthia escalated in AD 61, Corbulo posted his troops on 
the Euphrates. After defeating an army led by Caesennius Paetus, the governor 
of Cappadocia, the Parthian king, Vologaeses, proudly crossed the river on the 
back of an elephant. Having learned that Corbulo had arrived on the Euphrates 
frontier, he dispatched envoys to Corbulo’s camp, asking for the evacuation of 
all Roman forts beyond the Euphrates and proposing “to make the stream the 
border between them, as before”.114  
          It is striking that the Romans do not seem to have accepted the idea that 
they should give up all claims to the lands beyond the Euphrates. The obvious 
reason for this is that Rome never got round to acknowledging Parthia as its 
equal. Accepting the Euphrates as marking the limit of Roman rule was 
incompatible with the ideological assumption that Roman domination was, or 
should be, totally uncontested.  
 
6. The development of the limes system in the second century      
The Romans excelled in building roads. Since the Republican period, they had 
constructed roads to connect the recently conquered areas of Italy. During the 
Imperial period the Roman road network spread over the entire Mediterranean 
region. Roads symbolized Roman power, greatly facilitated troop movements 
and gave Rome control over of local economies and resources.  
          Following the conquests and annexations of the first century BC and the 
first century AD, the Romans also began to build roads in the peripheral zones 
of the empire. As Isaac has pointed out in an important article, during the Early 
Imperial period the literary and epigraphic sources use the term limes to refer to 
military roads constructed by the Romans during or after campaigns against 
external enemies.115 In the texts of the first century, the term does not denote a 
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clearly demarcated boundary. Nor is it used to refer to any military works built 
for defensive purposes.116  
          During the first century, the Roman legionaries stationed in the frontier 
zones not only constructed roads and bridges but also turned their hand to 
military camps and other military installations. Since almost all Roman military 
forces in Europe and the Near East were stationed along the Rhine, the 
Danube and the Euphrates, numerous legionary camps and smaller 
fortifications were therefore built along these three rivers. Many of these 
military installations were positioned in places which were logistically and 
strategically advantageous, such as the confluence of two rivers or near a 
crossing of frontier roads. Such locations facilitated communication and the 
control of traffic as well as offering good starting points for military campaigns 
conducted across the rivers in questions. Some military bases were not built on 
terrain which was convenient for defence against invading enemies, 
demonstrating that in this period considerations of defence were not 
paramount in deciding where to station military units.117  
          The first phase of Domitian’s Chattian War, fought between 83 and 85, 
resulted in the creation of a chain of timber-built forts and watchtowers to the 
east of the Upper Rhine, commencing from the Taunus Heights and the 
Wetterau Plain and thereafter running through the Odenwald down to the 
Neckar Valley. The construction of this limes system benefited from the 
German policy carried out by Vespasian, who had built roads linking the Upper 
Rhine area and the Danube.118 However, the limes system along the north-west 
frontier was not completed until the reign of Trajan in the early second 
century.119 
          During the final years of Domitian and under Trajan, the focus of 
military activity shifted to the East. Trajan did not undertake any offensive 
operations on the German and Raetian frontiers, but merely reinforced the 
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chain of fortifications guarding the frontier zones.120 In Britain, he built the 
Stanegate military road along the line between the Tyne and Solway Firth. 
Hadrian used this line to build his 74-mile-long wall. In the southern parts of 
Mons Aurasius (the Aurès Mountains of modern Algeria and Tunisia), a system 
of ditches and mud-brick bulwarks, the so-called fossatum Africae, was 
constructed. 
          The Historia Augusta claims that Hadrian created a more or less complete 
limes system protecting the empire from barbarian attack: 
 
During this period and on many other occasions also, in many regions where the     
barbarians are held back not by rivers but by artificial barriers, Hadrian shut them 
off by means of high stakes planted deep in the ground and fastened together in the 
manner of a palisade.121 
 
Antoninus Pius basically followed Hadrian’s frontier policy, although in his 
early reign a military campaign was mounted in the territory of Britain, which 
was followed by the construction of a new wall in the newly conquered land 
close to the Forth-Clyde isthmus. In the area of Odenwald, timber-built forts 
and towers now were transformed into stone structures. In the Wetterau and 
Neckar regions, Antoninus Pius pushed the old limes system forward 30 
kilometres and, by the end of his reign, twenty forts and 250 watchtowers had 
been built between Wörth-am-Main and Lorch-Rems.122  Here too the limes 
system was beginning to assume a distinctively linear shape, making the 
contours of the Roman frontier more visible.123 
          Isaac has argued that decision makers of Rome never thought about the 
efficient functioning of the frontier system or about ways of making provincial 
territories safe from attack by enemies. In my view, it cannot be denied that, as 
early as the Julio-Claudian period, rivers, roads and military works built in the 
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frontier zone played some part in the defence of the empire.124 Between the end 
of the Chattian War in the 80s and the mid-second century, the creation of a 
Roman limes system, buttressed by a chain of linearly arranged military 
installations, in conjunction with the major rivers, mountain ridges and deserts 
marking the outer edges of the world controlled by the Romans, defined the 
shape of the empire more clearly. The line of watchtowers running along 
German and Raetian provincial borders, for example, certainly played a role in 
military defence. At the same time the rivers, roads and military fortifications of 
the frontier zone, as argued by Whittaker, served to secure control of local 
resources and to facilitate logistics and communications. In other words, while 
these natural and man-made features undoubtedly played an important part in 
the defence of the empire, it does not follow that the geographical boundaries 
of the empire became fixed during this period. 
          In the long term, the development of a well-garrisoned and an 
increasingly well-defined perimeter seems to have had an impact on the way in 
which Roman frontiers and Roman power were conceptualized. There are 
indications, for instance, that during the reigns of Marcus Aurelius and 
Commodus territory began to play an increasingly important part in imperial 
thinking. Cassius Dio reports that, during the final years of Marcus Aurelius’ 
reign, a treaty was concluded with the Marcomanni, stipulating that, “they 
might now settle to within a distance of five miles from the Danube”.125 What 
is striking about this arrangement is that it regulated the activities a barbarian 
people on the basis of a precise calculation. In a later passage, Cassius Dio 
relates that under Commodus all military outposts in the territory of the 
Marcomanni beyond the five-mile strip were abandoned.126 This remark offers 
another piece of evidence that the outline of the frontier was becoming clearer. 
Not much later Commodus granted peace to another German tribe, the Burii, 
forbidding them to pasture their animals within a five-mile-wide strip of land 
bordering the province of Dacia. 127  Here too the boundary of the Roman 
empire was slowly being clarified. As said, in the time of Nero the territorial 
dispute between Rome and the Ampsivarii had been handled in a completely 
different manner. Therefore, it does not seem far-fetched to conclude that, 
during the final decades of the second century, the Roman government had 
                                                          
124 Cf. Wheeler (1993a) 27. 
125 Cass. Dio 72,15.  
126 Cass. Dio 73,2,4.  
127 Cass. Dio 73,3,2.  
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developed a higher degree of frontier consciousness than it had had about a 
century earlier.  
          To sum up, a combination of natural and artificial boundaries played a 
role in shaping the Roman frontier. During the period of roughly fifty years 
between the accession of Domitian and the end of Hadrian’s reign, a more or 
less coherent systems of linearly arranged military installations took shape. 
Since most of these installations could be used as bases for campaigns against 
barbarian tribes occupying territories not yet become provinces, it would be 
wrong to interpret them as demarcating the external boundaries of Roman 
territory. It also seems clear that the original function of most of these military 
installations erected in the frontier zone was to control movements into the 
empire rather than to protect the frontier against barbarian raids, although 
some of the barriers in question could also have been used for defensive 
purposes. Nonetheless, the gradual appearance of an increasingly well-defined 
system of linear fortifications, many of which were situated along rivers, 
prompted a gradual and subtle change in Roman worldviews. In the last part of 
this chapter, I shall examine what the new perception of the image of the 
Roman world of the mid and late second century looked like.  
 
7. A change in worldviews during the second century AD? 
 
In his panegyric on the blessings of the pax Romana, a speech which was 
delivered in Rome in AD 155, Aelius Aristides describes the Roman world 
ruled by Emperor Antoninus Pius as follows: 
 
Here you built the walls to defend you, and then erected towns bordering upon them, 
some in some parts, others elsewhere, filling them with colonist, giving these the 
comforts of arts and crafts, and in general establishing beautiful order. An encamped 
army, like a rampart, enclosed the civilized world in a ring… from the settled areas of 
Aethopia to the Phasis, and from the Euphrates in the interior to the great outermost 
island towards the west; all this one can call a ring and circuit of walls. … But the 
ring, must be greater and more impressive, in every way altogether unbreachable and 
indestructible, outshining them all, and in all time there has never been a wall so 
firm. … It is they who defend these ordinary walls. … Such are the parallel 
harmonies or systems of defence which curve around you, the circle of fortifications at 
individual points, and that ring of those who keep watch over the whole world.128 
 
                                                          
128 Ael. Arist. Or. 26,80-4 (translated by J. Oliver); Breeze (2011) 20.  
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          In his History of Rome Appian, a contemporary of Aelius Aristides, offers a 
similar picture of the Roman world being surrounded and guarded by military 
camps and as having acquired a clearly defined boundary: 
 
In general, possessing the best part of the earth and sea they have, on the whole, aimed 
to preserve their empire by the exercise of prudence, rather than to extend their sway 
indefinitely over poverty-stricken and profitless tribes of barbarians, some of whom I 
have seen at Rome offering themselves, by their ambassadors, as its subjects, but the 
emperor would not accept them because they would be of no use to him. For other 
people, the emperors appoint kings, not requiring them for the empire. On some of the 
provinces they spend more than they receive, thinking it shameful to give them up even 
though they make a loss. They surround the empire with a great circle of camps and 
guard so great an area of land and sea like an estate.129 
         
          A similar frontier consciousness is to be found in the work of Herodian 
in the late second and early third century: 
 
From the time when Augustus assumed control of the government, however, the 
princeps freed the Italians from the necessity of working and of bearing arms; 
establishing forts and camps for the defense of empire, he stationed mercenaries in these 
to serve as a defensive bulwark on the frontier. The empire was further protected by 
great barriers of rivers and mountains and impassable deserts.130              
 
Up to a point Appian’s assessment of imperial policies resembles Strabo’s 
comment that Britain was so unprofitable it was not worth occupying. 131 
Nevertheless, there is an important difference between the two passages. Both 
Strabo and Appian stress the importance of economic considerations, but 
Appian also describes the empire of the second century as a clearly defined 
geopolitical body which is defended “like an estate”. His language suggests that, 
compared to the emperors of the early Principate, those of the mid and late 
second century came to think of the empire as a more cohesive geopolitical 
entity. Interestingly, this development is paralleled by a shift in the meaning of 
the term imperium. As Richardson has shown, the terms imperium and provinciae 
began to be used to designate clearly defined territorial spaces in the Augustan 
                                                          
129 App. praef. 7.  
130 Although Herodian writes about the Augustan Age, his account of  frontier policies 
reflects the concerns of  his own time rather than those of  the Early Principate. 
131 Strab. 17,3,24; 6,4,2; Isaac (1990) 388. 
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period, but it was only in the early second century AD that this semantic shift 
reached “a mature middle age”.132  
          Therefore, it seems as if imperial ideologies were slowly being adjusted in 
response to changes in actual military policies. Emperors and members of the 
ruling classes of the Roman Empire might well have realized that the limited 
imperial resources could not sustain continuous territorial expansion, doubts 
which perhaps began to creep in in the reign of Hadrian.133 As the foregoing 
sections have shown, Hadrian took various steps signalling a change in frontier 
policy after the conquests of the Trajanic period. He withdrew some troops 
from the lower Danube in Dacia and gave orders to construct a wall in Britain. 
In North Africa a new frontier line, the so-called fossatum Africae, was built to 
regulate the movement of transhumant pastoralist and to protect the trade 
routes from nomadic raids.134 At some sites along the Rhine, artificial frontier 
barriers consisting of a new series of wooden palisades, tree trunks and 
trenches were either renewed or augmented. 135  Such activities might be 
interpreted as pointing to a change in actual frontier policies.136 
          However, it would be wrong to interpret these developments as 
demonstrating that the old idea of an imperium sine fine was beginning to 
disappear in the same period. Clear traces of the ideological claim that Roman 
ruled the orbis terrarum can still be found in sources of the second century AD. 
In his panegyric, the same Aristides who refers to the empire being surrounded 
by army camps states that Rome has no fixed boundaries, claiming that “no one 
dictates to what point your control reaches”. 137  According to the Historia 
Augusta, Septimius Severus dreamed one night that he beheld Rome and all the 
world from the top of a very high mountain, while the provinces sang together 
                                                          
132 Richardson (2008) 181. 
133 Webster (1985) 67. 
134 For the debate about the functions of  the ditch system, see Trousset (1974) 140-142; 
Webster (1985) 73; Wheeler (1993) 29; Whittaker (1994) 91; Cherry (1998) 24; Breeze 
(2012) 121, 128. Whittaker argues that the main function of  the limes in modern 
southern Algeria and Tunisia was to control the movements of  transhumant 
pastoralists; see Whittaker (2004) 10. However, Cheery argues that there were two main 
functions for these barriers: to provide security for the garrisoned Roman soldiers, and 
to facilitate of  collecting taxes from the local pastoralists. See Cherry (1998) 62-63.  
135  For a general discussion of  the change of  frontier policies under Hadrian, see 
Breeze and Dobson (1976) 28; Webster (1985) 67-85; Birley (1997) 113-141, 203-214.   
136 Whittaker (1994) 86. 
137 Whittaker (2000) 299. 
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to the accompaniment of the lyre and flute.138 On the triumphal arch of the 
same emperor can be read the phrase Ob rem publicam restitutam imperiumque populi 
Romani propagatum, “[erected] because of the re-establishment of the state and 
the extension of the power of the Roman people”.139  
These examples demonstrate that the new idea of a clearly defined 
empire defended by army camps coexisted with the open concept of empire of 
Late Republican and Early Imperial times. Therefore, care should be exercised 
not to overrate the degree of frontier consciousness in the second century AD. 
As Chapter Five will reveal, external threats or the wish of some emperors to 
bolster their legitimacy by means of military successes continued to prompt 
quite a few rulers of the Roman Empire to take the offensive against external 
enemies. But that does not make the emergence of an alternative concept of 
empire any less significant.   
 
8. Conclusion  
 
Since each frontier zone of the Roman empire was unique, not only because 
landscape, climatic conditions and transport facilities differed from region to 
region but also because there were enormous variations in the nature and level 
of external threats, it is impossible to develop a uniform picture of Roman 
frontier policies which is valid for the whole empire. 140  However, if an 
abstraction is made from regional distinctions, it is still possible to make some 
general observations regarding the long-term evolution of Roman views about 
frontier zones and frontiers. 
          During the first hundred years which followed Augustus’ death, the 
Roman world remained quite open and inclusive, both ideologically and in 
terms of actual military policies. Broadly speaking, no fixed boundary line 
serving the purpose of demarcating Roman from non-Roman territories came 
into existence until the mid-third century AD. During the Principate, the 
frontier provinces of the empire were surrounded by various client kingdoms 
which were not under the direct jurisdiction of the Roman government. 
Throughout this period, Rome’s foreign policies remained flexible and 
                                                          
138 SHA. Sep. Sev. 3,5,1; 3,9,1. 
139 CIL VI, 1033= ILS 425. 
140 As Gruen rightly puts it, “there was little in common between Decebalus and Parthia, 
between barbarous Britons and the nomad tribesmen of  the Sahara, and between 
Gothic invaders and Sassanian Persia.” See Gruen (1978) 565. These distinctions 
undermine the validity of  Luttwak’s theory.  
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capricious. The choice to adopt a particular policy appears to have depended 
largely on the personal and immediate needs of the reigning emperor. In 
making these decisions, emperors could not rely on accurate information about 
conditions or developments in the peripheral zones of the empire. 
Compounded with the overriding importance of personal and political needs, 
this made it impossible for successive emperors to develop a scientifically based 
and clear-cut imperial strategy devised to preserve or maximize military security. 
          Between the last decades of the first century and the early third century 
AD, the contours of the Roman Empire became slowly more concrete and 
visible. By the late second and early third century, various Greek and Latin 
writers admitted the existence of imperial boundaries. In part as a result of the 
absorption of various client kingdoms in the East during the first century AD, 
the empire had increasingly become an organic political entity consisting of 
clearly defined territorial and administrative units. Rivers, roads and all kinds of 
military installations which were built in the frontier zone were increasingly 
beginning to resemble a ring surrounding the empire. Even though this system 
was originally designed for control purposes rather than for defence, its 
appearance had the effect of making the frontier more visible and tangible, 
thereby giving the orbis terrarum Romanum an increasingly less open appearance. 
          It must be stressed that the administrative and military boundaries of the 
empire were never hermetically sealed, and that the idea of an “empire without 
boundaries” was never relinquished.141 After the reign of Augustus territorial 
expansion slowed down but it did not stop. At least until the time of Caracalla, 
the offensive spirit resurged whenever a particular emperor considered the 
opportune moment had come to launch fresh aggressive campaigns. 
  
                                                          
141 SHA Sep. Sev. 3,5.  
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Chapter 4  
The rise of Chinese imperialism: the northern frontiers 
and foreign relations of the Western Han  
 
1. World views and the political situation in the Qin and Western (Former) 
Han empires  
 
In Chapter Two, I argued that the Warring States era from the early fifth to the 
late third century BC was a crucial period in the formation of Chinese identity 
and Chinese worldviews. After the seven major states had been unified into a 
single empire by Qin Shi Huang, the term tianxia came into increasing use, 
often to refer to a coherent, unified geo-political entity. Consequently, in most 
cases tianxia should be understood as corresponding to the modern concept of 
“empire” (diguo帝國), a term which did not emerge in Chinese sources until the 
nineteenth century. 1  Despite this development, the term tianxia, “all under 
Heaven”, also retained its literal meaning in the Early Imperial period. Using 
the Stele Inscriptions of Qin Shi Huang as a case study, I have examined the 
two meanings of the tianxia in the ancient texts. The broader meaning of tianxia, 
as stated earlier, had a strongly rhetorical sense which was used to highlight the 
grandeur of the territory under the authority of the Chinese ruler. Nevertheless, 
by the Early Imperial period, in most cases, as Yu Yingshi 余英時 suggests, 
tianxia had evolved into a “more purely political concept”, as can be seen in the 
texts of the Stele Inscriptions.2 
          Qin Shi Huang had dreamed that control of the tianxia would be 
transmitted within his family on a permanent basis. In reality, the newly created 
empire collapsed very soon after his death. Only sixteen years after its 
unification, the tianxia fell apart again. Following a short period of turmoil and 
disorder, Liu Bang 劉邦 (256-195 BC), a junior officer from the peasant class 
and a native of the county of Pei 沛縣 (present-day Xuzhou 徐州, Jiangsu 
Province), finally seized the imperial throne after defeating the king of Chu, 
Xiangyu 項羽, in 202 BC. He assumed the title of Emperor Gao 高帝 (r. 202-
                                                          
1 For a recent discussion of  the use of  the Chinese word diguo 帝國 and its English 
translation “empire” in Chinese literature, see Elliot (2014). 
2 Yu Yingshi (2008) 378.  
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195 BC) and was the founder of the Han dynasty which lasted for the next four 
hundred years. 
          Unlike the Qin regime, the Han dynasty had no connections with the 
aristocratic lineages of the pre-Qin period. In fact, during the first phase of 
their rise to power Liu Bang and his followers were no more than a group of 
rebel bandits operating in the territory of the old state of Chu in the declining 
Qin empire.3 Alarmed by the rapid disintegration of Qin, Liu Bang and his 
advisors did their best to establish their power on a firmer footing. In their 
endeavours, the early Han rulers resorted to many of the administrative 
arrangements created by Qin Shi Huang, and there was also a high degree of 
ideological continuity with the Qin period.  
          When this situation is taken into consideration, it is not surprising that 
the broader concept of tianxia is to be found in various literary works 
composed in the early Western Han period. For example, Jia Yi 賈誼 , a 
statesman who lived during the reign of Emperor Wen 文帝 (r. 180-157 BC), 
makes the following comment on the relationship between the emperor and the 
inhabitants of the world: 
 
According to the ancient exegesis, when traveling to the east, west, south and north,  
as far as a ship or cart can reach, and as far humankind can journey, even though the 
barbarian peoples dwelt there, there was no one who did not submit to the sovereign 
called Son of Heaven.4 古之正義，東西南北，苟舟車之所達，人蹟之
所至，莫不率服，而後雲天子。       
 
In terms of the wufu (five-zone) theory described in Chapter 2, the Son of 
Heaven (tianzi天子) was supposed to occupy the centre of the five zones, in 
contrast to the territory of the barbarians which was to be found in the 
outermost ring, which was named the huangfu 荒服, “the wilderness zone”.5 
This theory neatly allowed the lands of the barbarian peoples to be part of the 
territory controlled by the wise kings of remote antiquity. The passage just 
quoted suggests that this idea still remained alive in the second century BC. 
During the Western Han period, all peoples were supposed to be subject to the 
                                                          
3 For the rise of  Liu Bang and the formation of  the new military meritocracy of  the 
Han, see the monograph by Liu Kaiyuan 李開元 (2000) esp. 119-190.  
4 Xinshu 3,1 (Wei Buxin) 131. 
5 For the five-zone theory in the Confucian canons, see the discussion in Chapter Two, 
and Yu Yingshi (1986) 379. 
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authority of the Chinese emperor which extended to the outermost edges of 
the inhabited world.  
The reality was completely different. More or less simultaneously with 
the establishment of the Han dynasty, the rise of the Xiongnu confederacy on 
the steppes of Inner Asia began to exert significant pressure on the northern 
frontiers of the Chinese Empire. The expansionist policies of the nomadic 
tribes undermined the position of superiority to which the Han imperial 
authorities aspired, and threatened the stability of the new government. 
Emperor Gao tried to resolve this problem by embarking on a major military 
campaign against the Xiongnu in 201 BC. Unfortunately, this military action 
ended in a humiliating defeat. Emperor Gao was besieged by the Xiongnu 
forces in Pingcheng 平城  (near present-day Datong, Shanxi province) for 
several days and almost died there.6 Thereafter, for a period of nearly seventy 
years between this defeat and the early years of the reign of Emperor Wu, the 
Han government generally took a defensive stance towards the Xiongnu (for 
details, see the discussion below). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, various Han intellectuals regarded the weakness 
of Han as unacceptable. This sentiment was particularly voiced by such 
Confucian scholars as Lu Jia 陸賈 and Jia Yi 賈誼, who reasoned that the pre-
eminence of the barbarian tribes was not consonant with the emperor’s 
position of authority. One of Jia Yi’s essays contains the following passage:    
 
The current situation in the world (tianxia) is upside down. I hope His Majesty can 
perceive this. The Son of Heaven is the head of all under Heaven. Why? Because the 
head is at the top. The barbarian people are the feet of all under Heaven. Why? 
Because the feet are at the bottom. Recruiting and giving orders to the barbarians is 
the concern of His Majesty, while paying tribute to the emperor is the ritual which the 
officials and subjects have to perform. Now the feet are at the top and the head at 






Jia Yi’s critique clearly shows that he was worried about the relations between 
the Han and barbarian peoples (mainly referring to the Xiongnu). In his work, 
                                                          
6 Hanshu 94a, 3753. 
7 Xinshu 3,10 (Jiexian) 127. 
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Jia Yi does not expound on what strategies the Han government used, or 
should have used, to tackle the threat posed by the barbarians in the frontier 
regions, restricting himself to the observation that the hierarchical relationship 
existing between the emperor and the barbarians was the reverse of what it 
ought to be. Only if the emperor occupied a position of unchallenged 
superiority could the relationship between him and the barbarians be fitted into 
the five-zone theory of the Chinese classicists, in which the Son of Heaven 
occupied the centre of the earth under Heaven and the barbarians the most 
peripheral parts. Now the correct world order had been turned upside down, a 
state of affairs which Jia Yi found totally unacceptable. 
          In practice, Jia Yi’s appeal had no discernible effect on the foreign 
policies or worldviews of the educated elite of the Han court. Certainly 
contributing to this apparent indifference was the presence of a less ambitious 
worldview according to which the tianxia was simply a geopolitical domain 
consisting of a fixed number of administrative units. In other words, the empire 
could be seen as a geopolitical entity composed of a certain number of 
commanderies, counties and kingdoms, all of which were under the rule of the 
Han emperor who was a member of the clan of Liu.8 In this interpretation, the 
tianxia is understood as a clearly defined political and ethno-cultural entity 
which was transmitted within the house of Liu Bang.9  
          As already discussed in Chapter 2, various terms, including sihai, hainei 
and sifang, had been used to refer to the outer limits of the tianxia long before 
the unification of China in 221 BC. Such terms were transposed to the imperial 
era and widely used in literary works of the Qin-Han period and thereafter. 
After Liu Bang/Emperor Gao had crushed the rebellion of Ying Bu 英布 (黥
布), the king of the Huainan kingdom 淮南王, in 195 BC he paid a visit to his 
hometown of Pei, where he invited his fellow villagers and old friends to a feast. 
                                                          
8 Under the Han capital Chang’an,  jun郡 (commandery) and xian縣 (county) were the 
two basic administrative units. Moreover, Emperor Gao distributed vast territories to 
his allies and kinsmen as a reward for their support during the civil war. The feudal 
system which had been abolished by Qin Shi Huang and Li Si had been initially 
restored by Xiang Yu in the interval between Qin and Han, and was preserved by Liu 
Bang. The territories received by these men became kingdoms. For the administrative 
structures of  the Western Han empire, see Bielenstein’s monograph (1980) 4-109. 
9 The biography of  Dou Ying claims that “the tianxia is the possession of  the Emperor 
Gao and it is passed from generation by generation (within the family)”. See Hanshu, 52; 
Shinichirō Watanabe 渡辺信一郎, trans. by Xu Chong (2008) 130. 
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At the height of this feast, the emperor sang a song he had composed himself, 
which was later named the “Song of the Great Wind” (Dafeng ge大風歌):  
 
The great wind blew forth and the clouds flew [away] and scattered. Now my might 
has been imposed upon all within the four seas (hainei), I have returned to my native 




Although the term tianxia does not appear in this text, it does contain the 
expressions hainei (within the seas) and sifang (four quarters). The “four quarters” 
guarded by the emperor’s “brave men” are clearly coextensive with the tianxia 
of the Han empire. On these grounds it would seem that, ideologically speaking, 
the empire of Han was less open than the Roman empire at the time of 
Augustus. 
          A few months after reciting the poem, Emperor Gao returned to 
Chang’an where he issued an edict to commemorate the twelfth anniversary of 
his accession to the throne, taking the opportunity to warn the nobles of the 
empire not to rebel against Han rule. In this edict, the term tianxia is clearly 
used to refer to a geopolitical entity consisting of a series of hierarchically 
arranged administrative units. In this text the barbarians seem to have been 
excluded from the world order referred to and they were not expected to 
observe the laws and rituals of the Han. The text reads as follows: 
 
I have been made the Son of Heaven, and thus far as Emperor (di) have possessed the 
tianxia for twelve years. I have subjugated the tianxia with the brave men and 
talented grandees of the empire; together we have pacified and reunited it. Among those 
of my followers who have distinguished themselves, I have established the best as kings, 
the next [best] as marquises, and moreover the least have been given the income of 
towns. Furthermore, some of the relatives of my important subjects have become 
marquises. All have been personally authorized to appoint their officials and levy 
taxes. Their daughters have become princesses. The marquises who have the income of 
towns all wear seals; we have granted them large residences. The officials [of the rank 
of] two thousand shi; we have moved to Chang’an to be granted small residences. 
Those who went to Shu and Han and subjugated the three [parts of the state of] Qin 
are all exempted [from taxes and services] from generation to generation. I might be 
said not to have been ungrateful to those talented officers and meritorious officials of 
the tianxia. Let those who rebel against the Son of Heaven without cause and 
                                                          
10 Hanshu 1b, 74.  
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arbitrarily raise troops be punished by the military forces of the tianxia and executed. 
Let this be published and announced to the tianxia so that it might clearly 









In Chapter Two, I noted that the distinction between nei內 (‘inner’) and wai外 
(‘outer’) is a key concept in understanding the worldview of ancient China. 
From the mid to late Warring States period, these terms were frequently used in 
texts referring to the distinction between the huaxia (a general name for the 
Chinese people) and the yidi (a general name for the barbarian peoples living on 
the periphery of the Chinese world).12 As argued in Chapter Two, between the 
fifth and late third centuries BC climatic changes on the northern frontier of 
the Chinese Central Plains sharpened the distinction between the farming 
populations of the Chinese states and the nomadic tribes of the north, thereby 
stimulating the economic and cultural cohesiveness of the agricultural zones. 
During the Early Western Han period the gap between the agriculturalists and 
the nomadic world of the northern steppe deepened, particularly after the rise 
of the Xiongnu empire. The threat posed by the formidable cavalry of the 
Xiongnu prompted the Han government to construct more fortifications on its 
northern border, thereby encouraging the stimulation of the emergence of an 
increasingly exclusive Chinese world order. 
                                                          
11 Hanshu 1b, 78. My translation is largely based on that of  Dubs (1938) 55. 
12 As Yates has pointed out, “the relations between the elites, religious leaders, and 
ordinary people of  the steppe, desert, and mountain fastness, between the outer regions 
(wai) and the emperors in Beijing, were very different from those that held between the 
emperors and the officials, local elites, and subordinate masses within (nei) China 
proper.” See Yates (2001) 355-356. I have argued that the distinction between nei and 
wai had come into existence long before the creation of  the Qin-Han empire. See my 
discussion in Chapter Two. The increasing disjunction between the agricultural society 
of  China and the nomadic world of  the north, in tandem with the establishment of  the 
unified empire and the more or less simultaneous rise of  Xiongnu power increased the 
importance of  these territorial concepts. 
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          Liu Bang had originally intended to build a new capital at Luoyang, the 
old capital of Luoyi of Zhou dynasty, the place it was assumed was located at 
the centre of the world (cf. Chapter 2). However, for the sake of security Lou 
Jing 婁敬, a senior minister, advised the emperor to establishing the capital in 
the homeland of Qin.13 Lou Jing’s proposal was supported by another senior 
official, Zhang Liang 張良.14 Finally the capital was established in Chang’an 
(modern Xi’an 西安), a city which was situated only about 30 km to the east of 
the old Qin capital Xianyang. The region in which Chang’an was situated was 
named Guanzhong 關中 (Within the Passes). Throughout the Early Han period 
this remained the core region of the empire.15 The area to the east of Mount 
Xiao 崤山 and Hangu Pass 函谷關 (in present-day Lingbao 靈寶), where 
Emperor Gao granted vast tracts of land to his kinsmen and supporters, was 
called Guandong 關東 (East of the Pass). Most other areas were divided into 
commanderies and counties which were directly administered by imperial 
officials.   
          On the basis of these arrangements, the early Han empire might be 
depicted as consisting of three zones, namely Guanzhong, Guandong and the 
remainder of the empire. The barbarian lands which were located outside the 
empire were conceptualized as making up a fourth zone. Furthermore, as I shall 
argue in Chapter Six, the humble origins of the imperial house of Liu stimulated 
various attempts to augment the legitimacy of the Han rulers by emphasizing 
the link between these rulers and Heaven as the highest power in the cosmos. 
According the political theories of Dong Zhongshu, for instance, the emperor, 
as “the Son of Heaven”, played an intermediary role between Heaven and 
mankind.16 A logical corollary of this theory was that the Han emperor should 
                                                          
13 As Lou Jing explained, the Qin area was protected by the Xiao Mountains, the Yellow 
River and the Four Passes. If  an emergency should arise, an army of  a million men 
could be instantly raised. Even there were disorder in the areas east of  the Xiao 
Mountains, the area of  Qin would remain safe. Using a wrestling metaphor, Lou Jing 
argues that as long as the emperor controlled the area of  Qin, he will be in good 
position to strangle his enemy and hit the latter’s back. See Shiji 99, 2716.  
14 Like Lou Jing, Zhang Liang gave various reasons for building the capital in the area 
of  Qin. The advantages mentioned by him included the good defensive location of  the 
region, the abundance of  all kinds of  materials and the fertility of  the land. See Shiji 55, 
2044. 
15 Chen Suzhen 陳蘇鎮 (2011) 230-234. 
16 About Dong Zhongshu’s theory and his contribution to the development of  the 
Chinese political cosmological thought, see Schwarz (1985) 363-381. A detailed 
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rule all of mankind, and indeed Confucius and Mencius had claimed that the 
true king leaves nothing and nobody outside his realm, and that his power is 
not constrained by distance.17 For these reasons, the unbounded worldview of 
the Western Zhou period never disappeared entirely (cf. Chapter Two). 
 Since the Han emperors of the early second century did not control the 
territories of the Xiongnu, the persistence of this all-encompassing worldview 
could been a spur which stimulated intellectuals and emperors to contemplate 
the possibility of further territorial expansion. In actual fact, Han thinkers such 
as Dong Zhongshu do not seem to have been worried by the discrepancy 
between ideological representations and realities. In the following section, I 
shall investigate how the seemingly contradictory worldviews which can be 
found in early Han sources were fused, and how these worldviews affected 
actual decisions taken regarding the relationship between the empire and their 
Xiongnu neighbours during the Western Han period.18 
 
2. Han worldviews and the relationship between the Han and the 
Xiongnu 
 
When Augustus became the first emperor of the Roman empire, Rome had 
already established unchallenged military supremacy throughout the 
Mediterranean world. In striking contrast to this achievement, the Han empire 
established by Emperor Gao was immediately faced with mounting threats 
from a rising steppe empire on its northern frontier. This fundamental 
divergence between the steppe and the sown prompted the early Han emperors 
to seek different strategies to deal with their barbarian neighbours than those 
adopted by the Roman emperors of the first century AD.    
          Unlike the Roman armies of the early Principate, the Western Han army 
initially was in a weak position in any confrontation with the steppe peoples, 
                                                                                                                                        
discussion of  Dong Zhongshu’s theory of  imperial sovereignty in relation to Heaven 
will be given in Chapter Six.  
17 L. S. Yang 楊聯陞 (1968) 26.  It should be noted that the saying “nobody outside his 
realm” refers mainly to the idea that “all under Heaven” had been conquered by the 
ruler’s moral power rather than by the use of  military force. For the moral duties of  
Chinese rulers, see Chapter Six.  
18 Loewe also observes this tension. As he puts it, “An emperor was essential to the 
maintenance of  government within the cosmology in which the rule of  man was placed; 
but how far he fitted the ideals that philosophers expected is another matter.” See 
Loewe (2002) 348.  
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both tactically and in terms of military equipment.19 By the last decade of the 
third century BC, the Xiongnu confederacy had acquired a highly developed 
hierarchical military system under their charismatic leader Modu Chanyu 冒頓
單于 (234-174 BC).20 Unlike the frontier soldiers of the Western Han period 
who were recruited from the farming population in the remote hinterland 
regions and were expected to serve for only one year, all adult Xiongnu males 
above a certain age were obliged to bear arms. The pastoral cavalry forces could 
move fast, making it relatively easy for the Xiongnu to raid Chinese territory on 
horseback. The Chinese infantry and chariots were no match for this highly 
mobile cavalry.21 This imbalance was exacerbated by the fact that, after the 
bitter Chinese civil war, the victorious Emperor Gao had demobilized a large 
part of his armies in order to minimize the risk of future rebellions. 
          After the death of Emperor Gao, the power devolved to the Empress 
Dowager Lü 吕(Zhi 雉) and her clan until Emperor Wen 文 (Heng恆 r. 180-
157 BC) was enthroned with the support of some old ministers in 180 BC. The 
dynastic feuds pursued by various members of the House of Liu and the 
faction of Lü at this time distracted the Chinese rulers from realizing the 
necessity of investing resources in their frontier armies. As literary sources 
show, during the larger part of the reign of Emperor Wen and his successor, 
Emperor Jing 景 (Qi 啟 r. 157-141 BC), the Han empire adopted an policy of 
appeasement, sending the Xiongnu large amounts of grain, silk, cloth and other 
luxuries to secure peace on its northern frontiers.22  
          Shortly after the humiliating defeat of the Han armies led by Emperor 
Gao at Pingcheng, in 198 BC, on the advice of Lou Jing 婁敬, a senior Han 
official, the Han government signed a treaty with the Xiongnu.23 Sima Qian 
                                                          
19 In terms of  military capabilities the Han generally lagged behind the Xiongnu in the 
early period of  the Han dynasty. This discrepancy emerges clearly from the essay by the 
Western Han statesman Chao Cuo. See Di Cosmo (2004) 203. 
20 On the formation of  the Xiongnu state and the territorial expansion which took 
place under Modu Chanyu in the late third century BC, see Barfield (1989) 323-6; Di 
Cosmo (2004) 167-190; Yu (2008) 118-220.  
21 In order to deal with this weakness, Emperors Wen and Jing increased the size of  the 
Han cavalry. See Di Cosmo (2004) 192-227, 235.  
22 For a detailed discussion of  these payments, see Yu (1967) 45-47; 61; 64. 
23 The treaty, signed in 198 BC, contained four main provisions. 1. The Han had to send 
a princess to the Xiongnu Chanyu to be his wife; 2. Each year the Han court had to 
provide the Xiongnu with a certain amount of  grain, wine, silk and foodstuffs; 3. The 
Han empire and the Xiongnu would be equal partners; 4. The boundary line between 
Han and Xiongnu was the Great Wall. See Shiji 110; Hanshu 43. Yu (1967) 41-42; 
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states that the treaty clearly stipulated that the Great Wall was to be the 
boundary line between the territory of Han and that of the Xiongnu. It also 
provided that all those peoples who drew the bows (引弓之國) beyond the 
Wall should be under the orders of the Chanyu, while all those wearing Han 
caps and sashes (冠帶之室) within the Wall were to be ruled by the Chinese 
emperor.24 This treaty unambiguously demonstrates that, in the world of real 
politics, the Chinese emperor was assumed to constrain his authority within a 
specified geographical space. The upshot was that this reality formed a sharp 
discrepancy with the ideal of universal imperial rule developed by the 
Confucian literati of the Han period. 
          The discrepancy between Confucian ideology and the political and 
military reality is also illustrated by the letters exchanged between the Xiongnu 
Chanyu and the Han emperor recorded in historical accounts. Ban Gu’s Hanshu
漢書 (The Book of Former Han) claims that the letters sent by Modu Chanyu 
to Emperor Wen contained the following passage: The great Chanyu of Xiongnu 
inaugurated by Heaven sends [his] respects to the [Chinese] emperor and wishes [him] well 
(天所立匈奴大單于敬問皇帝無恙).25 The Chanyu states unequivocally the 
claim that his authority derived from Heaven, thereby asserting that he was the 
equal of the recipient in terms of status. This interpretation is confirmed by the 
fact that Xiongnu Chanyu addressed the emperor as his “brother” (Kundi or 
Xiongdi 昆弟,兄弟).26 These indications suggest that the relationship between 
the Xiongnu Chanyu and the Han emperor was regarded as a relationship 
between equals, at least by the former.27 
          It is interesting that the Western Han rulers do not seem to have been 
particularly concerned by this discrepancy between Confucian ideology and 
political reality. At least part of the explanation of this paradox is that the 
military weakness of the Han empire could be compensated by insisting on the 
cultural superiority of the Chinese emperor over the Xiongnu. After the death 
of Emperor Gao in 195 BC, Modu Chanyu sent a letter to Dowager Empress 
                                                                                                                                        
Barfield (1981) 52; Chang (2007) 172. For archaeological evidence, including the tiles 
which were excavated from Han tombs in Baotou in Inner Mongolia in the twentieth 
century, see He Lin (1986). 
24 Shiji 110, 2902. 
25 Shiji 110, 2899; Hanshu 94a, 3756.  
26 In several letters sent to the Chanyu by Emperor Wen, the latter repeats that the Han 
and Xiongnu were brothers according to the terms of  the previous treaty. See Shiji 110, 
2902; Hanshu 94a, 3754. 
27 Di Cosmo (2004) 193. 
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Lü containing an offer of marriage. From the Chanyu’s perspective, the 
proposal made sense because the customs of the Xiongnu allowed a man to 
marry his brother’s widow (levirate), but from a Chinese point of view the offer 
was an unbearable insult. 28  Infuriated by this humiliation, Empress Lü 
summoned the chancellor, Chen Ping 陳平, and a number of senior officials to 
debate whether the Han should send out troops to punish the Xiongnu’s 
arrogance. Pan Kuai 樊噲, an eminent general who had helped Liu Bang in his 
rise to power, boasted that he would speedily crush the Xiongnu army with a 
hundred thousand soldiers under his command. His confidence was rebuked by 
another statesman, Ji Bu 季布 , who bitterly criticized Pan’s plan for two 
reasons. He began by reminding those present of the painful defeat which the 
late Emperor Gao had suffered in 200 BC. Furthermore, he argued that the 
barbarians were not worth attacking: 
 
The Yi and Di peoples are like beasts. It is neither worth even being glad if we receive 
compliments from them, nor worth being irritated by their insults.29 且夷狄璧如禽
兽，得其善言不足喜，恶言不足怒也。 
 
In the end Empress Lü accepted Ji Bu’s advice and wrote a respectful letter to 
the Chanyu in which she politely declined the latter’s marriage proposal. 
The “harmonious kinship” policy (heqin 和親) by means of which the 
early Western Han emperors tried to deal with the Xiongnu confederacy was 
not enough to guarantee the stability of the frontiers and dispel the hostility 
between the Han and Xiongu. From time to time, the Xiongnu army broke the 
peace and raided the northern frontier counties of the Han empire, extorting 
more subsidies.30 In short, the enormous amount of subsidies paid by the Han 
emperor did not buy peace and the financial burdens of the Han government 
only increased.31 
Another problem arose from the fact that the Han people was far less 
keen than the Xiongnu to exchange goods on the frontier. Whereas the Han 
court wanted to establish a clear border with “as few links as possible between 
                                                          
28 Shiji 110, 2879. About the Xiongnu people’s customs, see Chin (2010) 327. 
29 Hanshu 94a, 3755. 
30 Barfield (1981) 53. Since all of  the surviving sources are Han-biased, it is difficult to 
establish if  Han army also broke the peace and interfered in Xiongnu affairs.  
31 According to Sima Qian, the annual Han subsidy amounted to less than 5,000 hu of  




its border people and the Xiongnu”, the latter desired exactly the opposite.32 As 
a result of this inconsistency, the relationship between the two states remained 
unstable for the next century and a half. Aware of the Xiongnu’s fondness for 
Han goods, some early Han statesmen urged the emperor to continue 
implementing the heqin policy, stating that they were convinced that the 
barbarians would cease to harass Han frontiers after their desires had been 
assuaged by material goods. This scheme, first proposed by Jia Yi, became 
known as the policy of the “Five Baits”. Jia Yi stressed the best way of dealing 
with the barbarians was: 
 
(1) to give them elaborate clothes and carriages to corrupt their eyes;  
(2) to give them fine food to corrupt their mouths;  
(3) to give them music to corrupt their ears;  
(4) to give them lofty buildings, granaries, and slaves to corrupt their stomachs; and 
(5) to provide gifts and shower favours on those Xiongnu who surrendered.33 
 
The Shiji recounts that this strategy was betrayed to the Xiongnu Chanyu by a 
Han captive named Zhonghang Yue 中行說.34 Knowing the seductiveness of 
Han luxury goods, he warned the Chanyu not to be obsessed by Han goods or 
customs: 
 
The strength of the Xiongnu lies in the very fact that their food and clothing are 
different from those of the Chinese, and they are therefore not dependent on the Han 
for anything. Now the Chanyu has acquired this fondness for Chinese things and is 
trying to change the Xiongnu customs. Therefore, although the Han sends no more 
than one-fifth of its goods here, eventually it will succeed in winning over the whole of 
the Xiongnu nation. From now on, whenever you receive any Han silk, put this on 
and try riding your horses through undergrowth and brambles! In no time your robes 
and leggings will be torn to shreds and everyone will see that silks are no match for the 
utility of felt and leather garments. Likewise, when you receive any Han foodstuffs, 
throw them away so that people can see that they are not as practical or tasty as milk 
and kumiss.35 匈奴人眾不能當漢之一郡，然所以彊者，以衣食異，
無仰於漢也。今單于變俗好漢物，漢物不過什二，則匈奴盡歸於
                                                          
32 Lattimore (1940) 478-480; Yu (1967) passim., esp. 92-133; Barfield (1981) 54.  
33 Yu (1967) 37; Yang (1968) 27-9. 
34 Shiji 110, 2879. Chin (2010) 325.  






       
The foregoing discussion would appear to show that the rulers and educated 
elite of the early Western Han period harboured ambivalent sentiments about 
Han relations with the nomadic peoples in the north. On the one hand, some 
Han officials, such as Jia Yi, were well aware of the awkward discrepancy 
between the reality in which the Han emperor was in a weak position when 
confronted with the expansionist policies of the Xiongnu and the ideal picture 
of universal imperial power. On the other hand, the Han emperor was very 
reluctant to end the threat posed by the Xiongnu by use of military force. Even 
Jia Yi thought that the best way to counter the barbarian threat was to corrupt 
the Xiongnu’s minds by providing them with luxuries.36 
          Chao Cuo 晁錯 (200-154 BC), another prominent statesman living in the 
time of Emperor Jing who wrote several essays on military and frontier issues, 
came to a different conclusion. He was fully aware of the military power of the 
Xiongnu, pointing out that the Xiongnu soldiers were adept at horse-riding and 
shooting, galloping through rugged terrain and enduring harsh climatic 
conditions. Unlike Jia Yi, however, he believed that the Xiongnu’s threat could 
only be ended by military resistance.37 Despite his conviction, he was firmly 
opposed to the idea of carrying out any offensive campaigns against the 
Xiongnu, arguing that the best solution was the establishment of permanent 
garrisons of farmer-soldiers along the frontier.38  
          The first part of this chapter briefly touched upon the imperial 
worldview developed by Dong Zhongshu. In his opinion, the emperor 
occupied the centre of the cosmos, ruling all mankind by the mandate of 
Heaven. As a statesman, however, he seems to have been unconcerned by the 
                                                          
36 Loewe (2011) 107. 
37 For Chao Cuo’s theories concerning the best way of  dealing with the Xiongnu, see 
Hanshu 49, 2279 –2281. 
38 As he points out, “war is a dangerous thing …and the pursuit of  victory is at the cost 
of  human life. Once it has failed, it is too late to repent.” This is why in his proposals 
to the emperor Wen Chao did not advocate launching any major campaigns against the 
Xiongnu. On the contrary, he urged the emperor to pay more attention to the 
consolidation of  the frontier fortifications. For Chao Cuo’s proposal concerning the 
establishment of  new settlements along the borders, see Hanshu 49, 2283-2287. For a 
discussion of  Chao Cuo’s ideas and proposals, see Chang (2007) 147-150.  
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inferior position of the Han emperor in relation to the Xiongnu barbarians. 
Some of his views on this topic were recorded by Ban Gu: 
 
It is principles which move a righteous man, while profits move an avaricious one. 
Peoples like the Xiongnu cannot be persuaded by talk of benevolence and moral 
principles. All one can do is talk to them about fine profits and to get them to seek 
links with Heaven. Let them contract only with Heaven. Therefore, give them rich 
profits to subdue their will, bind them to Heaven by oath, and take their beloved sons 
in charge as hostages so that they are emotionally involved. Even were the Xiongnu to 
attempt to make a change, would they be willing to forego the chance of gaining a rich 
profit? Would they practise deceit on Heaven? Would they like to see their dear 
children put to death? Taxes and the handing-over of gifts are not as high as the cost 
of an army, and the strength of a city’s walls is not as effective as a promise agreed by 
men of integrity. What a benefit it would be to all if adults close to the borders could 
loosen their [war] belts and if their infants could be suckled in peace; if, with no enemy 
horse [cavalry] spying out what they could find at the defence lines, there would be no 







         
To judge from this passage, Dong was arguing that, when dealing with the 
Xiongnu, the emperor should not rely heavily on military force thereby creating 
enormous costs and disturbing the Han people of the frontier zone. Instead he 
urges the emperor to use a judicious combination of material benefits and 
emotional blackmail to keep the Xiongnu in check. This idea is very similar to 
the “Five Baits” approach advocated by his contemporary Jia Yi. 
          Much later, in the mid-first century AD, Dong’s approach was 
vehemently criticized by the historian Ban Gu. As Ban Gu points out, the 
Chanyu had never allowed his sons to go to the Han court as hostages. 
Furthermore, he observes that, during the reigns of Emperors Wen and Wu, 
Han armies had successfully fought large-scale campaigns against the Xiongnu. 
In these confrontations the losses of men, horses and land had been evenly 
                                                          
39 Hanshu 94b, 3832-3834. For Dong Zhongshu’s ideas regarding the Xiongnu, see the 
analysis by Loewe (2011) 106-109. My translation is a slightly adapted version of  that 
offered by Loewe. See ibid. 107-108. 
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balanced. Although the Han armies had captured new territories to the south of 
the Yellow River and set up the Suofang commandery to consolidate its gains, 
the Han government had lost the lands south of Zaoyang up to a distance of 
900 li. Although the Xiongnu did occasionally send envoys to the Han capital, 
they also detained the Han envoys dispatched from the Han imperial court. 
Finally, Ban Gu criticizes Dong Zhongshu’s lack of knowledge about the 
fortification of the frontiers and dismisses his plan to defeat the enemy through 
bribes as naïve.40   
At first sight Dong’s political ideas might seem to be a contradiction of 
the all-powerful image of the Han emperor, but closer inspection reveals that 
the military weakness of many Han emperors did not undermine prevailing 
ideas about the empire or the legitimacy of emperors.  In Chapter Six I shall 
argue that Han ideas about the ideal emperor focused on the latter’s role as a 
living moral example rather than any heroic military qualities he might possess. 
In other words, the reputation of the Chinese ruler depended, for the most part, 
on his success in disseminating morality and order among his Chinese 
subjects.41 A wise ruler was supposed to have the charismatic power needed to 
persuade the barbarians occupying the remotest areas to acknowledge the 
superiority of the Han emperor, on account of the latter’s benevolence and 
impeccable morality. On the other hand, since the barbarians living outside the 
empire were not regarded as subjects of the Han emperor, they were not seen 
as a target group in the emperor’s project of moral transformation. 
          These observations help to explain why some literati of the early Western 
Han were not so much concerned about the military inferiority of the empire in 
its combats with the Xiongnu barbarians. As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
idea of Chinese moral and cultural superiority can be observed as one of the 
products of the strengthening of Chinese cultural-ethnic identity between the 
collapse of the Western Zhou dynasty and the creation of the unified Qin 
empire. Paradoxically, these feelings of cultural and moral superiority were 
reinforced rather than reduced as a result of the rise of the steppe empire in the 
north by the Western Han period. 
          During the Warring States Period, many Chinese philosophers had 
already formulated the view in general that violence was not the best way to 
                                                          
40 For Ban Gu’s critique, see Hanshu 94b, 3831. 
41 Loewe (2002) 345. Roman emperors were also expected to pay great attention to 
their moral duties, see Noreña (2011) 37-100. However, during the Principate the 
reputation of  the ruling emperor continued to depend largely on military successes. For 
a more detailed discussion of  this topic see Chapters Five and Six.   
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achieve political ends. Partly for this reason, many Chinese rulers showed little 
interest in pursuing military glory and territorial expansion.42 Most of them 
appear to have seen the creation of a clearly defined physical boundary and 
compliance with the demands of the Xiongnu rulers as the best way to counter 
the threat posed by the northern barbarians. Only when this approach had 
ended in failure did some Han turn to a more aggressive frontier policy.43 
 
3. Military campaigns and territorial expansions (133-60 BC) 
 
3.1. Major campaigns of the Han (133-119 BC) 
 
It is not entirely clear why Emperor Wu decided to change the foreign policy 
regarding the Xiongnu. Both the Shiji and Hanshu recount that, although 
Xiongnu cavalry forces carried out small-scale raids into Han territory from 
time to time, no major incursions occurred during the reign of Emperor Jing.44 
When Emperor Wu ascended the throne, the harmonious pseudo-kinship 
policy was even reaffirmed by a clarification of the terms of the treaty and by 
increasing traffic in the border markets. Ban Gu records that the relationship 
between the Han empire and the Xiongnu grew less hostile and that border 
markets in the vicinity of the Great Wall boomed.  
          This felicitous period did not last long. Peace between the Han and the 
Xiongnu broke down in 136 BC. In this year a Xiongnu envoy came to 
Chang’an to visit the emperor with a marriage proposal from Chanyu Junchen
軍臣單于  (r. 161-126 BC). Emperor Wu convened a court conference to 
discuss this matter. Two statesmen, Han Anguo 韓安囯 (d. 127 BC) and Wang 
Hui 王恢 (d. 133 BC), dominated the debate. The following year, Nie Wengyi
聶翁壹, a Chinese merchant from the frontier city of Mayi 馬邑, proposed that 
Wang Hui ambush the Xiongnu forces led by the Chanyu when the latter 
                                                          
42 For a discussion of  violence and war in the Warring States period, see the seminal 
study of  Lewis (1990) 53-96. For attitudes to warfare during the Qin and Han empires, 
see the final chapter of  this dissertation.   
43 Since the early Han, the heqin policy was largely dictated by the military inferiority of  
the Han empire, but its existence does not prove that the Han elite was satisfied with 
the existing situation. On the other hand, it has to be said that the Han government 
tried to maintain peace with the Xiongnu by concluding a treaty in which the latter were 
treated as equal partners.  
44 Hanshu 94a, 3765. 
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visited the border. Wang submitted this proposal to the Emperor Wu, and 
another heated debate with Han Anguo ensued.45 The details of the discussion 
are recorded by Ban Gu. As an experienced military official from the old 
frontier state of Yan 燕, Wang Hui had a deep knowledge of Chinese-barbarian 
relationships. As far as he was concerned, the appeasement policy had proved 
to be a failure, since it did not stop the Xiongnu from raiding the Chinese 
borders whenever they wanted. The main reason for their audacity, Wang Hui 
thought, was purely and simply that the Xiongnu did not fear the emperor. 
Moreover, Wang Hui believed that the Xiongnu’s appetite for new territory 
could never be satisfied. Therefore he advised Emperor Wu to end the policy 
of appeasement and to subjugate the Xiongnu by force. Unlike most other 
literati, Wang Hui did not think that the Han army was inferior to the Xiongnu 
in the battlefield. 
          Wang Hui’s proposal was rejected by Han Anguo, the Imperial 
Chancellor, who advised the emperor to continue the “peace and marriage” 
policy designed to appease the Xiongnu. Han Anguo emphasized the 
superiority of the Xiongnu’s military strength, stating that the nomadic soldiers 
excelled in archery and that their speed could be compared to that of a 
hurricane or lightning. He also reminded the emperor of the fact that the two 
military campaigns which had been mounted during the reigns of Emperor Gao 
and Emperor Wen had yielded no positive results. Interestingly, as one of the 
court literati, Han Anguo also expressed his concern about the cultural gap 
existing between the Xiongnu and those inhabiting the Zhongguo (Central 
State). As he pointed out, since time immemorial the barbarians had upheld 
completely different institutions, rituals and customs to the Chinese. Therefore, 
as completely uncivilized people occupying the outermost parts of the world, 
the Xiongnu were not even worth worrying about.46 Finally, he expressed his 
worry that a military advance into enemy territory would create immense 
logistical problems. This Sino-centric view is in line with those formulated by 
some other Chinese scholar-officials already mentioned.  
           
          Although Emperor Wu had begun to consider the possibility of attacking 
the Xiongnu, no military offensive was launched until 129 BC. In the autumn 
of that year, the Han court sent four generals, Wei Qing 衛青, Gongsun Ao 公
                                                          
45 The debate is recorded at length in the Book of  Han Anguo by Ban Gu, see Hanshu 52, 
2398-2407.  
46 ibid, 2402.  
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孫敖, Gongsun He 公孫賀 and Li Guang 李廣, each commanding 10,000 
cavalry, to fight the Xiongnu. This first campaign ended in failure. In 127 BC, 
however, General Wei Qing, who had set out from Yunzhong 雲中 with an 
army to march on Longxi 隴西, inflicted a heavy defeat on the Xiongnu force. 
This success resulted in the recovery of the region of Henan 河南地, where 
two new commendaries, Shuofang 朔方 and Wuyuan 五原, were established. 
The fortification works running along the Yellow River were also reconstructed 
at this time. 
In 121 BC, the Xiongnu forces again suffered heavy losses when they 
were defeated by a Han army commanded by General Huo Qubing 霍去病. 
Having crossed the Yanzhi Mountain 焉支山 with 10,000 cavalry, he captured 
8,000 Xiongnu soldiers during the first phase of his campaign. In the summer 
of 121 BC, he launched a campaign across Juyan 居延 from Longxi and Beidi
北地  and succeeded in bringing the Qilian Mountains 祁連山  under Han 
control. This campaign resulted in 30,000 Xiongnu soldiers and over ten 
commanders being captured. Angered by the defeat of his subordinate kings, 
Hunye (or Hunxie) 渾邪王 and Xiutu 休屠王, the Chanyu decided to summon 
them to his capital and execute them. When King Hunye learnt about this plan, 
he killed Xiutu and led 40,000 armed soldiers to surrender to Han. His action 
led to the creation of the five Subordinate States of Han in the five 
commanderies of Longxi, Beidi, Shangjun 上郡, Shuofang and Yunzhong in 
the region beyond the old garrisons to the south of the Yellow River. Once 
these were set up, Han officials transferred large numbers of poor people from 
Guandong (the area east of Hangu Pass) to populate the area of Henan (the 
area beyond the part of the Great Wall built by the Qin king, Zhaoxiang, to the 
north of the Yellow River).47 
          Only three years later, in 118 BC, Emperor Wu again dispatched his 
generals, Wei Qing and Huo Qubing, with 100,000 cavalrymen to mount a 
large-scale attack on the Chanyu’s base in Mobei 漠北 after Xiongnu invasions 
of You Beiping 右北平 and Dingxiang 定襄 in 119 BC.48 The army of Wei 
Qing confronted the Xiongnu’s elite soldiers in the region of Mobei and 
inflicted another defeat on the Chanyu’s army, forcing Ichise Chanyu to flee to 
                                                          
47 For Emperor Wu campaigns against the Xiongnu and the political arrangements 
which were made between 129 BC and 118 BC, see Chang (2007) 162-75. 
48 Shiji, 110; Hanshu,94a; Liu Yanwei 劉彥威 (1997) 11.  
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the northwestern regions. At  the same time, the forces commanded by Huo 
crushed the army led by the Wise King of the Left at a distance of 2,000 li from 
Dai Commandery 代郡. The Xiongnu king escaped to the northwest with the 
remnants of his army, pursued by the Han army all the way to Hanhai 瀚海 
(Lake Baikal). In the wake of these successes, the Han government now 
established military settlements along the Yellow River between western 
Shuofang and Lingju 令居. Between Lingju and Dunhuang, a chain of military 
posts, watchtowers and beacon fires was established along the Great Wall as a 
measure to reinforce the defensive lines. Although the Xiongnu did not stop 
harassing the northern frontier regions, these campaigns ended the Xiongnu’s 
military superiority. 
 
3.2. Expansion into the Western Regions and the triumph over the 
Xiongnu (139 BC-AD 9) 
 
The rulers of Han had long realized that the military strength of the Xiongnu 
was based on their control of the multiple states of the Western Regions 西域, 
composed of a huge area to the west of the Yumen Pass (Yumen Guan玉門
關 ), which provided the Xiongnu with rich resources. In the light of this 
knowledge, the Han court dispatched Zhang Qian 張騫 to pay a visit to these 
western lands for the purpose of establishing an alliance. Zhang Qian’s first 
journey took place in 139/8 BC. It was not a success as Zhang Qian was 
captured by the Xiongnu people and detained by them until 129/128 BC, when 
he managed to escape to the Western Regions. Crossing a number of states in 
the Tarim Basin 塔里木盆地 and Xinjiang 新疆, he finally reached Yuezhi 月
氏, a powerful state in Central Asia. However, since Yuezhi had no intention of 
opposing the Xiongnu, Zhang Qian’s mission was ultimately unsuccessful.  
          In 119 BC Zhang Qian was sent to the Western Regions by Emperor Wu 
for the second time. The aim of his mission was to “cut off the right arm of the 
Xiongnu (斷匈奴右臂 )”. 49  In other words, the Han court was trying to 
establish a military alliance with some of the states in the Western Regions 
which had been under the control of the Xiongnu. However, Wusun 烏孫, the 
most important state the Han was trying to win over, showed little interest in 
                                                          
49 Hanshu 61, 2692.  
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becoming an ally of the Han emperor, pointing out that it was located very far 
away from the Han empire and knew little about the latter. This negative 
response was also motivated by the fact that the Xiongnu had controlled 
Wusun and many other peoples in the Western Regions for many years, making 
the Wusun nobles reluctant to offend their overlords. Although the 
contemporary historian Sima Qian rated Zhang Qian’s undertaking in travelling 
to the Western Regions highly, the fact remains that his two missions failed to 
produce any tangible results.50   
          Despite these unsuccessful diplomatic missions, Emperor Wu did not 
give up his intention of undermining the power of the Xiongnu by establishing 
control over the minor states in the Western Regions. Between 104 BC and 99 
BC he even took the step of launching military operations against the oasis state 
of Ferghana (Dayuan 大宛), which was situated to the southwest of the areas 
inhabited by the Xiongnu, at a distance of no fewer than 12,559 li from the Han 
capital. Both Sima Qian and Ban Gu claim that the main reason for launching 
the Ferghana campaign was Emperor Wu’s desire to acquire the legendary 
Ferghana horses.51  In reality, the campaign was part of a long-term strategy 
devised to dismember the Xiongnu confederacy. Ever since the reigns of 
Emperors Wen and Jing, the Han court had been trying to breed more and 
better horses which would be a match for the formidable Xiongnu cavalry.52 
On this occasion, the first move of the Han court was to send two generals, 
Zhao Ponu 趙破奴 and Wang Hui, to attack Jushi 車師 and Loulan 樓蘭, two 
states occupying the Turfan depression and its northern edges. The rulers of 
these states were in the habit of detaining the Han envoys and goods on their 
way to the Western Regions, thereby blocking Han connections with Central 
Asia.53 After an initial military setback in 104 BC, the Ershi General Li Guangli
李廣利 again attacked Ferghana in 102 BC. This time he won a decisive victory, 
and many states of the Western Regions now began to send envoys and tribute 
to the Han empire. 
                                                          
50 Shiji 123, 3170. 
51 This type of  horse was known as the “blood-sweating horse”. Its existence was 
unknown in Han China until Zhang Qian’s return from the Western Regions. The Han 
sources record that Emperor Wu sent people to Ferghana with good horses and gifts to 
exchange these for horses. See Shiji 123, 3160. 
52 On the policy of  horse-breeding in early Han, see He Pingli 何平立 (1995) 103-110.  
53 Yu (2008) 132. 
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          In 54 BC, during the reign of Emperor Xuan (r. 74-49 BC), the Xiongnu 
empire was split into a northern and a southern part, principally as a 
consequence of a feud which had commenced around 60 BC. In 53 BC Chanyu 
Huhanye 呼韓邪 (r. 58-31 BC), ruler of the southern Xiongnu, expressed his 
willingness to submit to the Han emperor by sending his son to the capital of 
Chang’an. Two years later, in 51 BC, Huhanye came to Chang’an in person in 
order to offer large amounts of tribute and to make his submission official. 
Meeting Huhanye in the Ganquan Palace 甘泉宮, the emperor rewarded him 
with substantial gifts. Among other honours, Huhanye was accorded a 
privileged rank which was higher than that of any other dependent king.54 The 
Han emperor ordered a large cavalry force to escort Huhanye back to Guanglu 
光禄 (the northwestern part of present-day Baotou, Inner Mongolia) in the 
northern frontier zone, and the Han court allowed him to garrison the cities of 
this area with Xiongnu troops. One year later, Zhizhi Chanyu 郅支單于, the 
leader of another Xiongnu group, also sent envoys and tribute to the Han 
emperor as an overture towards establishing friendly relations. According to the 
sources, compared to its dealing with the Northern Xiongnu, the Chinese 
government accorded the Southern Xiongnu preferential treatment.  
In 47 BC the two Han commanders of Chariots and Cavalry 車騎都尉, 
Han Chang 韓昌 and Zhang Meng 張猛 , established a new alliance with 
Huhanye at Dong Mountain 東山 near the Nuo River 諾水.55 Concerned about 
the rising power of the Southern Xiongnu, Zhizhi Chanyu led the Northern 
Xiongnu westwards, moving them all the way to Sogdiana (Kangju 康居).56 In 
36 BC, Han troops dispatched by the Protector-General Gan Yanshou 甘延壽
killed Zhizhi in this region.57 
                                                          
54 Cf. my discussion of  Xiao Wangzhi’s in the final part of  this chapter. 
55 Hanshu 94b; Yu (2008) 141. The treaty announces that from now on the Xiongnu and 
the Han will be united in one family and that the descendents of  the Han and the 
Xiongnu will not deceive or attack each other. Should there be robberies, the treaty 
stipulates that the governments on both sides must notify each other, and assume 
responsibility for punishment and compensation. If  one party is attacked by enemies, 
the other must send troops to assist. Finally, it emphasizes that whoever violates the 
agreement will bring misfortune upon themselves. 
56 According to the Shiji, Kangju was a nomadic state whose customs resembled those 
of  the Great Yuezhi. It was situated about 2,000 li to the northwest of  the Ferghana 
region. See Shiji 123, 3161.  
57 Hanshu 70, 3009; 94b, 3802. 
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          After learning about Zhizhi Chanyu’s death, Huhanye sent a petition to 
the Han court in which he expressed his willingness to pay homage to Emperor 
Yuan 元帝  (r. 49-33 BC). When Huhanye visited the court in 33 BC, he 
received twice as many gifts as he had done in 51 BC. In response to Huhanye’s 
proposal to strengthen Han-Xiongnu ties through marriage, it was decided that 
a concubine of the imperial court would become his wife. In other words, the 
heqin policy between the Xiongnu and Han recommenced but its content had 
been completely altered. During the final fifty years of the Western Han 
dynasty, the northern frontier remained relatively peaceful.  
 
3.3. Han administration and colonization in the Western Regions after 
Zhang Qian  
 
The large-scale military campaigns initiated in 129 BC during the reign of 
Emperor Wu profoundly changed the contours of Chinese historical geography. 
In the course of about three decades, Han territory was extended to the far-
flung areas to the west of the Hexi Corridor 河西走廊. It has been calculated 
that between 129 and 90 BC as much as 1.5-1.7 million square miles of territory 
passed into the control of Han China.58  
          In order to establish permanent control over these newly conquered 
territories, the Han government introduced new administrative structures. As 
said, when King Kunye 昆邪 and 40,000 of his followers submitted to Han rule 
in 121/120 BC, the Han court established five special administrative units, 
which were called “the Subordinate States” (shuguo屬國), in Longxi陇西, Beidi
北地, Shangjun 上郡, Shuofang 朔方 and Yunzhong雲中. Kunye’s men were 
settled in these areas.59 Later, four new commanderies, namely: Jiuquan 酒泉, 
Wuwei 武威, Zhangye 張掖 and Dunhuang 敦煌, were established in the 
western part of the Hetao Corridor 河套走廊, with the aim of checking the 
movements of the Southern Xiongnu. Collectively, these four commanderies 
became known as the Hexi sijun 河西四郡, “the Four Commanderies of Heixi”. 
                                                          
58 Chang (2007) 215.  
59  The Hanshu records this office was originally established in the Qin dynasty, 
specifically to be in charge of  those barbarians who had become subjects. It had been 
superseded after the fall of  Qin until its re-establishment by Emperor Wu to govern the 
Xiongnu tribes which had submitted themselves. See Hanshu 19a, 735.   
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          In the Western Regions the colonies of Jushi 車師, Bugur 輪台 (in the 
eastern part of modern Luntai, Xinjiang) and Kurla 渠犁 (present-day Korla, 
Xinjiang) were established to consolidate Han power in the region. The plan to 
increase the number of farmer-soldiers (tuntian 屯田) in Bugur proposed by 
Sang Hongyang桑弘羊, which had been rejected by Emperor Wu, was finally 
carried out in the reign of his successor Emperor Zhao 昭 (r. 87-74 BC). In 60 
BC, after the Rizhu king of Xiongnu 日逐 had submitted to the Han court, a 
special office, the Office of the Protector General of the Western Regions 西域
都護府, was established to govern these very extensive territories. The creation 
of this office signalled that the Han had gained secure control over these 
regions as far as the Ili Valley 伊犁谷地. By the end of the first century BC, the 
settlements of the “agricultural garrisons” extended all the way to the state of 
Khotan 于阗 and parts of the regions of Yarkant 莎車 to the west and 
southwest of the Tarim Basin. 
          Since the time of Modu Chanyu in the early third century BC, the ethnic 
group generally called the Donghu 东胡, which included the tribes of Xianbei
鮮卑 and Wuhuan 烏桓 who had originally lived in Inner Mongolia and then 
moved to Manchuria, and the Qiang 羌 of the northwestern frontier region, as 
well as the minor states of the oases of the Western Regions, had been under 
the control of the Xiongnu empire. During the reigns of Emperors Wu and 
Zhao, these states gradually won independence from the Xiongnu. It was an 
ephemeral independence as the vacuum left by the waning of the power of the 
Xiongnu was quickly filled by the Han empire. By the end of the first century 
BC, these nomadic states and tribes had been brought under Han economic 
and military control. To cope with the situation, in the early years of the first 
century AD, a new tributary system was developed. The chieftains of the 
nomadic peoples and states of the northern and western frontier zones now 
had to send their princes to the Han capital, where they were “lodged” for long 
periods. Furthermore, various types of goods had to be sent to the Han 
emperor. 60  In return, the tributary states and tribes annually received large 
amounts of gifts, including rice, other types of grain, fabrics and livestock, from 
the Han court, which also confirmed the legitimate status of their chieftains by 
granting them various official titles.61  
                                                          
60 Yu (1986) 416. 
61 Yu (1967) 45-51. 
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          The Han government also sought to consolidate the Han military 
presence in the marginal territories by encouraging people living in the Chinese 
Central Plain to move into the frontier zones. During the initial decades of the 
Han dynasty, the various emperors followed the advice of Chao Cuo, who had 
recommended a policy of “safeguarding the border and establishing protection 
against the Hu enemies by encouraging people to develop agriculture.” 62 
Emperor Wen, for instance, transferred large numbers of labourers from the 
area of Guandong to the northwestern frontier regions.63 Early in the reign of 
Emperor Wu, the Han army recovered the area of Henan which the Xiongnu 
had occupied during the Chinese civil war following the fall of Qin. The Hanshu 
reports that, immediately after this success, two new commanderies, Shuofang 
and Wuyuan, were set up in Henan and about 100,000 people were moved to 
the Shuofang area.64 More migration programmes were carried out after the 
Han army had advanced westwards in the time of Emperor Wu. A large 
proportion of the population of the four commanderies of Hexi 河西四郡 is 
believed to have come from the commanderies of the interior regions. 
Furthermore, colonies were established in the far-off Western Regions beyond 
the Yumen Pass after the Han empire had gained control over the states of 
these areas. Military colonies were set up as far west as Bugur and Kurla. In the 
reign of Emperor Xuan, this programme of colonization was extended to the 
most distant parts of the Western Regions, with new colonies being established 
at Jushi 車師, Yarkant and Bixu Jian 北胥鞬.  
Thanks to the bamboo strips excavated in places on the northern 
frontiers like Juyan 居延 and Dunhuang detailed information about the 
administrative networks of the northern and northwestern frontier regions of 
the Han empire is now available.65 The study of Chen Mengjia 陳夢家 reveals 
that the administrative units of the frontier zones had a strongly military 
appearance. In the northern frontier commanderies under the Grand 
Administrator, for example, the principal task of the commandants 都尉
                                                          
62 Chao Cuo’s suggestions regarding the defence of  the northern frontiers against the 
Xiongnu were recorded in the book which he wrote for Bangu; see Hanshu 49, 2278-
2289. 
63 On the substantial Chinese migration into the northern and western frontier zones 
during the Western Han dynasty, see Ge Jianxiong 葛劍雄 (1997) 147-153. 
64 Hanshu 6, 170. 
65 Chang (2007) vol. 2, 70-129. 
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appointed was to deal with security issues in specific localities or areas.66 In the 
reign of Emperor Wu, a chain of forts, beacon towers and watchtowers, with a 
total length of between 3,000 and 4,000 li (777 to 1,036 miles), was established 
across the vast expanse of Hexi.67  
As large numbers of colonists were being settled in some of the newly 
acquired frontier regions, groups of barbarians who had surrendered were being 
established in other areas which were also integrated into the administrative 
system of the Han empire. As mentioned earlier, the office responsible for 
these areas was called the Office for the Subordinate States. Initially, this office 
was based Chang’an but when the Xiongnu king Kunye submitted to Han with 
a large number of followers in 121 BC, Emperor Wu ordered the establishment 
of five Subordinate States in the frontier zone to accommodate these people. 
The commandant of each of these Subordinate States was subordinate to the 
Grand Administrator of a neighbouring Han frontier commandery. 68 
The principal aim of the Han government in settling these barbarian 
groups was not to promote the agricultural development of marginal areas, but 
to protect the frontier lands against any future barbarian invasions. In the 
Western Han period this idea had already been put forward by some officials 
such as Jia Yi and Chao Cuo, but had lain dormant and was not implemented 
until the time of Emperor Wu. 
 
4. Motives for territorial expansion   
 
In the first part of this chapter, it has been argued that the first emperors of the 
Han dynasty did not pursue any expansionist policy. Their territorial ambitions 
appear to have been confined to maintaining control of those regions in which 
                                                          
66 For the administrative network revealed by the Han bamboo texts from the two 
Commanderies of  Zhangye and Juyan in the Western Han period, see Chen Mengjia’s 
brilliant research: Chen Mengjia 陳夢家 (1980) 37-135. 
67 Chen Mengjia (1980) 219; Chen Xiaoming 陳小鸣 (2002) 28. Chen Mengjia studied 
the fortification works in the border region of  Juyan on the basis of  the bamboo texts 
which were discovered in the 20th century. 
68 Yu Yingshi (1967) 72; Sun Yancheng 孫言誠 (1987). The Dependent State (Shuguo) 
had appeared during the Qin dynasty, but under a different name, Shubang屬邦, which 
also means ‘dependent state’. The name of  the office was changed after the accession 
of  Liu Bang. It is not clear which, if  any, areas were administered by it between 
Emperor Wu’s accession to the throne and the creation of  the five Subordinate States 
in 121 BC. 
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Chinese civilization had taken root. Consequently, this assumption leads to the 
questions: Why did Emperor Wu and some of his successors decide to launch a 
series of large-scale military campaigns, some of which even reached the distant 
Ferghana region? How did the diplomatic missions and military expeditions 
organized in the period after 129 BC influence Western Han worldviews?      
On the basis of the argumentation cited, several observations can be 
made about these issues. First and foremost, the massive territorial expansions 
of Han China which took place between the late second and mid-first centuries 
BC can be seen as an active response to the constant pressures exerted on its 
northern and western frontiers. Unquestionably, from the late third century, the 
Xiongnu confederacy repeatedly made excessive economic demands on the 
sedentary population of the Han empire.69 In its heyday, the Xiongnu empire 
controlled a vast territory encompassing all of Mongolia and extending 
southwards to the Ordos region in the loop of the Yellow River in northern 
China.70 In the west, Xiongnu influence extended as far as the Ili Valley and 
Bactria. Not satisfied with the exploitation of the resources of the pastoral 
states and tribes occupying these areas, the Xiongnu frequently used their 
cavalry to invade and plunder Chinese territories. Unable to defend the frontier 
regions effectively, the first emperor of the Han dynasty, Emperor Gao, had no 
option but to make a peace treaty with Modu Chanyu (the fourth Xiongnu ruler) 
in around 200 BC. This treaty marked the beginning of the heqin policy of 
appeasement. Nevertheless, it was soon obvious that this policy did not have 
the desired effect of stopping all Xiongnu attacks, partly because on the 
                                                          
69 Recent scholars have tended to pay more attention to the social and economic nature 
of  Xiongnu society in order to explain why it relied so heavily on the products of  other 
peoples, including the Chinese. As Barfield argues, because the steppe peoples lacked a 
system of  tax collection, a few individuals (elite) regularly needed to be in possession of  
a large amount of  material goods to distribute among their followers to maintain their 
power and control of  his subordinates. This might explain why the Xiongnu made such 
excessive demands for products from China. As long as the Han government refused to 
open a market and exchange goods with the Xiongnu, raids were the only method to 
gain wealth. Had the Chanyu not been able to provide his tribesmen with material 
goods, his position would soon have been usurped by others. See Barfield (1981) 56; 
Namio Egami 江上波夫 (1988) 35, trans. Zhang Chengzhi 張承志; Di Cosmo (1994) 
117. Because the stability of  the Xiongnu empire depended heavily on extorting vast 
amounts of  wealth from China obtained by through pillage, tribute payments, border 
trade and re-export of  luxury goods, this type of  empire is called a “shadow empire” by 
Barfield. See Barfield (2001) 10; Scheidel (2010).  
70 Rogers (2011) 220-221.  
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Xiongnu side the Chanyu did not have the absolute authority to restrain his 
subordinates from pillaging the Chinese towns of the frontier region.71 
          The ruling elite of the Han empire was fully aware of the threats posed 
by the warlike barbarian nomadic peoples of the steppe world. Nevertheless, 
prior to the reign of Emperor Wu few actually urged the emperor to develop an 
expansionist policy in response to this challenge. The reasons for this reticence 
were complex, but one noteworthy point is that, in the eyes of most Han 
Confucian officials, the barbarian territories on the periphery of the Han 
empire were not worth occupying. Yan Zhu 嚴助, a senior official in the reign 
of Emperor Wu, for instance, claimed that from time immemorial the 
territories of Hu and Yue had been uninhabited places and that conquering 
them would be a pointless undertaking. 72  Such a Sino-centric outlook was 
ubiquitous among the upper echelons of the Han empire, as various examples 
have shown above.  
From the foregoing discussion it has also emerged that, by the late third 
century BC, the chasm between the pastoral nomadic culture of Inner Asia and 
the agrarian culture of the Chinese Central Plains had become so great that the 
emperors of the early and mid-second centuries BC showed little interest in 
extending their authority into the barbarian lands. In fact the reverse was true. 
The early Han emperors tried to limit the interactions between their subjects 
and the barbarian nomads. In this context it is worth pointing out that, 
throughout the Western Han period, the Great Wall of the northern frontier 
zone not only served to keep the barbarian enemies out but also performed an 
important function in preventing such Han subjects as peasants, slaves, 
convicts and traitors, from fleeing to the barbarian territories. 
When Huhanye Chanyu visited the Han court in 33 BC and married a 
court concubine (cf. above), for example, he offered to garrison the Han 
northern border between Shanggu 上谷 and Dunhuang with his men, allowing 
the Han frontier troops to be demobilized. Hou Ying 侯應, one of the elder 
statesmen of of the Han government who was well-versed in frontier matters, 
gave ten reasons this proposal should be repudiated. Finally, Emperor Yuan 
vetoed the proposal on the grounds that the Han forces of the frontier zone 
had been posted there not only to fend off barbarian invaders, but also to 
prevent Chinese villains from escaping to barbarian territory.73 
                                                          
71 Jagchid and Symons (1979) 245. 
72 Hanshu 64a, 2777. 
73 Hanshu 94b, 3819. 
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In light of these considerations, it is not surprising that the Great Wall 
was regarded as an official and fixed boundary line demarcating the territories 
of the Han empire and the Xiongnu. Nonetheless, during the first half of the 
third century, the military superiority of the Xiongnu made it easy for them to 
violate the terms of the peace treaty, revealing the concept of a neat dividing 
line between the two empires to be an illusion. When marriage alliances, 
subsidies and the establishment of frontier markets failed to achieve lasting 
peace, the only option left to the Han emperor was to end the threat posed by 
the Xiongnu confederacy by military force. In other words, there are good 
reasons to think that the decision to invade the territories of the Xiongnu was 
the outcome of a long-term policy whose main objective was to defend and 
secure the northern territories of the Han empire. 
 
5. The boundaries of the Western Han empire and the functions of the 
Great Wall 
 
The radical territorial expansion and the extension of administrative networks, 
coupled with the expansion of military fortification works into the Western 
Regions during the reign of Emperor Wu and subsequent Han rulers, lead 
neatly to a discussion of the military and ideological functions of the Great Wall 
during the Qin and Han periods. One of the questions which has to be raised is 
whether or not the Wall can be seen as a clear demarcating line separating the 
territory of the Western Han empire from the external regions. 
          As already mentioned, Chinese written sources referring to the situation 
existing during the first half of the third century BC clearly identify the Great 
Wall as the boundary between the Han empire and the Xiongnu. What is more 
surprising is that this concept persisted after the collapse of Xiongnu power 
and the expansion of the Han empire into the area to the west of Yumen Pass 
and into the Western Regions beyond the Hexi Corridor under Emperor Wu. 
One piece of evidence which points in this direction is a passage from the 
Hanshu dealing with the first years of the first century AD. In the reign of 
Emperor Ping平 (r. 1 BC-AD 6), five Chinese officials were sent from the Han 
capital Chang’an to the Chanyu’s court to carry out an investigation after two 
Han officials from the Western Regions had fled to the territories of Xiongnu 
with their wives, children and subordinates. The Chanyu, in response to the 
rebuke that the Xiongnu should have not harboured the fugitives from the 
Western Regions for the reason that these regions now belonged to the inner 
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subordinate areas (neishu 内属 ) of Han, claimed that, during the reigns of 
Emperors Xuan and Yuan, the Great Wall had been confirmed as the 
borderline between the Han and Xiongnu. The Chanyu seized this opportunity 
to argue that the Western Regions were not a part of the territory of Zhongguo 
(the middle state, referring to Han), so that the decision to allow the two 
officials access to the Xiongnu territory could not be regarded as a violation of 
the treaty. The answer given by the Chinese envoys is quite interesting. They 
did not give a direct response to the Chanyu’s explanation. Instead, they 
emphasized that the Xiongnu should hand over the fugitives as a gesture of 
their gratitude to the Han empire: 
 
The Xiongnu people engaged in internecine attack which nearly led to the extinction of 
the state. Thanks to the grace of Zhongguo, which enabled (the Xiongnu) to evade this 
pitfall, they could keep their wives and children keep safe and unharmed, and ensure 
that their generation will be succeeded from generation to generation. Therefore, the 
Xiongnu people should recompense such a great kindness.74 匈奴骨肉相攻，國
幾絕，蒙中國大恩，危亡复續，妻子完安，累世相繼，宜有以報
厚恩。   
 
According to the Hanshu, the Chanyu was persuaded by this argument, 
apologized and handed the two fugitives over to the Chinese envoys. 
Thereafter, new rules were drawn up which stipulated that four kinds of 
fugitives, namely: Chinese from Zhongguo (Han), people from Wusun 烏孫 , 
peoples from the states of the Western Regions (西域諸國) and the people 
from Wuhuan 烏桓, would not be allowed to enter Xiongnu territory without 
the consent of the Han.75 
  This episode suggests that, until the end of the Western Han at least, the 
Great Wall continued to be regarded as marking the borderline between Han 
China and the Xiongnu. On the other hand, it also appears that, as the result of 
the massive westward expansion which had taken place after 129 BC, the 
geographical limits between the Han and the Xiongnu had become ambiguous. 
Not only were the Western Regions situated outside of the Great Wall, they 
also lay beyond those areas which had been used to settle the large numbers of 
Xiongnu who had surrendered to the Han government. If these regions were to 
                                                          
74 Hanshu, 94b, 3818. 
75 Ibid., 3819. 
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be regarded as belonging to “the inner subjects” of Han, the Great Wall no 
longer constituted the demarcation line between Han and the Xiongnu.  
          This is not the place for an extensive discussion about the origins and 
functions of the Great Wall in Chinese history, but a few short observations 
directly relevant to the argument of this chapter are unavoidable.76 First and 
foremost, the English term “Great Wall” is a misnomer, since the Chinese 
phrase “Long Walls”長城 is to be interpreted as referring to a series of walls 
rather than to one single structure. During a period of two thousand years 
running from the Qin period down to the Ming dynasty 明  (1368-1644), 
various walls were built, destroyed and repaired. Although these walls clearly 
fulfilled multiple purposes, the principal aim of the emperors in the Chinese 
Central Plain who built, repaired or rebuilt them was to protect the sedentary 
agricultural society of the south against the nomadic pastoralists of the north.  
          In reality, the aim of keeping the barbarians out was achieved only during 
certain periods of Chinese history. For instance, after the end of the Eastern 
Han in 220, Chinese history succumbed to a long period of chaos and division 
which lasted nearly 300 years until the Sui 隋  (581-619) re-unified China. 
During the Tang 唐 dynasty, Chinese power was again extended beyond the 
Wall, penetrating deep into Central Asia. After the decline of Tang more than 
ten nomadic tribes built up states in the Central Plain. The Song 宋 (960-1279) 
dynasty was of Chinese origin but was engaged in a permanent struggle against 
a variety of northern nomadic states. Of the last five unified dynasties in 
Chinese history two, the Yuan 元 (1271-1368) and Qing 清 (1636-1911), were 
established by nomadic peoples who had invaded China from beyond the Great 
Wall.77 
          These observations do not alter the basic fact that these walls were built 
primarily for the purpose of defending the agricultural areas against the 
                                                          
76 For a general study of  the Great Wall over time, see Waldron’s seminal monograph 
(1990). Waldron argues that it was not until the late period, probably by the Ming 
dynasty, that the Great Wall came to be regarded as marking the cultural and ecological 
border between Chinese and barbarians in the north. For a critical assessment of  this 
theory, see Tackett (2008), a study focusing on the concept of  the Great Wall as 
marking the border between Northern Song and its northern neighbours. 
77 For a brief  chronological synthesis of  peace and war in the northwestern frontier 
regions and for a short discussion of  the rise and vicissitudes of  Chinese dynasties 
from the Han to the Ming, see Jagchid and Symons (1989) 52-78. Tackett (2008) 104-




barbarian nomadic peoples from the north. Similar defence systems were 
created to secure newly conquered areas. Sima Qian reports that, after expelling 
the Xiongnu from the Henan area, Qin Shi Huang established forty-four 
counties along the Yellow River which were protected by military posts 塞 on 
the banks of the Yellow River. After the Qin general Meng Tian had 
established control over the areas of Gaoque 高闕, Yangshan 陽山 and Bei 
Jiazhong 北假中, military posts and barriers 亭障 were constructed to keep the 
Rong people 戎 in check.78 As Di Cosmo has demonstrated, some sections of 
the Qin walls were built in newly conquered areas, supporting the view that 
some of the walls which were constructed in various periods of Chinese history 
served offensive goals, but of course that observation, valuable as it may be, is 
fully compatible with the view that most of the wall-building projects of the Qin-
Han period were carried out to increase security and as part of a long-term 
strategy for dealing with the threat posed by the Xiongnu. 
The migration policies of the Western Han emperors were also informed 
by defensive considerations. Large numbers of Chinese convicts were moved 
into Gaoque, Yangshan and Bei Jiazhong to populate these remote areas, 
primarily with the aim of blocking any future barbarian invasions. During the 
Western Han period, Emperor Wu’s decision to set up five Subordinate States 
to accommodate about 40,000 Xiongnu who had surrendered also served this 
purpose. 
          In his book about the economic relationship between the Han and the 
Xiongnu, Yu Yingshi raises the important question of whether the five states 
were located within or outside the Han borders. Although the exact 
whereabouts of these states cannot be determined, the fact that they bore the 
names of the five newly established frontier commanderies shows that they 
must have situated in close proximity to these commanderies.79 According to 
the Shiji and Hanshu, those Xiongnu tribes which had surrendered were 
                                                          
78 In the Annals of  the First Emperor, Sima Qian does not make clear what kind of  barrier 
was constructed. 
79 The five subordinate states were Longxi 隴西, Beidi 北地, Shangjun 上郡, Shuofang
朔方 and Yunzhong 雲中. According to the study by Xin Deyong 辛德勇, the term gu 
sai refers to the defensive fortification lines built by the state of  Qin in the reign of  the 
king of  Zhaoxiang. Until 127 BC when Wei Qing recovered the area, these lines 
functioned as the real border between Zhongguo and Xiongnu. See Xin Deyong (2009) 
256-284.          
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accommodated not far beyond the “old military posts” (gusai故塞) in the area 
of Henan.80 
  During the first years of the Western Han, the area of Henan was re-
occupied by the Xiongnu and Emperor Gao was forced to conclude a peace 
agreement which made the Great Wall the formal boundary between the Han 
and the Xiongnu. However, because various systems of walls existed in the 
northern regions, it was not always easy to tell where the boundary line ran. 
After the Han re-conquest of the Henan area around 120 BC, the military posts 
and forts along the bank of the Yellow River which had been erected by the 
Qin people in the era of Meng Tian were repaired. As just stated, although the 
five Subordinate States must have been located near these posts, unfortunately, 
it is unclear whether they were situated within or just outside of the wall built in 
the Qin dynasty.  
  The absence of a clear dividing line between the Han empire and those 
areas controlled by neighbouring political entities has led Owen Lattimore to 
formulate his well-known theory that one should think in terms of a frontier 
zone rather than in terms of “an absolute line of cleavage”.81 As observed by 
Yu Yingshi, the five Subordinate States were situated beyond the frontier 
commanderies, and at least some military fortifications might have been 
constructed beyond the area of permanent settlement in order to prevent the 
people of the frontier zone from fleeing to the barbarian nomads.82 Viewed in 
this light, the settlement of large numbers of submissive Xiongnu in the newly 
established subordinate states might be seen as one element in a defensive 
policy whose purpose was to protect the Han empire against future invasions, 
not only with the help of fortification walls, watch towers and garrison posts 
but also by creating a buffer zone inhabited by barbarians who were controlled 
by the Han government. 
 
6. The impact of territorial expansion on Han worldviews 
 
Emperor Wu’s successful campaigns against the Xiongnu extended Chinese 
imperial hegemony to the distant Western Regions. This led to a broadening of 
geographical horizons. In the course of the first century AD, with the further 
development of Confucian thought and the theory of the Mandate of Heaven, a 
                                                          
80 Shiji 110, 2887-2888 (蒙恬死……匈奴得寬，復稍度河南，於中國界于故塞). 
81 Lattimore (1941) 341.  
82 Yu (1964) 73.  
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partial resurgence of an unbounded worldview of the pre-Qin period can be 
observed. Wang Chong 王充 (AD 27-97), a philosopher living in the early 
Eastern Han dynasty, highlights this idea in two passages from his Discourse 
Balance (Lunheng論衡): 
 
Now the emperor has received the Mandate of Heaven and ascended the throne. He 
has inherited the accomplishments of the past, and in every aspect all was replete. The 
sihai (four seas) now became unitary, and all under Heaven presented a stable and 
peaceful order. The auspicious heavenly objects are so abundant, and the resonance 
between Heaven and Man is so highly tuned…The people of Yuechang used to pay 
the House of Zhou a white pheasant as tribute. Nowadays, the Xiongnu, the 
Shanshan and the Ailao pay cattle and horses [to the House of Han]. In the time of 
Zhou, the royal domain was limited to five thousand li, whereas now the territory of 
Han has been extended beyond the huangfu area (wild zone). Cattle and horses are 
more precious than white pheasants; the tribute from nearby submissive lands is less 
valuable than that from the distant regions. The people of Rong and Di in ancient 
times have now become Chinese. Those who were naked in the past are now dressed in 
Han garments. Those who used to have their heads bare, now wear Han caps. Those 
who had bare feet now wear shoes with thick soles. Rocks are now transformed into 
fertile lands and the savage have become civilized people. Pits and mounds are 









Holding a candle in the night, wherever the light shines, all can be measured. All 
under Heaven is exposed to the sunshine, which can hardly be measured/which is 
impossible to measure. Sailing a boat on the Rivers Huai and Ji, all the twists and 
turns can be discovered. Venturing on to the East (Yellow) Sea, south and north 
cannot be distinguished. As a consequence its breadth is difficult to assess and its 
depth can scarcely be measured/is impossible to measure. Han morality is so vast it is 
like unto the sunlight or the outer expanse of the ocean. People know this. Those who 
are not wise do not comprehend how powerful the Han is.84  
                                                          
83 Lunheng, Xuanhan.  








As discussed in Chapter 2, this broad worldview had come into existence long 
before the creation of the Han empire. However, as the two passages just 
quoted show, by the time of the early Eastern Han, the idea that the Han 
emperor exercised a kind of universal dominance had become closely bound up 
with the ideological claims about the emperor’s moral superiority and his 
relationship with Heaven. The central point Wang Chong is making is that the 
power of the Han morality reaches the farthest regions under Heaven.85 In this 
sense, as Michael Nylan has recently put it, by the Eastern Han period the term 
tianxia was generally used to refer to “the imagined community that depended 
upon the moral ruler’s exemplary consciousness that he held his lands in trust 
for the ancestors above and the people below.”86 
Although some Han scholars claimed that the lofty virtues of the Han 
emperor and the mandate he had received from Heaven entitled him to rule the 
entire terrestrial world, most of them did not subscribe to Wang Chong’s highly 
rhetorical vision that morality had been raised to Han standards in every part of 
the inhabited world. When the Xiongnu ruler Chanyu Huhanye visited 
Chang’an in 51 BC, a conversation took place at court as to how the Chanyu 
was to be received. Chief Minister Huang Ba黃霸 and Imperial Councillor Yu 
Dingguo 于定國 suggested that the etiquette which was used during visits of 
subordinate kings of the Han empire should be also accorded the Xiongnu, 
since the shining light of the emperor’s sacred morality had reached the four 
quarters of the earth and because the Xiongnu had expressed their submission 
by offering gifts and pledges of loyalty. Nevertheless, this proposal was 
criticized by Xiao Wangzhi 蕭望之 who offered the following counter-
argument: 
       
The Xiongnu’s ritual customs and calendar are different from those of the Han, and 
[moreover] they used to be Han’s enemy. (Therefore) it would be better not treat them 
as a subject, but to rank them above Han’s subordinate kings. Now the outer 
                                                          
85 I shall discuss this point of  view in Chapter 6.  
86 Nylan (2008) 43.  
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barbarians have gone down on their knees and called themselves fan87 of Han, and 
the Central State extends them courtesy but does not make them subjects. This is the 




 Eventually, the emperor did follow Xiao Wangzhi’s advice and issued the 
following decree: 
 
I have heard that the Five Emperors and Three Kings [of legendary antiquity] were 
not able to achieve a civilizing transformation and administration [throughout your 
area]. Nowadays the Chanyu of Xiongnu sees himself as a subject fan on the 
northern frontier and has adopted the Han calendar. I am not yet prepared to extend 
the morality to your people, but I shall treat you kindly as guests, and order that the 
Chanyu’s rank be superior to that of the Han subordinate kings. I admire [the fact] 





These texts show that even when the Han emperor had achieved hegemony 
over the barbarian peoples in the mid-first century BC, no attempt was made to 
incorporate these peoples fully into the civilized world of China.  
 
7. Rome and China compared 
 
To what extent did the pattern of imperial expansion which can be observed in 
the case of Han China resemble the pattern followed by the Roman conquests 
of the last centuries of the Republic and the first centuries of the Empire? And 
what can be said about developments in Chinese and Roman worldviews 
following the establishment of the Han and Augustan empires?  
                                                          
87 The term fan藩 generally means “foreign” or “barbarian”. It is a discriminatory word 
which was widely used to denote all non-Chinese peoples, tribes or foreigners who were 
regarded as culturally inferior. It remained in use until the period of  the Qing dynasty 
when it was used to refer to the foreign peoples mainly from European countries. For a 
good discussion of  this term, see L. S. Yang (1968) 10. By demoting themselves to the 
rank of  fan, the Xiongnu leaders were expressing their submission. 
88 On the event see Hanshu 78, 3282-3283; 94b, 3833. 
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          As stated, Roman expansion during the Republic followed a centrifugal 
pattern in which clearly defined boundaries with neighbouring political entities 
played an insignificant role. In the course of the first century BC, when Rome 
established control over the entire Mediterranean and parts of North-West 
Europe, Roman generals, politicians and members of the educated elite 
borrowed the Hellenistic ideology of world domination to define the logical 
outcome of this centrifugal process. The Virgilian phrase imperium sine fine refers 
not only to the ultimate goal of Roman imperialism, but also implies that 
Augustus pronounced that the whole world (orbis terrarum) acknowledged 
Roman superiority, on the basis of its unrivalled military strength. 
Although the rhythm of Roman expansion did slow down in the latter 
years of the reign of Augustus, various later emperors still thought it necessary 
to embark on ambitious military campaigns and hence the worldview which had 
been formed in the Late Republic was not radically transformed during the first 
two and a half centuries of the Empire. As late as the early third century, the 
Roman emperors continued to assert that Roman world was spatially unlimited, 
as revealed in the inscriptions on the triumphal arch of Septimius Severus.  
From the late first century AD onwards, the boundaries of the Roman 
administration did gradually become more clearly defined as increasing 
numbers of allied kingdoms on the periphery of the empire passed under direct 
Roman control and Roman emperors, although provincial governors continued 
to claim the right to intervene in the affairs of barbarian kingdoms or tribes. In 
the military sphere natural barriers and man-made military installations, such as 
legionary and auxiliary camps, watchtowers, palisades and ditches certainly 
played a part in protecting the provinces of the empire against barbarian attacks, 
but it is not an inevitable corollary that these natural and man-made features 
were regarded as boundary lines separating Rome from non-Roman territory. 
The gradual development of a more or less permanent system of defence-works 
was parallelled by an increase in a sense of ‘frontier consciousness’, but this 
development did not influence Roman emperors and educated members of the 
Roman upper class to abandon the open worldview developed since the Late-
Republican and Augustan periods. 
          The early Chinese empire had a very different approach to territorial 
expansion. Not least because the gap between the economy and society of 
imperial China and the pastoral nomads of the north had become unbridgeable, 
the Chinese emperors tried to demarcate their empire from the barbarian tribes 
occupying the northern steppes. When Qin Shi Huang established the first 
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unified Chinese empire, the concept that the emperor’s power was, or should 
be, unbounded coexisted with the idea that the tianxia ruled by the emperor was 
a relatively closed political and cultural entity from which the barbarians were 
excluded. As Drompp has pointed out, in Han China, since ‘‘natural 
boundaries’’ were believed to exist between the agricultural regions of the Han 
empire and the northern pastoralists, geography was conceived as a dimension 
of identity.89 
The Han conquest of the vast Western Regions under Emperor Wu 
could have strengthened or revived ideological claims to world domination. 
However, although the establishment of Han hegemony over the Western 
Regions certainly broadened Chinese horizons, it did not result in the 
abandonment of the traditional worldview. The way in which Huhanye 
Chanyu’s offer of submission was dealt with in 51 BC shows that, even as this 
late date, no attempt was made by the Han emperor to incorporate the 
Xiongnu into the administrative and cultural tianxia of his dominion.       
          Did the contrast between the basically open worldview which dominated 
Roman ideology in the early Principate and the far more closed Chinese mental 
map correspond to a differences in policies or strategies for dealing with 
neighbouring states and external threats? In recent scholarship, the question of 
whether Roman foreign policy was fundamentally aggressive (B. Isaac) or 
primarily reactive and based on ad hoc considerations and decisions (F. Millar) 
has been a matter of dispute. Although this issue continues to be debated, 
consensus can be easily reached on the fact that, throughout the whole period 
of the Principate there was no state in the Mediterranean which had the 
capability to challenge Rome’s hegemony. In my view, this situation made it 
possible for Roman responses and policies in the field of foreign relations to 
remain highly flexible, thereby rendering the debate about whether Rome was 
fundamentally expansionist or primarily passive more or less meaningless. As 
the history of the Principate demonstrates, the Roman empire could either 
undertake aggressive moves (such as Claudius’ conquest of Britain, Trajan’s 
Arabian and Parthian Wars and Septimius Severus’ British campaigns) or 
merely respond to changing circumstances on the frontier (as happened during 
the last decade of Tiberius’ reign and in a sense even when Marcus Aurelius 
launched the Marcomannic War). 
          From its very foundation, the Western Han empire found itself in a 
totally different situation. Since the final years of the third century BC, the 
                                                          
89 Drompp (1989) 141; Rogers (2012) 215. 
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aggressive southward expansion of the Xiongnu under their charismatic leader 
Modu Chanyu had put the Chinese northern border under pressure, and during 
the first phase of Han-Xiongnu relations the highly mobile and formidable 
Xiongnu cavalry forces placed the Han military in a weak position. Senior Han 
officials, mainly literati, maintained a strong Sino-centric tone in their responses 
to the threats posed by barbarian nomads, who were described as birds or 
beasts, living beyond the four seas, outside the civilized world (hua wai zhi di化
外之地) and even as not deserving to be ruled as the Han subject.90 Some 
scholars, among them Jia Yi and Chao Cuo, were less rhetorical and more 
realistic and therefore criticized the imperial government for its acceptance of 
the military inferiority of the Han empire. The first emperors of the Han 
dynasty tried to neutralize the Xiongnu threat by means of the “harmonious 
kinship” (heqin) policy, but this proved not only financially burdensome but also 
failed to prevent the Xiongnu from raiding the frontier provinces. In the long 
run these factors prompted the Han government to rethink its policy. From the 
early 120s, Emperor Wu’s military campaigns radically reversed the relationship 
between Han and Xiongnu, carrying Han military power as far as the Western 
Regions. 
          In Chapter 3 it has been argued that the Roman conquests of the first 
and second centuries AD should not be interpreted against the background of 
an expansionist tradition which had deep roots in Roman republican history. In 
striking contrast to this situation, Chinese imperialism did not begin to take 
shape until about a century after the establishment of the first unified Chinese 
empire. In other words, whereas Roman imperialism was driven by an old 
tradition of aggressive militarism, Chinese imperialism should be seen as the 
byproduct of a policy whose principal aim was to put an end to the continuous 
pressures emanating from the grassland regions. 
Another interesting point of comparison concerns the presence, or 
absence, of what Luttwak has called a “grand strategy”. The current majority 
view is that, contrary to what Luttwak has suggested, the Roman emperors of 
the late first to early third centuries AD did not develop any coherent strategy 
for the defence of the empire, and that what Luttwak sees as a coherent policy 
is largely the product of modern hindsight.91 If, however, the concept of a 
                                                          
90 The non-Chinese barbarian peoples were stereotypically described as birds or beasts 
in the classical Chinese literature which predates the imperial period. For the discussion, 
see Pines (2005) 59-102. 
91 Whittaker (2004) 29; Gruen (1978) 564. 
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“grand strategy” is interpreted to refer to a series of disconnected attempts to 
steer Roman frontier policies in a new direction, it is actually possible to 
maintain that certain decisions taken by Roman emperors were indeed 
informed by strategic considerations. Examples include the consilium which 
Augustus left for Tiberius, Domitian’s withdrawal of the Roman army from 
Scotland and Hadrian’s approach to frontier policies in the Near East and 
Britain. On the other hand, Luttwak’s critics are right to the extent that such 
measures never developed into anything closely approaching a coherent and 
long-term frontier policy. Instead, the surviving sources tend to convey the 
impression that emperors did not feel bound to the policies of their 
predecessors, so that frontier policies fluctuated in an almost random manner. 
          Compared to their Roman counterparts, the emperors of the Qin and 
Han empires adhered to a fairly coherent long-term policy in their dealings with 
the nomadic tribes and states of the north. From the late third century BC, this 
policy was designed to maintain a relatively clear separation between the 
agricultural zones of the south and the vast grasslands of the north. It was this 
policy which prompted successive Qin and Han emperors to build, extend or 
repair the series of Great Walls.92 Of course, this is not to suggest that the 
Great Wall was a insuperable obstacle to interaction between the inhabitants of 
the Han empire and the nomadic peoples living beyond it. As emphasized by 
Lattimore, it is better to think in terms of a symbiotic and interactive 
relationship between the agricultural and nomadic zones.93 What is sometimes 
overlooked, however, is that the Great Wall played an important part in 
supervising and controlling all movements generated by this symbiotic 
relationship and that Lattimore’s observations are fully compatible with the idea 
that the primary function of the Great Wall was to deny the nomadic population 
of the northern grassland free access to the agricultural regions within the wall.  
          As mentioned earlier, the First Emperor sent Meng Tian with about 
300,000 troops to attack the Hu tribes on the northern borders. As a result, Qin 
                                                          
92 As early as the pre-imperial age of  China in the fourth and third century BC, the 
western and northern fringes of  a number of  Chinese states experienced increasing 
tensions with various nomadic tribes on the northern frontier. However, various states, 
among them Zhao, Qin and Yan, did manage to achieve territorial expansion in their 
struggles with the northern tribes. Thereafter walls were built in an attempt to 
consolidate control over the expanded agricultural zone. In this sense, it can be argued 
that the construction of  the Great Wall in the pre-imperial period was the outcome of  
the military expansionist policies of  the agricultural states. This theory is developed and 
presented in full in Di Cosmo’s 2004 monograph.  
93 Rowe (2007) 760-761. 
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gained the area of Henan, and a new wall was built between Lintao and the 
Ordos region. Since the newly acquired areas were not very suitable to arable 
farming on account of their arid climate and poor opportunities for irrigation, 
the conquest of Henan and the construction of a new wall must be understood 
as aimed at achieving the dual aim of imposing control over the Hu people and 
of keeping the Xiongnu out of the Hetao Plain.94  
Later emperors continued to adhere to the Qin policy of protecting the 
empire against the Xiongnu and other nomadic tribes living beyond the 
northern and western frontiers, and invested further resources into 
strengthening the frontier fortifications. As noted above, Chao Cuo wrote three 
essays in which he urged Emperor Wen to pay attention to the security of the 
northern and western frontiers, namely a Proposal on Matters of Arms (Yan 
Bingshi Shu言兵事疏), a Proposal on Guarding Borders and Encouraging the 
Development of Agriculture (Shoubian Quannong Shu 守邊勸農疏 ) and a 
Proposal on Migrating People to Man the Garrisons (Mumin Shisai Shu募民實
塞疏).95 Although these treatises cover three different topics, they are all based 
on the idea that strengthening the defences of the frontier zone is the best way 
to keep the empire safe from barbarian attack.96   
An explicit statement concerning the defensive function of the Great 
Walls is to be found in the Book of the Late Han (Houhan Shu後漢書), composed 
by Fan Ye 范曄 (394-445) during the Eastern Han period: 
 
Heaven created the mountains and rivers, the Qin built long walls and the Han 
constructed fortresses and walls. The purpose of all these [activities] is to divide the 
interior from the exterior, and to distinguish those [people] of different traditions.97 天
設山河，秦築長城，漢起塞垣，所以別內外，異殊俗也。 
 
Although this is a late text, it supports the conclusion that, at least during the 
Qin and Han periods, social separation and military defence were the most 
important functions of the Great Walls. As the treaty between the Han and the 
Xiongnu shows, it was still seen as the boundary line between two states, at 
least until the late 130s BC. The military victories of the period 129-90 BC 
                                                          
94 The area was roughly bounded by the Great Wall of  King Zhaoxiang of  Qin and the 
loop of  the Yellow River. See Shiji 112, 2954; Xin (2009) 262-263. 
95 On these proposals, see Chang (2007) Vol. 2, 9. 
96 See the notes about Chao Cuo in the pages above.  
97 Hou Hanshu 90, 2992; Waldron (1990) 42.  
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changed the balance of power between the Han empire and the Xiongnu. 
Besides the vast lands of the Hexi Corridor formerly held by the Xiongnu, even 
the Western Regions were now brought under the Han control. Nevertheless, 
even these very ambitious military campaigns could be interpreted as examples 
of “active defence” which stemmed from the desire to end the threat posed by 
the Xiongnu.98 
          In the Roman world there were similar stone-built walls (such as 
Hadrian’s Wall), palisades, ditches, legionary forts and watchtowers. It cannot 
reasonably be denied that these constructions, as well as various major rivers, 
such as the Rhine and the Danube, helped to protect the provinces of the 
empire from barbarian attack. Nonetheless, there are strong reasons to accept 
the current consensus that the principal purpose of these installations was to 
facilitate control over the populations of the frontier zone. The Great Walls of 
the Qin and Han empires likewise played a part in keeping the population of 
the empire under control, but in these empires this purpose was clearly seen as 
a secondary function of walls which had been built primarily for defensive 
reasons.  
The foregoing observations help to achieve build up a better 
understanding of the logic of territorial expansion in the early Roman and 
Western Han empires. Since the 1970s specialists in the field of Roman imperial 
history have tried to find an explanation for the slowing down of Roman 
territorial expansion after the Augustan period. According to J. C. Mann, the 
pace of the slackening of imperial expansion was not planned but simply the 
result of “inertia”.99 Brunt argues that military expansion became less important 
because the emperors of the Principate were expected to play other roles in 
addition to that of military imperator.100 Focusing on the material benefits of 
warfare, Sidebottom claims that Roman emperors had multiple ways of 
                                                          
98 For the concept of  “active defence”, cf. Di Cosmo (2004). The principal focus of  the 
discussion which took place between the two senior officials, Han Anguo and Wang 
Hui, in 135 BC was on the question of  whether the Han empire should send troops to 
attack the Xiongnu enemy. Although Wang Hui’s proposal was strongly opposed by 
Han Anguo and his supporters, the two officials were agreed that campaigning deep 
into the Xiongnu lands was too dangerous. Eventually, Emperor Wu accepted Wang 
Hui’s proposal to send troops to capture the Changyu alive by trickery. Only when this 
plot failed, did the Han emperor decide to embark on a more aggressive course to deal 
with the threat posed by the northern barbarians. 
99 Mann (1979) 181. 
100 Brunt (1990) 169-176. 
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enlarging their territory. 101  Whatever the best explanation might be, it is 
imperative not to lose sight of the fact that imperial expansion continued after 
Augustus, albeit in a more piecemeal fashion. In the next chapter the discussion 
will show that territorial expansion through conquest was still seen as an 
effective way by which emperors could win personal glory and prestige and by 
which to reaffirm the power of Rome.  
The vast majority of Qin and Han emperors showed little interest in 
foreign wars and military conquest. Nevertheless, this disinterest which did not 
stop these emperors from claiming unrestricted imperial sovereignty 
throughout all under heaven, but as will be shown in Chapter Six, they did so 
from a very different perspective than their Roman counterparts. 
  
                                                          




Roman emperors and territorial expansion 
 
1. The roles of Roman emperors in the Principate 
Although Rome had become an empire before it had an emperor, once 
autocracy was established, as the first man (princeps) the emperor needed to 
perform various tasks imposed on him by his position as the leading statesman 
of the empire.1 On certain works of art, emperors appear as heroic conquerors 
clad in military attire, but on other objects they are portrayed as benefactors in 
civic dress. Starting with Augustus, the emperors of the Principate assumed 
responsibility for keeping the city of Rome adequately supplied with grain, and 
provincial cities which had been hit by earthquakes or destroyed by fires could 
ask the emperor for financial support. In the religious sphere, the emperor was 
the Pontifex Maximus, and in the provinces statues of emperors were set up in 
sanctuaries dedicated to the imperial cult. In brief, an emperor was expected to 
play a gamut of roles which corresponded to the expectations of various groups 
of people, ranging from senators, ordinary Roman citizens, soldiers to subjects 
without citizen rights.2  
          Again the Res Gestae Divi Augusti offers some good insights into the 
multiple roles which Roman emperors were expected to play. Throughout the 
Res Gestae, Augustus emphasizes his excellent relations with the Senate, 
representing himself as a leading statesman who surpassed his fellow senators 
not in power but only in authority.3 As revealed in the first chapter, the theme 
of world conquest occurs mainly in Chapters 3-4 and 25-33 of the text. 
Although in many cases Augustus and his successors entrusted the army to 
their senatorial peers who fulfilled their commission under the auspices of the 
                                                          
1 From countless discussions of  these topics, I single out Millar (1977) 355-361 and 
422-424. 
2 Since the main focus of  this chapter is the military image of  the emperor, I shall not 
try to provide a detailed discussion of  each and every role which a Roman emperor 
played. My aim is merely to call attention to the fact that the legitimacy of  imperial rule 
depended not solely on the military achievements of  emperors and the generals fighting 
under their auspices. A secondary aim is to allow a broad comparison between the roles 
played by Roman and Chinese emperors. 
3 RG 34,3. 
139 
 
emperor, Augustus was the imperator of the Roman army.4 In emphasizing his 
good relations with the army, in Chapters 16-17 Augustus draws attention to 
the sums of money which he expended on the veterans who had completed 
their military service and had been settled in colonies. Besides his military 
functions, Augustus had various civil tasks. In Chapters 5 and 18 of the Res 
Gestae, Augustus lists the distributions of grain and money which he made to 
the urban plebs of Rome. In Chapters 7 and 10, he focuses on his religious 
roles as chief priest, augur and member of the board of Fifteen Men 
(quindecimvir sacris faciundis) responsible for the supervision of foreign cults which 
had been adopted at Rome. Chapter 8 deals with his censorial duties pursuant 
to membership of the Senate and arranging the holding of the census. Finally 
Chapters 18-24 are devoted to his role in organizing various games and to the 
construction programmes which were carried out during his reign.  
          Augustus’ successors were expected to play the same roles, and they were 
censured if they failed in these tasks.5 For example, Suetonius criticizes Tiberius 
for showing very little interest in holding games or in initiating building 
projects.6 When Nero died in 68, he was detested for his cruelty and immoral 
way of life not only by senators but also by many ordinary citizens, despite the 
fact that during his early reign he had enjoyed immense popularity among 
soldiers and the majority of the Roman plebs on account of his generosity in 
disbursing large sums of money and the enthusiasm he had displayed for 
organizing games and spectacles to entertain the populace.7 Titus was praised 
for his endeavours in dealing with catastrophes, first the eruption of Vesuvius 
in 79 and then a huge fire and a plague in the city of Rome.8 Domitian had a 
deeply problematic relationship with the Senate, but continued to enjoy the 
support of the army and remained popular both with the Roman plebs and 
with the provincial population because he organized many shows in Rome and 
dealt competently with food shortages in the province of Asia.9 
                                                          
4 RG 4,2. IRT 301, Campbell (1994) 72. 
5 Zanker (2010) 46.  
6 Suet. Tib. 28.  
7 For the popularity of  Nero and the “bread and circuses” during his reign, see Griffin 
(1984) 104-112. Mayer (2010) 119-126. 
8 Suet. Tit. 8,4. 
9 Suetonius offers a detailed account of  Domitian’s public entertainments. See Suet. 




          Olivier Hekster has rightly pointed out that “the popularity of members 
of the Domus Augusta had much to do with the fact that they were the sole 
beneficiaries of the brilliant glory of the triumph and from Domitian and his 
successors, the only ones who could please the populace with games and 
spectacles.”10 However, in spite of the popularity an emperor might earn for 
providing bread and circuses, his reputation also depended on the way in which 
he performed his other duties. Under the Republic consuls, praetors and 
tribunes had been responsible for carrying out various juridical duties. From the 
time of Augustus emperors were personally expected to hear cases, to preside 
over jury sessions and to hand down verdicts.11 Tacitus’ Annales are full of 
references to emperors presiding over trials or investigating cases while 
presiding over a tribunal either in the Senate House or in the Forum. In the 
second century, Trajan, Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius are reported to have 
handed down many judgements.12  
          The administrative duties of an emperor included answering letters sent 
by his legati in the provinces and receiving ambassadors dispatched by cities or 
envoys from friendly states or tribes. Countless examples are to be found in 
Tacitus’ Annales, in Cassius Dio’s Histories, in Pliny the Younger’s Epistulae and 
in the writings of Fronto. 
          Last but not the least, all Roman emperors were commanders-in-chief of 
the imperial army. During the Principate, the military title imperator usually took 
pride of place in the emperor’s titulature, even though they were no longer 
expected to lead each and every military campaign in person.13 Images of the 
emperor as imperator were disseminated on coins, in the form of sculptures, on 
reliefs and through other media, not only for the purpose of reinforcing the 
loyalty of the legions but also to broadcast the message of their military virtus 
and efficient military leadership to a wider audience. 14  In the city of 
                                                          
10 Hekster (2001) 21.   
11 To give just one example, when Claudius was administering justice in the Forum 
Romanum in AD 51, he was surrounded by an angry mob which complained about the 
shortage of  grain. See Tac. Ann. 12,43,1; Suet. Claud. 18,2. Millar (1977) 229. For the 
various legal instructions given and decisions made by Roman emperors, like edicta, 
mandata, rescripta and decreta, see Sirks (2001) 122. 
12 For imperial hearings and the emperor as a judge see Millar (1977) 229-240. 
13 For the use of  the name Imperator Caesar by Augustus, see Syme (1958) 172-188. 
14 Recent scholarship has paid a great deal of  attention to the role of  Roman coins in 
shaping imperial images and disseminating them to provincial communities. See, for 
instance, Wallace-Hadrill (1986); Ando (2000); Noreña (2013). In regard to imperial 
portraits, it is still a matter of  contention whether this reflects the interplay between the 
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innumerable monuments, memorials such as the Arch of Titus and the columns 
of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius were erected, 15  and statues depicting the 
emperor wearing military garb are found not only in Rome but in many 
provincial cities as well.16 There can be no doubt that the reputation of the 
emperors of the Principate depended not only on their track record in 
providing “bread and circuses” to the population of the capital city but also on 
their ability to create and maintain an image of military prowess by various 
visual arts and materials.  
          Ever since the time of Mommsen, the nature of Roman imperialism, and 
the forces which drove this process, have been fiercely debated.17 However, in 
their discussions of this issue scholars have focused mainly on the Republican 
period, offering various interpretations of the motives and factors lying behind 
the rise of Roman power in the Mediterranean. Ancient historians have shown 
far less interest in how the dynamics of Roman imperialism were sustained in 
the Early Imperial period.18 It is true that few scholars believe that incentives 
for Roman aggression had entirely ceased to operate after Augustus, for the 
simple reason that some further expansion took place and, not least, because 
Rome maintained its ascendency over the peoples of the Mediterranean world 
and North-West Europe for another two hundred years. What is a matter of 
dispute is exactly how Rome managed to achieve this objective. Did Rome 
continue to adopt an offensive stance and hence normally take the initiative, or 
did it develop an essentially passive and defensive frontier policy?19  
                                                                                                                                        
emperor and the local communities, following a “centre-periphery” pattern. In any case, 
there can be no doubt that the reception and reshaping of  imperial images by local 
communities are important topics. See Rose (1997) 108-120; Price (1984) 170-206. For 
some case studies see Mayer (2010) 114-119, dealing with portraits of  Augustus created 
by Samos, and Osgood (2012) on an altar dedicated to Claudius by the people of  
Ravenna.  
15 Arch of  Titus: Hannestad (1988) 124-132; Trajan’s Column: Hannestad (1988) 154-
167; Coarelli (1999) and below. For a discussion of  the city of  Rome as a theatre for 
representations of  imperial power, see Wallace-Hadrill (2003) 189-206. On the military 
imagery of  Roman emperors in the city of  Rome, see Koortbojian (2010).  
16 Statues of  emperors wearing cuirasses have been found throughout the empire, but it 
is difficult to say how many of  these were created in provincial cities. For a general 
discussion of  the military imagery on the basis of  statues found in the provinces, see 
Højet (2005) 182-184.  
17 I have addressed this point in the first chapter of  the thesis.   
18 Sidebottom (2005) 317. 
19  Two starkly different opinions in scholarship held by Millar and Isaac can be 
observed here. Both Millar and Isaac refute the theory of  a Roman grand strategy put 
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          The principal aim of this chapter is to explore the incentives for 
territorial expansion in the Early Roman empire (AD 14-AD 211). I shall argue 
that some key features of the bellicose culture of the Republican period, 
including a martial ethos and the pursuit of military glory and prestige, 
continued to play an important role during the Principate.20 One of my points 
is that this ideology was not merely a rhetorical device or a tool of imperial self-
presentation, but also had an important bearing on foreign policies. In many 
cases considerations of martial glory and prestige do actually appear to have 
been the main reason for territorial expansion. On the other hand, while some 
important continuities in values can be observed, there is no reason to think 
that these continuities ever led to the creation of a long-term, scientifically 
based “grand strategy”. As the research shows, the imperial decision making of 
the emperors of the Principate remained quite elastic. As a general rule, Roman 
emperors launched their campaigns whenever they thought such an 
undertaking might be useful or necessary. The reason this flexible approach 
could be maintained was that Rome’s power in the Mediterranean world 
remained unchallenged. 
 
2. Military values as incentives for expansion: from Augustus to 
Septimius Severus 
 
The role of military honour and virtus in shaping Roman imperialism can hardly 
be overestimated. 21  Although Roman politicians of the Middle and Late 
Republic subscribed to the theory of the just war (bellum iustum), war generally 
tended to be heavily eulogized.22 Pragmatically, a successful campaign not only 
                                                                                                                                        
forward by Luttwak, but Millar maintains a relatively traditional view in terms of  
imperial policy making in the early empire. Taking into account the limited means of  
communication and lack of  information, he concludes that, “the (Roman) imperial 
power was largely static or inert, and its activity stimulated by pressures and initiatives 
from below.” Whereas Isaac believes that the Roman government was highly 
autonomous in the issue of  imperial policy making. According to Isaac, down to the 
reign of  Diocletian at least the stance of  the Roman army in the East was on the whole 
quite aggressive; see Millar (1966) 156-166; (1982) 1-23; Isaac (1990) 372.  
20 David Potter (1996) 55, attempts to distinguish the Roman ideology of  war, world 
conquest and pragmatic military policies and activities. 
21  On virtus as a key element in the aristocratic ethos during the Republic, see 
Rosenstein (2007) 133-136. 
22 On the subject of  the glory of  imperial expansion in the late Republic and Early 
Empire, see Brunt (1990) 288-333. On the Roman concept of  the “just war”, see 
Cicero, de officiis 1,34–36. Cf. Albert (1980); Brunt (1990) 305-314.  
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brought land, slaves and other types of booty, it was also the most immediate 
way for Roman aristocrats to acquire glory and gain access to high office. 23 It 
has been argued that the existence of this highly militaristic culture fuelled the 
territorial expansion which ultimately resulted in the establishment of Roman 
hegemony in the Mediterranean world during the second century BC. 24 
Remarkably, the pace of conquest was maintained during the civil wars of the 
period 90 BC-45 BC. As the careers of Sulla, Pompey, Caesar and Crassus show, 
aggravated competition between ambitious Roman generals, mingled with 
traditional bellicose values, acted as a catalyst for further territorial expansion.25 
          Augustus established a dominant position in the state, but did everything 
in his power to stress the continuity of republican values and traditions. In the 
Res Gestae, he emphasizes his military virtus in order to highlight the 
continuation of the ancestral martial ethos.26 He even claims to have surpassed 
the summi viri (best men) of the Republic by achieving victory over Parthia. In 
reality, he had only managed to persuade the Parthians to return the Roman 
standards by means of diplomacy. In the Forum Augusti, the figures of Aeneas 
and the other most prominent members of the gens Iulia were displayed, 
reflecting Augustus’s aspiration to link “himself and his family to the gallery of 
Republican duces, triumphatores, as heir to the grandest martial traditions of the 
state.”27 Cogently, the statue from Prima Porta shows Augustus as a grandiose 
                                                          
23 See Hopkins (1978) 25-47; Harris (1979) 9-53; Rosenstein (2006) 366-367. In his 
insightful book Imperatores victi, Rosenstein shows that ultimately many unsuccessful 
commanders still managed to reach high office. See Rosenstein (1990). But this does 
not contradict the view that military honour was an important asset for young 
aristocrats trying to obtain high office. For a good discussion of  the military ethos of  
the aristocratic elite of  Republican Rome and its relationship with the political 
aspirations of  this group, see Rosenstein (2007) 132-147, esp. 136f. In her Triumph in 
Defeat (2014), Clark argues that, during the middle Republic, “the outcomes of  Roman 
wars were not decided solely on the battlefield, but ultimately by the Senate’s verdicts.” 
See Östenberg’s review (2014). This suggests that the Roman senatorial elite during the 
middle Republic did not see military defeats as a source of  irreparable damage to the 
reputation of  the commanding general. But Clark also points out that, after the mid-
second century, the Senate gradually lost patience with defeated generals.  
24 See Chapter 1. 
25  For an analysis on the relationships between the “great individuals” of  the late 
Republic and the Roman Senate, see Christian Meier’s influential monograph, Meier 
(1980).  
26 On attitudes regarding the Republican tradition under Augustus, see Eder (1990) 71-
122; Gowing (2005) 17-27. For a discussion of  aristocratic honours during the Empire, 
see Lendon (1997) 30-106. 
27 Ovid, Fast. 5,563-566; Suet. Aug. 31,5; Dio 55,10,3; For the Forum Augusti see Zanker 
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general wearing a cuirass and stretching his right arm as he addresses his 
soldiers.28 On a practical level, Augustus reinforced his relationships with the 
army by looking after the material interests of both serving soldiers and 
veterans. In the Res Gestae he draws attention to the many veteran colonies he 
established.29 In AD 6 he set up the aerarium militare, from which military pay 
and the costs of retirement schemes could be covered.30  
          During the first decades of the empire, territorial expansion was driven 
by various factors and considerations. Nevertheless, unquestionably the pursuit 
of military prestige was a crucial element. If this were not so, it is hard to 
explain why Augustus went to the trouble of sending his armies to such remote 
areas as Ethiopia, Arabia and Free Germany. Posing as the guardian of 
traditional Roman values, Augustus skillfully shifted public attention away from 
the painful civil war at home to the periphery of the world where Romans 
sacked towns, subdued peoples and achieved important victories.31 
          In the reign of Tiberius, the boundaries the empire remained more or 
less stable. It can be speculated that Tiberius decided to follow Augustus’s 
posthumous advice, but it also seems relevant that, as one of Augustus’ most 
successful generals, Tiberius had already covered himself with substantial 
military glory before he became emperor.32 When Tiberius ascended the throne 
in AD 14, he was already fifty-six years old and decades of campaigning and 
declining physical strength might have diminished his enthusiasm for further 
direct involvement in military affairs.33According to Suetonius, after Tiberius’ 
retreat to Capri some new military and administrative offices were left vacant 
                                                                                                                                        
(1968); (1988) 213, f.166; Hannestad (1988) 83-89; Brunt (1990) 412-413. 
28 Hannestad (1988) 50. On the statue of  Prima Porta, see Hannestad (1988) 50-56, fig. 
34 in 52; Zanker (1989) 175-176, 188-189.  
29 RG, 16. 
30 Cass. Dio 55,25,1.  
31 Of  course, Augustus also highlights the peace and order which he had brought the 
Roman people. But, as mentioned in Chapter One, he took care to remind the readers 
of  the Res Gestae that the pax Augusta had been established by military victories. 
32 Tiberius as a beloved general was favoured by his soldiers, see Vell. Pat. 2,104. For 
Tiberius’ military success during his early years, see Levick (1972) 21. Tiberius 
mentioned his military glories in one letter which he sent to Germanicus in AD 16, see 
Tac. Ann. 2,26,1. 
33 As a member of  the imperial house, Tiberius had had a glorious military career 
before he retired to Rhodes in 6 BC. This is also one of  the reasons Augustus, after 
losing several intended successors (first Marcellus, followed by Gaius and Lucius), 
decided to recall and adopt him in AD 4. For the imperial succession, see Sattle (1953) 
486-530; Levick (1972) 779-781; (1976) 31-47; Swan (2004) 86.  
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for many years.34 Nor does Tiberius seem to have been concerned about the 
fact that some parts of Roman territory were de facto occupied by barbarian 
peoples.35 Tiberius’ apathy to affairs of state and foreign policy stood in sharp 
contrast to the activist policies of his predecessor and elicited some sarcastic 
comments from Tacitus.36 
          The reigns of Gaius (Caligula) and Claudius witnessed a revival in 
imperial interest in the pursuit of military prestige. Unlike Tiberius, both Gaius 
and Claudius lacked military experience when they ascended to the throne. 
When he was only two to three years old Gaius had accompanied his father, 
Germanicus, during the latter’s campaigns in Lower Germany, and Germanicus’ 
enormous reputation enabled Gaius to raise support from the army at the 
critical moment when Tiberius died in AD 37. Nevertheless, the family 
connection with Germanicus did not fully compensate for the fact that, unlike 
almost all other men of the Julio-Claudian family, the young Caesar had never 
undertaken any military duties.37 Shortly after Gaius had oppressed Gaetulicus’ 
conspiracy, he left Rome in 39, travelling first to Gaul and then to the German 
frontier. 38  Since Tacitus’ account of Gaius’ military actions on the Rhine 
frontier during AD 39 and 40 does not survive, the motives behind the young 
emperor’s northern expedition must remain a matter of speculation.39 What can 
be said is that there is nothing either in the literary sources or in the 
archaeological record to suggest that the Rhine frontier was under serious 
threat after the revolt of the Frisii in 28. 40  Suetonius’ account of Gaius’ 
campaign is sarcastic, while Tacitus dismisses it as a ludibrium (farce). The most 
likely reading of the situation is that Gaius’ advance into Germany and his 
                                                          
34 Tac. Ann. 1,80. 
35 Tac. Ann. Suet. Tib. 37,1; 41.  
36 Tacitus criticizes Tiberius’ indifference to the provocation of  the Parthians. See Tac. 
Ann. 3,74; 4,31-2. Mann (1976) 177. 
37 Augustus’ closest relatives, like his nephew Marcus Marcellus, his right-hand man 
(and son-in-law) Marcus Agrippa, his two grandsons Gaius and Lucius, as well as 
Tiberius and his brother Drusus were all military men.   
38 Gaius’ hopes of  attaining military prestige are revealed by his fantasy of  riding in a 
chariot dressed as a triumphator or as Alexander the Great. As Barrett comments, he 
“was not immune to the attractions of  military glory, and it was inevitable that he 
would feel the need to emulate his forebears”. See Barrett (1989) 125; Suet. Cal. 19,2,52; 
Cass. Dio 59,7,1;17,3.  
39 On Gaius’ military activity in 40, see Bicknell (1968) 496-505. 
40 Tac. Ann. 4,72-74. 
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abortive plan to conquer Britain reflected the young emperor’s unrealistic wish 
to win military glory as a successful military commander. 41 
          However, his uncle Claudius’ conquest of Britain in 43 unambiguously 
shows that the bellicose ideology of the Republican period continued to play an 
important part in practical policy making during the empire. When Claudius 
assumed the purple, he was already fifty-one years old. Unlike Tiberius, 
however, he had not won any military victories before his accession. Suetonius 
reports that he had long been barred from taking up any public duties because 
of his supposedly inadequate mental and physical capacities.42 Therefore it is 
not surprising that, no doubt also aware of his father’s fearsome military 
reputation, Claudius hastened to join his general, Aulus Plautius, in launching a 
campaign against the Britons as soon as his position as emperor was secure.43 
The conquest of Britain in 43 went smoothly.44 After the defeat of Caratacus, 
Claudius led the Roman troops into Camulodunum (modern Colchester) which 
subsequently became a veteran colony and the headquarters of the new 
province of Britannia. Six months after leaving Rome, Claudius returned to the 
capital where he was awarded a grand triumph by the Senate. Later, Claudius 
issued coins to advertise his military successes and he probably also built a 
triumphal arch bearing an inscription stating that he had been “the first to 
subject barbarian tribes beyond the Ocean to the rule of the Roman people”.45 
In AD 49, he extended the pomerium or religious boundary of the city, a gesture 
indicating his success in extending the territory of the Empire.46 
                                                          
41 Suet. Cal. 43,1; Tac. Germ. 37,5. Suetonius reveals that Gaius’ German campaign was 
not a well-planned military action. Caligula was originally persuaded by someone to 
supplement the troops of  Batavians, and only after that did the idea of  a campaign 
form in his mind. This example demonstrates that the policy making in the Early 
empire was a matter of  individual whim, not of  precise planning. 
42 Suet. Cal. 2,2; 4. 
43  On the motives behind Claudius’ British conquest, scholars have had few 
disagreements: the pursuit of  military prestige and the intention to strengthen the 
nexus between him and his army were main purposes. See Levick (1990) 137-139. 
Osgood (2011) 86.  
44 For the outline of  the Claudian invasion, see Mattingly (2007) 95-97. The latest 
version: Osgood (2011) 84-106. 
45 CIL VI 40416. The reverse of  RIC I Claudius, 30 shows the architrave of  a triumphal 
arch inscribed with the phrase DE BRITANN(IS). See also RIC I Claudius 33 and RIC 
I Claudius, 44. The relief  from the Sebasteion at Aphrodisias depicts the heroic image 
of  Claudius and the captive Britannia. See Smith (1987) 115-117; Pl, XIV, no.6. 
46 Eck (2000) 236. 
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          Unlike his predecessor, Nero never visited any of the frontier camps and 
had not commanded any Roman army. Nevertheless, there are reliable 
indications that he realized the importance of maintaining good relations with 
the soldiers. Tacitus and Cassius Dio note that he was displeased with his 
mother’s open interference in military affairs.47 He also tried to capitalize on the 
military successes of his generals and on other events which might have been 
interpreted as demonstrating Roman military or political superiority. After 
Corbulo had invaded Armenia and captured the capital city of Artaxata in AD 
58, Nero was saluted as imperator, and one of the relief panels from the 
Sebasteion of Aphrodisias, constructed between c. AD 20 and c. AD 60, shows 
Nero threatening a collapsing Armenia. 48  Both Suetonius and Cassius Dio 
report that when king Tiridates of Armenia visited Rome in AD 66, he was 
diademed and entertained by Nero. On this occasion, Nero himself was again 
saluted as imperator, offered laurels on the Capitol and closed the gates of the 
temple of Janus to mark the end of warfare.49 Although Nero never led the 
army to the front in person, a considerable amount of territorial expansion took 
place during his reign. He received twelve (possibly even thirteen) salutations as 
imperator, fewer than Claudius (who received twenty-seven) but still an 
impressive number.50   
During Vespasian’s reign, despite the fact that several client kingdoms 
were annexed by Rome, 51  no new conquests were attempted. Part of the 
explanation might be that Vespasian had acquired a substantial amount of 
military prestige before coming to power. The case of Titus is somewhat similar. 
Titus had emerged as an eminent and popular general when he was serving in 
his father’s army in Syria.52 The victory over the Jews and the sack of Jerusalem 
                                                          
47 Cass. Dio 61,8,1. 
48 For the salutation see Tac. Ann. 13,41. For a good discussion of  the relief  panels 
from Aphrodisias, see Alcock (2002) 90-93. While the panel from Aphrodias depicts 
Nero as the conqueror of  Armenia, there is no reliable evidence that he ever claimed 
the title Armeniacus. The abbreviated legend ARMENIAC, which appears on didrachms 
and hemIdrachms of  Nero which were struck in Caesarea in AD 59 may mean 
Armenica (sc. victoria) rather than Armeniacus. See Mattingly (1965) clxxxv; Bedoukian 
(1971) 11. 
49 Suet. Ner. 13. This sequence of  events shows that Nero was trying to represent pax 
as the welcome result of  successful warfare.  
50 For the territorial expansion which took place in Nero’s reign, see Chapter Three. For 
his salutations as imperator see Griffin (1984) 231-233. 
51 Luttwak (1976) 60.  
52 Mucianus’ praise of  the military qualities of  Titus is recorded by Tacitus in Histories, 
see Tac. Hist. 2,77. 
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in 73 enhanced his military reputation. Coins showing the legend IUDAEA 
CAPTA circulated all over the empire.53 After his death, Domitian erected a 
triumphal arch in the Forum Romanum to commemorate his brother’s victory 
over Judaea.54 In actual fact, the Judaean campaign of Vespasian and Titus was 
fought to quell a regional revolt rather than with the aim of enlarging the 
territory of the empire. Even the successful oppression of a rebellion generated 
sufficient military prestige to bolster the legitimacy of the imperial house.      
          Domitian was twenty-nine years old when he became emperor in 
September 81 but, unlike Vespasian and his brother Titus, he lacked sufficient 
military honours when he ascended the throne. This deficiency appears to have 
been his main reason for launching an offensive against Germania Libera, the 
result of which prompted Tacitus’ comment tamdiu Germania vincitur.55 In 83 he 
celebrated a triumph to crown his successful campaign and received the title 
Germanicus.56 The Chattian War resulted in a modest extension of Roman 
territory, giving the Romans control over the Taunus Ridge and the Wetterau 
region. As seen in Chapter Three, a series of forts, watchtowers and roads was 
established in this region.57  
          Taking a broad view of military expansion between the final years of 
Augustus and Domitian’s death, it can be said that, of those campaigns which 
were fought during the ninety years following the battle of the Teutoburg 
Forest, only the conquest of Britain resulted in a substantial extension of 
Roman territory, and that Britain was also the only area in which the Romans 
continued to pursue a consistent offensive policy right up to the end of the first 
century AD.58 Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that all emperors of the 
Julio-Claudian and Flavian dynasties tried to obtain at least a certain amount of 
military prestige and that the intimate connection between military success and 
the legitimacy of imperial rule continued to stimulate further territorial 
expansion.  
          The accession of Trajan marked the beginning of a new period of 
vigorous Roman expansion. Lacking the aura of an Italian aristocratic origin, 
                                                          
53 Hannestad (1988) 119, fig.75; Beard (2003) 557. 
54 For the Arch of  Titus, see Hannestad (1988) 124-32. LTUR s.v. Arcus Titii (Via 
Sacra). 
55 Tac. Germ. 37. 
56 Jones (1990) 129. For the title appearing on official documents and coins, see Kneissl 
(1969) 43–57; Buttrey (1980) 52–56.  
57 Schönberger (1969) 155-164; Webster (1985) 192; Jones (1990) 129.  
58 Whittaker (2008) 302.  
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Trajan might have felt that he needed military honours to win the approval of 
the Senate and the Roman people. 59  Despite the fact that his ambitious 
conquests in Arabia, Dacia, Armenia and Parthia were prompted by a variety of 
factors, there can be no doubt that the pursuit of military glory was a cardinal 
concern in launching these wars.60 The image of Trajan as a fellow-soldier and 
commander-in-chief of the army is clearly reflected on Trajan’s Column. The 
giant Adamklissi monument which was erected in the eastern frontier province 
of Lower Moesia likewise underlines his martial qualities.61 
          Immediately after Trajan’s death in 117 the new emperor, Hadrian, 
radically revised the expansionist policies. As mentioned in Chapter Three, he 
withdrew the army from the Lower Danube, thereby restricting the new Roman 
province of Dacia to the area within the Carpathian mountains. In Britain he 
built a wall with the aim of facilitating the task of controlling the movements of 
the barbarian tribes of the north. On the south-western German frontier a new 
system of wooden palisades and trenches was created to consolidate the Agri 
Decumates. In Africa, the Fossatum Africae was established to regulate the 
movements of transhumant pastoralists. During the early 130s Hadrian’s 
generals suppressed the revolt of Bar Kokhba in Judaea, but no aggressive 
military expeditions were launched during his long reign. His goal was clearly to 
maintain the Roman empire within well-defended boundaries.62 
          The fact that Hadrian opted for a non-expansionist policy by no means 
implies that he had little interest in military affairs. On the contrary, many 
sources refer to Hadrian’s good relations with the imperial army. Before his 
accession to the throne, he had had a long career in the frontier armies.63 After 
he had become emperor, his frequent inspections of military camps during his 
                                                          
59 Trajan’s father served as commander of  a legion under Vespasian in the Jewish War 
and then became consul. Trajan himself  spent many years in the army before his 
accession. He was appointed consul in 91, and afterwards returned to Germania with 
three legions. He remained on the German frontier until the news of  the assassination 
of  Domitian in AD 97 was delivered to him by Hadrian. See SHA Hadr. 2,5. For the 
early life of  Trajan, see Bennett (1997) 20-27. 
60 For the adoption of  Trajan and his succession, see Kienast (1968), to be read with 
Todd (2001) 324-331. 
61 On Trajan’s Column, see Lepper and Frere (1988); Packer (1997) 113-120; Lancaster 
(1999) 419-439; esp. Coarelli (1999). On the Adamklissi monument, see Rossi (1971) 
55-65.    
62 According to the Epit. de Caes. 14,10 Hadrian claimed: “I have achieved more by 
peace than others by war.” Cf. Campbell (2002) 135. 
63 Ando (2000) 316. 
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constant journeys clearly expressed his concern for the well-being of the 
soldiers. Various writers record that Hadrian attached great importance to 
military discipline. 64  There is also a rich collection of numismatic evidence 
highlighting Hadrian’s intimate relationship with the praetorians and with the 
imperial legions of the frontier provinces.65 This approach to military affairs 
appears to have won broad approval, as Hadrian’s conservative frontier policy 
did not elicit much criticism from senatorial writers.66 
          Antoninus Pius adhered broadly to Hadrian’s approach to imperial 
policies.67 However, because he had not achieved any martial successes before 
his accession, he urgently needed a military victory to bolster his reputation. 
With this in mind, it is not surprising that, shortly after ascending the throne, he 
launched two aggressive campaigns, one on the frontiers of Upper Germania 
and Raetia and another in Britannia.68 Since there are no indications that the 
north-western frontiers were under any threat in this period, these campaigns 
appear to have been driven mainly by ideological considerations. Following 
these attacks, Antoninus Pius was acclaimed imperator in 142, whereafter he 
issued commemorative coins advertising his military prowess.69 Once he had 
obtained the requisite military gloria, Antoninus Pius never again undertook any 
other military expeditions. In this respect his approach to military policies 
resembles that of Claudius, another emperor who lacked military credibility at 
the beginning of his reign. As stated in Chapter Three, multiple factors played a 
part in military decision making during the Principate, but the military policies 
adopted by Claudius and Antoninus Pius strongly suggest that the desire to 
                                                          
64 Cass. Dio 69,9,4; Epit. de Caes. 14. 11. 
65 Campbell (1994) 74. Many of  these coins shows Hadrian dressed in military costume. 
On some coins he is accompanied by one or more military officers, while others depict 
him addressing soldiers from a platform. Hadrian on horseback is also a popular scene. 
For examples, see BMC III, Hadrian no.1313; BMC III, Hadrian no. 1672.    
66 From his perspective as a Roman senator, Dio Cassius comments that in general 
Hadrian was an excellent emperor, in spite of  the fact that many people were murdered 
at the beginning and at the end of  his reign. See Cass. Dio 69,23,2.    
67 For a more extensive discussion, see Chapter Three.  
68 Cf. Chapter Three.   
69 Several coins struck in AD 143-144 refer to Antoninus Pius’ military successes. On 
the obverse of  one of  these coins, Antoninus Pius appears wearing a laurel wreath. On 
the reverse, the image of  Virtus holding a spear appears, with the legend VIRTUS AVG. 
see RIC III Antoninus Pius, 102. The obverse of  another coin which was minted in 
143-144 also shows the emperor wearing a laurel wreath, while the reverse depicts a 
flying Victory holding a trophy in her hands. See RIC III Antoninus Pius, 109 a. For 
similar coins, see RIC III Antoninus Pius, 104, 105a, 106, 110, 111a.   
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increase the legitimacy of imperial rule remained a major stimulus for military 
conquest, especially in the case of those emperors who had not built up any 
military prestige before their accession to the throne. 
          During the first years of Marcus Aurelius’ reign, pressure on the 
northeastern Roman frontiers intensified. The sources suggest that initially 
Rome was reluctant to launch large-scale attacks against barbarian tribes which 
were harassing provincial territory.70 Nevertheless, there are also indications 
that military honour still played an important role. For example, the revolt 
which took place in Syria in 161 offered Lucius Verus an excellent opportunity 
to attain military glory, although he also earned the dubious reputation for 
incompetence in commanding the army. After putting down the revolt and 
restoring peace to Syria, the Roman army boldly advanced into Armenia. The 
capture of the capital Artaxata in 163 earned Verus the title Armeniacus.71 Both 
Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus were hailed as imperator, and coins were 
minted in Rome to advertise the victory. On some coins a personified Armenia 
can be seen sitting on the ground and surrounded by weapons. On some types 
the image of Mars holding a trophy appears.72 Another coin which depicts 
Lucius Verus sitting on a tribunal and crowning a king has the legend REX 
ARMENIIS DATUS.73 
          In 165 Avidius Cassius led an army to the Euphrates, where a major 
battle took place at Dura-Europos. In the aftermath of this battle Seleucia-on-
the-Tigris, one of the most important cities of the Parthian empire, was sacked. 
In the following year, Verus’ army crossed the Tigris and appeared in Media, 
earning Verus the title Medicus. As Birley explains, these wars “resulted in a 
modest extension of Roman territory with the annexation of land as far as 
Dura.”74  
          Any attempt to elucidate the exact reasons for the military campaigns of 
the first and second centuries while trying to assess the role played by military 
provocations or to judge the validity of territorial claims made by Rome and by 
                                                          
70 This can be clearly sensed in Dio’s account in Books 72 and 73.    
71 SHA Ver. 7,1,2; SHA Marc. 9,1. CIL VIII 19690; CIL X17; AE 1960, 21. 
72 RIC, Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus 191.  
73 For aurei, see BMC [II H 18] IV no. 300ff. For sesterces, no. 1099ff. Hannestad (1988) 
op. cit. 219; 399, n.286. 
74 On Verus’ military activities in the East, see SHA Ver. 5-11; Cass. Dio 71,1,3. Birley 
(2000) 165; Birley (2008) 194-195. In the Historia Augusta, Verus is depicted as a corrupt 
general who led a life of  luxury and debauchery. The author has a low opinion of  his 
capacities as a military commander.   
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other political entities leads to the inevitable conclusion that it very difficult to 
determine whether Rome played an active and aggressive role in most of these 
conflicts or was merely passively responding to challenges originating from 
outside the Roman world. Therefore, little can be gained by entering into this 
debate.75 Whatever the exact motives behind these conflicts might have been, it 
must be emphasized that the emperors of the Principate, as their Republican 
predecessors had done, could freely use the option of initiating military violence 
to satisfy their appetite for glory if they thought such an action was desirable or 
necessary. On the other hand, they also had the option to end wars if this suited 
their best interests. During the last years of Marcus Aurelius’ reign, for example, 
if the Historia Augusta is to be believed, the emperor planned to annex the lands 
beyond the middle Danube and establish two new provinces, Marcomannia and 
Sarmatia.76 Immediately after his father’s death, Commodus gave up this plan 
and stopped the nascent war with the Iazyges, the Quadi and the Marcomani. 
Having done so, he hastened to Rome to enjoy a comfortable life.77 He did not 
escape unscathed as his indifference to military glory incurred the criticism of 
various members of the Senate, including his father’s right-hand man 
Pompeianus and the historian Cassius Dio.78  
          Even as late as the early third century, some emperors still continued to 
subscribe to the military ethos of earlier centuries. Septimius Severus might 
justifiably be described as the most aggressive emperor since Trajan. Although 
up to a point his military policies might have reflected his background and 
personality,79 they can also be seen as having been partially driven by the need 
to strengthen the new emperor’s legitimacy after the civil war of the years 193-
197. In the early years of his reign, Septimius Severus undertook various 
campaigns in the eastern territories, first in Armenia and followed by incursions 
into Arabia and Parthia. The victory he won over the Parthians in 198 earned 
                                                          
75 Potter (1990) holds a similar opinion.  
76 SHA Marc. 27,10. 
77 Cass. Dio 73,1.  
78 Cass. Dio 73,1,2; Hdn. 4,6-7.   
79 Severus was the first Roman emperor to originate from Africa. Before his accession 
to the throne, he had had a long career in the army. He first served as legatus of  the Legio 
IV Scythica in Syria under the provincial governor Pertinax in 181-183, and then as 
legatus Augusti pro praetore in Gaul. After fulfilling the governorship of  Sicily and 
attaining the consulship in 190, he became governor of  Upper Pannonia with three 
legions under his command in 191. He proclaimed himself  emperor in April 193. The 
civil war strengthened his relationship with the legions in the East. See Birley (1988) 58; 
63; 83.  
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him the title Parthicus Maximus.80   
          In 208, when he was already sixty-three years old, he launched a new 
expedition against the barbarians of northern Britain. The contemporary 
historian Herodian claims that, on the eve of the war, the Britons sent envoys 
to Severus to discuss terms of peace, but Severus dismissed their offers and 
went ahead with his preparations for the war as he was eager to “gain a victory 
over the Britons and the title of honour”.81 
          Herodian reports that Septimius Severus vigorously continued to pursue 
military success until his death. 82  Archaeological evidence from Carpow 
confirms that he had planned to occupy northern Britain permanently, a project 
which had not been attempted since Agricola. 83  During the campaign he 
restored Hadrian’s Wall and his expedition to Britain earned him a title 
Britannicus in 209.84 One of the inscriptions on the Arch of Severus explains 
that the monument had been erected ob rem publicam restitutam imperiumque populi 
Romani propagatum, “because of the restoration of the state and because the 
Empire of the Roman people has been enlarged.” 85  Septimius Severus’ 
annexation of northern Mesopotamia and his invasion of northern Britain are 
evidence that an individual’s desire to obtain or increase military prestige was 
still a strong stimulus for territorial expansion.  
 
          One of the conclusions which emerge from the foregoing discussion is 
that, instead of being just the “icing on the cake”, concerns fuelled by a desire 
for prestige and legitimacy were still a major factor in Roman military policies.86 
During the Republic, fierce competition among aristocratic families for military 
honours had been an important factor in the expansion of Roman territory and 
the emergence of the Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean world. From the 
early Principate, the emperors quickly monopolized the highest military 
honours, such as the right to be acclaimed imperator, the right to celebrate 
triumphalia and the right to preside over various military festivals.87 Certainly all 
                                                          
80 SHA Sev. 16,2; Hdn. 3,91,12.  
81 Hdn. 3,14,5.  
82 Hdn. 3,15,2-3.  
83 Birley (1971) 182. Intensive excavations have been conducted at Carpow in the last 
half  century, see Birley (1971) 254, no. 21.  
84 SHA Sev. 18,2; ILS 431. 
85 CIL VI, I 033 = ILS 425. 
86 Alcock and Morrison (2001) 279. 
87 About these military honours, see Campbell (1984) 120-148. In 19 BC L. Cornelius 
Balbus was granted the honour of  celebrating a full triumph for his military success 
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these sources of prestige had become imperial monopolies by the end of 
Claudius’ reign at the latest. Several passages in Tacitus’ Annals suggest that 
Tiberius was not happy with Germanicus’ successes in the German frontier 
region, and that letters were sent to stop him from undertaking any further 
military expeditions. Elsewhere Tacitus informs his readers that in 48 Claudius 
discouraged Corbulo’s ambition to take military action against the Chauci 
because he was worried that the latter’s military accomplishments would dwarf 
his own martial achievements. This led Corbulo to lament how fortunate the 
republican generals had been.88 In the Agricola Tacitus reveals that Agricola’s 
successes in Britain aroused Domitian’s jealousy and resulted in the former 
being summoned back to Rome.89 In the late second century Laetus was killed 
by Septimius Severus because his excellent reputation with the soldiers had 
incurred the latter’s odium.90  
          Even if most military honours were monopolized by the emperors, it 
does not follow that the contest for them had completely disappeared. In what 
follows, I shall focus on two forms of rivalry which certainly persisted. The first 
of these competitions was between Roman emperors and their predecessors; 
the second was rivalry between generals.  
 
3. Rivalry with predecessors and peers  
After Tiberius there was hardly any need for emperors to become personally 
involved in military campaigns since legati could be commissioned to undertake 
various military missions under the auspices of the emperor. Any victories won 
by these legati were attributed to the emperor. However, the fact that they no 
                                                                                                                                        
against the Garamantes. This was the last time that someone who was not a member of  
the imperial house held a triumph. See Ehrenberg-Jones (1955) 36. In AD 22 Blaesus 
successfully put down the Tacfarinas rebellion, which had lasted for years. He was given 
an honorary triumph and hailed as imperator by his soldiers. Subsequently only emperors 
were acclaimed imperator. See Tac. Ann. 4,74,1. The last ovation awarded to someone no 
belonging to the imperial house was that of  A. Plautius, in AD 47. See Tac. Ann. 13,32; 
Suet. Claud. 24,3. The surviving sources record only two senators who were given the 
prerogative to proclaim their military fame through a new cognomen. See Vell. Pat. 
2,116,2; Cass. Dio 55,28,4, Florus 2.31, Suet. Cl. 24. See also Talbert (1984) 362–364. 
For the monopolization of  these honours by the emperors of  the early Principate, see 
Campbell (1984) 120-53. On cognomina. see Vell. Pat. 2,116,2; Cass. Dio 55,28,4, Florus 
2.31, Suet. Cl., 24. See also Talbert (1984) 362-364, Campbell (1984) 358-362. 
88 Tac. Ann. 11,20. 
89 Tac. Agr. 42.  
90 Cass. Dio 76,10. 
155 
 
longer had to dirty their hands in warfare by no means implies that the 
emperors of the Principate no longer felt the urge to seek military glory. As 
already mentioned, some emperors who felt deficient in military honours, such 
as Claudius, Domitian and Antoninus Pius, were clearly keen to obtain them. In 
addition to trying to achieve at least some military successes to bolster the 
legitimacy of their rule, emperors were also competing with their Hellenistic, 
Republican and imperial predecessors. 
As noted above, Claudius’ received twenty-seven acclamations as 
imperator, more than any other emperor. In this way he attempted to escape the 
shadow cast by his earlier life and to prove that he was able to do better than 
any other member of the imperial family.91 Suetonius relates that Domitian 
embarked on a campaign in Gaul and Germany with only one aim: he wanted 
to equal his brother in power and status.92 Prior to his accession, in order to 
demonstrate that his military skills were not inferior to those of his brother 
Titus, he even convinced his father to send him to Parthia to assist the Parthian 
king, Vologaesus, against the Alani.93 Both Augustus and Trajan consciously 
tried to emulate Alexander the Great. The former paid his respects at 
Alexander the Great’s tomb in Alexandria after the defeat of Antony and 
Cleopatra. 94  The Mausoleum of Augustus as well as the claim to world 
domination, which is mentioned in the Res Gestae, reinforce the impression that 
Augustus attempted to rival Alexanders’s exploits.95 About one hundred years 
later, after the subjugation of Parthia, Trajan arrived in Charax (Basra), at that 
moment the easternmost part of the Roman Empire. Cassius Dio reports that 
when the emperor stood on the bank of the river and watched a merchant ship 
sailing to India, he lamented that he did have the opportunity to surpass 
Alexander the Great because his age prevented him from conquering the 
regions farther to the east.96 Even Commodus, who showed little interest in 
military matters, took the title Conqueror of the World shortly before his death 
in 192.97  
During the Principate, non-imperial generals had to be very aware of the 
possibility that the pursuit of military glory might arouse the jealousy or enmity 
                                                          
91 Eck (2000) 235. 
92 Suet. Dom. 2,1. 
93 Suet. Dom. 2,2. 
94 Suet. Aug. 18,1.  
95 Levi (1947) 206; Nenci (1958) 290-298; Zanker (1988) 72-77; Cooley (2009) 4, 36-37. 
96 Cass. Dio 68,29,1-2; Bennett (1997) 202. 
97 Speidel (1993) 109.  
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of the emperor. However, this does not mean it is possible to jump to the 
conclusion that the commanders of the Early Imperial period lost any desire to 
win glory because they had been reduced to being mere puppets of the emperor, 
and there are clear indications that successful commanders were generally 
admired. 98  Tacitus reports that, when the Romans and foreigners in Syria 
learned of Germanicus’ death, they paid their respects to their beloved 
general.99  
It also appears from the literary sources that ambitious generals were still 
intent on achieving honours and rivalry between generals in the pursuit of glory 
remains a stock theme in Early-Imperial literature. After Dolabella had defeated 
Tacfarinas in 24, for example, he requested an honorary triumph. Tiberius 
rejected this request because he feared that Dolabella’s reputation would 
overshadow that of the emperor’s uncle, Junius Blaesus.100 The governor of 
Upper Germania, Antistius Vetus, planned to build a canal between the Saône 
and the Moselle by which goods could be more conveniently transported to the 
Rhine and the North Sea. Because he was jealous of Antistius, the imperial 
governor of Gallia Belgica refused to allow him to bring the army into his 
province to complete the project.101 Gaius Suetonius Paulinus’ aggressive policy 
in Wales seems to have been motivated in part by his desire to rival Corbulo’s 
military reputation after the latter had achieved enormous successes in 
Armenia.102 During the civil war of 68/69, two commanders of Vespasian’s 
army, Mucianus and Antoninus, fell out with each other because they were both 
seeking military glory.103 Unquestionably, Domitian’s decision to recall Agricola 
from Britain was also prompted by jealousy.   
 
4. Public opinion  
 
Throughout the duration of the Principate, not only emperors and generals of 
senatorial background, but large sections of the population were interested in 
                                                          
98 Campbell (1975) 27.  
99  Tac. Ann. 2,73. In more than one place in Tacitus’ narratives, Germanicus is 
compared to Alexander the Great, expressing immense regret about his death at such a 
young age. 
100 Tac. Ann. 4,26,1. 
101 Tac. Ann. 13,53,4. 
102 Tac. Ann. 14,29,5. 
103 Tac. Hist. 3,52. Tacitus also records the competition between Valens and Caecina for 
glories, which resulted in their defeat by Otho. Tac. Hist. 2,23.    
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military achievements and territorial conquest. Some emperors enjoyed great 
posthumous reputations among the Roman population, and in most cases these 
reputations were based on military successes achieved during campaigns of 
conquest. All Roman emperors were highly sensitive to public opinion and 
played on it by disseminating images depicting them as imperatores conquering 
towns and peoples in the peripheral regions of the world. A wide variety of 
visual media continued to broadcast propagandistic messages acclaiming 
Rome’s military prowess, as discussed above. In many cities of the empire, 
monuments carrying symbols of the emperors’ martial valour show that 
imperial messages conveying military successes were positively received by the 
inhabitants of the empire.104  
Significantly, some emperors were criticized for their indifference to 
state affairs and military matters. Although Augustus had retrieved Roman 
hostages and standards from the Parthians by diplomacy, both Virgil and 
Horace expressed their expectation that one day Augustus would subjugate 
Parthia by force. 105  Nero was completely uninterested in leading troops. 
Suetonius says that he even toyed with the idea of withdrawing the army from 
Britain, but gave the plan up because such a step might incur disrepute.106 
Tacitus complains about Tiberius’ passivity in imperial affairs, which aroused 
the contempt of the Parthian king, Artabanus III.107 Both Pliny the Younger 
and Cassius Dio criticize Domitian for spending huge amounts of money to 
make peace with Rome’s enemy, Decebalus of Dacia.108 Commodus is likewise 
blamed by Herodian for ending the war on the Danube frontiers by dispensing 
huge sums of money rather than by force.109   
Taken together, the literary and epigraphic sources leave no doubt that 
traditional values emphasizing military conquest and victory remained one of 
the most important motives for imperial expansion in the early empire.110 There 
are in fact indications that this ideology continued to play a part in imperial 
policy making until at least the mid-third century. 111  While countless 
                                                          
104 For the relationship between the emperor and urban elites in the Early Empire, see 
Ando (2007) 359-377. 
105 Hor. Od. 4,15,23; Verg. Aen. 6,719-807. 
106 Suet. Ner. 18,1. 
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111 As Woolf  has pointed out, “Military glory was still a desideratum” in the imperial 
period. Woolf  (1993) 183. 
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publications refer to the first two centuries of the Principate as the period of 
the pax Romana, it was a time in which many wars were fought.112 The concept 
of the pax Romana refers primarily to a situation in which the outbreak of civil 
wars had become extremely rare. On the frontiers, violence continued much as 
before, and the intervals between peace and war were nearly always of short 
duration. Although the pace of territorial conquest slowed down after Augustus, 
the fundamentally positive attitude to warfare did not change significantly 
during the Principate.  
          As Campbell has pointed out, viri militares still accounted for a substantial 
proportion of senators during the first and second centuries AD,113 and almost 
all men belonging to the imperial house or closely related to it took up posts as 
military tribunes shortly after receiving their toga virilis. As the account of Dio 
shows, the military tribunate still functioned as the inevitable stepping-stone for 
sons of senators aspiring to gain entry into the Senate.114  
As Table 1 shows, almost all Roman emperors of the first, second and 
early third centuries AD acquired personal experience of commanding troops 
in the frontier zones either before or after their accession. Young Octavian 
joined Caesar’s army for the campaign against Pompey’s sons in Spain, and it 
was during this campaign that Caesar first noticed his qualities. Although 
Augustus himself was not regarded as a remarkable general, the list of imperial 
family members who were favoured by Augustus, from Marcellus, Drusus, 
Gaius and Lucius down to Tiberius and Germanicus, shows that military 
qualifications played an important part in his choice of possible successors. His 
two grandsons, Gaius and Lucius, who were later adopted, were sent to the 
army shortly after they had assumed the toga virilis. Both the brothers Drusus 
Nero and Tiberius, his stepsons, also proved notable generals. Young 
Germanicus was given the command of the army which was sent to suppress 
the revolt of the Pannonians and the Dalmatians in AD 6. His outstanding 
military achievements made him extremely popular with Roman soldiers and 
civilians alike.115 In contrast to this renown, because Agrippa Postumus and 
                                                          
112 See Woolf  (1993). In a recent article, Mattern discusses banditry and revolts in the 
Principate; see Mattern (2010). 
113 On viri militares in the Republic, see De Blois (2000). On viri militares in the empire, 
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Claudius failed to demonstrate their capacity to command an army, they were 
detested by Augustus and Livia. 116  After the death of Germanicus in 19, 
Tiberius’ son Drusus emerged as the most promising successor. Tacitus refers 
to a letter of recommendation written to the Senate by Tiberius, in which the 
emperor stressed that Drusus had matured after an eight-year probation period 
in which he had repressed mutinies, brought wars to a successful conclusion, 
and had been awarded a triumph and two consulships. 117  These examples 
suggest that military experience continued to be an important factor in selecting 
imperial successor during the early Principate.  
 
Emperors Vir militaris Heirs Vir militaris 
Augustus √ Gaius Caesar √ 
Lucius Caesar √ 
Tiberius √ 
Tiberius √ Germanicus √ 
Drusus √ 
Caligula √ -- -- 
Claudius √ Nero × 
Nero × -- -- 
Galba √ Lucius Piso √ 
Otho √   
Vitellius √ 
Vespasian √ Titus √ 
Titus √ -- -- 
Domitian √ -- -- 
Nerva × Trajan √ 
Trajan √ Hadrian √ 
Hadrian 
 
√ Lucius Aelius √ 
Antoninus Pius × 
Antoninus Pius × Lucius Verus √ 
Marcus Aurelius √ 
M. Aurelius √ Commodus √ 
Commodus √ -- -- 
Pertinax √ --  
Didius Iulianus √ -- 
Sep. Severus √ Caracalla √ 
 
                                                                                                                                        
2,43; 2,69; 3,1-7; 3,49. Suet. Cal. 3-5. 
116 Suet. Aug. 64,1; Claud. 2; Cass. Dio 55,32,1;  
117 Tac. Ann. 3,56,7. 
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Table 1. Military experience of Roman emperors, 27 BC-AD 211 
 
When Gaius was still very young, Germanicus took him with him to the 
frontier camps, where he was nicknamed “Caligula” by his father’s soldiers.118 
Likewise, after Claudius’ conquest of Britain, he granted the honorary title 
Britannicus to his natural son. 119  Suetonius records that he often took 
Britannicus in his arms and commended him to the soldiers of the Praetorian 
Guard.120 Some twenty-five years later, Vespasian had been acclaimed imperator 
by the army in Judaea before he made his bid for throne. His military qualities 
are celebrated by Flavius Josephus.121 When Titus was in his early twenties, he 
had already served as a military tribune in Germany and Britain and built up a 
military reputation.122 This helped to pave the way for his being designated 
successor to the throne by Vespasian.123 This also explains why Vespasian’s 
younger son, Domitian, was so eager to launch a campaign against the Chatti in 
AD 83, regardless of the fact that the military glories resulting from Agricola’s 
successful military exploits in Britain were supposed to accrue to the 
emperor.124  
          In the period of the new dynasty which began with Nerva and Trajan, 
although all emperors with the exception of Commodus were created by means 
of adoption, martial qualities continued to play an important role in the imperial 
succession. After the oppression of the conspiracy under Aelianus, Nerva 
announced the adoption of Trajan, a notable general who was holding the 
governorship of Upper Germany at the time. The Senate and Nerva knew that 
Trajan had massive support among the army.125 When Hadrian became military 
tribune of the Legio II Adiutrix in 94, he was only eighteen years old. Since 
Hadrian had accompanied Trajan during the two Dacian wars as well as the 
Parthian War, there can be little doubt that his military talent had won him the 
emperor’s favour.126 Viewed in this light, Hadrian was a logical candidate for 
                                                          
118 Suet. Cal., 9,1. 
119 Suet. Claud. 17; Scullard (2011) 253-255.  
120 Suet. Claud. 27,2. 
121 See Jos. BI, Books 3 and 4.  
122 Suet. Tit. 4,1; Tac. Hist. 2,77,1. 
123 Jones (1984) 99. Vespasian was the first emperor to be succeeded by one of  his 
natural sons.  
124 Tac. Agr. 39; Jones (1992) 128. 
125 Cass. Dio 68,3.  
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by Nerva in 97.  
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succession to the imperial throne, although the surviving sources claim that his 
adoption and designation as successor owed much to Trajan’s wife, Plotina.127 
Immediately after his adoption by Hadrian in 136, Aelius was made consul and 
then governor of Pannonia with imperium proconsulare. According to the Historia 
Augusta, Lucius Verus had achieved some important military victories, even 
though he was not credited with the same military capacities as some other 
candidates for the imperial throne.128 Marcus Aurelius had never done military 
service in the frontier provinces before becoming emperor, but he sent his co-
ruler, Lucius Verus, to the East, permitting him to carry out campaigns against 
Parthia and Armenia. 129  In the speech which he gave the soldiers after 
becoming emperor in 181, Commodus recalled that his father had often taken 
him to the military camps when he was a child.130 Although the possibility that 
this speech is a literary creation of Herodian cannot be discounted, the fact that 
Marcus Aurelius took Commodus with him during the Marcomannic campaign 
of 175, when he was only thirteen years old, suggests that his father did try to 
keep him away from a life of ease in Rome. On his deathbed Marcus Aurelius 
commended his son to his statesmen and army commanders, asking them to 
assist Commodus in state business and military affairs.131  
          The sources for the early third century demonstrate the continued vitality 
of the tradition of taking young princes to the frontier provinces to give them a 
taste of military life. Septimius Severus dispatched his two sons, Caracalla and 
Geta, to the army camps, wishing them to gain military glory by fighting against 
the barbarians instead of being corrupted by the luxuries and pleasures of the 
city of Rome.132 When Severus died during the British campaign in 211, both 
his sons were serving in the expeditionary forces in the frontier zone.  
As Table 1 shows, between 27 BC and AD 211 only three out of twenty-
one emperors, Nero, Nerva and Antoninus Pius, never acquired any military 
experience before or during their reigns. In the time of the Republic, Roman 
                                                          
127 Cass. Dio 69,1,1; SHA Hadr. 4,10. 
128 SHA Ael., 3,5.  
129 The author of  the Historia Augusta records that when Lucius Verus was young he 
lacked honour in both civil and military life. This might have been the reason his 
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aristocrats had had to do ten years of military service before they could hold 
public office at Rome.133 In the Principate young male members of well-to-do 
senatorial or equestrian families could begin upon administrative careers 
without fulfilling this requirement. Nevertheless, it appears from Tacitus that 
good generalship continued to be regarded as proof of virtue,134 and military 
experience and military success were still important to those aspiring to gain 
access to the top ranks of Roman society.135 This helps to explain why the 
Senate continued to contain a significant proportion of viri militares.136 
Agrippa’s outstanding military talents enabled him to become the right-
hand man of Augustus for decades until his death in 12 BC. Galba’s success in 
maintaining strict discipline in the Rhine legions impressed Gaius when he 
visited the army at Mainz in early 40.137 Domitius Corbulo was entrusted with 
major military missions during the reign of Claudius and Nero, giving him the 
opportunity to display his extraordinary military prowess. 138  Agricola was 
appointed governor of Britain for ten years and he used this position to 
campaign deep into Scotland in 85.139 Albinus’ victory over the barbarian tribes 
on the Rhine frontier attracted the attention of Commodus. 140  During the 
Principate competition among members of the Roman ruling class still existed. 
Unlike their Republican predecessors, senators and equites were now principally 
competing for the emperor’s attention, but military achievements clearly 
continued to play an important part in this process.141 
From the emperor’s perspective, war and military conquest were a very 
important means of strengthening the connection between the imperial family 
and the army.142 The mutiny which broke out on the Pannonian and Rhine 
frontiers in AD 14 offers a good example of this assertion. The revolt began in 
the legionary camps of Pannonia when Augustus died and Tiberius succeeded 
                                                          
133 Polyb. 6,19,2-5. 
134 Tac. Agr. 39. Tacitus mentions the competition which existed between the governors 
in Britain for the sake of  military glory. 
135 Campbell (1976) 18.  
136 Ibid., 12.  
137 Suet. Gal. 6,3.   
138 On the career of  Corbulo, see Syme (1970) 27-39; Vervaet (2003) 436-464. 
139 Levick (1999) 159. 
140 SHA Alb. 6,3-4.  
141 As Hopkins puts it, “in order to be a top official (ordinary consul or supplementary 
[suffect] consul), the successful contestant had to have held a whole series of  
administrative posts.” See Hopkins (2009) 188.  
142 See Campbell (1984) 382-401. 
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to the throne. After learning about the crisis, Tiberius sent his son, Drusus, to 
the Pannonian frontier. After he had arrived, Drusus told the mutinous soldiers 
that the Senate would consider their complaints to do with payments and 
conditions of service, whereupon the soldiers shouted that it was not the Senate 
but the emperor who should be concerned about these issues. 143  When 
Germanicus, the highest commander of the eight legions on the Rhine, realized 
that the situation was getting out of hand, he forged a letter in the name of 
Emperor Tiberius in which it was recorded that the army’s requests were 
met.144 Concerned that his wife and son, Agrippina and Caligula, might be 
attacked by the disgruntled soldiers, Germanicus decided to send them to the 
lands of the Belgic Treviri. When the soldiers apologized for their recklessness, 
he reproached them gravely. Recalling the glorious history of the first and 
twentieth legions, he reminded the soldiers of the benevolence of Tiberius, 
their former commander, who had recruited his soldiers personally and fought 
many battles at their side. By emphasizing the affinity between the emperor and 
his soldiers, he managed to quell the revolt.145 According to Tacitus, he played 
on the mutineers’ sense of guilt by offering them the opportunity to redeem 
themselves by advancing into German territory, an operation which led to the 
territorial expansion during the early reign of Tiberius.146  
          There were many methods to cement or reaffirm the nexus between the 
emperor and the soldiers, but the best one was to command the army in person 
or to entrust other members of the imperial family with the responsibility for 
important expeditions. Although some emperors showed little enthusiasm for 
either of these options, many did not hesitate to embrace them.147Augustus 
entrusted the command of his armies to close family members. Caligula’s 
German campaign of AD 39 served the purpose of reinforcing the loyalty of 
the legions of Upper Germany.148 When the news of the rebellion of Galba 
reached Rome in AD 68, Nero began to make plans for a military expedition. 
According to Suetonius, Nero boasted to his friends that he would be able to 
win over the soldiers of the frontier zone simply by showing them his tears. 
The anecdote sounds ludicrous, yet it does reflect the standard image of the 
                                                          
143 Tac. Ann. 1,26,4-6.  
144 Tac. Ann. 1,36. 
145 Tac. Ann. 1,42; Campbell (1984) 34-5.  
146 For the northern expedition launched against Germans, see Tac. Ann. 1,50-2,24 
147 Nero and Commodus showed little interest in commanding armies. 
148 The conspirator Gaetulicus served as governor for ten years from 29 to 39. About 
the conspiracy, see Barrett (2001) 91-114. 
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emperor as a fellow-soldier and commander-in-chief of imperial armies. 149 
Fifteen years later, Domitian decided to undertake the command of the legions 
which crossed the Rhine in the Chattian War of AD 83.150 
          Trajan excelled in his role as imperial dux militum.151 Hadrian did not 
show the same enthusiasm for leading the army to war, but he did spend a large 
amount of time visiting Roman legionary bases and supervising army drills and 
manoeuvres, and he showed a keen interest in the daily lives of officers and 
ordinary soldiers.152 Marcus Aurelius sent his co-ruler, Lucius Verus, to the 
Danube frontier to command the army, not only because he wanted to keep 
him away from the luxurious life in Rome but also because he wanted to 
strengthen the ties between the army and the imperial family.153 A few decades 
later, Caracalla was fond of posing as a fellow-soldier among the troops 
stationed on the German frontiers.154   
 
5. Conclusions: some thoughts on the roles of Roman emperors 
 
The literary, epigraphic and numismatic sources leave no doubt that the 
Republican emphasis on martial virtues continued to play an important part in 
Roman foreign policy and in imperial self-presentation during the Principate. 
After the reign of Augustus, almost all wars were fought outside Italy, in such 
remote corners of the Roman world as North-West Spain, Syria, Germany, the 
Danubian region and North Africa. Nevertheless, traditional military values 
remained strong. Military qualities were regarded as an important criterion in 
choosing a successor to the imperial throne. As we have seen, Roman emperors 
were expected to play multiple roles, but among these that of commander-in-
chief remained of paramount importance, as shown by imperial titulature, 
images and legends inscribed on Roman coins,155 formulaic texts inscribed on 
monuments, literature and all kinds of material images. The Roman soldiers had 
                                                          
149 Suet. Ner. 43,1.  
150 Domitian arrived in Gaul in 82. Initially, he pretended to be conducting a census, but 
suddenly turned on the Chatti. See Jones (1992) 128.  
151 Campbell (2002) 134.  
152 Cass. Dio 69,9. 
153 SHA Ver. 4,3.  
154 Hdn. 4,7,4. 
155 For the imperial portraits on Roman coins, see King (1999) 123-146. For military 
style, see King, op. cit., 133. 
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to swear an oath of allegiance to the emperor, and emperors were expected to 
address the troops in person when visiting the legionary camps.156 
          Unquestionably emperors did enjoy considerable freedom in 
emphasizing some aspects of their roles at the expense of others. Some 
emperors, such as Nero, Antoninus Pius and Commodus, showed minimal 
interest in commanding armies during their reigns. Making a completely 
different choice, Augustus, Trajan and Septimius Severus showed a keen 
interest in seeking territorial gains during their long reigns. Caligula, Claudius 
and Domitian showed some interest in territorial expansion, but the offensives 
which took place during their reigns mainly served the purpose of increasing 
the emperor’s prestige. After their ascension to the throne, Tiberius, Vespasian 
and Hadrian were better known as politicians than as military generals, although 
each of them had had a long career in the army and were not lacking in military 
prestige. During their reigns, most frontier issues were dealt with by diplomatic 
means rather than by military force. 
          One of the conclusions which emerges from this chapter is that Roman 
imperialism during the Principate was both flexible and complex. As far as the 
foreign policies of individual emperors are concerned, there was no strict rule 
which had to be followed. Augustus’ imperial policy was generally offensive, 
but unlike Trajan and Septimius Severus, he rarely interfered personally in 
military affairs. Nero did not present himself as a dux, but it is fallacy to 
conclude that he was a non-militaristic monarch. On the contrary, with regard 
to territorial expansion Nero was much more ambitious than the other two 
emperors in his group, Antoninus Pius and Commodus. Marcus Aurelius spent 
a great deal of time with the Roman legions on the Danubian frontier, but it 
cannot be inferred from this that he was militarily more aggressive than his 
predecessor Antoninus Pius. 
          Precisely because different emperors followed different foreign policies 
and adopted different attitudes to military affairs, Millar’s claim that the Roman 
empire played a passive role in relationships with barbarian or hostile nations is 
an oversimplification. On the other hand, exactly the same is true of Isaac’s 
monolithic claim that, “the frontier policy of Rome in the east was 
intermittently but persistently aimed at expansion.”157 It seems more realistic to 
say that in deciding to take either a passive or a more active and aggressive 
stance towards hostile barbarian states or tribes, Roman emperors were 
                                                          
156 Campbell (1984) 65-84. 
157 Isaac (1988) 372.  
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prompted by considerations relating either to their personal prestige or by what 
they believed to be the political and military interests of the empire. A key 
factor in all this was that, whatever roles the Roman emperors decided to play, 
Rome’s unchallenged military and political superiority ensured that it was 
always able to respond elastically to changing situations on the frontier issues. 
Antoninus Pius, who is regarded as one of the most unwarlike emperors in 
Roman history, pushed the German-Raetian limes forward and built a new wall 
in Scotland. Whatever his motives might have been, these actions illustrate that 
Rome enjoyed much more freedom than its opponents in changing its foreign 
policies.  
          Given the freedom to manoeuvre enjoyed by Rome during the Principate, 
it is in a way not surprising that the history of territorial expansion shows such 
a varied picture during this period. Certainly, the traditional militaristic ethos 
remained alive, stimulating imperial interest in territorial expansion. Lucius 
Verus was given the unofficial title of propagator imperii and a medallion issued in 
AD 178 which celebrates the successes of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus 
also bore the legend propagatores imperii.158 As late as the early fourth century, 
Constantine the Great was referred to as propagator orbis in an inscription.159 
While the foreign policies of individual emperors show much variation, this 
emphasis on successful warfare and territorial expansion as a source of imperial 
prestige and legitimacy sets Early-Imperial Rome apart from Qin and Han 
China where emperors were not expected to excel in military leadership or 
indeed to become personally involved in military affairs at all. 
  
                                                          
158 Birley (2000) 184. 




The Son of Heaven: from the Great Unifier 
 to the Wise Monarch 
 
1. The roles of the Chinese emperors of the Qin and Han dynasties 
  
Unlike Rome, China had a long-standing tradition of monarchy before the 
Empire emerged. Although Qin Shi Huang is seen as the first emperor in 
Chinese history, in many respects the duties he was expected to fulfill and the 
roles he was expected to play were determined by the monarchic traditions of 
the pre-Qin period.  
One century before the unification of China in 221 BC, Qin had attained 
great power as a result of Shang Yang’s reforms. These reforms significantly 
weakened the influence of the hereditary aristocratic families and helped to 
centralize power in the hands of the Qin rulers. Benefiting from this strong 
basis, Qin Shi Huang managed to incorporate all Chinese states within a unified 
empire. As noted in Chapter Two, he changed the title of the Qin monarch 
from king to “August Thearch” to underline the fact that his power exceeded 
that of all previous overlords and kings. Interestingly, when Liu Bang and his 
followers established a new dynasty in 202, he decided to keep the title of 
“August Thearch”, despite the fact that Qin Shi Huang had been deeply 
detested by many of his subjects.1  
          The roles that the early Chinese emperors played reflected the long-
standing traditions of Chinese monarchy and kingship. Nevertheless, these 
roles were not static and some important new developments took place. For 
instance, by carrying out various sacrifices the emperor highlighted his close 
connections with the highest deities, a tactical move which allowed him to 
endow himself with superhuman powers which, on paper, liberated him from 
all the restrictions of the terrestrial world. 
          The Chinese emperor was much more than the lawgiver and the supreme 
judge, he was the embodiment of law and justice; he had the authority to 
override existing laws.2 This situation contrasts sharply with the case of his 
                                                          
1 Shiji 8, 379. 
2 In contrast to the Roman emperors, Chinese emperors seem not to have participated 
in lawmaking and they did not often intervene in particular law cases. Instead, an 
emperor usually appointed or ordered certain officials to tackle various kinds of  judicial 
or legal matters. 
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counterpart in Rome, where “good” emperors were supposed to subscribe to 
the principle leges super principem.3 
          The Chinese emperor was also the head of the administration. No 
important political decision was made without consulting the emperor. 
Although imperial decision making usually meant that the emperor discussed 
specific issues with court officials,4 it should be noted that the extent to which 
emperors applied themselves to state business depended on the actual 
capabilities and on the character of the reigning monarch. Sima Qian records 
that the First Emperor was a diligent ruler who spent a great deal of his time 
reading and responding to submissions written on bamboo strips.5 In contrast 
to his diligence, the early emperors of the Western Han dynasty showed less 
enthusiasm for dealing with public affairs. Part of this neglect can be attributed 
to the fact that, during the early Han period, court culture was influenced by the 
Huang Lao doctrine which decreed that emperors should adhere to the 
principle of “reigning without interference” (Wuwei er zhi 無為而治 ). 6  In 
practical terms, this doctrine meant that the emperor was expected to respond 
passively to the propositions submitted by his subjects.7 However, this is not to 
say that all early Han emperors remained indifferent to all practical matters. As 
already discussed, the degree of their active involvement in administrative 
affairs depended on the inclinations and personalities of the individual 
emperors.8  
                                                          
3 Plin. Pan. 65,1: quod ego nunc primum audio, nunc primum disco, non est “princeps super leges” sed 
“leges super princepem” (what I now heard, and what I just now learned, is not “the princeps is above 
the laws”, but “the laws are above the princeps”). The Lex de imperio Vespasiani also refers to 
the principle leges super principem, although the princeps is said to be exempt from certain 
laws. See ILS XI 244 = McCrum and Woodhead (1961) 1-2; Ferri (2003) 74, n.179.  
4 Examples can be found in Chapter 4 in which I address Han foreign policies towards 
the Xiongnu. 
5 Shiji 6, 258. 
6 A doctrine of  wuwei is set out in the Huainanzi淮南子, a work produced at the court 
of  Liu An 劉安 (180-122 BC), who was a cousin and rival of  Emperor Wu. The author 
of  this treatise argues that “the ruler of  people” (renzhu人主) should remain quiescent 
and take no part in public affairs. For a translation of  three chapters of  this treatise and 
a commentary, see Major (1993). For the latest studies on the Huainanzi, see the 
collected papers edited by Queen and Puett (2014). 
7 As the Huainanzi says, “the method of  the ruler of  mankind is such that he is situated 
in a position in which no positive action is taken; he sets in motion orders which are 
not spoken.” See Loewe (2004) 555. 
8 Emperor Wu was a famously ambitious monarch, his keen intervention in almost 
every aspect of  the state affairs elicited the criticism of  some conservative senior 
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          For example, both Emperor Wen and Emperor Jing were praised by 
Sima Qian because during their reigns the people of the empire were exempted 
from various corvée duties and not disturbed by constant demands for them to 
do military service.9 The approach of these emperors stands in sharp contrast 
to that of Emperor Wu whose energetic interference in almost every aspect of 
state affairs elicited bitter criticism from some senior officials after his death. In 
this context it should be remembered that, during the reigns of Emperors Wen 
and Jing, the Han empire was at a grave disadvantage in its dealings with the 
Xiongnu on the northern frontiers. In contrast to this, Emperor Wu launched a 
series of ambitious military campaigns which resulted in the total defeat of the 
Xiongnu and also significantly extended Han territory. Interestingly, a close 
look at the historical accounts relating to the Western Han period reveals that 
Emperor Wu’s achievements did not win him much praise in the classical 
texts.10 During the final years of his reign, Emperor Wu himself issued an edict 
in which he admitted that his imperial militaristic policies had seriously 
disturbed the population of the empire and had provoked many complaints.11  
          Needless to say, although much more can be said about imperial roles in 
Qin and Han China, even this very brief survey is enough to reveal some of the 
distinctive features of Chinese conceptions of the roles emperors had to play. 
In the first part of this chapter, I shall focus specifically on the relationship 
between Chinese emperors and the army. Obviously, the Chinese emperor had 
the final say in decision making to do with military affairs,12 but in striking 
contrast to Roman emperors, Chinese emperors rarely appeared on the 
battlefield to take personal command of their armies. On the contrary, almost 
all the emperors of the Qin and Han empires avoided direct involvement in 
warfare and violence. It is my contention that this difference between Roman 
and Chinese ideas about the relationship between the emperor and the army is 
connected to the difference in Roman and Chinese worldviews which has been 
discussed in the first two chapters as well as to differences in actual military 
                                                                                                                                        
officials. See Tian Yuqing 田餘慶 (2004) 55-61.  
9 Shiji 10-11, 413-449. 
10 For Ban Gu’s general appraisal on the life of  Emperor Wu, see the Hanshu 23, 1101. 
For Sima Qian’s implicit criticisms of  his contemporary, Emperor Wu, see Durrant 
(1995) 159, n.35. 
11 Zizhi Tongjian 22, 739. For the discussion about the edict, see Chen Suzhen (2011) 
282-289. 
12 Some examples are given in Chapter 4 in the discussion of  the policies for dealing 
with the Xiongnu at court.  
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policies. In brief, an examination of the relationship between Chinese emperors 
and the army helps us to discern some of the distinguishing features of the 
workings of imperial power in Qin and Han China, and it simultaneously 
illuminates some of the driving forces behind the frontier policies pursued by 
Chinese emperors between the late third and late first centuries BC.  
 
2. The anti-militaristic tradition in Pre-Imperial and Early-Imperial 
China  
 
Students of ancient Chinese history are familiar with the thoughts of Confucius 
and his followers, who argued that the best way to subdue an enemy was not by 
violence but by the exercise of benevolence, righteousness and ritual. Such 
ideas can be traced back to the fifth century BC or even earlier. It should be 
noted that from the late Spring and Autumn period, especially during the 
Warring States period when the so-called “Hundred Schools” (Baijia百家) of 
Thought became a dominant force in Chinese intellectual life, an anti-warfare 
mentality became increasingly common among the members of the elite. 
Master Mo (Mozi 墨子 d. 391 BC), the founder of Mohism, was the most 
famous anti-war thinker of the early Warring States period. His antipathy to war 
is well reflected in his philosophical ideal of  “universal love” (jianai兼愛) and 
“no offensive warfare” (feigong非攻).13 Developing Confucian thought, Mencius 
emphasized the ruler’s de德 (virtue) and ren仁 (benevolence), claiming that the 
wise ruler should use his superb moral qualities rather than force of arms to 
attain the unification of the tianxia.14 Master Zhuang (Zhuangzi 莊子 d. 280 
BC), the most prominent representative of Taoism after Laozi 老子, similarly 
stressed that violence was not the optimal way to solve conflicts.15 A basically 
                                                          
13 About the theory of  war propounded by Mozi and his followers, see Huang Pumin
黃樸民 (1995); Paul van Els (2013). 
14 In Mencius’ opinion, the sole righteous reason to begin a war is to eliminate despotic 
rule. Nevertheless, Mencius maintains that, if  the ruler is sufficiently benevolent, war 
and violence can and will be avoided, and the entire world will be peaceable and unified. 
This idea is clearly reflected in the dialogue between Mencius and King Lianghui 梁惠
王. The latter asked Mencius how the tianxia could be pacified. Mencius replied that, to 
be at peace, the tianxia would have to be unified. The king then asked who could unify 
the tianxia, and Mencius replied this could be done by a person who is not obsessed 
with killing. See Mengzi 1,6: 12.  
15 Lewis sees Mencius as the most forthright pacifist in ancient China. See Lewis (1990) 
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negative attitude to warfare is even to be found in the writings of the school of 
Militarism. In The Art of War (Sunzi Bingfa 孫子兵法), a well-known military 
treatise ascribed to Sun Wu 孫武 (544-496 BC), the author subscribes to the 
view that not fighting is the best way of subduing the enemy.16 
          From the mid-Warring States period, an increasing number of educated 
men became aware of the fact that power could be obtained only by using 
violence, and this change of heart prompted the emergence of more positive 
attitudes towards warfare. Shang Yang, the architect of the reforms of the Qin 
state in the fourth century BC, stressed the crucial roles of both warfare and 
agriculture in the struggle for the supreme power in a state. He believed that a 
wise monarch should mobilize all available resources to develop farming but 
also not neglect to prepare for war. 17  Han Fei 韓非  (280-233 BC), a 
philosopher and Shang Yang’s successor in Legalism, who was also a Qin 
statesman, emphasized the crucial role of warfare in bringing about political 
unification. 18  He frowned on the Confucian values which emphasized the 
ruler’s personal morality, arguing that a state could not rise to prominence if the 
ruler despised warfare. 
          Nevertheless, the Legalists’ concern with military strength did not mean 
that they saw war as the best option if the ruler’s political goals could be 
achieved in other ways. What they did argue was that active preparation for 
warfare was the only effective way to achieve unification. On the eve of 
imperial unification, an increasing number of educated men saw warfare as an 
                                                                                                                                        
129. Personally I think Zhuangzi possibly goes even farther than Mencius in 
condemning fighting. Zhuangzi opposes violence in any form. In the eyes of  Zhuangzi, 
because they were involved in killing and provoked hostility Huangdi, King Tang of  
Shang and King Wu of  Zhou were not as wise as the Confucian and Mohist thinkers 
thought. See Zhuangzi 8,29: 260. 
16 See Sunzi, 3: 21. Paul van Els has pointed out the flaws in the simplified anti-thetical 
views of  the pro-war and pro-peace advocates. See van Els (2013) 14. 
17  Shang Yang’s thought is reflected in various chapters of  The Book of  Lord Shang 
(Shangjun Shu商君書). For the importance of  agriculture and warfare, see such chapters 
as The establishment of  foundamentals (Liben 立本), Agriculture and war (Nongzhan 農戰), 
Attention to law (Shenfa 慎法 ) and Making orders strict (Jinling 靳令 ). For an English 
translation of  the Shangjun Shu, see Duyvendak (1928). 
18 Interestingly, although Hanfei stresses the importance of  military strength in the rise 
of  the state, he places little value on the ruler’s personal valour and military spirit. 
Hanfei was adamant that the ruler should remain in his palace, regulating the state by 




important means by which to establish a rich and powerful state, but even in 
their eyes military effort was nothing more than a device by which to end 
discord, bolster the monarchy and achieve unification. 
          The stele inscriptions which were set up by First Emperor of the unified 
empire reflect Qin attitudes to war. For the purposes of this investigation the 
following five passages are of particular interest: 
 
He launched punitive attacks against rebellions. His might shook the four extremities. 
His martial virtue and righteousness extended to the four regions. …Thenceforth, the 




The black-headed people are at peace and tranquil, and do not use weapons and 
armour.黔首安寧，不用兵革。20 
 
The six states had been restive and perverse, greedy and criminal, slaughtering 
endlessly. The Emperor felt sympathy for the multitudes, so he mobilized his troops to 
campaign and display martial virtue. 六國回闢，貪戾無厭，虐殺不已。
皇帝哀眾，遂發討師，奮揚武德21。 
 
Disaster and harm were cut off and stopped, and arms shall forever be halted.淄害
絕息，永偃戎兵。22 
 
The six kings were despotic and rebellious, greedy and criminal, arrogant and 
violent…. Relying their strength, they grew overbearing, and frequently put arms and 




As these texts are highly rhetorical, they should not be interpreted as a 
reflection of the emperor’s true feelings towards violence. Nonetheless, from a 
comparative perspective it is noteworthy that, in his Res Gestae, which is equally 
rhetorical, Augustus displays a radically different attitude towards warfare. As 
                                                          
19 Inscription of  Mt Yi, 4-6; 28-30. 
20 Inscription of  Mt Langxie, 55-56. 
21 Inscription of  Mt Zhifu, 16-21. 
22 Inscription of  Mt Zhifu Dong-guan, 17-18. 
23 Inscription of  Mt Kuaiji, 19-20; 23-24; 31. 
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are Augustus’ military feats, Qin Shi Huang’s martial prowess is obviously 
presented in a positive light. However, unlike the Res Gestae, which celebrates 
the subjugation of foreign countries and peoples, the First Emperor does not 
present his military achievements as a splendid enterprise, despite the fact that 
the newly unified empire adopted Legalism, noted for its more positive attitude 
towards warfare, as its basic ideology. Instead of being celebrated as a glorious 
activity per se, war is presented as a righteous activity whose purpose was to 
eliminate the atrocities and ruthlessness of the six kings and to liberate the 
people of the tianxia from their enslavement to despotic rule.24 This assertion is 
emphasized by the fact that waging war without a righteous purpose is 
condemned; the unquestionable message of the last text. In other words, after 
despotism has been obliterated, peace and order have been restored and the 
tianxia has been unified, fighting must stop. 
          Adopting the same attitude to warfare found in the stele inscriptions, the 
Shiji reports that, after the six states had been eliminated, weapons were 
collected from the length and breadth of the tianxia and taken to the capital city 
of Xianyang, where they were melted down and used to fashion twelve metal 
statues of men.25 While this was happening, the imperial army was redeployed 
to the frontiers under the command of various generals. Distancing himself 
from the military sphere, the emperor devoted himself to restoring social order, 
law-making and implementing various radical cultural and economic reforms 
designed to solidify the unification of the empire. 
          In his seminal work on violence in early China, Mark Lewis points out 
that, by the sixth and fifth centuries BC, an anti-militaristic culture had taken 
root in China and that, from this period, it became far less common for the 
rulers of warring states to lead their troops in person.26 Instead, soldiers were 
entrusted to the hands of generals who were professional military men. The 
reasons behind this development can be sought in the declining importance of 
the city states and the concomitant rise of territorial states after the decline of 
Zhou. During this process, changes in weaponry and other military innovations 
exacerbated the cruelty of war. Simultaneously, the numbers of men needed to 
wage a war increased dramatically. As a result, after the sixth and fifth centuries 
                                                          
24 In classical texts, this type of  war is sometimes referred to as yi bing 義兵 , the 
righteous war. I shall discuss it and its difference with the Roman bellum iustum in the 
final section of  this chapter.  
25 Shiji 6, 239. 
26 Lewis (1990) 15-52. 
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BC, warfare was no longer a predominantly aristocratic activity. 27 After the 
introduction of quasi-universal military service, the states of Pre-Imperial China 
grew much more bellicose and aggressive, and the divide between military and 
civil society simultaneously deepened with the emergence of professional 
generals.28 The new military specialists needed to have a thorough grounding in 
military affairs and the skill required to command armies. After military 
command had been transferred to these professional generals, they enjoyed a 
high degree of autonomy in military affairs. 
          Some might want to attribute the ideology of anti-militarism simply to 
the ideals formulated by Confucius and his followers. Although the influence of 
Confucianism cannot be denied, it would be a mistake to see it an autonomous 
force operating independently of military and societal developments. 
Confucianism claimed that a wise ruler should be able to ensure the harmony 
and compliance of everything under heaven by exercising the power of virtue 
rather than by using force. This philosophy made it clear that it made no sense 
for a ruler to lead armies.29 It should be noted that, during the same period, 
non-Confucian schools of thought also attached little importance to the ruler’s 
military ethos and duties, as mentioned above. These anti-militaristic ideologies 
perfectly fitted the circumstances of the Warring States period in which military 
leadership was, in most cases, transferred to subordinate generals. Monarchs 
were simply not supposed to become too deeply involved in military affairs.30  
          In classical literary sources, some references can be found to kings 
leading their armies in person. The most famous example is that of King 
Wuling of Zhao趙武靈王 (r.325-299 BC) in the middle of the Warring States 
period.31 Through a series of reforms, King Wuling forced the Zhao nobles to 
adopt the same clothes as the Hu barbarians and to learn how to wield a bow 
on horseback. Nevertheless, such examples are extremely rare in early China. 
Even the aggressive policy of King Wuling, whose territory extended into 
present-day Inner Mongolia and was therefore on the frontline, had been 
developed in response to the constant raids of the nomadic tribes living on the 
northern borders.32  
                                                          
27 Rosenstein (2009) 40. 
28 Lewis (1990) 127. 
29 For example, Mencius stresses that the virtues of  the ruler eliminated any need for a 
commander. See Lewis (1990) 129. 
30 Sunzi 9: 75. 
31 About King Wuling of  Zhao and his reforms, see Shiji 43, 1806ff.  
32 For the motives of  the military actions of  King Wuling of  Zhao, see Di Cosmo’s 
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          Although intense warfare and high levels of violence were the hallmarks 
of the last phase of the Warring States period, all the victorious armies of Qin 
were commanded by professional generals. In striking contrast to the situation 
in the Roman empire, Chinese rulers had ceased to command armies and to 
involve themselves personally in military affairs long before the foundation of 
the empire. 33  This clear distinction between civilian and military affairs 
continued to exert a profound influence on Chinese dynastic culture, and 
contributed to the rise and persistence of conceptions about the responsibilities 
and duties of rulers in which martial qualities and achievements did not play any 
significant part. 
 
3. Soldiers and civilians in the Qin and Western Han periods 
 
In his monograph on the military meritocracy of the early Western Han period, 
Li Kaiyuan 李開元 describes in elaborate detail how after the collapse of Qin, 
as a sort of regional “bandit group” Liu Bang and his followers step by step 
built up a large-scale military and political entity. So successful were they that, in 
only a few years, the Liu Bang group had established an empire encompassing 
the territories of Qin.34 Quoting a statement made by Liu Bang himself, Li 
Kaiyuan concludes that control over the tianxia was established by weapons and 
on horseback.35 After the creation of the Han empire, all senior posts at the 
imperial court and in the central government, like that of the Chancellor 丞相, 
the Supreme Commander 太尉 and the Imperial Councillor 御史大夫, were 
awarded to close friends of Liu Bang who had won military honours during the 
latter’s bid for power.36 At the same time, a new “meritocratic class” consisting 
of approximately 600,000 men who had given Liu Bang military support was 
created.37 This class became the new nobility of Han society.38  
                                                                                                                                        
analysis, Di Cosmo (2008) 134-138. 
33 I shall leave the main comparative discussion of  this issue in the summary at the end 
of  the chapter.  
34 This work has become an influential monograph on studies of  early Chinese imperial 
history in Chinese and Japanese scholarship, but has not yet been paid sufficient 
attention by Western scholars.  
35 Cf. Section 4 of  this chapter.   
36 According to Li Kaiyuan, old friends from Liu’s hometown accounted for 47% of  
the highest offices during the reign of  Emperor Gao and for 67% during the reign of  
Empress Lü. See Li (2000) 158; Wang Aihe (2001) 33.  
37 Li Kaiyuan (2000) 225. 
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          In the period immediately following the foundation of the Han empire, 
the emperor realized that he had to rely on the men who had supported him. 
Therefore, when Emperor Gao ascended the throne, many prominent ministers 
were granted large tracts of land to “share the tianxia” (gong tianxia共天下).39 
Later, the emperor would fear that his reign was under threat from those of his 
former supporters who maintained armies in their allotted territories. Therefore, 
shortly after the establishment of Han, many generals, among them Han Xin 韓
信, Xin of King Han 韓王信, Ying Bu 英布 and Lu Wan 盧綰, were murdered 
on the pretext that they had rebelled against the new emperor. After Emperor’s 
Gao’s death, power devolved into the hands of the Empress Dowager Lü and 
her family and the position of the Western Han nobility was weakened even 
more.40  
          In the previous section, attention was drawn to the fact that Chinese 
rulers had been in the habit of entrusting military commands to professional 
generals since the Warring States period. However, during the Qin and Han 
empires the distinction between military commanders and civil administrators 
became less rigid. As before, the task of carrying out military missions was 
often entrusted to people who had ample military experience and a specialized 
knowledge of fighting. Nevertheless, many of these men had not been 
specifically trained as generals, and their long careers were often not exclusively 
spent in the army. A civil official could become a general by imperial 
appointment. Conversely, some famous military commanders of the Western 
Han period, like Zhou Bo 周勃, Wei Qing, Li Guang 李廣, Huo Qubing and 
Gongsun He, went on to pursue civil careers in the local or central 
administration after building up a military reputation by commanding armies 
against the barbarians. It should be emphasized that there is nothing to suggest 
that military glory was regarded as an important asset to those wishing to 
pursue an administrative career. The conclusion is rather that, as soon as the 
stability of the new regime was ensured, the Han emperors began to build up a 
vast bureaucratic apparatus which was thoroughly civil rather than military in 
character. 
          During the reign of Emperor Wu, the government set up a new system 
for recruiting government officials. Those aspiring to posts in the imperial 
                                                                                                                                        
38 ibid.  
39 Qin Jincai 秦進才 (2004). 
40 For the nobility of  the Western Han, see Loewe (2004) 279-323.  
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administration now had to pass an examination which focused on the presence 
or absence of various virtues, such as intelligence and excellent virtue (xianliang
賢良), uprightness (fangzheng 方正) and filial piety and integrity (xiaolian孝廉).41 
Military talent and prestige did not play a part in this competition. Some 
generals were appointed to prominent positions but principally because they 
were related to the Liu family rather than on account of their military 
experience or their popularity with the troops. The most obvious examples are 
Wei Qing and General Ershi Li Guangli in the reign of Emperor Wu. 
          Shifting the focus of attention to the armies of the Qin and Han empires, 
it is difficult to avoid the impression that these were far less professional than 
their Roman counterparts. On paper, the laws of the Qin and the Western Han 
stipulated that all adult males had to undergo regular military training and to 
serve in the army, although only for a very short period.42 In practice, a large 
proportion of the population obtained immunity from military obligations by 
paying a special tax. 43  Lei Haizong’s 雷海宗  data reveals that, during the 
twenty-six foreign wars which were fought during the reign of Emperor Wu, 
there were at least six campaigns in which the main body of Han troops 
consisted of such irregular soldiers as convicts, vagrants and foreigners.44 As 
mentioned in Chapter Four, Chao Cuo advised Emperor Wen to establish 
military colonists in the frontier zone with enough land to support themselves 
by growing their own food. This recommendation reveals the weakness of the 
early Han imperial army. 
 
4. The emperors, the frontiers and the army 
 
When Qin Shi Huang created his unified empire, the dominant worldview was 
based on the opposition between the Chinese world, which was conceptualized 
as a political and geographical entity, and the rising nomadic empire of the 
                                                          
41 Ibid. 175. For the system of  recruitment adopted by Emperor Wu, see Loewe (2004) 
119-154. For the recruitment and training of  officials in the Western Han period, see 
Yan (2004) 65-70; Loewe (2011) 136-42. For the transformation of  the system for 
selecting officials and the role of  examinations between the Western Han period and 
the Six Dynasties, see Yan Buke (1991). 
42 About the Western Han corvée service and military system, see Lao Gan 勞榦 (1943); 
Huang Jinyan 黃今言 (1982); Zhang Zhifei 臧知非 (1988); Huang Shuihua 黃水華 
(1998); Shigechika Hiroki (1986). 
43 Xie Guihua 謝桂華 (1989); Zhu Shaohou 朱紹侯 (1990) 3-8. 
44 Lei Haizong (2001) 32. 
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northern steppe. Later this binary worldview became even more entrenched. 
The distinction between the two geographical concepts of nei内 (inner) and wai
外 (outer) became even more important than before, the nomadic barbarian 
peoples of the steppe, including the Xiongnu, now being regarded as the “other 
people” who did not belong to the world of the huaxia.  
          As noted in Chapter Two, some of these ideas seem to have taken shape 
before the foundation of the empire. Some states, in particular Qi and Zhao, 
had begun to build parts of the Great Wall to mark themselves from the 
nomads.45 After Meng Tian’s successful attack on the barbarian tribes living 
beyond the northern frontier of the newly created empire, a new section of the 
Great Wall was constructed north of the Yellow River.46 The importance of the 
construction of the Great Wall in Chinese history cannot be overstated, as O. 
Lattimore recognized in his classic work Inner Asian Frontiers of China.47 During 
the next two millennia interactions between the Chinese agrarian world within 
the Wall and the nomadic world beyond the Great Wall played an important 
part in Chinese history.48 
          In what follows, I shall focus on the roles that the Qin and early Han 
emperors were expected to play after the process of unification had been 
completed and the new conception of a non-barbarian tianxia had been 
established.  
          I have already referred to the fact that the First Emperor tried to prevent 
potential rebellions by ordering all the weapons in the old six states to be 
collected and melted down. Furthermore, the Qin government tried to promote 
cultural unity on an intellectual level by burning the canonical scriptures (fen-shu
焚書) and by burying six hundred Masters and Confucians alive (keng-ru 坑
儒 ). 49  Harsh laws were promulgated to prevent revolts. From the stele 
                                                          
45 It should be noted that the construction of  the Great Walls in some states on the 
northern borders in the mid-late Warring States period was not always motivated by 
defensive considerations. Drawing attention to the Great Wall of  Zhao, Baiyin Chagan 
argues that the principal purpose of  the construction of  the Great Wall along the Yin 
mountain range on the Zhao border during the reign of  King Wuling was an attempt to 
expand the amount of  arable land controlled by Zhao. See Baiyin Chagan (2000) 81-86. 
46 See Chapter 4. 
47 Lattimore (1951) esp. 13-27. 
48 For a critical assessment of  the view that the Great Wall marked the boundary line 
between the nomadic world and the agrarian Chinese world, see Di Cosmo (2004) 127-
160. For the functions of  the Great Wall in early imperial China, see Chapter 4. 
49 Qin Shi Huang’s real attitude to the Confucians is a matter a dispute. Some scholars 
pointed out that those who were buried alive by Qin Shi Huang were not Confucian 
179 
 
inscriptions it appears that the emperor also made a series of inspection tours, 
at least partly for the purpose of strengthening the relationship between himself 
and the millions of commoners inhabiting the tianxia.  
          Although the Qin and early Han emperors took various measures to 
prevent future rebellions, they showed little interest in expanding the territory 
of the empire into the so-called haiwai, “the outside world”.50 As a general rule, 
as far as their relationship with the army was concerned, these emperors 
followed the Pre-Imperial tradition of avoiding personal involvement in military 
affairs and appointed professional generals to carry out campaigns and fight 
battles. Of all the emperors of the Western Han dynasty only Emperor Gao, 
the founder of the Han empire, actually commanded an army against the 
Xiongnu during the military campaign of 200 BC. As we have seen, this military 
adventure ended in a total disaster. Licking its wounds, the Han government 
now adopted a more defensive frontier policy and, until the end of the Western 
Han dynasty, not a single military campaign was led by the emperor in person, 
even after Emperor Wu (r. 141-87 BC) had embarked on a more aggressive 
military policy.51  
In stark contrast to the rulers of the Roman empire, who took pride in 
being addressed as imperator, the emperors of the Qin and Han periods never 
assumed any title referring to a military role.52 The reason for this is quite 
simply that the Chinese emperor was not expected to lead his soldiers to or on 
the battlefield. In fact, any attempt to persuade the ruler to become involved in 
war was seen as highly problematic and dangerous. When Emperor Gao was 
troubled by the advice of his statesman about Lu Jia, who was in the habit of 
arguing that the tianxia could be conquered only from horseback rather than by 
studying the Classics, the latter warned the emperor that, even if the tianxia 
were to be taken by weapons, it could not be ruled in the same way.53 His 
advice was praised by the emperor. 
                                                                                                                                        
scholars but Magic Masters. See Zhou Fang (2013); Pines (2013) 232-233.   
50 For a detailed discussion the frontier policies of  the Qin and early Han emperors, see 
Chapter 4. 
51 For a more detailed discussion of  frontier policies and the relationship between the 
Han empire and the Xiongnu, see Chapter 4.   
52  So far none of  the generals of  Shi Huangdi’s famous terracotta army has been 
identified as the First Emperor. See Falkenhausen, Thote, Pines et al. (2008); Pines 
(2013) 2.  
53 Emperor Gao took pride in the fact that, as a commoner, he conquered the world by 
“wielding a short sword”. See Shiji 8, 391. 
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Another example is presented by the execution of Chao Cuo 晁錯 (200-
154 BC). It is said that an important reason for having him killed was that he 
had tried to persuade Emperor Jing 景帝 (157-141 BC) to quell the rebellions 
of the seven kingdoms in 154 BC by commanding the imperial army in 
person.54       
          In the early Western Han era, two fundamental factors reinforced this 
anti-militaristic ideology. The first of these, as argued in detail in Chapter Four, 
was that the rise of the powerful Xiongnu confederacy on the steppe in the last 
decade of the third century, an event which happened to coincide with the 
creation of the Han empire in the south, impeded expansion to the north. The 
defeat of the army led by Emperor Gao in 200 BC prompted the Han 
government to implement an appeasement policy devised to maintain peace 
and stability in the frontier zone. The second of these factors was that the early 
Han rulers seem to have felt that the economy and society of their recently 
created empire needed to recover after the devastations and atrocities of the 
civil war. This suggestion does go some way towards explaining the popularity, 
in early Han times, of the Huang Lao doctrine, according to which the emperor 
should interfere as little as possible in public affairs. 55  For example, when 
Minister Cao San 曹参 displaced Chancellor Xiao He 萧何 and took charge of 
state affairs, the emperor expressed his discontent about Cao San’s inactivity in 
administrative issues, suspecting this negligence could be attributed to his own 
apathy towards public affairs. Cao San countered this criticism by claiming that 
it was the primary task of the monarch and his Chancellor not to neglect their 
duties rather than to take the initiative.56  
          As Confucianism gradually gained prominence, the emperors’ moral and 
civic virtues were paid an increasing amount of attention. It is true that the 
military successes of Emperor Wu elicited a certain amount of praise when his 
                                                          
54 Shiji 101, 2747. This was not in fact the most fundamental reason for the execution 
of  Chao Cuo. But, in the eyes of  Chao Cuo’s antagonists at court, his attempt to 
persuade the emperor to go the battle presented the best pretext for demanding his 
death. Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037-1101), a famous poet and politician in the Song dynasty, who 
wrote an essay entitled “On Chao Cuo” (Chao Cuo Lun 晁錯論), rightly pointed this 
out. See Su Shi Wenji, Vol. 4, 107-108. 
55 van Ess (2007) 246. 
56 See Shiji 54, 2029-2030. Cao San’s reply does not give an accurate picture of  Han 
administration since, as the right-hand man of  the emperor, in the early Han period the 
chancellor was expected to supervise many public affairs. Nevertheless, the story 
illustrates that the Huang-Lao doctrine was a real force in early Han politics. 
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aggressive militaristic policy towards the Xiongnu brought spectacular successes. 
However, in this context it should be noted that when he ascended the throne, 
the emperor was actually called Liu Che. It was only after his death that he was 
“canonized” as Emperor “Wu” 武 (martial), evidently because of this martial 
feats. This assumption raises a problem since because Liu Che’s aggressive 
military policies were criticized both during the final years of his reign and after 
his death, it is by no means obvious that the title “Wu” should be interpreted as 
a reflection of a widely shared positive appreciation of his military feats and 
territorial expansion. In fact, according to the sources, widespread disapproval 
of Liu Che’s policies prompted the Han statesmen to debate whether or not he 
should be granted any posthumous title at all.57 When the title was eventually 
bestowed, it might have been intended as descriptive rather than as 
unambiguously positive and honorary. 
          Whatever the case might be, it should not be overlooked that, even 
though Emperor Wu is regarded as one of the most bellicose monarchs in 
Chinese history, he never actually gained any experience in commanding the 
army during his long reign. The only military activity over which this emperor is 
reported to have presided was a triumphal ritual organized to celebrate the 
victory which his generals had won over the Xiongnu in 111 BC.58 
          In a nutshell, it is a truism that warfare played an important part in 
shaping Chinese worldviews. As a result of the power of the Xiongnu nomads 
living on the periphery of the newly founded Chinese world, initially Chinese 
rulers did not find themselves in a position from which they could try to 
establish hegemonic power over the entire far eastern world. Emperor Wu (or 
his generals) managed to eliminate the Xiongnu threat and conquered many 
new territories, but his principal aim appears to have been making his empire 
safe from external attack. The traditional attitudes to warfare and the loose 
relationship which existed between Chinese rulers and their armies acted as 
disincentives for pursuing continuous territorial expansion. Unlike their Roman 
counterparts, the emperors of the Qin and Han dynasties appear to have had 
little interest in pursuing universal domination over foreign lands and people by 
military means. This striking difference raises the question of exactly how the 
idea of “empire” was conceptualized by Chinese intellectuals.  
 
 
                                                          
57  Loewe (2006) 346. 
58 Loewe (2009) trans. Wang Hao 王浩, 148.  
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5. The emperor as a moral sage 
 
5.1. The de of Qin 秦德 
 
Various Han sources attribute the rapid demise of Qin to its deficiency in de德, 
“virtue”, or “morality”. Jia Yi, a statesman living in the early Western Han 
period, wrote a famous and thought-provoking essay entitled Guo Qin lu過秦
論 (On the Faults of Qin) in which he adopted precisely this position towards 
Emperor Qin Shi Huang and his son, Qin Ershi 秦二世.59 As a Confucian 
thinker, Jia Yi produced good reasons to explain the failure of Qin in terms of a 
failure to observe the code of conduct (li) and righteousness (yi), both of which 
were paramount principles in Confucian morality.60 The First Emperor and his 
ill-fated empire were held up as a warning to Han rulers so that they should 
avoid the faults of Qin. Those writers who tried to convey this message painted 
a picture of Qin Shi Huang and Qin Ershi which stands in total contrast to the 
idealized images of the ruler delineated in Confucian ethics.61 In the light of the 
                                                          
59 The entire essay can be found in the biography of  Shi Huangdi by Sima Qian. See 
Shiji 6, 276-84. This essay can also be found in Jia Yi’s politico-ethical treatise, The New 
Books (Xinshu新書).  For the study of  Jia Yi’s Xinshu, see Charles Sanft’s unpublished 
PhD dissertation (University of  Münster, 2005).  
60 Xinshu, baofu保傅, 183-185. In contrast to the long-standing dynasties of  Shang and 
Zhou, Jia Yi sees extremely cruel punishments untempered by any moral cultivation as 
an important reason for the speedy downfall of  the Qin. On li in Jia Yi’s writings, see 
Chen Suzhen (2011) 145-148. 
61 In the Chinese political landscape, which was dominated by Confucian thought from 
the early Eastern Han period to the late Qing period, views on the First Emperor have 
been constantly reshaped by Chinese rulers to serve specific political purposes. Since 
roughly the early decades of  the 20th century, with the escalation of  the anti-Confucian 
campaigns in Chinese society, a number of  liberal intellectuals, such as Zhang Binglin
章炳麟  (1869-1936), Lu Xun 魯迅  (1881-1936) and Hu Shi (1891-1962) 胡適 , 
challenged the stereotypical views of  Qin Shi Huang which had long dominated the 
Chinese ideological realm. They arrived at a re-evaluation of  the role played by Qin Shi 
Huang in Chinese history, promoting the Legalism of  Qin as an alternative system to 
Confucianism (ru 儒 ). Mao Zedong 毛澤東 (1893-1976) publicly expressed his 
admiration of  Qin Shi Huang’s accomplishments, leading Chinese historians to present 
a far more positive image of  the first emperor in Chinese history. Nevertheless, this is 
not the place for an in-depth examination of  the ways in which views about the First 
Emperor have evolved during the past two millennia. Recent discussions of  this topic 
include Kern (2001), 155-163; Pines (2013) 227-238; and van Ess (2013), 239-257. 
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existence of this hostile tradition, it is by no means easy to establish how the 
First Emperor of China perceived his roles and duties, but it is important at 
least try to achieve a better understanding of these perceptions, if only because 
they are highly relevant to any attempt to elucidate the nature of the Chinese 
empire in its early stages.   
          One of the key terms which still remains to be examined is the 
appellation “emperor” (huang-di 皇帝), a new title coined by Qin Shi Huang 
himself to broadcast his achievements after heeding the proposals of 
Chancellor Wang Wan 王綰, Imperial Secretary Feng Jie 馮劫 and Li Si. The 
passage from Sima Qian’s Annals of Qin Shi Huang referring to the creation of 
this new title runs as follows: 
 
In days of old, the territory of the Five Emperors was 1,000 square li, and beyond 
this was the territory of the feudal princes and of the barbarians. Some of the feudal 
princes came to court and some did not, for the Son of Heaven was unable to exercise 
control [over them]. Now Your Majesty has raised a righteous army to punish the 
oppressors and bring peace and order to all under Heaven, so that everywhere within 
the seas has become our provinces and districts and, as a result, the laws and 
ordinances have been unified. This is something which has never ever existed, which 
the Five Emperors did not attain in remote antiquity or thereafter. Your servants 
have carefully discussed this with the scholars of broad learning and, as in antiquity 
there was the Heavenly August, the Earthly August, and the Supreme August, and 
the Supreme August was the most highly honored, so your servants, risking death, 
submit a venerable title, and propose that the King should become “the Supreme 
August”. His commands should be “edicts”, his orders should be “decrees”, and the 
Son of Heaven should refer to himself as “the mysterious one”.’ The King said: ‘Omit 
the word “supreme” and write “august” and pick out the title of “thearch” used from 








Sima Qian asserts that the victorious king of Qin was fully aware of the fact 
that his achievements surpassed those of the three most honourable Augusts 
                                                          
62 This passage is translated by Dawson. See Dawson (2007) 62. 
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and the Five Thearchs of remote antiquity. He adopted the character huang皇 
(August) to advertise that his grand enterprise was on a par with that of the 
sages of the past.63 The title di帝 (Thearch) had been used to address monarchs 
for many centuries. The king of Qin combined these two characters to form a 
title which broadcast the fact that his feats surpassed those of all earlier rulers. 
Shrewdly he established an ideological connection with remote antiquity to 
increase the legitimacy of his position as emperor. 
          Writers of the Western Han period attributed the rapid collapse of the 
Qin to the introduction of cruel laws, abuse of manpower, the heavy burden of 
public works and high levels of taxation. Ultimately, the Qin rulers themselves 
were held responsible for the demise of their dynasty. Qin Shi Huang and Ershi 
were accused of having neglected moral cultivation and of having relied too 
much on coercion through punishment.  
          From the mid-Warring States period to the late Western Han period, 
Legalism 法 and Confucianism 儒 offered two radically different approaches to 
administration and politics. After the triumph of Confucianism in the first 
century AD, the moral and civilizing transformation of the tianxia became a 
central theme in treatises dealing with imperial rule. The Qin rulers were heavily 
influenced by Legalism, but also incorporated moralizing conceptions of 
imperial power in the ethos of their reigns. In the stele inscriptions of Qin Shi 
Huang, for example, the term de 德, “morality”, appears nine times.64 This has 
led Martin Kern to call attention to the links between Qin culture and the 
rituals of the Zhou period.65 By comparing the texts of the Qin bamboo strips 
excavated at Shui-hu-di 睡虎地  (in present-day Yunmeng 雲夢 , Hubei 
Province) to the stele inscriptions, scholars like Kanaya Osamu 金谷治, Bodde 
and Kern have demonstrated that, as far as social and moral concepts are 
concerned, no clear-cut dividing line existed between Confucianism and 
                                                          
63 According to Shuowen Jiezi 說文解字 (Explanation of  Characters), huang 皇 means 
“greatness 大”. The Shuowen explains that the character was used to refer to the 
earliest kings who ruled the tianxia. See Xu Shen, Shuowen jiezi zhu 2,185, com. Duan 
Yucai 段玉裁. 
64 See Chapter 2. In interpreting the sources referring to the Qin emperors, it should be 
borne in mind that all the writings of  classical literature were only collected and 
compiled many centuries after they were written. The Stele Inscriptions of  Qin Shi 
Huang and some other contemporary sources offer a contemporary window on the 
self-presentation of  the First Emperor. 
65 Kern (1999) 19, note 26.  
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Legalism. Instead, the same social and cultural values “seem to have succeeded 
remarkably well in coexisting with Legalism during the First Emperor’s reign.”66 
          The upshot has to be that the existence of what was known as the 
Hundred Schools of Thoughts in the mid-late Warring States period does not imply 
the existence of radically different and contesting views about the duties of 
rulers.67 In the stele inscriptions of Shi Huangdi, restoring peace, order and 
harmonious social standards are presented as essential prerequisites for the 
creation of a stable and prosperous society governed by laws and regulations. In 
short, the emphasis on legal principles does not necessarily mean that moral 
ethics played no part in the Qin conception of imperial administration and that, 
consequently, the emphasis on the ruler’s moral cultivation cannot be regarded 
as an exclusively Confucian theme.68 
 
5.2. The emperor as a source of moral transformation in the Western Han 
period 
 
Confucian officials of the early Han period such as Lu Jia paid ample attention 
to the ruler’s moral self-cultivation. Lu Jia’s main contribution was the 
formulation of a moral-cosmic philosophical doctrine which combined 
Confucian moral doctrine with cosmological theories.69 Lu Jia claimed that the 
legendary kings of remote antiquity had been sages who possessed superb 
moral and intellectual qualities. Later Chinese rulers were believed to have 
applied the classical writings which had been transmitted from this legendary 
period in their government of the state and the people. Confucius was assigned 
a key role because he had classified and collated various kinds of classical 
writings, among them the Book of Poetry 詩, the Book of Documents 書, the 
Book of Music 樂 and the Book of Rituals 禮.70 Lu Jia believed that any ruler 
                                                          
66 Bodde (1990) 75-76; Kern (2000) 165. The compilation of  the Lüshi Chunqiu呂氏春
秋, the encyclopaedic compendium compiled under the patronage of  Lü Buwei 呂不韋 
(291-235 BC), Chancellor of  the Qin state, might be seen as a sign that various 
prominent philosophical ideas which had developed since the late Spring and Autumn 
and early Warring States period were beginning to converge. 
67 Kern (2000) 165-166. 
68 Lu Xiufen (2006).  
69 On Lu Jia’s politico-philosophical principles, see Wang Aihe (2000) 145-47. 
70 Confucius presented himself  as a transmitter rather than as an original thinker. For 
example, see Lunyu 7,1: The Master said, A transmitter and not a maker, believing in and loving 
the ancients, I venture to compare myself  with our old Peng. 
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who did not adhere to the ethical values laid down by Confucius and his 
disciples displayed an insufficient knowledge of Heaven. As did Jia Yi, whose 
ideas have already been discussed, Lu Jia attributed the failure of Qin to the 
moral deficiencies of its rulers. As already noted, Lu warned Emperor Gao that, 
if he wanted to avoid the fate of Qin, he should follow the path of morality in 
order to maintain the sovereignty.71 Given the fact that the early Han court was 
heavily influenced by the Huang-Lao school of thought, particularly under the 
patronage of Empress Dowager Dou 竇太后, the influence of Lu Jia’s theory 
on the practical politics in this period can hardly be overestimated.72  
          The influence of Lu Jia’s theory can also be seen in the writings of such 
later thinkers, as Dong Zhongshu’s 董仲舒, who developed the innovative 
theory of “the Resonance between Human and Heaven” (tianren ganying天人感
應).73 Influenced by Lu Jia’s moral-cosmic theory, Dong Zhongshu stressed the 
importance of the emperor’s moral duty in connecting Heaven and mankind. 
Dong believed that all portents which can be observed in the temporal world 
are to be interpreted as revelations made to mankind by Heaven. Auspicious 
portents signified that Heaven was content with the way the temporal monarch 
ruled by exercising his superb moral qualities, whereas bad omens were meant 
to alert the emperor to the fact that his rule was not entirely based on the 
principle of moral transformation. According to this theory, the principal duty 
of the ruler was to act as an intermediary between men and Heaven rather than 
as a lawgiver, a bureaucratic administrator or an effective general. 74 This aim 
                                                          
71 In the first part of  this chapter, I have mentioned the dialogue between Emperor 
Gao and Lu about the best way to rule the tianxia. In the Xinyu, the author not only 
emphasizes the importance to monarchs of  the self-cultivation of  morality, but also 
advocates that crown princes should receive a moral education from childhood. This 
required the employment of  sagacious teachers capable of  assisting the young masters 
to govern their behaviour and cultivate their virtues. 
72 For the Huang Lao school of  thought and its relation to the early Han politics, see 
the PhD dissertation of  Csikszentmihalyi (1994) esp. 7-58. M. Loewe has pointed out 
that, in the early years of  the Western Han, ‘the references in official writings to the 
character, thoughts and actions of  Confucius, or to the values of  his sayings, are rare, 
one might almost say extremely rare.’ See Loewe (2012) 7-8.  
73  Dong’s philosophical thoughts and political beliefs have been treated in many 
monographs and essays. See Loewe’s latest monograph: Dong Zhongshu: The Confucian 
Heritage and the Chunqiu Fanlu, 2011.  
74 Di Cosmo claims that one of  the roles of  the Chinese emperor was that of  supreme 
lawgiver. See Di Cosmo (2004) 218. It has been said of  the Chinese emperor that “his 
will —or whim —could override any existing regulations or immunities”, see Hulsewé 
(1986) 529. Pertinently the emperor’s role as a lawmaker or lawgiver is not highlighted 
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was achievable if the emperor ruled the world by observing Confucian moral 
values. In short, the emperor should emulate the behaviour of the wise kings of 
the past and set his people a moral example. Only in this way could Heavenly 
favour be procured and the legitimacy of imperial authority be put on a firm 
footing.75  
          The promotion of Confucian moral principles by Dong Zhongshu and 
other Confucian scholars was supported by Emperor Wu. In 136 BC the latter 
ordered the creation of the position of the Erudite (Boshi 博士) to supervise the 
teaching of the Five Classics (Wujing Boshi五經博士) and in 124 BC he opened 
the Academy (Taixue, 太學) in the capital Chang’an.76 However, Jia Yi’s exile 
from the imperial court and Dong Zhongshu’s failure to gain admittance to the 
emperor’s inner circle of advisors are evidence that the Confucian scholar-
officials had not yet completely prevailed over other schools of thought. In the 
Shiji Sima Qian obliquely criticizes the emperor’s obsession with witchcraft and 
magical powers.77 As far as Confucians were concerned, the pursuit of such 
things was incompatible with traditional values.  
During the final years of Emperor Wu’s reign, his flamboyant personality 
and his huge ambitions in both domestic and foreign policy began to draw 
critical comments from Confucian officials. As was the First Emperor, he was 
criticized for being obsessed with visiting localities associated with various 
divine beings and spirits, for being unable to control his appetite for foreign 
exotics and for trying to obtain elixirs which would make him immortal.78 On a 
more pragmatic level, in order to finance the costly wars against the Xiongnu 
and other barbarian peoples, the emperor carried out a series of unpopular 
economic reforms, which included the creation of a state monopoly on the 
                                                                                                                                        
in classical literature. In my view, the main roles of  the Chinese emperor were that of  
upholder of  order and rituals in the everyday world, and that of  being a living moral 
example, setting the standard for the rest of  society. Cf. Gan Huaizhen (2008) 381-391. 
75 For the relationship between the emperor and Heaven, see the discussion below.  
76 For discussions of  the establishment of  the positions of  erudites to teach the Five 
Classics and of  the Academy, see Fukui Shigemasa 福井重雅 (1976); Yang Hongnian
楊鴻年 (1985) 191-222.  
77 Sima Qian credited Ji An 汲黯, an administrator and Huang-Lao adherent in the 
reign of  Emperor Wu, with criticizing the emperor’s “extravagance behind the façade 
of  benevolence and righteousness”. See Shiji 120, 3105; Hanshu 60, 2317. 
78 Puett (2011), 175; Nylan (2008), 49-50. Both Shi Huangdi and Wu were also criticized 
for their self-absorption and self-aggrandizement. 
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production of iron and salt.79 The task of implementing these reforms was 
entrusted to a group of cruel officials (kuli 酷吏 ). 80  These policies and 
concomitant measures explain why the regime of Emperor Wu has been 
summed up as “Confucianism outside but Legalism inside”. (wai Ru nei Fa外儒
內法).81 
          Between Emperor Wu’s death and the mid-first century BC, Han rulers 
began to place even more emphasis on Confucian values. Towards the end of 
Emperor Xuan’s reign, a conference was organized in order to establish the 
value which should be attached to certain exegetical texts, particularly to those 
of the two commentaries on Confucius’ Chunqiu 春秋 (The Spring and Autumn 
Annals), namely Gongyang zhuan 公羊傳 (Gongyang’s Commentary) and Guliang 
zhuan穀粱傳 (Guliang’s Commentary).82 As Loewe has pointed out, this event 
can be seen “as the first step towards the formation of a uniformly acceptable 
set of Confucian ideas.”83 Emperor Yuan 元帝 (r. 49-33 BC) seems to have 
been the first emperor since Emperor Gao to have received a thorough 
classical education. He systemically studied such Confucian canons as the Book 
of Poetry詩, the Book of Documents 書 and the Analects 論語, and in doing 
so contributed to the growing status of Confucianism. As already established, 
Confucian thought highlighted the virtues and merits of the wise rulers of the 
early Zhou period and saw self-cultivation and the fulfilment of moral 
obligations in accordance with the Confucian tenets as the ruler’s primary 
duties.  
          A key figure in promoting the image of the Western Zhou period as a 
“Golden Age” was the usurper Wang Mang 王莽  (45 BC-AD 23), who 
launched a series of reforms under the mantle of Zhou traditions during his 
short reign (AD 9-23).84 His self-presentation as ruler was based on the idea 
that a worthy ruler should display the same superb virtues as the ancient sages, 
                                                          
79 Nylan (2008), 49-50. 
80 In the works of  both Sima Qian and Ban Gu, the stories about a number of  cruel 
officials can be found.  
81 Loewe (1986) 154. 
82 Loewe (2012) 25. 
83 Loewe (2012) 26. 
84 There has been plenty of  research on Wang Mang’s reforms behind the façade of  
ancient Zhou institutions and his short-lived reign, and hence it does not require 
further discussion here. For example, see Goodrich (1957) 114-118. About Wang Mang 
and the pseudo text of  the Rituals of  Zhou, see Puett (2010).  
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an aim which could be achieved by adhering to the moral guidelines outlined in 
the classical canons.85 Wang Mang’s dream of a renaissance of the Zhou age 
was clearly inspired by Confucius’ over-idealized depiction of the Western 
Zhou system. Wang associated himself with the Duke of Zhou who was 
thought to have instituted the Zhou ritual system and afterwards reinforced the 
legitimacy of his rule by linking the present to the past. Unlike Qin Shi Huang, 
Wang refused to identify himself as the creator of a new era. Wang’s attempt to 
return to the institutions and rituals of Zhou failed, but his policies did 
stimulate the development of Confucianism during the early Eastern Han 
dynasty.  
          After Wang Mang’s political experiment had failed, his nostalgia for ritual 
and institutions of the Western Zhou meant that they were tainted, but this did 
not result in a dismissal of Confucian values. On the contrary, in the early 
Eastern Han period Confucian officials continued to occupy key positions at 
the imperial court and in local administration, exerting a profound influence on 
emperors.86 Precisely because Confucianism remained important, an attempt 
was made to end the disputes which had arisen between different branches of 
Confucian thought and to establish a unitary version of the most important 
classical texts. In 79, during the reign of Emperor Zhang 章帝 (r. 75-88), a 
court conference was convened in the White Tiger Hall (Baihu Tang 白虎堂) 
for this purpose. In accordance with a proposal made by the senior official 
Chunyu Gong 淳于恭, the historian Ban Gu compiled a book entitled Baihu 
Tong 白虎通 , based on the discussions which had been held during the 
conference. 
          One of the conclusions which emerges from the foregoing discussion is 
that the time span between the mid-Western and early Eastern Han periods was 
a key period in the standardization of the Confucian classics.87 Simultaneously, 
Confucianism became the mainstream school of thought, a position which it 
would keep for almost 2,000 years. According to the standardized Confucian 
tenets, in their late-Western Han shape, the most important obligation that the 
                                                          
85 Nylan (2008) 39-64. 
86 Loewe (2012) 27-30.  
87 The course of  the canonization of  the Confucian Classics since the first century AD 
has been marked by very complicated debates among Chinese scholars, focusing on the 
Old Text and the New Text of  the classical scriptures, which lasted for over two 




emperor had to fulfill was to study and emulate the acts of the sages of remote 
antiquity. Despite the spectacular failure of Wang Mang’s reforms, the idea that 
the ruler should govern his behaviour by studying the lessons of the superb 
moral sages, which could be consulted in a set of authorized texts, had found 
general acceptance by the end of the first century AD. As a result of this 
development, such Confucian virtues as li 禮 (ritual behaviour) and xiao 孝 
(filial piety) increasingly gained ground as the principles of behaviour to which 
any gentleman (junzi 君子) was supposed to adhere.  
However, if moral excellence was the most important defining 
characteristic of rulers, how could the principle of dynastic succession be 
justified? The principle of hereditary succession to power had been followed 
since the first three Chinese dynasties, Xia, Shang and Zhou. When Qin Shi 
Huang established the unified empire, he did not abolish this system but 
strengthened it by proclaiming that the empire would be ruled by his 
descendants for 10,000 generations.88 Likewise, succession to power during the 
Western Han period was based on the principle that control over the tianxia 
was to be transmitted through Liu Bang’s lineage.89 It stands to reason that 
under this system, not all occupants of the imperial throne would be on a par 
with the legendary wise kings of remote antiquity.  
The next section reveals how this thorny issue stimulated some educated 
men to look for other ways of legitimizing imperial rule. One of their solutions 
was to develop the theory that the legitimacy of the emperor’s rule derived not 
only from his superior moral qualities, but also from the fact that he ruled by 
virtue of a Mandate given by Heaven.   
 
6. The image of emperor as Son of Heaven  
 
It should be noted that the term tianzi 天子  (Son of Heaven) was not an 
innovation when the Qin empire was founded in 221 BC. However, to explore 
                                                          
88 Shiji 6, 254.  
89 The Hansu reports that, after he founded the Han dynasty, Emperor Gao sacrificed a 
white horse and swore an oath that, with the exception of  Liu’s lineage, whomsoever 
made himself  king would incur the hostility of  the whole empire. See Hanshu 40, 2047. 
After the death of  Liu Bang, the Empress Dowager Lü seized power. Her elevation as a 
consort from outside the clan of  Liu ultimately provoked conflicts between the ruling 
clan and Lü’s family. With the assistance of  honorary senior officials in Liu Bang’s time, 
the influence of  Lü’s family in the end was removed and the position of  the ruling clan 
was solidified with the accession of  Emperor Wen. 
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the origins of tianzi in Chinese political terminology is not an easy undertaking, 
given the many uncertainties surrounding the transmission of the literary 
sources between the early Western Zhou and late Warring States periods.90 
Nevertheless, since it is known that Heaven was thought of as the highest deity 
as early as the Western Zhou period, it is not surprising to find that the ruler of 
Zhou was called tianzi, a term which appears widely in inscriptions of the 
Western Zhou period after ca 1000 BC.91 In the Spring and Autumn and early 
Warring States periods, as the power of the Zhou kings declined and the 
elaborate system of Zhou rituals and sacrifices gradually disintegrated, Heaven 
fell out of favour as the supreme deity in the religious and political landscape.92 
However, after the Qin had annihilated the six major states and transformed 
the tianxia into a single unified community, the king of Qin, Ying Zheng, 
adopted a series of brand new names to advertise his accomplishments. As 
mentioned earlier, Qin Shi Huang dispensed with the title of “king” and chose 
a new title, August Thearch. Nevertheless the title tianzi was maintained. This 
could be an indication that, as the legitimate successor of the Western Zhou 
rulers, Qin Shi Huang claimed divine support for his rule and aspired to rule 
the new empire on the basis of the Mandate of Heaven.93  
                                                          
90 About the title tianzi, see Yuri Pines (2008) note 7, 69. From the very beginning of  
their dynasty, the Zhou kings claimed that they acted in the name of  Heaven, see e.g., 
the He zun, cast in 1036 BC, at the very beginning of  Zhou rule (discussed by 
Shaughnessy 1997, 77-78). The title “Son of  Heaven” was coined later but, by the 
middle of  the Western Zhou period, it was already firmly associated with the kings 
(Takeuchi 1999). Throughout Zhou history this title remained restricted to the Zhou 
monarchs. Cf. Eno (2009) 101. 
91 See Takeuchi Yasuhiro 竹内康浩 (2009) 101. As time went by, after around the 
reigns of  King Zhao 昭 (d. 977 BC) and King Mu 穆 (?d. 922 BC), Tianzi appears 
frequently in bronze inscriptions. As Kern notes, “in the corpus of  the Jinwen yinde, 
the royal appellation ‘Son of  Heaven’ appears 13 times (in a total of  just eight 
inscriptions) in the early period, 61 times in the middle period, and 84 times in the late 
period.” See Kern (2009) 148. 
92 Zhu Weizheng 朱維錚 (2008) 331. 
93 Here I do not agree with Pines who argues that “the First Emperor’s position vis-à-
vis the divine powers was not of  subservience but at the very least of  equality, if  not 
superiority.” See Pines (2013) 269. Pines thinks that Qin Shi Huang, unlike “all known 
rulers of  China”, saw himself  as a Messianic monarch. But, as I shall argue below, the 
rites of  the feng and shan conducted on Mount Tai were a ritual to seek to cosmic 
sanction from the highest divinity, though as to details, the First Emperor could not be 
quite sure whether or not Heaven was the supreme deity. I agree with Pines’ argument 
when he takes pains to stress the unique and distinct character of  the new empire and 
the idiosyncratic personality of  the First Emperor. But the inscriptions and transmitted 
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It is notable that the tours of inspection on which Qin Shi Huang’s 
embarked between 219 and 210 BC were invariably associated with a series of 
religious practices, of which the most famous and significant one was the 
sacrificial performance of feng 封 and shan禪 on Mount Tai.94 These sacrifices 
suggest that, while the new ruler was trying to promulgate his image as the 
supreme monarch of the tianxia, he was also intent on affirming the existence 
of a relationship with Heaven by performing sacrifices on sacred mountains. 
This would also explain why Sima Qian pays so much attention to the 
Emperor’s cultic activities.  
Qin Shi Huang was not the first Chinese monarch to ascend sacred 
mountains to perform such sacrifices. Chinese historiography relates that the 
Yellow Emperor (Huangdi 黃帝), who reigned in the mythical age of remote 
antiquity, was the first sage-ruler who managed to perform the feng and shan 
sacrifices on a sacred mountain, after which he was empowered to ascend to 
Heaven and became an immortal.95 The feng-shan ceremonies practised by Qin 
Shi Huang and Emperor Wu were most likely intended to emulate the model of 
the Yellow Emperor in efforts to obtain eternal life. Perhaps this is why 
magicians, who were called Technical Masters (fangshi方士) in ancient sources, 
constantly tried to persuade the First Emperor (and Emperor Wu) to conduct 
these feng-shan ceremonies on sacred Mount Tai. According to the Shiji, the 
stories told by these masters prompted Qin Shi Huang to send a magician 
named Xu Shi徐市 accompanied by twenty youths and maidens to the three 
divine islands, Yingzhou 瀛洲 , Penglai 蓬萊  and Fangzhang 方丈  in the 
Eastern Sea to establish contact with the immortals and to obtain the elixir of 
immortality.96  The feng and shan rites performed on Mount Tai might have 
served the same purpose.97 
                                                                                                                                        
sources do not offer any solid evidence from which to draw the conclusion that Qin Shi 
Huang identified himself  as the equal counterpart to the highest deity. For Pines’ article, 
see Pines (2013) 258-279. 
94 The feng and shan cult is said to have been recorded in an essay in the Guanzi, an 
encyclopaedic treatise named after Guan Zhong composed in the seventh century BC. 
Unfortunately the essay has been lost. Sima Qian attributed one book in his magnum 
opus to the rites of  feng and shan. See Shiji 28, 1355-1404. 
95 Shiji 12, 468. 
96 Shiji 28, 1369-1370 
97 Lewis (1999) 55-56. Lewis outlines various certain features in relation to the aspects 
of  the feng and shan rites. One of  them is that the mountain sacrifices in ancient China 
were linked to immortality. See ibid. 58-59. 
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Whereas this does remain a possibility, a closer look at Sima Qian’s 
record reveals that the search for immortality might not have been the only 
motive which led Qin Shi Huang and Emperor Wu of Han to perform these 
ceremonies. Sima Qian recounts that seventy Confucian scholars from the old 
states of Qi and Lu were summoned to meet the emperor at the foot of Mount 
Tai to discuss the way in which the feng and shan sacrifices had been performed 
in ancient times. When they failed to reach a consensus, the First Emperor 
became angry and dismissed them.98 Interestingly enough, a similar incident 
took place during the reign of Emperor Wu, when the latter ascended Mount 
Tai to perform the feng ceremony in 110 BC.99 Emperor Wu, like the First 
Emperor, was displeased by the inability of the scholars he had consulted to 
offer adequate explanations about the time-honoured rituals on the basis of the 
ancient texts, and dismissed them.100 
The fact that both these emperors asked Confucian scholars to offer 
interpretations of the ancient rituals demonstrates that the early Chinese 
emperors, from the time of Qin to mid-Western Han, oscillated between two 
cultic traditions. Importantly, the Masters of Techniques were able to persuade 
emperors to ascend Mount Tai to perform sacrifices to Heaven and to send 
men to the islands of the Eastern Sea to search for the elixir of immortality. 
The Confucian scholars likewise stressed the significance of the feng and shan 
rites, but they saw these in a very different light. In their view, the purpose of 
the feng-shan practices was to strengthen the nexus between the emperor and 
Heaven, the supreme deity in the imperial pantheon. The ascension of Mount 
Tai and the performance of the sacrifices to Heaven would reaffirm the 
Mandate of Heaven and the bestowal of Heaven’s favour.101 
          The status of Confucianism was raised after the accession of Emperor 
Wu in 141 BC, especially after the death of Empress Dowager Dou (d. 135 BC), 
who was a passionate adherent of the Huang-Lao doctrines. Unquestionably, 
the sources are explicit that Emperor Wu, as had the First Emperor, also 
devoted abundant energy to trying to establish contact with various gods, 
ghosts and immortal spirits in an attempt to attain personal immortality. 
Besides Heaven, Earth and the Five Emperors, the Great One (Taiyi 太一) 
                                                          
98 Shiji 28, 1367. 
99 For Emperor Wu’s feng and shan ceremonies, see the article of  by Lewis (1999). 
100 Shiji 28, 1399. 
101  Influenced by Confucian thought, Sima Qian expresses his antipathy to the 
Magicians’ propaganda for their cults of  immortality. See Lewis (1999) 70-71. 
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became a very popular deity at the time and was venerated highly by the Han 
Technical Masters.102 For example, Miu Ji 謬姬, a famous technical master, 
advised Emperor Wu to build altars for sacrificing to the Great One on the 
outskirts of Chang’an. When another altar was built at Ganquan 甘泉 , a 
religious centre situated some seventy kilometres to the northeast of Chang’an, 
upon the suggestion by Minister Gongsun Qing 公孫卿 in 130 BC, this centre 
became the principal site for the cult of the Great One.103  
During the time of Emperor Wu, the link between the temporal 
monarch and Heaven was strengthened as a result of the efforts of a number of 
Confucian literati who were interested in promoting Heaven. As mentioned 
above, one of them was Dong Zhongshu, who developed the theory of the 
Resonance between Heaven and Men. He and other Han literati said that the 
emperor played an intermediary role in linking the heavenly and temporal 
worlds. 104  He also thought that Heaven communicated with mankind by 
providing auspicious or inauspicious omens.105 
Yet it was not until the last decades of the first century BC, particularly 
the pivotal period of the reign of Wang Mang, that the sacrifice to Heaven 
became the most important cult act performed by the Chinese emperor.106 In 
AD 56, the founding Emperor of the Eastern Han dynasty, Guang-wu 光武 
(Liu Xiu 劉秀  r. 25-57) visited Mount Tai to perform the feng and shan 
                                                          
102 On the origins of  the Great One from the perspective of  archaeological studies, see 
Li Ling (2000) 207-239. For the cult of  the Great One in the Western Han, see Bujard 
(2009) 791-792. 
103 Originally Ganquan was a place at which sacrifices were made to the Five Emperors. 
When the Great One emerged as a popular deity in the mid-Western Han period, it 
became the main site for the cult of  the Five Emperors and the Great One. The altar 
used to make sacrifices to the Great One also began to be also used to sacrifice to the 
Five Emperors. See Bujard (2009) 789; Tseng (2011) 83. 
104 Only the emperor was deemed to be qualified to receive the signs directly from 
Heaven. This belief  might be the reason the emperor carried out the sacrifice on the 
summit of  the Mount Tai alone when he performed the feng ceremony for the second 
time.  
105 For omens and their significance and symbolic meanings during the Han period, see 
Tseng (2011) 92-132.  
106 In fact, the (failed) attempt made by Kuang Heng 匡衡 and Zhang Tan 張譚 to 
reform the Jiao (suburban altar) sacrifice 郊祀禮 in the reign of  Emperor Zhang (AD 
75-88) also shows that the educated elite of  the Han empire had begun to regard 
Heaven as the highest deity who bestowed the Mandate upon the ruler of  mankind. For 
the tentative reform of  Jiao advocated by Kuang Heng and Zhang Tan, see Gan 
Huaizhen (2005).  
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ceremonies. 107  A crucial difference between these sacrifices and those 
performed by Qin Shi Huang and Emperor Wu is that Emperor Guang-wu 
explicitly promulgated the idea of the Mandate of Heaven promoted by the 
Confucian literati. Following the ceremony on Mount Tai, he ordered a stele on 
which the texts received from Heaven were engraved to be set up.108 In the 
same year he sacrificed to Heaven on the outskirts of the Eastern Han capital 
of Luoyang 洛陽. Emperor Ming 明帝 (r. 57-75) began to sacrifice to Heaven 
in a new Bright Hall in 59.109 This innovation did not impede the use of the 
Bright Hall for also sacrificing to the Five Emperors of remote antiquity and to 
a number of deceased Han emperors. 110  This Hall played an increasingly 
important role in linking the emperor to Heaven. When he performed the 
sacrifices to Heaven in this building, the emperor accepted the sacred authority, 
bestowed on him by Heaven, to rule the empire and its people. The fact that 
the deceased ancestors and the immortal spirits were venerated in the same 
building signified that the dynastic rule of the imperial house was also 
sanctioned by Heaven. 
As Heaven became the supreme deity in the imperial pantheon, the 
worship of other immortal spirits, like the Great One, either faded away or was 
integrated into the Heaven sacrifices. Cogently, from the early first century AD, 
emperors only rarely travelled eastwards to Mount Tai to perform feng and shan 
ceremonies. Instead, Luoyang and its suburbs became the places in which 
emperors conducted ceremonies to sacrifice to Heaven, Earth and the 
ancestors. After Emperor Wu, the Han emperors no longer showed strong 
interest in climbing sacred mountains in remote areas in pursuit of immortality. 
Instead, the continuity of dynastic rule and the political power of individual 
emperors were both increasingly associated with the tianming天命, the Mandate 
or Destiny of Heaven.  
                                                          
107 For the details of  the ceremony, see the article by Xing Yitian (2011b) 177-201.  
108 Bujard (2009) 799.  
109 The First Bright Hall in Luoyang was built by Wang Mang in 4 BC, see Hanshu 25b. 
The origin of  the Bright Hall, which is said to have been in existence from the early 
Zhou period, remains unclear. See Csikszenmihalyi (1994) 2. 
110 Prior to the last decades of  the Western Han period, plenty of  funerary temples in 
which sacrifices were made to the deceased emperors and empresses, had been built 
throughout the empire. By the reign of  Emperor Yuan (r. 49-33 BC), however, many of  
these temples were being closed on the advice of  some literati. Only the temples of  a 
few emperors, like Emperor Gao, the founding emperor, Emperor Wen, Wu, Zhao and 
Xuan were allowed to stand. See Bujard (2009) 797; Loewe (1992), 302–340. 
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During the early and middle Western Han periods there had been “no 
implication that the term tianming refers to the appointment of a particular 
dynasty or person to rule over the mankind.”111 It was not until the late first 
century BC and early first century AD that such Confucian scholars as Liu Xin
劉歆 (46-23 BC) and Ban Biao 班彪 (3-54), the father of the historian Ban Gu, 
began to explore and develop the concept of Mandate of Heaven and the idea 
that the emperor occupied a pivotal position between Heaven and Earth. They 
developed the doctrine of the Triple Concordance 三統 which taught that 
Heaven, Man and Earth could only attain harmony if the emperor, under the 
Mandate of Heaven, were able to govern himself and to rule the people in 
accordance with the principles laid down by the Classics. In his famous essay 
On the Mandate of Kings (Wangming Lun 王命論), Ban Biao highlights the idea 
that the sovereignty of the Han dynasty, empowered by Heaven, could be 
traced back to the great sages of remote antiquity, among them Yao and 
Shun.112 The rapid downfall of the short-lived Xin dynasty founded by Wang 
Mang was interpreted as a sign that the legitimate power of Han, which had 
been granted by Heaven, could not successfully be broken by usurpers. From 
the early Eastern Han period, the ming命 (Mandate or destiny) of the ruler and 
the dynasty and the distinction between the emperor and ordinary mortals were 
both increasingly emphasized. In this same period, a body of writings known as 
the apocryphal texts 讖緯, a rich collection of omens and esoteric stories which 
had either been transmitted from the distant past or recently composed under 
the cloak of antiquity, assumed an important role.113 In short, from the late 
Western Han period, the transmission of the throne within the ruling house of 
Liu was cemented by the development of the theory of the Mandate of Heaven.  
 
By emphasizing the principle of legitimate succession within the Liu clan 
and by tracing the beginning of Liu’s line back all the way to the mythical age of 
Yao, the ideological problems created by the fact that some emperors failed to 
                                                          
111 Loewe (1994) 109. As seen above, the idea that the emperor ruled the state under 
the Mandate of  Heaven had been a political principle as long ago as the Western Zhou 
period. Emperor Gao’s achievement in reunifying the empire and Emperor Wen’s 
defeat of  the powerful relatives of  the Empress Dowager Lü was seen as owing much 
to the blessing of  Heaven. 
112 Wenxuan 52. On Ban Biao’s essay, see Loewe (1986) 735-737. 
113 For the study of  the apocryphal texts, see the seminal annotation of  the Japanese 
scholars Yasui Kōsan 安居香山 and Nakamura Shōhachi 中村璋八 (1994); see also Xu 
Xingwu (2003); Gentz (2009) 833. 
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possess the superb moral qualities stressed by Dong Zhongshu and some other 
literati were neatly circumvented. It seems reasonable to suppose that this was 
one of the reasons the Han rulers eventually took the step of abandoning the 
shamanistic ideology represented by the Technical Masters and recognizing the 
cosmological and moral political theory advocated by the Confucians. Viewed 
in this light, it not surprising that, even during the Eastern Han period, when 
most emperors were weak, sovereignty continued to rest with members of the 
House of Liu.114 Although the authority of some emperors was challenged, the 
fundamental principle that the supreme power could only be transmitted within 
that House survived intact until the founding of the Jin 晉 dynasty in the late 
third century. 
 
7. Rome and China compared 
 
One of the conclusions which emerges from the foregoing discussion is that, 
during the Qin and Han periods at least, Chinese attitudes to warfare differed 
profoundly from those prevailing in Early-Imperial Rome. During the Republic, 
warfare played a major part in the daily lives of a very high proportion of 
Romans and Italians. By the late second century BC, a succession of very 
ambitious military campaigns had ensured Rome of hegemonic power 
throughout the Mediterranean world. During the reign of Augustus, the Roman 
legions were transferred to the periphery of the Mediterranean world and war 
was reduced to a distant reality for the majority of the Roman people. 
Nevertheless, nearly almost all of the Roman emperors of the first and second 
centuries continued to present themselves as possessing the Roman martial 
ethos and advertised their military virtues and accomplishments on coins, in 
inscriptions and by means of statues.115  
In the Res Gestae, Augustus takes pride in the fact that he had re-
established peace and order for the Roman population.116 Nevertheless, the idea 
that peace had been won by military victories on land and sea is also 
highlighted.117 Quite unlike their Chinese counterparts, neither Augustus nor 
                                                          
114 Loewe (2004) 578-579; (2011a) 274. In Eastern Han, for example, only the first three 
emperors had attained adulthood when they ascended the throne. 
115 For Roman rulers highlighting their martial prowess through various media see, for 
instance, Ando (2000) 278 ff.; Campbell (1984) 142-148; (2002) 135-146; Hekster (2007) 
342-351. 
116 RG  6,2; 13.  
117 RG 13. 
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his successors ceased to see war as the ultimate guarantor of military and social 
stability. Importantly, military victories continued to be seen as an excellent way 
to obtain wealth and glory, not only by the emperors themselves but by the vast 
majority of the ruling class of the empire. 
Augustus’ military accomplishments throughout the orbis terrarum are one 
of the most important themes of the Res Gestae. It was only during the final 
years of his reign that the elderly emperor began to reconsider the desirability 
of further territorial expansion. During the two centuries following Augustus’ 
death, the pace of expansion slowed down. Despite the marked reduction in 
warlike exploits, however, the aspirations for glory and military prestige 
nurtured by Roman emperors still played an important part in driving forward 
territorial expansion. Although from the second century some Greek 
intellectuals, among them Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom and Dio Cassius, did 
make some negative comments on Roman mainstream propaganda on warfare, 
the decision makers of the Roman empire, that is, the emperor and most 
senators, rarely expressed any qualms about engaging in aggressive military 
expansionism as long as victory was achieved and the emperor’s desire for 
military prestige was satisfied.118 
Attitudes to violence and warfare in ancient China were, by and large, 
very different. Mark Lewis has rightly argued that, prior to the seventh and 
sixth centuries BC, China had possessed an extremely militaristic and bellicose 
culture.119 As far as can be ascertained, warfare, hunting and sacrifice played an 
important part in the lives of the nobility of Western Zhou society.120 Although 
rites, music and moral cultivation were given a great deal of emphasis in the 
dictums of Confucius, whether actual or apocryphal, training in such military 
skills as archery and chariot-driving, two of the “six arts” (liu yi六藝), is also 
advocated by the Master.121 Since Confucius was a product of Western Zhou 
culture, his positive attitude to military arts should not come as a surprise but, 
                                                          
118 On negative attitudes to warfare of  the Roman philosophers, see Sidebottom (1993) 
241-264. 
119 See Lewis (1990) 15-50. 
120 The aristocratic society in the Western Zhou was based on a strict lineage structure. 
Success in battle was as an important means to win honour for the lineage. See Lewis 
(1990) 51. But Lewis restricts his argument to the Spring and Autumn and Warring 
States periods, making no attempt to trace the role of  heroism and martial prowess in 
aristocratic circles to the Western Zhou and Shang periods. 
121 The “six arts” were the six skills which the Western Zhou nobles were expected to 
master during their education. They were rites, music, archery, chariot-driving, 
calligraphy and mathematics.  
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despite the fact that they were undeniably present, these arts occupied a far less 
prominent position in Confucian thinking than such ritual and non-militaristic 
values as benevolence and righteousness.122  
Furthermore, as said in the first part of this chapter, the late Spring and 
Autumn and early Warring States periods witnessed the emergence of 
increasingly negative sentiments towards war among the educated classes of the 
Chinese states, though this negativity by no means implies that China was being 
transformed into a non-militarized society in either of these periods.123 On the 
contrary, warfare played a crucial role in the creation of the Qin empire and, 
during the 300 years of chaos and violence which preceded this event, war 
penetrated deep into daily life. Nevertheless, compared to Rome, cultural and 
social stimuli for going to war were much weaker.124  
In one of the Chinese classical military treatises composed in the 
Warring States period, the author Master Wu (Wuzi 吳子) distinguishes five 
motives for raising troops. As Paul van Els has shown, of these types of 
warfare only the yibing 義兵, the “righteous war” which was fought for the 
purpose of ending chaos and oppression, was regarded as a fully justified 
military activity.125 Mobilizing large numbers of people for the purpose of a 
“strong war”, that is, a war launched for the pursuit of fame, is disapproved of 
by the author. Similarly, in the fictional conversation between Master Wen and 
the Old Master, recorded in the bamboo manuscript Master Wen (Wenzi 文子), 
presumably created in the early Han period, the author distinguishes between 
five types of warfare, namely: “righteous” 义兵 (punitive war), “reactive” 應兵 
(defensive war), “furious/indignant” 忿兵 , “greedy/covetous” 貪兵  and 
                                                          
122 Xing Yitian (2011b) 227. 
123 A point stressed by Di Cosmo (2009) 2.  
124  In his discussion of  the theory of  grand strategy in Chinese history, Alastair 
Johnston sees violence, in both western and eastern societies, as a “highly efficacious 
and preferable to all nonviolent approaches, and offensive strategies are favored over 
static defense.” See David Graaf ’s review article (1997) 450. He dismisses the 
“stereotypical” view of  attitudes to warfare in ancient China represented by John 
Keegan, claiming that the pervasive sense of  antipathy to warfare in the writings of  
ancient Chinese philosophers, like Confucius and Mencius, is “almost perfunctory or 
symbolic”. See Johnston (1995) 153. In my view, it remains highly significant that 
Chinese and Roman attitudes to warfare were completely different. 
125 The other four types for war were: “strong/aggressive war” 強兵, “hard/unyielding 
war” 剛兵, “oppressive war” 暴兵 and “rebellious war” 逆兵. For the translation of  




“arrogant” 驕兵. Only the first two kinds of warfare were supposed to bring 
positive results.126 
          During the Republic, the Romans developed the theory of the “just war” 
(bellum iustum). 127  At first sight, this concept resembles the “righteous” and 
“reactive” wars of the Master Wen manuscript. However, if the scope of the 
analysis is broadened to include general attitudes to warfare, it is highly 
significant that, in China, aggressive warfare was rarely promoted by members 
of the educated elite, whereas in Roman society it was highly valued and 
admired, both during the Republic and during the Principate. As long as 
warfare could be presented as ending a perceived threat to the salus of Rome, 
the Romans would not be guilty of waging offensive wars and therefore would 
have the backing of the gods.128 In contrast to ancient Chinese attitudes to 
warfare, the Roman approach was to a certain degree amoral.129 As J. C. Mann 
has rightly pointed out, the Romans “had no need to apologize for the growth 
of Roman power, or try to excuse Roman rule over other peoples.”130 
          The highest magistrates of the Roman Republic were all military generals, 
and had been hailed as imperatores after gaining military victories. This tradition 
survived until the early years of the Principate, when the title imperator was 
monopolized by the Roman emperor and became part of imperial titulature. As 
argued in Chapter 5, the actual form of the relationship between the emperor 
and the army varied from one reign to the next. Some emperors, among them 
Galba, Vespasian, Trajan and Septimius Severus, owed their ascension largely to 
the army and maintained a close relationship with the soldiers. Other emperors, 
such as Nero, Antoninus Pius and Commodus, did not attempt to build close 
ties with the military. Tiberius, who had been intimately associated with the 
army and had acquired a considerable amount of military prestige under 
Augustus, displayed a more detached attitude to military affairs after his 
ascension to the throne. In contrast to this, Caracalla, who had a problematic 
                                                          
126 See van Els (2013) 26-33. For the study of  Wenzi, see van Els’ PhD dissertation 
(Leiden University, 2006). 
127 On Roman the Roman notion of  “just war”, see Sidebottom (2007) 25-8. For the 
“just war” in the Roman imperial context, see Mantovani (1991). 
128 In this regard, the Third Punic War is a good example. See the speech by Cato the 
Elder in the Senate ORF2 fr. 195. For the role that religion played in Roman warfare, see 
Rüpke (1990). Rüpke, particularly in Parts Two and Three, argues that, in the Roman 
context, offensive war could be legitimized on religious grounds. 
129 Brunt (1990) 177. About religion and Roman war, see Birley (1978); Helgland (1978); 
Rüpke (1990); Stoll (2007) 451-476. 
130 Mann (1979) 176.  
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relationship with the Senate, was very concerned about his image as a “fellow 
soldier” of those serving in the legions, especially after his brother Geta had 
been murdered.131 Even the most unwarlike emperors had to take the interests 
of the soldiers into account, restricting this concern not just to the members of 
the Praetorian Guard in the capital, but extending it to those in the legions 
stationed in the frontier zone. Throughout the entire period of the Principate, 
emperors had to find a balance between their own ambitions and the interests 
of the Senate and the army. 
          In China relationships between rulers and the army were very different. 
From the early Warring States period in the fifth century BC, indeed even 
earlier, the rulers of the multiple states of the Central Plain had gradually 
distanced themselves from personal involvement in battles. The emperors of 
the Qin and Western Han empires were not expected to act as commanders-in-
chief. 
          In recent years scholars in the field of Qin and Han history have begun 
to use visual materials to supplement or correct the deficiency in the literary 
sources. As a result of this trend more attention is beginning to be paid to tomb 
frescos and reliefs.132 In a recent article Xing Yitian draws attention to the fact 
that many tombstones of the Han period show hunting scenes, arguing that 
local Han local officials also received a military training. Some other tomb 
frescoes show Han officials fighting under their leaders against the Xiongnu 
enemy. Xing Xitian argues that this demonstrates that, in the bureaucratic 
system of the Han empire, no clear distinction was made between civil and 
military duties.133  
          It should be noted that almost all of the visual evidence used by Xing 
comes from the tombs of the local elites and dates to the Eastern Han period. 
More importantly, frescoes or reliefs of this period never show the emperor or 
high-ranking members of the Han bureaucracy as military commanders leading 
campaigns against the Xiongnu or other enemies.134 To this extent the visual 
                                                          
131 Campbell (1984) 52.  
132 The pioneering work is Wu Hong’s study on the Wu Liang Shrine: Wu Hong 巫鴻 
(2006) trans. Liu Yang 柳揚 and Yin He 岑河. The Taiwanese scholar Xing Yitian has 
made a brilliant study of  the arts of  early ancient China, focusing particularly on Han 
frescoes and stone and brick reliefs. See Xing Yitian (2011a).   
133 For a case study interpreting a battle between a local Han army and the Xiongnu 
represented on a Han tomb stone, see Xing Yitian (2011a) 315-397. 
134 Xing Yitian (2011a) 9-46. 
202 
 
evidence chimes in perfectly with the literary record which does not contain any 
reference to emperors taking part in battles.  
In 51 BC, when Huhanye Chanyu paid a visit to Chang’an to declare his 
submission to the Han emperor, Xuan, a large force of cavalry was sent to 
escort him on his journey, and other troops lined the route. In Chang’an, 
Huhanye was entertained with luxurious banquets and various games. 135  In 
complete contrast to this, when King Tiridates I of Armenia and the brother of 
the Parthian king, Vologaeses, visited Rome in AD 66, “armed cohorts stood 
around the temples in the Forum and [Nero] himself was seated in a curule 
chair on the rostra, dressed in the robes of a triumphant general and surrounded 
by military standards and flags.” Subsequently, after Tiridates had made two 
supplications, one in the forum and another in the theatre, and has been 
rewarded with diadem, “Nero placed him in a seat at his own right hand. 
Acclaimed ‘Imperator’ for this, Nero offered laurels on the Capitol and closed 
the gates of the temple of two-headed Janus, to show there were no longer any 
wars being waged.”136  
           As did Vologaeses’ visit to Rome, Huhanye Chanyu’s visit to Chang’an 
signalled his submission to the emperor. Unlike Nero, however, the Han 
emperor appears to have been totally uninterested in using Huhanye Chanyu’s 
visit as an occasion either for a display of Han military strength or as an 
opportunity to broadcast his personal martial qualities or his close relationship 
with the army. While late Western Han superiority over the Xiongnu 
undoubtedly rested on the military strengths of the Han empire, this never 
resulted in a greater ideological emphasis on the emperor’s military role. 
  
                                                          
135 Hanshu 96 b, 3798. Loewe (2009) 86. 
136 Suet. Ner. 63,1-6. My translation is a slightly adapted version of  that of  Catharine 
Edwards (2000) in the Oxford World Classics series. Between 64 and 65 a new series of  
aurei was issued to commemorate this event. The reverse of  these coins shows the 
closed doors of  the temple of  Janus, encircled by the legend PACE P R TERRA 
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In the introductory chapter of a recent volume containing a series of 
comparative papers on the Roman and Han empires, Walter Scheidel draws 
attention to the many similarities which existed between these two imperial 
states. As he puts it: 
 
Two thousand years ago, perhaps half of the entire human species had come under the 
control of just two powers, the Roman and Han empires, at opposite ends of Eurasia. 
Both entities were broadly similar in terms of size. Both of them were run by god-like 
emperors residing in the largest cities the world had seen so far, were made up of some 
1,500 to 2,000 administrative districts, and, at least at times, employed hundreds of 
thousands of soldiers. Both states laid claim to ruling the whole world, orbis 
terrarum and tianxia, while both encountered similar competition for surplus 
between central government and local elites and similar pressures generated by 
secondary state formation beyond their frontiers and subsequent “barbarian” 
infiltration. Both of them even ended in similar ways: one half, the original political 
core—the west in Europe, the north in China—was first weakened by warlordism 
and then taken over by “barbarian” successor states, whereas the other half was 
preserved by a traditionalist regime.1 
 
Scheidel states that an empire “usually involves the unequal relationship 
between a ruling center (core) and a ruled (peripheries).” As he points out, 
historical empires were often multi-ethnic and multi-lingual, with diverse 
communities linked to a central power via varied local elites.2 In the particular 
cases of the Roman and Han empires, these consisted of vast territorial states 
containing various peoples which were ruled by monarchs. These similarities 
are the background to the comparative investigations which have been 
undertaken in this dissertation. 
          In Chapters 1 and 2, I have examined the formation of the idea of world 
domination in Pre-Imperial Rome and China. During the first centuries of the 
Republic, the political horizons of the Roman elite initially remained limited to 
Central-Western Italy and then to Peninsular and North Italy, Sicily and 
Sardinia. However, in the Greek-speaking East, Alexander’s unprecedented 
conquests had stimulated the formulation of an ideology of world domination. 
As Rome conquered large parts of the Hellenistic world, Roman generals and 
                                                          
1 Scheidel (2009) 11. 
2 Scheidel (2009b) 17-19. 
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intellectuals appropriated this ideology, which neatly summed up the logical 
outcome of the seemingly unstoppable process of centrifugal expansion which 
had taken place during the last two centuries BC. However, although the all-
embracing worldview associated with this ideology is referred to in various 
sources dealing with Pompey’s eastern campaigns, it did not become a 
dominant theme in Roman imperial ideology until the age of Augustus. 
          At the other end of the Eurasian continent, worldviews developed in a 
strikingly different way. In Pre-Imperial China the idea that the world consisted 
of a centre and four quarters existed but it shared the stage with another 
concept in which the world consisted of five concentric zones, of which the 
innermost represented the highest level of civilization. Interestingly, the latter 
theory reinforced the nascent construction of “Chinese-ness” during the late 
Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods. At approximately the same 
time, the rise of pastoralist societies in the huge strip of land on the northern 
periphery of the Central Chinese Plains deepened the divide between the 
Chinese and non-Chinese worlds. In the long run, these processes would 
contribute to the emergence of a relatively closed and exclusive worldview.  
          A comparison between the Res Gestae Divi Augusti and the Stele 
Inscriptions of Qin Shi Huang supports this analysis. While Augustus claimed 
to have established Roman domination throughout the orbis terrarum, the first 
Chinese emperor claimed to control the tianxia, “all under Heaven”. Although 
superficially these two terms might seem to convey broadly the same meaning, 
a closer inspection reveals that the concept of orbis terrarum was closely linked to 
the imperial ideology of imperium sine fine (“power/empire without limits”), 
whereas in various passages of the Stele Inscriptions (though not in all of them) 
the Chinese term tianxia clearly refers to the Chinese world to the exclusion of 
the lands of the non-Chinese barbarians. 
          The central problem examined in Chapters 3 and 4 has to do with the 
extent to which the very different ideological conceptions of “world 
domination” in Early-Imperial Rome and in Qin and Han China corresponded 
to differences in actual military policies. During the early Principate, the military 
situation and military policies differed from region to region. None the less, 
indications provided in various literary sources as well as extensive 
archaeological evidence both support the idea that, before the third century AD, 
there was no fixed and clear-cut boundary which demarcated Roman from non-
Roman territories. In this sense the Roman empire remained an imperium sine fine. 
On the other hand, the annexation of various neighbouring states as well as the 
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construction of increasingly complex military defence-works along major rivers 
and other natural boundaries, which commenced in the later years of the 
Flavian dynasty, gradually made the imperial frontier more cohesive and visible. 
This situation stimulated the formulation of a more closed worldview which 
made a sharper distinction between the civilized Roman world protected by the 
frontier defences and the barbarian world beyond. Importantly, it should be 
stressed that this alternative worldview never eliminated the all-encompassing 
worldview of the Augustan age and that, up to the final years of the reign of 
Septimius Severus, many emperors launched aggressive military campaigns 
beyond the Rhine, the Danube and the Euphrates.  
During the first seventy years of the Han empire, Chinese military 
policies could have scarcely appeared more different to those encountered in 
the Early Roman empire. Compared to their Roman counterparts, the early 
Han rulers showed little interest in territorial expansion. It can be argued that 
the adoption of this non-expansionist policy was largely determined by the 
military weakness of the Han underlined by the threat posed by the Xiongnu 
empire of the northern steppes. 
The situation did change in the early 120s BC when Emperor Wu’s 
aggressive military campaigns resulted in an unprecedented territorial expansion 
of the Han empire, ultimately extending Han control as far as the Western 
Regions. Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to think that the primary goal 
of these military campaigns was to secure the heartland of the Han empire by 
expelling the Xiongnu. Likewise, the establishment of an elaborate system of 
fortification works along the Yellow River and in various other areas mainly 
served the purpose of improving security.  
During the first and second centuries AD, the Roman empire also 
acquired an elaborate system of legionary camps and other military structures, 
such as walls, palisades, ramparts and ditches, which formed a more or less 
linear frontier along the major rivers and other strategic topographical 
boundaries. Indubitably, although these natural and artificial barriers played a 
role in defending the empire against hostile barbarian attacks, it is also certain 
that, throughout the period of the Principate, many of these military 
installations were used as bases for further conquest. During this period the 
uncontested military superiority of the Roman armies allowed Roman rulers to 
adopt an elastic policy. This elasticity explains why some emperors launched 
major campaigns of conquest, whereas others merely reacted to challenges 
posed by various barbarian peoples.  
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The final two chapters of this dissertation focus on the relationship 
between the Roman and Chinese emperors and their respective armies. More 
than thirty-five years ago, Fergus Millar wrote that “the emperor was what the 
emperor did.”3 Up to a point this observation remains valid. In both China and 
Rome, the emperor had to play multiple roles if he were to display his power 
and authority. The power of these rulers was not merely symbolic, although 
symbolic power can be very real.4 For many decades Roman historians have 
disputed whether the emperor played an active role in administrative and 
military affairs or mainly confined his duties to responding to petitions 
submitted by his subjects.5 Millar correctly pointed out that on account of the 
limitations of the geographical and ethnographical knowledge available to the 
emperor and his advisors, it was difficult for the former to obtain reliable 
information about any developments which might have been taking place on 
the periphery of the empire and subsequently to made a quick response. On the 
other hand, it would be a mistake to infer from this that emperors never 
developed any plans of their own. Max Weber’s observation that the roles 
rulers had to play were shaped to a significant degree by the expectations of 
their subjects must be borne in mind. 6  During the Principate, all Roman 
emperors had to play the role of military imperator, whether they liked it or not. 
In other words, because of social and cultural expectations Roman emperors 
were under pressure to seek military honours, preferably by leading the army in 
person. 
          In stark contrast to their Roman counterparts, the emperors of the Qin 
and Han dynasties were not expected to play any military role after the decision 
to start a particular war had been taken. As early as the Warring States period, 
Chinese rulers had distanced themselves from military affairs. Although the 
Stele Inscriptions erected by the first Qin emperor, Shi Huangdi, do extol his 
successes in unifying the tianxia by his martial virtues (wude武德), neither in the 
literary sources nor in any other works of art does he ever appear as a military 
general. In this respect Qin Shi Huang’s self-representation was very different 
from that used by Augustus. Another pair of emperors who invite comparison 
are Trajan and Emperor Wu. These two emperors have been described as the 
most warlike emperors of the Roman and Han empires. Both took pride in the 
                                                          
3 Millar (1977) xi. 
4 Noreña (2011) 318; Sumi (2013) 533. 
5 See Millar’s work (1977).  
6 Weber (1980) 140-48; Wallace-Hadrill (1981) 298. 
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massive territorial gains which were the fruits of their aggressive military 
policies. However, although Trajan was keen to present himself as an active and 
effective military commander, Emperor Wu never commanded any army on the 
battlefield.  
          Both the Roman and Han empires were created by military successes 
won against competing rulers. Nevertheless, the authority of the Chinese 
emperor and the concomitant legitimacy of the Han dynasty were not primarily 
based on the military qualities of the emperor and his family. The legitimacy of 
the Han rulers rested largely on the superior moral qualities which were 
attributed to them and on the idea that their rule was sanctioned by Heaven. 
These concepts were elaborated on when Confucian principles achieved a 
dominant influence at the imperial court after the death of Emperor Wu. The 
Han literati asserted that the emperor could achieve the same moral qualities 
and superior intelligence as the wise kings of remote antiquity by studying the 
Classics. Should he achieve this goal, his virtues would be broadcast not only 
among the inhabitants of the civilized tianxia within the Seas (hainei), but also 
throughout the barbarian realms; indeed even among the birds and animals 
inhabiting the sky and earth. Consequently universal rule in all areas under 
Heaven, the broader sense of tianxia, could be achieved. In terms of actual 
policies this doctrine entailed that, as soon as hegemonic power had been 
achieved by military intervention, the ruler should end all military campaigns 
and concentrate on moral self-cultivation within the tianxia and the “Four Seas”.  
The findings of this dissertation strongly support the conclusion that, in 
most texts which were produced during the Qin and Western Han dynasties, 
the idea of universal rule signified something completely different to the 
Roman concept of imperium sine fine. This contrast is paralleled by a striking 
difference in conceptions of imperial roles and virtues. While Roman emperors, 
as their Chinese counterparts were also expected to do, were supposed to 
display a wide range of virtues, such as aequitas and liberalitas, in Rome military 
virtus continued to be regarded as an important component in the package and 
military success was a crucial requirement for the legitimacy of the emperor’s 
rule.7 
                                                          
7  Of  course there was some room for manoeuvre, with different virtues being 
highlighted during the reigns of  particular emperors. See, for instance, Charlesworth 





Rond het begin van de jaartelling leefde ongeveer de helft van de 
wereldbevolking in gebieden die ofwel tot het Romeinse rijk ofwel tot het 
Chinese keizerrijk behoorden. Beide rijken beschikten over enorme legers en 
over een uitbreide militaire infrastructuur. Een andere overkomst was dat zowel 
de keizers van het Principaat als de Han-keizers van de tweede en eerste eeuw 
v. Chr. claimden dat hun macht zich uitstrekte over ‘de gehele wereld’. Hoewel 
er frappante overeenkomsten tussen beide rijken bestaan, laat een gedetailleerd 
onderzoek zoek zien dat de Romeinse conceptie van ‘wereldheerschappij’ in 
belangrijke opzichten verschilde van het Chinese concept van keizerlijke 
heerschappij over ‘alles wat zich onder de hemel bevindt’. Ook blijkt de 
militaire politiek van de Romeinse keizers gericht te zijn geweest op andere 
doelstellingen dan die van de keizers van de Qin-dynastie en Westelijke Han-
dynastie en blijkt de verhouding tussen keizer en leger in deze rijken 
fundamenteel anders te zijn geweest. Het belangrijkste doel van deze dissertatie 
is deze verschillen aan het licht te brengen en te verklaren.    
In de eerste twee hoofdstukken wordt het ontstaan van de Romeinse en 
Chinese ideologieën van ‘wereldbeheersing’ onderzocht. Gedurende de eerste 
250 jaar van de Romeinse Republiek was de politieke horizon van de Romeinse 
elite aanvankelijk beperkt tot het westelijk deel van Midden-Italië en later tot 
geheel Italië plus Sicilië en Sardinië. Intussen hadden de spectaculaire van 
Alexander de Grote in de oostelijke helft van het Middellandse Zeegebied 
voeding gegeven aan een ideologie van ‘wereldheerschappij’, die vrijwel zeker 
voortbouwde op vergelijkbare concepten uit de Mesopotamische traditie. Nadat 
de Romeinse legers in de loop van de tweede en eerste eeuw v. Chr. grote delen 
van de Hellenistische wereld hadden veroverd, werd deze ideologie, die een 
perfecte beschrijving bood van een onafgebroken proces van centrifugale 
expansie, door Romeinse generaals en intellectuelen overgenomen. Het 
alomvattende politieke wereldbeeld dat met deze ideologie verbonden was, is 
terug te vinden in een aantal bronteksten die handelen over de campagnes die 
door de troepen van Pompeius in het oosten werden uitgevochten. Vanaf de 
Augusteïsche periode werd ‘wereldheerschappij’ een prominent thema in de 
politieke ideologie van het Principaat. 
Aan de andere kant van Eurazië ontwikkelden zich andersoortige 
wereldbeelden. In de bronnen betreffende de periode voorafgaande aan de 
vestiging van het eerste keizerrijk door Qin Shi Huang (221 v. Chr.) vinden wij 
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niet alleen de gedachte dat de wereld uit een centrum en vier daaromheen 
gelegen gebieden bestaat, maar ook een conceptie volgens welke de wereld is 
opgebouwd uit vijf concentrische zones waarvan de middelste zone het hoogste 
niveau van beschaving vertegenwoordigt. Laatstgenoemde visie kon goed 
worden gecombineerd met de primair culturele notie van Chinese identiteit die 
zich tijdens de late Periode van Lente en Herfst en de periode van de Strijdende 
Staten tot ontwikkeling kwam. Ongeveer in dezelfde periode accentueerde de 
opkomst van pastorale samenlevingen in de uitgestrekte grasvlakten ten 
noorden van de centrale vlakten van China de scheidslijn tussen de Chinese en 
niet-Chinese wereld. Deze ontwikkelingen droegen in belangrijke mate bij aan 
het ontstaan van een relatief gesloten en exclusief wereldbeeld.      
Deze analyse wordt ondersteund door een vergelijking tussen de Res 
Gestae Divi Augusti en de Stele Inscripties van Qin Shi Huang. In de Res Gestae 
claimt Augustus dat dankzij zijn inspanningen de Romeinse opperheerschappij 
zich uitstrekt over de gehele orbis terrarum. In de Stele Inscripties van Qin Shi 
Huang claimt de eerste Chinese keizer de heerschappij over de tianxia, d.w.z. 
over ‘alles wat zich onder de Hemel bevindt’. De gelijkenis tussen deze 
formuleringen is echter misleidend. Een nauwkeurige bestudering laat zien dat 
de Romeinse conceptie van heerschappij over de orbis terrarum nauw verbonden 
was met de ideologie van het imperium sine fine (‘onbegrensde heerschappij’), 
terwijl de Chinese term tianxia in bijna alle gevallen verwijst naar de Chinese 
wereld met uitsluiting van de woongebieden van de niet-Chinese barbaren. 
In de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 wordt nagegaan in hoeverre de verschillende 
concepties van ‘wereldheerschappij’ die wij in het vroege Romeinse Keizerrijk 
en in Qin en Han China aantreffen, corresponderen met verschillen in de 
feitelijke militaire politiek van beide rijken. In het geval van het Romeinse rijk 
verschilden de militaire situatie en de militaire politiek van gebied tot gebied. 
Niettemin biedt een veelheid van literair en archeologisch bronnenmateriaal 
steun aan de conclusie dat er gedurende de eerste en tweede eeuw n. Chr. niet 
zoiets bestond als een duidelijke scheidslijn die de grens tussen Romeinse en 
niet-Romeinse gebieden markeerde. Zo bezien kan het Romeinse rijk inderdaad 
als een imperium sine fine worden gekarakteriseerd. Aan de andere kant leidden de 
geleidelijke annexatie van steeds meer omliggende cliënt-staten en de aanleg van 
steeds meer militaire installaties langs een aantal grote rivieren en langs andere 
natuurlijke grenzen er toe dat de grenzen van het rijk langzamerhand steeds 
zichtbaarder werden en een grotere samenhang gingen vertonen. Dit gebeurde 
vooral vanaf het einde van de Flavische periode. Deze ontwikkeling lijkt een 
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stimulans te hebben gevormd voor de formulering van een meer gesloten 
wereldbeeld waarin een scherper onderscheid werd gemaakt tussen de 
beschaafde Romeinse wereld die beschermd werd door de militaire installaties 
aan de grenzen, en de barbaarse wereld daarbuiten. Wel moet worden 
benadrukt dat dit nieuwe wereldbeeld de alomvattende conceptie van de 
Augusteïsche periode nooit heeft verdrongen. Veeleer bestonden het oude en 
nieuwe wereldbeeld naast elkaar. Een zelfde soort van continuïteit zien wij waar 
het gaat om de militaire politiek. Tot het einde van de regeringsperiode van 
Septimius Severus bleven Romeinse legers met agressieve bedoelingen de Rijn, 
de Donau en de Eufraat oversteken. 
Gedurende de eerste 70 jaar van de Westelijke Han-dynastie volgden de 
Chinese keizers een totaal militaire politiek dan het merendeel van hun 
Romeinse tegenhangers. Vergeleken met de meeste Romeinse keizers van het 
Principaat deden de keizers van de vroege Han-dynastie vrijwel geen pogingen 
om hun gebied uit te breiden. Een belangrijk deel van de verklaring hiervoor is 
gelegen in het feit dat het rijk van de Westelijke Han-keizers gedurende de 
eerste decennia van de tweede eeuw v. Chr. in militair opzicht niet opgewassen 
was tegen het rijk van de Xiongnu dat op de noordelijke steppen was ontstaan. 
Vanaf 129 v. Chr. resulteerden de agressieve militaire campagnes van 
keizer Wu in een spectaculaire uitbreiding van het Han-rijk. Hierbij werden 
uiteindelijk zelfs de op grote afstand gelegen Westelijke Gebieden onder 
controle van de Han-keizer gebracht. Hoewel de militaire politiek van de Han-
keizers vanaf dit moment duidelijk van karakter veranderde, zijn er sterke 
aanwijzingen dat de talrijke veldtochten die op bevel van keizer Wu werden 
ondernomen, primair ten doel hadden om het kerngebied van het Han-
imperium door de onderwerping of verdrijving van de Xiongnu duurzaam te 
beveiligen. Ook de aanleg van nieuwe versterkingen langs de Gele Rivier en in 
andere gebieden was hoofdzakelijk bedoeld om de veiligheid van het Han-rijk 
te vergroten.  
In de loop van de eerste twee eeuwen n. Chr. ontstond ook in het 
Romeinse rijk een uitgebreid systeem van legerkampen, muren, palissaden, 
greppels en andere militaire installaties. Het staat buiten kijf dat dergelijke 
installaties een rol speelden bij de verdediging van het rijk tegen barbaarse 
invallen. In veel gevallen werden zij echter ook gebruikt als springplanken voor 
verdere veroveringen. Gedurende de gehele eerste en tweede eeuw n. Chr. 
behielden de Romeinen in alle grensgebieden een militair overwicht op hun 
tegenstanders. Dit stelde de Romeinse keizers en hun generaals in staat om een 
211 
 
flexibele militaire politiek te voeren waarbij uit een reeks van opties kon worden 
gekozen. Dit verklaart waarom sommige keizers grootschalige 
veroveringscampagnes lanceerden, terwijl andere keizers ervoor kozen om 
slechts te reageren op reële of vermeende dreigingen van de kant van barbaarse 
stammen. 
De laatste twee hoofdstukken handelen over de relatie tussen Romeinse 
en Chinese keizers en het leger. Bijna vijftig jaar geleden schreef Fergus Millar 
over de keizers van het Principaat: “the emperor was what the emperor did”. 
Tot op zekere hoogte blijft deze uitspraak juist. Zowel de heersers van het Han-
imperium als de keizers van het Principaat moesten een reeks van rollen spelen 
om hun macht en gezag effectief te etaleren en te affirmeren. Met andere 
woorden, de macht van de Chinese en Romeinse keizers was zeker niet louter 
‘symbolisch’. Decennia lang hebben oudhistorici gedebatteerd over de vraag of 
de Romeinse keizer op bestuurlijk en militair gebied een actieve rol speelden of 
voornamelijk reageerden op verzoekschriften die door hun onderdanen werden 
ingediend. Millar heeft er terecht op gewezen dat de keizers van het Principaat 
en hun adviseurs niet de beschikking hadden over betrouwbare geografische en 
etnografische kennis over de randgebieden van het Romeinse rijk. Dit maakte 
het vrijwel ondoenlijk om snel en adequaat te reageren op ontwikkelingen aan 
de periferie van het rijk. Aan de andere kant zou het verkeerd zijn om hieruit de 
conclusie te trekken dat Romeinse keizers nooit een goed doordachte en 
consistente militaire politiek ontwikkelden. In dit verband blijft Max Webers 
observatie dat de rollen die machthebbers moeten spelen, voor een groot deel 
door de verwachtingen van hun onderdanen worden bepaald, van belang. 
Tijdens het Principaat werd van alle keizers verwacht dat zij de rol van imperator 
speelden, of zij het nu wilden of niet. Kortom, het was vrijwel onmogelijk voor 
deze keizers om zich te onttrekken aan de maatschappelijke en culturele 
verwachting dat zij militaire roem zouden vergaren, bij voorkeur als 
bevelhebbers die hun legers persoonlijk aanvoerden. 
De maatschappelijke en culturele verwachting ten aanzien van de keizers 
van de Westelijke Han-dynastie waren totaal anders. Van deze keizers werd niet 
verwacht dat zij enige militaire rol zouden spelen, althans nadat de beslissing 
om een bepaalde oorlog te beginnen genomen was. Al vanaf de vroege Periode 
van de Strijdende Staten hadden Chinese heersers zich van het krijgsbedrijf 
gedistantieerd. In de Stele Inscripties refereert Qin Shi Huang uitvoerig aan de 
succesvolle wijze waarop hij de tianxia met behulp van zijn martiale deugden 
(wude武德) had weten te verenigen, maar in geen enkel literair traktaat en in 
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geen enkele uiting van beeldende kunst verschijnt hij als militair bevelhebber. In 
dit opzicht verschilt de zelfpresentatie van de eerste Chinese keizer opvallend 
van die van Augustus. Ook een vergelijking tussen keizer Trajanus en keizer 
Wu is instructief. Beide keizers zijn meer dan eens gekarakteriseerd als de meest 
oorlogszuchtige keizers van het Principaat en de Westelijke Han-periode. Beide 
keizers beroemden zich op de enorme gebiedsuitbreidingen die door hun 
agressieve militaire politiek tot stand kwamen. Maar waar Trajanus er een eer in 
stelde om zich als een actieve en effectieve militaire bevelhebber te presenteren, 
bestaat er geen enkele aanwijzing dat keizer Wu ooit het bevel over een leger te 
velde op zich nam. 
Zowel het Romeinse als het Chinese keizerrijk werden gecreëerd doordat 
de eerste keizer zijn tegenstanders met militaire middelen wist uit te schakelen. 
Toch berustten het gezag van de Chinese keizer en de legitimiteit van de Han-
dynastie nooit in belangrijke mate op de militaire kwaliteiten van de keizer of 
andere leden van het keizerlijk huis. In plaats daarvan stoelde de legitimiteit van 
de Han-keizers primair op de superieure morele kwaliteiten die hem werden 
toegedicht alsmede op de claim dat zijn heerschappij berustte op een Hemels 
Mandaat. Deze ideologische concepties werden verder ontwikkeld toen, na de 
dood van keizer Wu, Confuciaanse ideeën over het keizerschap een steeds 
grotere rol in hofkringen begonnen te spelen. Volgens de aanhangers van dit 
gedachtegoed kon de keizer door het bestuderen van de klassieke geschriften 
dezelfde morele kwaliteiten en hetzelfde superieure intellect ontwikkelen als de 
wijze koningen uit vroegere tijden. Vervolgens zouden zijn deugden niet alleen 
bekend worden in de gehele tianxia in het gebied binnen de vier zeeën (hainei), 
maar ook in de woongebieden van de barbaren en zelfs onder de vogels en de 
landdieren. Op deze manier zou uiteindelijke de universele heerschappij over de 
tianxia (alles wat zich onder de hemel bevindt) in letterlijke zin worden bereikt. 
In de praktijk betekende dit dat de heerser, zodra zijn hegemonie met militaire 
middelen was veiliggesteld, alle militaire expedities diende te staken om zich 
volledige op de morele perfectionering van de bewoners van de tianxia binnen 
de vier zeeën te kunnen toeleggen.  
De uitkomsten van het in dit proefschrift uitgevoerde onderzoek laten 
zien dat het ideaal van ‘wereldheerschappij’ dat in de bronnen betreffende de 
Westelijke Han-dynastie wordt aangetroffen, in de meeste gevallen een geheel 
andere betekenis had dan het Romeinse concept van het imperium sine fine. Het 
verschil tussen deze concepties correspondeert met een verschil in opvatting 
over keizerlijke rollen en deugden. Hoewel ook van Romeinse keizers werd 
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verwacht dat zij door feitelijk gedrag aantoonden over een reeks van niet-
militaire deugden, waaronder  aequitas en liberalitas, te beschikken, bleef 
gedurende het gehele Principaat de militaire virtus een belangrijke onderdeel van 
het keizerlijke deugdenpakket. Tegelijkertijd bleef militair succes een cruciaal 
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